University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-2004

Contesting constitutional meaning : the political Constitution and
the myth of judicial supremacy.
George, Thomas
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Thomas, George,, "Contesting constitutional meaning : the political Constitution and the myth of judicial
supremacy." (2004). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2379.
https://doi.org/10.7275/w4ez-yd90 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2379

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

CONTESTING CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING:
THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION AND THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL

SUPREMACY

A

Dissertation Presented

by

GEORGE THOMAS

Submitted

to the

Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts

fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
May 2004
Department of

Political

Science

in partial

© Copyright by George Thomas 2004
All Rights Reserved

CONTESTING CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING:
THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION AND THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

A

Dissertation Presented

by

GEORGE THOMAS

Apprqved

as to style and content by:

Sheldon Goldman; C^air

rtuango^

Milton Cantor,

ivioinuci

—

<

/

(

Member

Pa
M.

J.

5

Peterson, Department

Head

Department of Political Science

DEDICATION

For Courtney

Remember Venice

in the rain'

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I

should begin by thanking Jeff Sedgwick and Jerry Mileur.

of their way
for

it

—

if,

to bring

in fact,

me

to

Amherst. Jerry, as

all

I

would

his

also like to thank

him

way

make my

to

for giving

me

—but

stay in

1

and American

political thought.

Much of my

and thought comes from

institutions

the root of this dissertation.

He

would

like to

Amherst a happy

a true education in politics (of

and a deep understanding of the relationship between

things!)

out

wont, would never take credit

he even wants such a lofty responsibility

properly thank him for going out of his
one.

is

who went

political parties

understanding of American

Jeff; indeed, in

many ways,

his thinking

is at

has always been very generous with his time and

fostered a collegial environment for graduate students

— more than

just a mentor.

I

count Jeff as a lifelong friend.
Craig

W. Thomas

crucial stage,

me

to rethink the structure

which helped me reorganize the

invaluable, although

1

forced

I

dissertation. His help

me

to

be more rigorous

design and methodology). Craig also happens

initial

—

as

my

brother,

note that his only contribution

while

I

who

I'd like to

to

was

in

my

research

have the same name

—even

thank here as well. Though

— besides being

wasn't working, as well as blessing

me

it

yet.

v

1

with two beautitul nieces

it

the

should

a best friend and entertaining

note that the writing and argument were "dense" and occasionally ask

done with

at a

absolve him of all responsibility for the finished product (as

can guess just where he would force

middle

of my argument

me

— was
1

was

to

For helpful comments along the way,
K-eith Whittington,

audience

in

mind.

outside reader.

I

I'd

also like to thank Milton Cantor,

this dissertation.

testify to the true nature

Bob Lacey,

Pious— "ok,

agreed to be

my

my

Mel

that

Dean Alfange and Shelly Goldman.

him

me

best regroup and begin

the kindest and least pretentious of

only hope to emulate.

my

of friendship.

the most exacting standards of anyone

on occasion mistaken

but don't just engage in

good cheer and, on occasion, heated responses

Dean has

is

keep

usually over a pint, frequently indulged

greatest scholarly debt belongs to

I

to

find the blend of the theoretical and historical that

late-night theorizing with

tells

who

me

the opportunity to present an early sketch of this project, where

theory”—that helped me

My

Mark Graber.

Historical Society, and particularly

received particularly good advice from Dick

animates

also like to thank

and especially John Brigham, who reminded

The Supreme Court

me

Urofsky, gave

I'd

He prowls

have ever met

again—yet, behind

men

(in a profession,

Dean

for a virtue).

I

is

—one look from

his stern intellect, he

no

less,

where pretension

also a remarkable teacher,

the classroom

is

demanding nothing

less

who

1

can

than

excellence from his students and, in his presence, one expects nothing less from

oneself.

He

holds more constitutional law in his head,

know. And, while we often do not see eye
teacher. This

is

true of Shelly as well.

top of his head in a

allowed

me

to

way

that astounds.

I

fear,

to eye, he has

than

I

will ever

been an invaluable

He, too, knows constitutional law off the

1

am

thankful that his intellectual openness

pursue a dissertation very different from what he himself would

have done. He's a generous

spirit

and a rigorous

vi

intellect. In sorting

out

my

thinking

take

it,

I

was often brought back

trusted

I'd

to a question Shelly

eventually stumble upon myself

1

had subtly planted and,

hope what follows

I

at least

partly repays their confidence in me.

My

greatest debt

is

to

my

family. Courtney Johnson has heard the arguments

that follow for tar too long and, often, with

leaving her to sort

it

out, as she so often does.

agitated, or simply tired of

best editor in

life

me

it,

starting

And

apropos of nothing,

while

I

Angelo Joseph Thomas reminds me,

wonderfully articulate way, that constitutional theory palls

to thank

my

("That's a

hammers, and

parents for

first,"

1

all

who I am

all

in

comparison

else that he touches. Finally,

I

can hear them say.)

1

1

vii

in his

to

fail

me.

would never have been a scholar without

do what

without them.

my

cannot begin

they have done over the years. Truly, words

them, as they always insisted that
be

impatient,

she was steady, calming, and restorative. She's

as well as in writing.

sticks, screwdrivers,

was often

I

love.

But, far more,

I

would never

ABSTRACT
CONTESTING CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING:
THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION AND THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY

MAY 2004
GEORGE THOMAS, B
Ph.D,

A.,

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Sheldon

In the last

decade a

has broken out

upon the

Goldman

lively debate about "extrajudicial" constitutional interpretation

among

constitutional scholars.

And

while this debate has insisted

centrality of nonjudicial constitutional interpretation, this scholarship

remains rooted

in "legal"

primacy of place

views of the Constitution, which continue

to the Court.

This dissertation seeks to go further by articulating

a political view of the Constitution, which will allow us to resituate

of the Constitution and place questions of interpretation within

framework. This

political

to give

view suggests

how we

think

this larger

that the constitution calls forth continual

debate about constitutional meaning, that the “settlement” of constitutional issues

is

not an essential feature of our constitutional system and, thus, that

constitutional politics with overlapping views, discontinuities, and essentially

unsettled

meaning

are an inherent feature of our Constitution. Recovering the

political Constitution

is

an essential step

in rethinking

and, in doing so, overcoming the deeply ingrained

viii
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"Is there

no virtue among us?

theoretical checks,

is

be not,

we

are in a wretched situation.

No

no form of government, can render us secure. To suppose

any form of government
people,

If there

will secure liberty or happiness without

a chimerical idea.”

James Madison

any virtue

that

in the

INTRODUCTION:

CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

recent events are any indication, there

It

is

a deep skepticism that

legislative bodies are capable of addressing the
Constitution in a

way. In

tact, the

in recent

one thing

memory—the

that links the

impeachment of a president

our history and the Supreme Court
election for the

first

two most stunning

s

high-minded

constitutional events

for only the

second time

in

opinion ettectively deciding a presidential

time in our history

—

is

a deep suspicion that the Congress

is

not capable of settling serious constitutional questions. During the
House's

impeachment of President Clinton,

legal scholars offered to guide the

House

in

defining what constitutes an impeachable offense, quite sure that the House itself

was not capable of speaking

to this delicate constitutional question.

asserted despite the fact that the Constitution clearly vests this very

House, our most democratic national
In a similar vein,

in

Bush

v.

Gore do so on

the Congress

would have

choosing between two
constitutional issues,

institution, not

many of those who
the grounds that

to

it

And

this

power

was

in the

with lawyers or courts.

praise the

Supreme Court's opinion

averted a constitutional

crisis.

That

determine a presidential election, potentially

slates

of electors, and, thus, weigh

was seen

on serious

in

as the root of the constitutional crisis. According to

one of our most preeminent jurists, and one who frequently
empirical analysis, this itself was cause for alarm:

“We

calls for rigorous

only

know what could

have ensued

and what could have ensued

Judge Posner bases
does

his

is fairly

We

Congress with

taking up such questions

it

worry; indeed, to precipitate a constitutional
Court's opinion

in

Bush

v.

Gore shared

might attempt

to

weigh

in

crisis.

this

very

clearly gives this

2

power

Again, this

on the

is

issue.

While they decried the

Most preferred

The Supreme Court

power under

But

itself

section 5 of the 14

lh

is

to let the

preferred the voice of a court to the

and not

to courts.

the political branches speak to constitutional questions.

so.

criticized the

odd. because the Constitution itself quite

to legislative bodies

even, their capability to do

reason to

as worried that the Florida state

Supreme Court’s opinion stand— they

voice of the legislature.

is

Even those who

this skepticism.

Supreme Court's opinion, they were just

Florida

Yet

are so distrustful of the legislature's ability to reason
about the

Constitution that the mere thought of

legislature

1

argument on speculation, not empirical evidence. And he

this despite the tact that the Constitution vests
the

power.

let

described as chaos.”

We

We are
seem

reluctant to

to doubt,

such doubt warranted?

echoes such thinking.

Amendment, which

In

speaking of Congress’

plainly says that Congress

has the power to enforce the terms of the amendment, the Court has said that

1

Richard Posner, Democracy’s Deadlock: Breaking the 2000 Election (Princeton, Princeton

University Press, 2001). For a critique of this view, see

How

Howard Gillman, The

Votes That

Decided the 2000 Presidential Election (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2001 ). As Gillman argues, [FJorcing politicians to work through a presidential selection
process without the roadmap of a crystal clear legal process is not a crisis; it is democracy, and
has all the disadvantages and advantages of democratic politics,” 195. For a defense o (Bush v.
Core, and especially a criticism of the legal academy’s bias, see Peter Berkowitz and Benjamin

Counted:

the Court

it

Wittes, "The Lawfulness of the Election Decision: A Reply to Professor Tribe" Villanova Law
Review (forthcoming) and Berkowitz, "The Professors and Bush v. Core" Wilson Quarterly
Autumn 200
1

2

Jed Rubenfeld, "Not as Bad as Plessy Worse" and Laurence Tribe, "eroG v. hsuB: Through the
ed.. Bush v. Gore The Question of Legitimacy (New
,

Looking Glass" both in Bruce Ackerman,
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

7

Congress

has been given the power

‘to enforce,'

constitutes a constitutional violation.

Were

it

not the

power

determine what

to

not so. what Congress

would be

entorcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the ‘provisions
of [the

Fourteenth

Amendment ].'” 3 The meaning of these

provisions

is

be determined

to

by the Court. The legislature cannot be trusted with such vexing questions
of
constitutional

interpretation.

meaning and

is

thereby obligated to follow the Court's

While such claims

public, scholars, and even

there

is

supremacy resonate strongly with the

to judicial

members of the

so-called political branches themselves,

growing criticism of the Court's own insistence upon judicial supremacy.

Scholars on both the

from the Court"

left

that lends

political

have sought

right

to ‘‘take the Constitution

name of democratic government.

in the

view the Constitution

and the

in largely legal terms,

and

it

Still,

is this,

such

away

tend to

critics

this dissertation argues,

credence to claims of judicial supremacy and skepticism that the

branches

may

meaningfully speak

By beginning from

to the Constitution.

the premise that the Constitution

of judicial supremacy suggest

that the very nature

is

law, the proponents

of constitutional government

requires the Court to act as the supreme and exclusive arbiter of constitutional

meaning. Indeed, as
judicial

1

supremacy

City of Boerne

v.

argue, the legalist view of the Constitution

I

4

If

.

we

the crux of

much of conventional

are under a constitution, so

Flores, 521 U.S. 507,

is

529 (1997). See especially. Cooper

v.

Aaron 358 U.S.
,

(1958).
4

Keith Whittington suggests that there are three fundamental objections to extrajudicial

constitutional interpretation,

take up these objections

in

I.

my

It’s

anarchic.

2. It’s irrational.

3. It’s

discussion of judicial supremacy,

I

tyrannical.

While

suggest that they

all

1

want

have

to

their

roots in the view of the Constitution as law akin to ordinary law. Whittington, “Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation-Three Objections and a Response” University of North Carolina

Law Review

80: 3 (2002).

3

1

wisdom

goes, the Constitution must be rigorously and
authoritatively enforced by

the judiciary, particularly the

is

Supreme Court

5
.

This

means not only

the exclusive interpreter of constitutional meaning,
but that

Court

interpretations

its

are authoritatively binding on the other branches
of government

that the

6
.

If the political

branches are free to disregard judicial interpretations of the
Constitution, and
thereby continually dispute constitutional meaning, then
authoritatively

bound by

the Constitution as law

we

cannot be

7

It

.

is

useful, here, to distinguish

between two forms of judicial supremacy. The strong form of judicial supremacy
suggests that the judiciary

interpreter

A

is

the exclusive interpreter as well as the authoritative

of constitutional meaning (exclusive,

after all, implies authoritative ).

modified version of judicial supremacy suggests

that the

the exclusive interpreter of the Constitution, but that

Constitutional interpretation

may

people, but once the Court hands

'

0

down

“On

a decision,

not

interpretations are final

its

9
.

its

interpretation

is

taken to be

Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation”

110:7: 1359-1387 (1997).

Scott Gant qualifies the notion of judicial supremacy by suggesting that the judiciary

exclusive interpreter of the Constitution, but that
at least in

is

well include the Congress, the President, and the

Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer,

Harvard Law Review

Supreme Court

8

the short run. Gant, “Judicial

Constitution" Hastings Constitutional

its

Supremacy and Nonjudicial

Law

is

not the

interpretations are. once given, authoritative

Quarterly 24:359-440

(

Interpretation of the

1997).

For a general

discussion, see also Bruce Peabody, “Nonjudicial Constitutional Interpretation, Authoritative

Settlement, and a

New Agenda

for

Research" Constitutional Commentary

16:

63-90 (1999).

Alexander and Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,” 1381.
x

See Alexander and Schauer, “Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation."

1

There is a growing literature by both conservatives and liberals increasingly critical of judicial
supremacy calling it, even, the judicial usurpation of politics. Michael Perry, We the People
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999),
3-14; Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999), 6-32; Cass Sunstein, One Case at a Time Judicial Minimalism and the
Supreme Court (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998); Scott Douglas Gerber, “The
Judicial Brezhnev Doctrine" Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy (2000). "The End ot
Democracy?” First Things November 1996, especially Robert Bork’s “Our Judicial Oligarchs

—

and Robert George’s “The Tyrant State."

4

authoritative, thereby binding the Congress, the
President, and the people to

reading ot the Constitution.
distinction

On

its

both normative and empirical grounds, the

between a strong torm of judicial supremacy and a modified
version

important, but

interpretation

is

it

is

not central to the question

I

wish

is

Whether judicial

to raise.

held to be exclusive or merely final, each view insists that

authoritative jud.it iul settlement

Even with

necessary to constitutional governance.

is

the turn to history in legal scholarship,

much of constitutional

theory remains rooted in theoretical and normative issues, with

little

attention to

the historical functioning of our constitutional system. Reading the
leading

defenders of judicial supremacy, for example, one

argue tor judicial settlement

in a

way

is

struck by the fact that they

that altogether skirts empirical questions:

they insist that nonjudicial constitutional interpretation will lead to chaos,

bringing into doubt the very notion of the Constitution as law. But nowhere do
they bother to

show

11

this.

Thus many of their concerns about nonjudicial

constitutional interpretation

and not

in actual

judicial

supremacy are

it

seem

to be rooted in their theory

problems of constitutional governance. Modified versions of
far

more accurate

descriptively, as they concede that, like

or not, the Congress and the President have, on occasion, engaged in

constitutional interpretation, but such thinking

10

of constitutionalism

For

this

still

insists

view see Scott Gant, “Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial

on authoritative

Interpretation of the

Constitution" and James Fleming, “The Constitution Outside the Courts" Cornell
86: 167: 21 5-249, 22

1

(review of Tushnet's Taking the Constitution

Away from

Law Review

the Courts ),

James Fleming, “The Canon and the Constitution Outside The Court"
Constitutional Commentary 17: 267-273 (2000).
Sotirios Barber and

11

Larry Alexander and Fredrick Schauer,

“On

5

Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation.”

settlement by the judiciary.

Yet

this

very notion seems suspect on both

conceptual and empirical grounds.
Judicial

supremacy operates as a

sort

presuppositions are ottered up to us, but find
constitutional history.

he myth, though,

I

is

of constitutional myth:
little

grounding

in

its

and

logic

our actual

poweriul. Our preoccupation with

it

leads us to slight the role that the political branches play in
maintaining our
constitutional system and important constitutional developments
that exist outside

the courts

13
.

A

Constitution

many

role that in

itself.

And

the

myth

instances

is

is

called forth by the very text of the

made even more powerful

as constitutional

theory so often focuses on a perfectly imagined judiciary, measuring
to the

“ought

ol theory, like a platonic

form

in

an imagined

polity.

it

according

Against

this,

the political branches are seen in real-world terms, usually in their worst light,

eager to trample on the Constitution. So

much of constitutional

operates in the land of mythology and not political science;

it

is

theory itself often

perhaps not a

coincidence that one of the most famous defenders of judicial supremacy calls his

imaginary judge Hercules

As
limitations

12

14
.

constitutionalism has

come

to be seen as primarily about legal

on government by way of legal

text, the judiciary is

seen as “the one

Scott Gant qualifies his version of judicial supremacy saying that, well, nothing

so, then

why do we

really

need authoritative judicial settlement?

If constitutional

is final. If

that

reopened by the other branches or by the public, then why close them by the judiciary?
1

’

Stephen Griffin, American Constitutionalism From Theory

University Press, 1996) and

Wayne Moore,

to Politics (Princeton: Princeton

Constitutional Rights

and Powers of the People

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). See also Bruce Ackerman,

We

Transformations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) suggesting

that constitutional

politics are “extraordinary”
14

the People:

and “transformative” events.

Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University

6

Press, 1987).

is

questions can be

institution

above

Constitution

is

all

others essential to the preservation of the law .” 15
If the

a sort ot "higher law,”

it

is

only in thinking of this law as akin to

“a statute emanating from the sovereign people”
and coupling that with judicial

review that

it

is

maintained

Constitution” into the
law,

is

we may

interpret

it

16
.

Yet

this

view collapses the "what of the

"who of interpretation .” 17

If

we

insist that the

then posit that the judiciary must interpret the law and
must

according to legal conventions. Such a view, though, conflates

"constitutional fundamentally” with judicial supremacy
dissertation seeks to establish a

more overtly

drawing on public law scholarship
the Constitution-as-law (what

interpreter-of-law

takes

(who

is

that has

text, but the

Constitution

Against this view,

this

view of the Constitution,

begun unpacking the easy merger of

the Constitution?) with the judiciary-as-

interprets the Constitution?). If the legal Constitution

Constitution.

From

this

view, the Constitution

very framework of government that the text calls to

is

maintained by political devices and not by the

what Madison called a mere “parchment

l<;

political

18
.

bearings from John Marshall, the political Constitution might be seen as

its

James Madison's

structured in such a

is

Constitution

way

is

not just legal

life.

The

fact that

it

political

is

“law,”

barrier.” Accordingly, the Constitution

as to maintain constitutional limits (although this

is

Charles Mcllwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

1947) 140.

Edward Corwin, The

" Higher

Law ” Background of American

Constitutional

Law

(Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 1955) 89.
1

1

am

following the interrogatives

set forth

by Walter Murphy, Sotirios Barber, and James

Fleming, American Constitutional Interpretation

WHAT

is

the Constitution?

sort out these
IS

WHO may

interpret

(New York: Foundation Press, 1995). By asking
And HOW is to be interpreted? Murphy et al

it?

it

concepts that are often merged together.

William Harris, The Interpretable Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,

1993)20-24.

7

only part ot the picture) by
itself

this

very framework, relying on the political
process

and the interaction between these branches of
government over

constitutional meaning.

maintaining

it

is

As

the Constitution

a political task tor

all

is

our fundamental charter,

the branches, not simply a legal task for
the

Court.

At

least

have turned
significant

shift in

such has been a crucial recognition

their attention to the

development

in constitutional theory in recent years

politics."

the People

,

constitutional evolution in favor of great

transformation. Ackerman,

among

constitutional development .'

we

law and morality'

Perhaps nowhere

Ackerman’s two volume We

constitutional politics,

decade, as scholars

importance of constitutional politics

focus from the relationship between

between "law and

in the last

0

He

is this

which

may

19
.

The most

well be this

to the relationship

more evident than

in

Bruce

rejects standard narratives

moments of constitutional

conflict

others, offers a regimes analysis of

argues that in extraordinary

of

and

American

moments of

(as a people) reforge our constitutional understandings

and create “new” constitutional regimes. For Ackerman, there have been three
constitutional regimes

telling

—

the Founding, Civil War, and

of our constitutional history, the

political

New

Deal

— not one.

In this

branches and the people are

primarily responsible for transforming constitutional meaning in these unique

constitutional

19

moments, usually against

See Mark Graber, "Constitutional

Politics

the Court, which, properly, adheres to the

and Constitutional Theory:

Neglected Relationship" (Review of Lucas A. Powe,

Law and Social

Jr.,

A

Misunderstood and

The Warren Court

in

American

Politics)

Inquiry 27: 309 (2002).

20

Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (volume
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991 and 1998).

8

1)

and Transformations (volume 2)

older understanding of the Constitution and
thereby provokes debate about the

very nature ot constitutional government. The
people, then, in a genuine act of

popular sovereignty,

ratify

new

constitutional understandings giving us a

constitutional regime. Yet, even tor

politics are

new

Ackerman, such moments of constitutional

rare— moments of punctuated

dispute that disrupt our otherwise placid

constitutionalism. During times of ordinary politics, the
Court properly takes up
the primary responsibility ot entorcing and detending
the Constitution. In a

similar vein, Keith Whittington has advanced a view ot
constitutional regimes that
are attached to “reconstructive presidents," presidents that
reconstitute our

lundamental constitutional commitments and thereby
1

Constitution."

Court"

—

Such presidents

are "departmentalists"

the defender of the inherited regime

—and

alter

who

how we

think about the

argue against the “Old

recreate the political order and

our constitutional commitments. But here, too, a reconstituted Court takes

primary responsibility tor detending and articulating these new constitutional
understandings.

history

is

I

he

common theme

that “political

of constitutional

'

of a regimes narrative of our constitutional

interpretation

politics, after

is,

by and

which we return

large,

to a

more ordinary

where the Court, once more, becomes central." There

21

“The

Political

Foundations of Judicial Supremacy"

an extraordinary

in Sotirios

is

a

moment

politics

good deal of truth

Barber and Robert

P.

to

George,

on Constitutional Making, Maintenance, and Change
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) and "Presidential Challenges to Judicial Supremacy
and the Politics of Constitutional Meaning,” Polity Volume XXXIII, Number 3 (2001).
Whittington's work focus on the political construction of judicial power and is thus more open to
eds. Constitutional Politics: Essays

regimes being

tluid.

22

Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police
Powers Jurisprudence (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993) and Akhil Amar, The Bid of
Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998) also offer a
of regimes analysis of constitutional development, revealing how our essential constitutional

commitments have been

radically altered.

9

sort

this, especially the

but

it

recognition of punctuated

moments of constitutional change,

misses the way significant constitutional change
can come incrementally,

absent extraordinary transformation, or clear-cut
political realignment, as well as
the

way

in

which constitutional meaning may remain

regimes understanding ot constitutional development

on progressive

in a state

is

A

of unsettlement.

a definite improvement

views, which too frequently sees constitutional
change as an

easy forward movement that has gradually recognized
the promise of the “living”
Constitution

usually, so such narratives go, by

way of Court

claims to judicial supremacy have even been founded
constitutional “development .”

23

in

to

Indeed, the very language of “development”

something higher .'

inadequate insofar as

moments

after

continuity.

it

to the

Such a packaging of our

norm of constitutional

constitutional history

by our very constitutional framework.

William Brennan,

24

at

in a linear

Yet. a constitutional regimes approach

recurrent feature of our constitutionalism

Lecture delivered

A

—

a feature,

I

settlement and

masks

meaning

persistent

that are a

argue, that

central claim of

my

is

called forth

dissertation

Jr. "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Georgetown University, Oct. 12, 1985.

Means

is

that

Ratification"

On What

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984) and "Notes on

Constitutional Maintenance"

We

is

and unusual

See, for such "aspirational" theories of constitutional interpretation, Sotirios Barber,

the Constitution

is

4

constitutional conflict and disputes over constitutional

r>

moves

treats constitutional politics as discrete

which we return

Some

such facile views of

freighted, insinuating a sort of constitutional evolution that

manner, always

opinions.

in

the People: The Fourteenth

Barber and George,

eds.. Constitutional Polities ;

Michael Perry,

Amendment and the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1999). Though, the Rehnquist Court has surely given pause to such theorizing,

which took much of

its

inspiration from the

constitutional thinkers like
courts,"

Warren Court. One

Mark Tushnet, who wants

and Cass Sunstein, who would

like to see the

found skepticism of the Court stems from

gets the feeling from leading

to "take the constitution

Court go "one case

their political inclinations.

10

at a

away from

the

time," that there

new

constitutional discontinuity and unsettlement
are crucial to a full understanding
of

American

I

constitutional development.

my

he argument ot

dissertation unfolds in

might be aptly described as a
First,

I

two

steps

and the approach

sort ot “constitutional theory as
political science.”

argue that the preoccupations ot judicial supremacy
are rooted

view ot the Constitution

—one

institutional struggles in our

that has itself

been a part of political and

history— and posits

as the only

it

Constitution. Against this legal view of the Constitution,

Constitution

is

I

way

to see the

argue that the

better understood in political terms. This conceptual

the legal Constitution (and

its

link to judicial

in a legal

unpacking of

supremacy) and a rearticulation of

the political Constitution (unlinking judicial supremacy and
constitutional

maintenance) will clear the way for an empirical and
ot the dissertation

examines the lunctioning ot our

historical analysis.

institutions

when

The bulk

contesting

constitutional meaning, treating constitutional debate itself as an arena of
political
struggle.

1

examine four

historical periods

where constitutional meaning was

contested between the political branches and the Court in a sustained fashion.

Through the

lens of these constitutional conflicts,

in action, illuminating

how

we

constitutional struggles

see the political constitution

were actually resolved

between the branches of government w hen meaning was contested and

how

illustrating

constitutional politics has been a central aspect of our constitutional

development. Moreover,

this historical

and empirical examination

'5

will also allow

Louis Seidman, Our Unsettled Constitution: A New Defense of Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review (New Haven: Yale University Press, 200 ) examines how judicial review may work to
unsettle politics, but the argument on the whole is a normative justification for a particular view of
1

the Court and judicial review.

me

examine

to

the presuppositions of judicial supremacy:
does the Court itself act

m ways consistent with the requirements of authoritatively

settling constitutional

meaning?
Chapter

1

ot

my

dissertation seeks to recover a political

view of the

Constitution in order to take on the central beginning
point of judicial supremacy:
as the Constitution

is

law,

Gibson argued long ago,
that

is,

the Constitution

Constitution not so

it

must be enforced by the judiciary. But as Judge

this is to

reason from the very premise that

must be treated as law because

much

it

is

as a legal text but an institutional

law.

26

If

is in

we

dispute;

see the

framework of

governance, then the basis ot judicial supremacy and the preoccupations
that

come along

with

it

are not so clear.

Given

this, the first

chapter

is

theoretical

and

conceptual, offering a Madisonian view of the Constitution. This will
allow us to

broaden our focus,

letting us take

on many of the presuppositions of judicial

supremacy

that are rooted in a legalist

move

examine the whole Constitution, going beyond

to

us to

pay attention

view of the Constitution and, from

there,

the Court' s-eye-view,

to institutional design, constitutional structure,

and the

political

give and take between the branches of government. 27 In beginning with a

Madisonian view of the Constitution,

was paramount
this

to

I

want

to

maintaining the Constitution

framework, we might

try to place judicial

show how
itself.

1

constitutional structure

suggest that in establishing

review and questions of

constitutional interpretation within this larger view. This will allow us to see that

36

"

Eakin

v.

Raub, 12 Sergeant

&

Rawle 330 (1825).

7

Keith Whittington, “Herbert Wechsler’s Complaint and the Revival of Grand Constitutional
Theory” University of Richmond Law Review 34:509 (2000).

12

many

ot the preoccupations of judicial

supremacy are rooted

in a

conceptual view

ot the Constitution and not necessarily
in questions of actual
constitutional

governance. While

Murphy
In fact,

I

s,

1

1

draw on theories of “interpretive

seek to connect those with larger questions
of constitutional design. 28

draw heavily on Murphy's conceptual separation
of the “what of the

constitution” trom the

political terms,

the

I

“who of interpretation.”

we may

suggest that

“what of the Constitution.” 29

understand them

How

and

the Court

one another as

time. Similarly, presidents

constitutional

“who of interpretation”

meaning

at

may

And

is

a

within

at a particular

and thus

is

is

time

is

that

and

we must

political

shaped by

political,

historically contingent.

not an abstract question of

the answer, very likely, will vary across

be central to the development and articulation of

one point

constitutional development

government, so

part of an historical

the great protector of rights

theory, but an historical question.

see the Constitution in

way, the Madisonian Constitution

institutional struggles

is

we

ot the branches of

each institution functions

constitutional,

Whether

in relation to

If

situate the

In this

examines the dynamic interaction

process.

plurality” like Walter

in history

and

far less

important

at

another. If

dynamic process, the claims of judicial supremacy

or departmentalism will vary through our history and will very likely be the result

of political struggles, which,

in turn,

shape

This Madisonian view invites us to look

government
Chapters

:s

to see

2, 3, 4,

Walter Murphy,

how

and

“Who

constitutional

at

how we

think about the Constitution.

the actual practices of constitutional

meaning

is

generated. This will be the task

5.

Shall Interpret?”

Review of Polities 48: 401 (1986).

13

A

Madisonian understanding of the Constitution
also illuminates

our constitutional history that are
understandings.

governance,
that

it is:

politics,

traditional narratives

of

and

framework of

better recognize the Constitution for
the imperfect

document

does not always give us an easy distinction
between law and

that

that

odds with

treating the Constitution as a political

we can

one

one

By

at

parts

does not always give us "right” answers to
constitutional

questions, and one that does not necessarily call for
fundamental settlement of

such questions. In

tact, as a

framework of governance

the Constitution calls forth

perpetual disagreement that asks us to reconcile competing
values: an enterprise
that

countenances unsettlement and discontinuity, an enterprise

to the possibility

foster

of “failure.”

30

The framework

is

established, true enough, to

and protect American principles, but no framework

guarantee success

that is itself open

and, here, the Court cannot "save

of

government can

us in this enterprise (as

proponents of judicial supremacy often suggest). The Madisonian Constitution
if

1

may

play on the phrase, a "living constitution" that

Murphy, Barber, and Fleming, American Constitutional
11

See especially Mark Brandon, Free

in the

is

is,

argued over and altered.

Interpretation.

World: American Slavery and Constitutional Failure

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

As Brandon

notes, there

is

nothing inherently

problematic about multiple constitutional perspectives coexisting; although, a breakdown of
constitutional dialogue

where nothing

as during the Civil War.

is

shared

in

common

could lead to a constitutional “failure”

See also Wayne Moore, Constitutional Rights and Powers of the People

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). arguing that multiple perspectives

of “official” constitutional channels.
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may

exist outside

not in the neat unfolding of Supreme
Court opinions toward a higher end,
but

in

the heated terrain of political dispute. 31

Chapters

2, 3, 4,

and

5

of the dissertation turn

to four historical periods

constitutional conflict to illuminate the
Madisonian Constitution. 32
different institutions

on different constitutional issues

at different

By looking

of
at

points in time,

these cases are selected to represent various
periods in our history, multiple
constitutional issues, and different constitutional
actors (and conflicts and

debates).

I

hus the studies attempt to capture a range of
constitutional

just a tew discrete instances that cut against
judicial

politics, not

supremacy and the

legal

Constitution that, in Justice Roberts words, “are good
for this day and this train

Let me say a word about normative concerns and the nature
of a written constitution. The
Madisonian framework is deeply concerned with normative commitments
and underlying
constitutional values; it seeks to further and maintain such values
through the constitutional
framework. It is not, then, open to whatever change happens to come about,
or wholly elastic in its
view of constitutional values. Rather, it provides a framework within
which constitutional debates
occur. It does not necessarily call for a single coherent view,
or settlement, depending upon the
constitutional issues in question. The written Constitution (and the
values it rests upon) is more
likely to be secured through multiple institutions rather than

by way of a single institution acting
here the Madisonian Constitution draws explicitly on the
written nature of the Constitution. The Constitution was written
so that its terms
constitutional

as the constitutional

limits

and boundaries, the

read the Constitution

And

enforcer.

to

rights

make

— would be
fundamental law — did

and powers of the people
sense of

it

as

—

clear to

all.

The

ability to

not require special training,

but could be clearly grasped by the average citizen. Indeed, the very move
to mark down the
in writing was a rejection of the unwritten British constitution,
not just because

Constitution

it

could be easily altered, but because such a constitution was removed from the citizens who were
the basis of all legitimate authority in the American mind. The Americans thus rejected Chief
Justice Coke s dictum that the law was based on "artificial reason” and therefore the peculiar
province of those tutored

in the

law insofar as

applied to discerning constitutional meaning. This
between ordinary law (where this might be
acceptable) and the written Constitution. hus, rooting judicial supremacy in the peculiar training
of lawyers and courts undermines the very foundation of a written Constitution as conceived by
the Americans. A point vividly brought home by Madison in a letter to Jefferson, when he insisted
it

highlights, as well, the fundamental distinction
I

that these political devices for maintaining the Constitution

might

fail: these mechanisms "are
The people, who are the authors
of this blessing, must also be its guardians.” Quoted in Lance Banning, Jefferson and Madison
Three Conversations From the Founding (Madison: Madison House, 1995), 21.

neither the sole nor the chief palladium of constitutional liberty.

th

Amendment was a fundamental constitutional change (implicating both the Court's
th
and the Congress’ constitutional power) am examining post 14 Amendment cases to hold “The
As

the 14

I

Constitution” steady for the cases

I

am

sampling.

15

The cases locus on

only.

the details ot constitutional dispute and are largely

descriptive in nature, revealing that the standard vocabulary of
authoritative

settlement and

link to judicial

its

supremacy

constitutional dispute and settlement.

And

before as the subject of scholarly debate,
constitutional settlement, using

them

I

fails to

capture the variety of

while these areas have been examined

view them through the lens of

to illustrate

and illuminate the Madisonian

Constitution. These studies suggest that constitutional authority

meaning

constitutional

is

constitutional questions

shaped

is

a

dynamic process involving

branches of government, so that

”

My

that

approach

it

itself

may

in the political arena. Settling

we must

is

fluid

and

contested

the interaction of the

understand the branches

in relation to

new institutionalism"
when contesting

be labeled “historical-institutionalism” or “the

seeks to investigate the historical functioning of our institutions

in

is a close connection between my theory and the cases
propose to examine. The cases studies themselves should help refine and alter my theory,
which may be treated as a working hypothesis. As am not attempting to formally test my theory,

constitutional meaning. In this, there

studies

I

1

connection between “evidence" and “theory"

this close

fully

formed, but

Supreme Court

is

theory

as the exclusive and authoritative interpreter of constitutional meaning.

studies should allow

me

to classify

and categorize constitutional dispute

has previously been done, offering us a conceptual handle
settlement.

my

acceptable. Indeed,

Moreover,

is

not

process of being constructed to offer an alternative to our focus on the

in the

describing these cases

in

I

in

in a

much

The case
way than

richer

speaking about constitutional

can look for possible causal relations and

generate hypotheses for future research, which might then be tested

in a more rigorous manner.
Even if my case studies are primarily exploratory, the division between this type of case
where would rigorously test a hypothesis is not as stark
study and a confirmatory case study

—

as

it

appears.

crucial cases,

My

—

I

exploration will involve comparison between

and even an

initial

probing of

that authoritative judicial settlement

constitutional settlement,

I

my

my

cases, an examination of

theory (as well as rival theories). While

of constitutional meaning doesn't capture the

I

am

Nor do

I

theorizing that other types of settlement

partial settlement

— more

actually settled. There

is

suggest

don't wish to simply disconfirm this view by sampling on a “theory-

wish to “confirm” some alternate hypothesis. Rather,
examine the range of constitutional settlement and how we arrive at it.
infirming” case study.

I

range of

full

I

want

to

unsettlement, constitutional dialogue, and

ways in which constitutional questions are
But more importantly, want to offer a more

aptly describe the various

hypothesis probing here.

1

accurate description of constitutional settlement than currently exists. In this way,

my

larger

theorizing doesn't seek to falsify theories that focus on the Court and authoritative settlement so

much

as incorporate

them

into a broader theoretical

framework. I'm trying

to

examine what

underlies these different types of settlement. This will allow us to speak to how settlement is
arrived at and how constitutional meaning is generated, providing us with rich insights into this

process and, thereby, a better understanding of our constitutional system.
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one another as part

ot an historical

and

political process.

Moreover, these cases

illustrate that constitutional conflict is a perennial feature

framework with

the

all

messy

of our constitutional

features of unsettled meaning, constitutional

dialogues, partial settlement, and concurrent tensions and discontinuities
in
constitutional meaning. In short, these cases suggest that the Madisonian

Constitution more aptly captures our constitutional history than beliefs about
the

and settlement of constitutional meaning. 34

legal articulation

Chapter 2 examines the conflict between the Court and the Congress over
the

meaning of the Fourteenth and

episode

is

particularly interesting because

War

ot the Civil

Amendments from 1870-1883. This

Fifteenth

comes

it

conflict

more ordinary

in the heat

Moreover,

politics that follow.

we

politics

see the

of the Civil War, but

in the early years

we

see

between the Congress and the Court on the meaning of rights where,

according to

much of constitutional

rights in a principled

14

momentous

era, a so-called return to ordinary politics, but

meaning of these Amendments being shaped not
in the far

after the

Existing empirical

manner against

work

Rosenberg has shown

theory,

that

we

should see the Court protecting

the Congress.

The opposite

is

true.

And

the

leads us to be skeptical of the claims of judicial supremacy. Gerald

Supreme Court opinions do

constitutional practices they call forth, Robert Dahl has

not immediately bring about the

shown

that the

"do generally succeed in overcoming a hostile Court on major policy
and Harold Spaeth have shown that the Court does not always follow
constitutional meaning. While these

works are

crucial,

my

Congress and the President

issues,”
its

and Jeffrey Segal

own pronouncements on

study takes a different tack. See, Gerald

Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Cun Courts Bring About Social Change (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1991), Robert Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker” Journal of Public

Law

,

288,

Mark Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian

Difficulty” Studies in American Political Development 7 1993), Barry Friedman, “A History
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy” 73 New York
(

ot

333-433 (1998) and Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, Majority Rule or
(New York: Cambridge University
's Adherence to Precedent
Spaeth's contention that Court
and
Segal
hardly
support
alone
could
this
Although
1998).
Press,
opinions are the result of the justices’ political preferences and are almost never influenced by
University

Law Review

2:

Minority Will The Supreme Court
:

17

event that paves the
in the election ot

Amendments
meaning

way

for a constitutional settlement

1874, where

it

retreats

the switch in Congress

is

from the early promise of the Civil War

so that by the time the Court renders
opinions on the reach and

ot the fourteenth and Fifteenth

Amendments,

is

it

essentially in line with

the Congress's view.

C hapter

3

explores the national government's

economic regulation and
period

is

Supreme Court's

the

first

reaction,

too often treated as the precursor to the

New

entry into national

from 1895-1925. This

Deal struggle of the 1930s,

where the "conservative" Court struck down progressive

legislation.

This period

witnessed a three decades long constitutional debate about
the government's

power

to regulate the national

even as the
dialogue.

political

It is

economy

remained, by and large, unsettled

branches and the Court engaged

difficult, then, to treat the

singular and rare

that

New

moment of constitutional

context of constitutional

drift

conflict during this era also

conservative court was striking

it

of constitutional

Deal revolution that followed as a

conflict,

and unsettlement. The

make

in a sort

when

it

details

is

placed

in this larger

of constitutional

difficult to sustain the notion that a

down

progressive legislation: the Congress itself

often invited the Court to construct constitutional meaning, illustrating the

important interaction between the branches of government

in negotiating

constitutional meaning.

Chapter 4 picks up with the national government's attempt

economy, which,
politics

after years

of unsettlement, was firmly

of 1935-1941. Here the Court came

18

settled

into line with

to regulate the

by the

FDR's

New

Deal

constitutional

vision, providing tor

sweeping regulation of the economy. Yet,

this

very

settlement provoked a protound constitutional
debate about the role of the Court
in protecting constitutional rights

(what would become

unsettled to the current day. This

movement

civil liberties) that

reveals that

some

remains

constitutional

issues might be settled even while others
remain unsettled and essentially

contested,

making

it

difficult to

speak of coherent constitutional regimes,
as there

were tensions and discontinuities

New

Deal revolution

that,

in constitutional

over the course of years,

settlement and pulled apart the logic of the

1

thought

he attempt to unsettle the

New

New

Deal

is

fell

at the

very core of the

away from

the initial

Deal Constitution.

taken up

in

Chapter

5

with

President Reagan’s attempted constitutional reconstruction.
While Reagan's

attempt to displace the

New

Deal and reconstruct our constitutionalism

is

often

characterized as a failure, such characterizations are too hasty in
focusing on

whether a
in

full scale constitutional

over turning such cases as Roe

"revolution" occurred.

v.

Wade which was
,

Reagan did not succeed

a central part of his

criticism ol the Court. Yet he did succeed in chastening the

national

power and bringing back

constitutional federalism: the

the Rehnquist Court have placed limits

Power

for the first time since the

reopened a once

settled area

New

New

Deal view of

Reagan justices of

on the reach of Congress’ Commerce
Deal revolution and,

at the

of constitutional meaning. That

very

this has

least,

occurred

while these same Reagan justices upheld a women's constitutional right
abortion

—although

this area also

constitutional change occurs in

moves back and

some

forth

—

reveals

areas and not in others, in

19

have

to

how

fits

and

starts.

without leading to

full scale constitutional

transformation. Indeed, such

the

is

course ot American constitutional development.

By
that

it

is

placing the Court within the political framework,
scholars have shown

not a distant countermajoritarian institution
upholding our Constitution

against political encroachments. 3

how

'

Coming from

another angle,

I

want

to

show

the political branches are central to maintaining the
Constitution. Blinded by

our locus on the legal Constitution and the Court,
political

we

rarely investigate

branches are a central part of our constitutionalism.

I

how

these

should also note,

here, that this does not imply the vulgar characterization—
often put forward by

behavioral political science
crass politics

institutional

36
.

that debates about constitutional

meaning

are

all

Rather, by situating constitutional debates within a larger

framework,

we

see that shaping constitutional

meaning

is far

more

political than constitutional theory often recognizes, but, just as surely, our

political institutions are far

constitutionalism than

we

more important

often realize.

Thus, while scholars

like

Robert Dahl have led us

Court's countermajoritarianism. they have

little

the political branches in constitutional terms.

this issue

our understanding of

to

by investigating

how

I

to say

hope

to

to

be skeptical of the

about the performance of

speak to both prongs of

our constitutionalism actually functions. In

situating Court opinions within the give-and-take of constitutional politics,

we

Robert Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National PolicyMaker” Journal of Public Law 288; Mark Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative
Deference to the Judiciary”; Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change
,

See, for example, Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold

Model (New York: Cambridge

J.

Spaeth, The

University Press, 1993).
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Supreme Court and

the Altitudinal

cannot only ask whether Court opinions
authoritatively

settle constitutional

meaning, but empirically investigate the
presuppositions of judicial supremacy.

Many

proponents of judicial supremacy

may

well agree that the Court

countermajoritarian, but they see this as a
good thing, as

Constitution against politics.
political

political

Embedded

thinking

is

branches are threats to our constitutionalism.
Yet,
branches actually functioned when

maintaining constitutional limits?
regard, as

that

in their

it

so often asserted?

is

we must

Is

Does

it

comes

is

protects the

an insistence that the

how have

the so-called

to protecting rights

and

the Court's performance truly better
in this
this

vary across institutions and over time,
so

be attuned to the historical interplay between
the institutions and not

simply preoccupied with the Court? These are
empirical and historical questions
that are

more

judicial

supremacy acknowledge

often asserted than investigated.

cannot be avoided ."

37

They

our system must play a role

that “the empirical

further

in

Even

acknowledge

the leading proponents of

dimension [of their claim]

that the historical functioning

of

any empirical analysis, especially when discussing

the political branches' relationship to questions of constitutional
settlement.

Other scholars have similarly insisted

more concern
debate

that a “sustained historical analysis" with

for the actual practice of constitutional settlement

is

central to this

38
.

Larry Alexander and Fredrick Schauer, “Defending Judicial Supremacy:
Constitutional

Commentary 2000

An Argument”

Vol. 17: 455-482, 464.

18

Come Round at Last? The New Critique of
Review” Constitutional Commentary 17:683 (2000), 693; Howard Gillman, “From
fundamental Law to Constitutional Politics And Back' Law and Social Inquiry 199. Bruce
Stephen Griffin, “Has the Hour of Democracy

Judicial

—

,

Peabody, “Nonjudicial Constitutional Interpretation, Authoritative Settlement, and a
for Research” Constitutional Commentary Vol. 16: 63 ( 1999).
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New Agenda

Labeling these contests “constitutional
politics” raises an important
question of how

we

do we know,

example,

for

separate constitutional politics from
ordinary politics. 39
that

such disputes are not merely

political

disputes disguised as constitutional
disputes for rhetorical purposes?

which

1

take up in the chapters that follow,

exhibiting a

commitment

is

when we

to constitutional text. 40

But

1

How

and policy

One way.

see the political branches

do not

limit

cases where the political branches display
fidelity to constitutional

my

analysis to

text.

In part

1

suggest that a Madisonian view of the Constitution
makes this easy distinction

between

politics

and the Constitution

difficult. In

attempting to maintain

constitutional boundaries and propriety, the
Madisonian solution relies in part on

the sell-interested action ol the various actors:
“the interests of the

connected

to the constitutional rights

of the office.” 41

It is

man

will be

not always easy to

separate constitutional views from policy preferences or
the politics of the day. In
tact,

debates about constitutional meaning are almost certainly
rooted

politics ol the day,

development

is

why

ol constitutional

opinions— is key
difficult, tor

which

to

in the

a historical analysis that examines the

meaning

— and not simply looking

understanding our constitutionalism.

It

at

Court

would be very

example, to make sense ol Justice Stone's lamous argument for

judicial review in footnote 4 of Carotene Products without understanding the

14

In treating

Supreme Court cases

pronouncements and actions of the

as disputed by the political branches,
political

I

rely

on the

branches themselves. The branches must make some

They may insist that they are not bound by the Court's opinion,
or attempt by legislation, pronouncement, or judicial appointment to overcome

effort to challenge the opinion.

refuse to enforce

it,

the Court’s interpretation. This

would even include

a sustained rhetorical assault on the Court’s

opinions.
40

Gillman, "From Fundamental

Law

to Constitutional Politics

— And Back,” 199-200.

preceding development of "substantive due process"
the politics that surrounded that decision. 42

Given

constitutional politics

to

meaning.

It is

is

any broad attempt

in

this.

shape or

constitutional in the broad sense that

it

Lochner

1

v.

New

York and

suggest that

alter constitutional

contributes to our

constitutional discourse, speaks to and shapes constitutional meaning, and accepts
that

we

what

are governed by the Constitution (even while disputing the particulars of
43

that means).

While such constitutional struggles are rooted

disputes of the day and shape

describing

how

how we

in the political

think about the Constitution,

my

concern

is

such contests over constitutional meaning play out between the

branches of government rather than with whether or not any particular view of the
Constitution put forth by those branches

Constitutional politics

discontinuities

—

is

44

correct.

is

— with continued

dispute, unsettled meaning, and

a sustained and continuous part of American constitutionalism.

Against this backdrop, judicial supremacy operates as a blinding myth.

Its

claims

are unsubstantiated and yet they continue to dominate constitutional scholarship,

ignoring the rich terrain that our constitutionalism occupies.

I

hope

constitutional questions often remain unsettled, are reopened, and,

41

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John

Books,

1

999), no. 5

1

,

Jay,

to

show

that

when

The Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor

290.

v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) and Lochner v. New York, 198
Paul Pierson, "Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political
See
U.S. 45 ( 1905).
Processes" Studies in American Political Development, 14 (Spring 2000) 72-92.

42

United States

44

See Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional
Oxford University Press, 2000) 20-22.
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Politics in

Europe (New York.

settlement does occur,

and not

at

is

usually torged by

moment with

a single

great benefit here

it

the handing

way

ot political consensus over time

down of a Supreme Court

This should help give some measure

to

stands, scholars give us legal theories

politics as a

unsupported by empirical evidence

which the

political

ongoing role
this

view,

I

in

that— to put

bluntly

it

— nobody

it

system

is

not.

We

rage as

if

45
.

it

believes,

that are flatly

the Court's opinion

was

Focusing only on the Court, we miss the ways

in

—the broad constitutional framework—plays an

itself

maintaining (and creating) constitutional meaning. In articulating

hope

and recover a

44

in fact

46
.

whole

our Court-centered discussion. As

and dramatic assertions about the importance of judicial decisions

when

A

properly situating a discussion of Supreme Court opinions

is

and constitutional law within the framework of American

everything,

opinion.

to

overcome the deeply ingrained myth of judicial supremacy

political

understanding of the Constitution.

Again, that’s not to discount normative concerns, they are just not the key to this study. While
study seeks to look at the actual functioning of our constitutionalism, it would still be fully

this

compatible with strong normative views of constitutional meaning. Indeed, it suggests that the best
way to protect the proper reading of the Constitution is interpretive plurality rather than always
siding with a particular branch. Thus we may go with the branch that we think is right in any
constitutional dispute.
45

See Howard Gillman and Cornell Clayton’s “Introduction”

Court

in

American

Politics:

New

in their

Institutionalist Interpretations

edited volume. The

Supreme

(Lawrence: University Press ot

Kansas, 1999) 1-11.

Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope. For a critique of Rosenberg see Bradley Canon and Charles
1999) 209Johnson, Judicial Politics: Implementation and Impact (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press,
they
work,
Rosenberg's
of
shortcomings
of
the
some
211. While Canon and Johnson reveal

46

themselves demonstrate

whole

in their

discussion of abortion that the Court’s opinions are hardly the

story, 3-16.
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CHAPTER
RECOVERING THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION
1

“That

all

power

is

originally invested in,

and consequently derived from the

people.

That government

is

instituted,

and ought

to

be exercised for the benefit of

which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of
acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness
and safety.

the people;

“That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible
reform or change their government, whenever it be found adverse to the
purposes of its institution.” James Madison

right

to

—

"Now,

it

is

1

the proper function of the judicial department to interpret laws, and by

the very terms of the constitution to interpret the supreme law.

Its

interpretation,

becomes obligatory and conclusive upon all the departments of the federal
government, and upon the whole people, so far as their rights and duties are

then,

derived from, or affected by that constitution.”

—Joseph Story

2

Constitutionalism in the American tradition suffers from two distinct but
related problems. In the

first

place, there

is

the insistence

upon a written

constitution as fundamental law that “prescribes the limits of

power .”

3

This move, so

so that the government

arises

from just

The mere

may

question was

at will,

truly be said to be limited.

how

is itself

even

American

a part of early

this point though:

act of writing

Constitution

much

how do we make

no guarantee.

if written,

to bring this

then

we

all

constitutional thought,

is

The second problem

these written limits effective?

If the legislature

are right back

fundamental law

delegated

down

could

where we

alter the

started.

to earth, so that

it

The

might

James Madison, proposed amendment with what became the Bill of Rights, which Madison
sought to place as the opening of the Constitution, with the other proposed amendments weaved
Bill of Rights.
into its body, rather than tacked on to the end, in what became know as the
1

Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, reprinted with an Introduction by Ronald
Rotunda and John Nowak (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1987 [1833]) 128.

2

3

Wood, Creation of the American Republic (Chapel

1998)281.

25

Hill:

University of North Carolina Press,

4

actually be effective in maintaining the very limits

How,

then,

do we bond the

polity to the

was

direction. This solution, the legalist solution,

cognizable in courts. In this

permanent by making

As Gordon Wood

its

way

structural

complemented

that both

"What

its

constitutional governance

enforcement

7
.

implementation

becomes

in fact, the

is,

its

in the

view of the Constitution and

legal

4

it

it

was

in a different

effective and

its

gave meaning

fundamental ity or

itself

its

creation
6

solution to the problem of

popular understanding of constitutional

In this view, the Constitution functions as

The Supreme Court

to the

ordinary courts of law .”

law articulated by the

Court, which insists upon constitutional limits by exercising

review.

But

the Constitution, as law,

in the final analysis

Americans' conception of a constitution was not

The

William

political.

and pulled

it

makes

the Constitution

and

in

.

limits enforceable in the courts, just like ordinary law.

has said,

by the people, but rather

purported to establish

word of the Constitution,

Harris phrase? James Madison's solution

supplemented by another

it

its

power of judicial

has pushed this argument, insisting that

it

"There was therefore no logical or necessary reason why the notion of
to Englishman for over a century, should lead to the American
invocation of it in the ordinary courts of law. Indeed, in an important sense the idea of
fundamental law actually worked to prohibit any such development, for it was dependent on such

As Gordon Wood

says,

fundamental law, so

common

a distinct conception of public law

in

contrast to private law as to be hardly enforceable

regular court system.” Creation of the American Republic , 292.

I

his

is

a point

in

the

Edward Corwin

suggesting that a constitution’s status as fundamental law was a hindrance to its
legality, "Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review.” See especially Robert Burt,
The Constitution in Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) 59-76.

noted earlier

5

in

William Harris

11,

The Interpretable Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Press,

1993).
6

Wood, Creation of the American Republic 291
,

.

Similarly,

Edward Corwin has remarked that
” Corwin, "Marbury v. Madison

“the supremacy of constitutions was a real barrier to their legality.
and the Establishment of Judicial Review” Michigan Law Review
original.
7

See Marbury

v.

Madison

,

5 U.S. (1

Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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12:

538, 555 (1914) emphasis

in

8

"speaks

tor the Constitution

and

interpretation of the Constitution

as a people

we

that

.

once

has spoken

it

In fact, the

we

are

Court has gone so

bound by

its

far as to say that

are tested in taking our constitutional ideals seriously by our

willingness to adhere to the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. Living up

our constitutional ideals depends,

to

heed the Court's voice

4
.

in

no small measure, upon our willingness

This rather dramatic claim to judicial supremacy suggests

that the Constitution will cease to function as

which means

interpreted by the Court,

less than the people, are

the

Court— whether

bound by

law

if

it

that the other

the Court's

exclusively or finally

—

is

not authoritatively

branches of government, no

view of constitutional meaning:

that gets to define the substance

the Constitution. If the political branches can read the Constitution in their

light,

to

and thereby disregard or second-guess judicial

interpretations, then

it

is

of

own

we

are

no longer living under the Constitution, or so advocates of judicial supremacy

would have us believe

8

For a clear statement of this see City ofBoerne

Aaron, 358 U.S.
9

10
.

“Their belief

in

1,

v.

Flores 52

1

U.S. 507, 529 (1997);

Cooper

v.

18 (1958).

themselves as such a people

is

not readily separable from their understanding of

the Court invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak before all
others for their constitutional ideals. If the Court's legitimacy should be undermined, then, so

would the country be in its very ability to see itself through its constitutional ideals." Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992). See also, John Brigham, The Cult of the Court
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
See especially Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional
10, No. 7: 1359-1387. Scott Gant qualities the notion
Interpretation” Harvard Law Review Vol.
10

1

of judicial supremacy by suggesting that the judiciary
Constitution, but that

Gant, “Judicial
Constitutional

its

interpretations are,

Supremacy and Nonjudicial

Law

is

not the exclusive interpreter ot the

once given, authoritative

—

at least in

Interpretation of the Constitution

Quarterly 24:359-440 (1997).
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the short run.

Hastings

It

we

see the Constitution as a political framework, the insistence on the

judicial enforcement of the Constitution

this chapter is

conceptual and theoretical,

political science."

12

First,

1

conceived the

political

it

is

problematic.

11

The aim of

a sort of “constitutional theory as

argue that a Madisonian view of the Constitution

emphasizes constitutional structure and
Constitutional maintenance

much more

is

institutional design as central to

— not simply

framework

judicial enforcement.

As

originally

itself invites “interpretive plurality,”

suggesting that questions of constitutional interpretation would be resolved as part

of constitutional politics and often

in the

ordinary political process. Multiple and

even conflicting views of the Constitution are an inherent

11

Walter Murphy,

“Who

Interprets?”

—even healthy —

part

Review of Politics 48: 401 (1986); Mark Graber, The

of

Civil

War as a Constitutional Failure (unpublished manuscript); Stephen Griffin. American
Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Keith
Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Wayne Moore, Constitutional Rights and Powers of
Interpretable
the People (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); William Harris, The
Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Mark Brandon, Free in the

World: American Slavery and Constitutional Failure (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
University Press, 1989);
1998); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton: Princeton
Press ot Kansas,
University
Susan Burgess, Contest for Constitutional Authority (Lawrence:
Aspiration
onstitutional
C
Decline
of
1992); Gary Jacobsohn, The Supreme Court and the
Values
Constitutional
Shaping
Devins,
Neal
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986);
Dialogues:
Constitutional
Fisher,
Louis
and
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992);
1988).
Press,
University
Princeton
(Princeton:
Interpretation as Political Process
12

Revival of Grand Constitutional
Keith Whittington, “Herbert Wechsler’s Complaint and the

Theory” University of Richmond Law Review 34:509 (2000).
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the constitutional framework.

Constitution

I

examine

13

Second, to draw out Madison's

political

his participation in early constitutional debates.

To

see the

Constitution through a Madisonian lens suggests a close connection between
constitutional theory and history: examining the Constitution as an institutional

dynamic
in the

invites us to

view how

this

dynamic has

actually

worked (and changed)

course of American constitutional development. The articulation and

development of constitutional meaning from the
bringing the Constitution to

system.

I

suggest that

life

we may

political

branches

is

a key part of

and maintaining a functioning constitutional

situate judicial

review within

this

framework and

see constitutional law as a part of this larger constitutional whole. Third.

examine the connection between judicial supremacy and

By beginning from
judicial

the premise that the Constitution

is

I

the legal Constitution.

law, the proponents of

supremacy make the Court the enforcer of the Constitution and come very

close to focusing on constitutional law as the whole of our Constitution. Yet in

doing so they subvert the constitutional framework and pull against the nature of a
written constitution, even while drawing on Madison's separation of powers to do

so.

13
|

By making

constitutional questions legal questions, and therefore the peculiar

should also note that when

1

refer to the

maintaining constitutional government,

1

Madisonian Constitution or the Madisonian solution to
mean to suggest that it has developed exactly as
is “proper” because Madison saw it this way. Rather,

don't

Madison himself would want it to, or that it
argue that the system can be described as Madisonian because it operates broadly as he suggested
even if many of the particulars go against his own vision. For example, even if we could find
definitive proof that Madison was against judicial review, we could still describe judicial review

1

as functioning within the Madisonian view of checks and balances. Madison was deeply skeptical
of a continual return to constitutional issues. In Federalist 49, Madison insisted that reverence tor
the laws

—and

for the Constitution

— was necessary

to the health

and tranquility of the

polity.

"The

danger of disturbing the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public passions is a still
ot
serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional questions to the decisions

more
whole

the
society.” While Madison was speaking specifically against turning frequently to
constitutional
making
to
applicable
equally
is
point
his
questions,
constitutional
on
people
questions frequent matters of public debate.

the

29

province of courts and lawyers, the Court
than within

it.

placed above the Constitution rather

Moreover, by making the written Constitution the peculiar province

of courts and lawyers,

and accessible

is

we move

against

it

very purpose as a public document open

to all citizens.

While judicial supremacy has come under
right, these critiques

The

The plea

instance.

interpretation, or,

is

usually for

often that the Court got

more judicial

driven more by a desire to look

taken up in great detail

in the

at

restraint,

of the Constitution. Both.

I

My

theory of

concerns here are

is

is

that

it

moves us beyond debates

argue below, are outgrowths of John Marshall's

who

look to Marshall

s

insistence that the

the primary enforcer of constitutional limits see the need for an active

judiciary

—

1

it

is

the essence of maintaining the law.

same concern, with

14

restraint, a particular

both of which have their leet in the legal view

Madison. Those

v.

in this or that

chapter that follow). Yet, one of the benefits of

about judicial activism or

is

wrong

the actual functioning of our system (which

thinking of the Constitution in political terms

Court

it

on occasion, a repeal of judicial power.

opinion in Marbury

and the

by normative and polemical concerns of constitutional

insistence

is

left

tend to focus on the contemporary court and particular

judicial decisions, driven

interpretation.

from both the

fire

See Michael Perry,

its

We

potentially expansive

the People: The Fourteenth

^

On

the other hand, this very

view of judicial power, has

Amendment and

the

led others

Supreme Court (New

the Constitution Away from
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3-14; Mark Tushnet, Taking
Sunstein, One C ase at a
Cass
6-32;
Courts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999),

the

Harvard University Press, 1998),
Time: Judicial Minimalism and the Supreme Court (Cambridge:
Journal of Law and Public
Harvard
Doctrine”
Scott Douglas Gerber, “The Judicial Brezhnev
1996, especially Robert Bork s
November
Things
First
Policy (2000). “The End of Democracy?”
State."
Tyrant
“The
George's
Judicial Oligarchy” and Robert

“Our
15

University
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge. Harvard

30

Press, 1987).

to plead for judicial humility.

As judicial opinions

on the Constitution, the Court ought

are taken to be the final

to deter to the political

word

branches and exercise

such power only when these branches are clearly wrong. 16 Each view, though,

common

shares a

premise and

it

is this

premise that

cannot meaningfully speak of activism or

1

want

to get

restraint without

beyond.

We

understanding what the

other branches of government are doing (by looking to the framework), and this

is

not a constant but something that varies across time.

Too much

constitutional debate, then, occurs within Marshall's

conceptual framework, or between the “two Marshalls” of Mar bury,'
occasional

if futile

nod

Judge Gibson's opinion

to

abandonment of judicial review

altogether.

in

Eakin

v.

1

with an

Raub, calling for the

The Madisonian view

offers an

alternative vision. Recovering the political Constitution will help us ask whether

authoritative settlement by the judiciary

indeterminacy

clearing

away

—

is

truly central to

—and

the avoidance of politics and

American constitutionalism. This conceptual

will then let us turn to an empirical

examination of the actual

functioning of our constitutional system in the course of American constitutional

development, which

is

taken up

in the historical studies that follow.

Law”
James Bradley Thayer, “The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Branch
Dangerous
Least
The
Bickel,
Alexander
also
See
Harvard Law Review 7: 129 ( 893).
16

1

(New Haven: Yale
17

University Press, 1962).

“
Mark Tushnet, Marbury

v.

Madison and

the

Theory of Judicial Supremacy” Robert

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

ed„ Great Cases in Constitutional Law
exception is Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury

P.

George,

An

v. Madison and Judicial Review (Lawrence:
Marbury only speaks to the Court’s power).
that
(arguing
University Press of Kansas, 1989)
18

Learned Hand, The

Bill

of Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University
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Press, 1958).

The Madisonian Constitution

Much

like

Thomas

written constitution

Jefferson and John Marshall, Madison agreed that a

was our "peculiar

“political institutions ."

10

And

yet

writtenness of the Constitution.

security," the great

Madison was

A

improvement of our

reluctant to rely

on the mere

written constitution, like written law generally,

gives clarity to the rights of the people and to the limitations of the government by
0

way of text .' As
to either the

such, the limits of governmental

whims of the judge

power would not be subjected

or the legislature. All could turn to the written

constitution's text and thereby grasp, in advance, the limits and powers of the

government. Madison, though, insisted

enough

to preserve the Constitution.

that writtenness, in

The mere

mere demarcation on parchment,”

did not

surely imagine, as Marshall did in

Marbury

prescribed constitutional limitations

a

itself,

was not

act of writing the Constitution, “a

make
,

and of

it

self-enforcing.

One could

government overstepping

—and doing so

its

despite the fact that those

limitations are clearly demarcated. If constitutional limitations were not

somehow

enforced, as Marshall said, then “a written constitution was an absurd attempt on

the part of the people to limit a

power

that

is

illimitable.”

'

On

this score

Madison

agreed with Marshall. To be effective the Constitution had to be maintained. But

how?

14

20

Marbury

at 178.

Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 275.
,

21

The Federalist Papers No. 48, 281.
,

22

Marbury

at 177.
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Structure. Political Institutions

Madison's great

and the

Self-Governing” Constitution

political innovation

was

to

make

the Constitution “self-

3

governing ,"' to create an

framework

institutional

boundaries ot the written Constitution.

It is

that

would police

this institutional

the

framework, through

the normal operation of the political process, and not just
judicial interpretation

and judicial review
this sense,

that is responsible for maintaining the constitutional
polity. In

Madison's solution

rather than legal .'

4

The key

to the

problem of constitutionalism was

to constitutional

maintenance for Madison

structure the constitutional text calls forth: constitutional design
25

the constitutional enterprise

state

.

The

division of

power between

is

political

is

the very

paramount

to

the national and

governments, the large republic, and the separation of powers and checks

and balances are

all institutional

innovations that structure our politics in very

particular ways: they favor certain political

outcomes over others and through the

ordinary political process maintain a functioning constitutional system.
Constitutional interpretation occurs within this system and allows us to situate

disputes about constitutional meaning and the exercise of judicial review within

this larger political

framework. What

23

Michael Kammen, A Machine
(New York: Vintage, 1986).
24

that

I

am

calling the

Would Go of Itself: The

Michael Zuckert, “Epistemology and Hermeneutics

in

Madisonian system

Constitution in American Culture

the Constitutional Jurisprudence of John

Thomas Shevory, ed, John Marshall’s Achievement: Law,
Interpretations (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1989).
Marshall"

in

is

Politics

and Constitutional

25

Jack Wade Nowlin, “The Constitutional Limits of Judicial Review: A Structural Interpretive
Approach" Oklahoma Law Review 52: 521-564 (1999) and “The Constitutional Illegitimacy of

Expansive Judicial Power: A Populist Structural Interpretive Analysis" Kentucky Law Journal 89,
387 2000/2001, Bruce Peabody, “Coordinate Construction, Constitutional Thickness, and
Remembering the Lyre of Orpheus” University' of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 2:
662-675 (April 2000), John Dinan, Keeping the People 's Liberties: Legislatures, the Public and
Judges as Guardians of Rights (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999).
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political in the first instance in that

it

does not suggest

that the Constitution will

be reduced to neat legal rules by the judiciary acting as
the sole constitutional
umpire.

The
the

political Constitution,

much

power of the government and secure

like the legal Constitution, seeks to limit

the rights of the people (although that

only part of the picture). The primary difference

is

is

the solution to enforcing the

very limits the Constitution purports to establish. The legal Constitution
attempts

government and enforce constitutionalism by way of the

to limit

writtenness ol the Constitution, as law,

with the judiciary enforcing the
text ."

6

text.

It is

the great

by Madison,

is

reluctant to rely

simple power of text. Thus the
“limited

The

way

an attempt

But can the polity be bound by words

the judiciary enforcing the text?

fully

is

— by

uphold

bond the

limitations

polity

by way of

political Constitution, as articulated

on "mere parchment

barriers;”

Mark Graber

institutional design .”

27

fundamental constitutional arrangements cannot be seen

in legal

In this vein, the Constitution

is

is

it

most

doubts the

suggests,

Following

be reduced to legal rules, as "the scope of constitutional law
narrow.”"

its

very

the written Constitution, with

political solution, as

power primarily through

to

to

text: the

this,

terms and cannot

necessarily

not the equivalent of law enforced by

the judiciary.

The Constitution

is

an active institutional framework, a sort of "living

constitution.” Constitutional exposition and development, as well as maintenance,

2b

27

William Harris, The Interpretable Constitution,

Mark Graber, The

28

Griffin,

Civil

War

2.

as a Constitutional Failure, 23.

American Constitutionalism,

45.

34

takes place within a political process that
institutional design)

and

link this institutional

is

is

structured by the Constitution (as

not simply “free floating .” 29 Part of

framework with the question

“Who

my

project

to

is

interprets?”, thus

locating the discussion of constitutional interpretation in the context of
the
political

C onstitution and judicial review

in the

context ot the separation of

powers. The “jurisprudential model,” as Keith Whittington calls
focus on the legal Constitution

constitutional maintenance

is

at the

expense of the

is

means

is

And

if

is at

it is,

meaning

this

may

the primary constitutional value:

29

it

times

even

then

if

tacit

it

is

we may

or indirect.

worked out within

Yet

law,

it

is

To recover

law of a

ask not only what

authoritatively, but

we

see the Constitution

come

also suggest that authoritative settlement

many

it

whether such

terms, authoritative settlement does not necessarily

from the judiciary. But

or

political Constitution.

central to the constitutional enterprise. If

more Madisonian

in

30
.

to settle constitutional

“settlement”

if

to recognize that

fundamentally different sort

leads us to

fundamentally a political task and the political

branches play a central role here even
the political Constitution

it,

is

not

constitutional issues can be left unsettled

the confines of the political process, subject to change and

Brandon, Free in the World 140,
,

6.

See also Wayne Moore, Constitutional Rights and Powers

of the People.
30

Griffin,

American Constitutionalism and

Law of the

Constitution

(New Haven: Yale

especially Sylvia Snowiss, Judicial Review

University Press, 1990).

See also

and

“As Far as Republican Principles Will Admit: Presidential Prerogative and Constitutional
Government” Presidential Studies Quarterly 30: 3: 534-552 September 2000 (situating
prerogative within the political Constitution).

35

the

George Thomas,

revision over time

realize that the

31
.

To

see the Constitution through a Madisonian lens

Constitution does not always speak through the judiciary and

does not always speak with one voice .” 32

It is

also to recognize, as a corollary,

that not all constitutional issues are legal issues resolvable

Constitutional interpretation

moreover, as

much

is

to play

recent scholarship has shown,

when

in

by the judiciary

33
.

only a part of the constitutional enterprise. And,

enterprise connected only to the judiciary.

have a role

is to

comes

it

is

not a distinctly legal

The executive and

the legislature also

to constitutional interpretation.

Coordinate Construction: Interpretation w ithin the Constitutional Structure
Interaction between the branches of government over constitutional

meaning

—

often involving high issues of constitutional interpretation, perhaps

involving more ordinary politics

it

even need be) and

fits

—

is

a central feature of settling such meaning (if

within the system of checks and balances and separation

of powers. Scholars have long insisted

that the judiciary is not the sole or

authoritative interpreter of constitutional meaning. If

seriously, as

Edward Corwin has argued, we

not the Court's interpretation of

Tushnet,

“

Marhury

v.

Madison

43.

288, 346 (1936), "constitutional issues

As
.

take the Constitution

bound by the Constitution and

which are not the same

it,

branches of government must have a say

11

are

we

.

Thus the other

in constitutional interpretation.

Justice Brandeis argued in
.

thing.

determined

will not be

in

Ashwander

v.

TVA, 297

U.S.

advance of the necessity of

deciding them" thus keeping the constitutional issue open and flexible. See also, Keith
Whittington, “Extrajudicial Interpretation
'

2

Three Objections and

a

Response."

Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial

Review, 172.

”

Ibid. 172, 174.

See

also,

Bruce Ackerman,

We

the People: Foundations (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1991); Burt, Constitution in Conflict Griffin, American Constitutionalism.
,

14

Marhury

v.

Madison 555. See
,

also Levinson, Constitutional Faith 43.
,

36

Coordinate construction, or departmentalism, as

this has

come

to be

3

known, emphasizes
realize.

It is

the political nature of the Constitution

more than we often

not just that the president and Congress have a legitimate
say in

interpreting the Constitution.

The point

I

want

to

make

is

deeper.

over constitutional meaning are not simply legal debates that

of bringing the Constitution

to life

that debates

call for judicial

resolution, rather, such debates can be a part ot a larger political
part

It is

dynamic

and finding workable solutions

that is

to

constitutional problems. John Agresto frames the issue perfectly:

we base our understanding and
defense of judicial review on the idea that “the Constitution
If,

is

following Marshall,

law," then the primacy of the Court in the American

system of governance becomes more set. But if our basic
view of the Constitution begins not with what the
Constitution is
law but with what it establishes

— —

—

democracy of separated powers, checked and
then the activity of judicial review becomes part

constitutional

balanced

—

of an interlocking

of governance. In other words,
the idea ot the Constitution as law interpreted by judges
and the idea of the Constitution as a framework for limited
totality

government may well lead

to different results. 36

Murphy, “Who Shall Interpret?’’ and Walter Murphy, James Fleming, and Sotirios Barber,
American Constitutional Interpretation second edition (Westbury, NY: The Foundation Press,
1995) 260-378. Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, and Abraham Lincoln all defended, at times,
variants of departmentalism
as did Madison. As Andrew Jackson said in his statement vetoing
an act to continue the Bank of the United States, “it is maintained by the advocates of the bank that
,

—

its

constitutionality in

all its

features ought to be considered as settled by precedent and by the

Supreme Court. To this conclusion can not assent.” In his First Inaugural,
Lincoln similarly refused to be bound by the Court's settlement in DredSeotf. “I do not forget the
position assumed by some, that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court;
nor do deny that such decisions must be binding in any case, upon the parties to a suit, as to the

decision of the

1

I

object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration,
cases, by

all

confess that

other departments of the government.
if

the policy of the government,

upon

.

.

vital questions, affecting the

whole people,

be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made,
litigation

between

parties, in personal actions, the people will

having, to that extent, practically resigned their

in all parallel

At the same time the candid citizen must

government,

have ceased, to be
into the

in

their

is

to

ordinary

own

rulers,

hands of that eminent

tribunal.”
36

Agresto, The

Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy

1984) 71.

37

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

And

surely they do. Political constitutionalism begins from the institutional

framework, whereas judicial supremacy begins from the axiom
Constitution

is

law.

To understand Madison’s
the governing

that the

framework

political constitutionalism

the Constitution establishes.

we must begin from

We can

how

see

our

Constitution structures our politics in very particular ways by focusing on what

Mark Tushnet

calls

our “thick” Constitution

37
.

The

thick Constitution focuses on

such things as the bicameral structure of Congress, the unitary executive, the
independent judiciary, the division of powers between the

government, the
to take office.

A

suggest that this

is

fact,

states

and the national

even, that one must be of a certain age before being eligible

glance

is all

at

much of current

“mere surplusage”

constitutional law

in

and theory might

Marshall's phrase

38
.

Oddly, though,

it

the bulk of our Constitution. Indeed, the structure of our Constitution

dominated early constitutional debates and thinking

34

Paying attention to the

.

actual institutions the Constitution creates will allow us to address

and intimately related

In the first place

points.

it

will

two important

show us how

institutional

design was meant to preclude certain possibilities and maintain constitutional

boundaries without resorting,
40

politics

.

In a similar fashion,

one branch of the government

37

'

H

39

Tushnet, Taking the Constitution

Marbury
Jack

in

at

1

most cases,

Madison sought

make

— perhaps dominated by
Away from

it

nearly impossible for

a majority

—

to ignore the

the Courts.

Constitutional Limits of Judicial Review:

Approach.”
Griffin,

to

on

74.

Wade Nowlin, “The

40

to the law, but instead relying

American Constitutionalism 59-87.
,

38

A

Structural Interpretive

Constitution's putative limits. Madison was concerned with maintaining rights

and constitutional propriety, yet his solution
our politics

bill

in a particular

of rights

41
.

it

is

suggests, even while arguing that

in structuring

we may

say, in a

forgo the

the thick Constitution that gives the political branches

incentives to maintain constitutional propriety

fact, as

problems lay

manner and not merely by writing them down,

As Tushnet

thick Constitution,

to these

42
.

preoccupied by rights and principles as

The

political Constitution

much of modern

is

is,

in

constitutional

theory and interpretation. Rather than appealing straight to moral theory,

however, or moral theory disguised as neutral constitutional
political constitution seeks political solutions

the

means of achieving

—

institutional solutions

—

that are

constitutional values and principles.

interesting, in this light, that the Federalist

It is

interpretation, the

Papers the great
,

we would

exegetical writing on the Constitution, rarely refers to what

today

call

constitutional law. Rather, the Federalist Papers particularly Madison's writings,
,

refers to the institutional

the

new

Constitution

is

dynamic of the new Constitution.

a great

improvement

Ibid.

See

also,

Remembering
4

"

“On

and

why

how

it

government, Publius devotes

Bruce Peabody, “Coordinate Construction, Constitutional Thickness, and
Keeping the People 's Liberties.

the Lyre of Orpheus” and Dinan,

Tushnet, Taking the Constitution

Epstein,

In explaining

in political institutions

will effectively provide for limited (and effective)

41

'

Away From

the Struggle for Judicial

the Courts, 95-128. See also. Jack Knight and Lee

Supremacy" Law and Society Review 30:87-120 (1996).
,h

This has perhaps changed with the ratification of the I4 Amendment, which arguably paved
way for the legalization of the Constitution shitting our focus to rights (and the Courts) and away

43

from constitutional
overlooking the

structure.

fact that

But such a reading

Congress seems

to

relies

on a

legalist

view of the amendment

have been entrusted by way of section

5 with

defending (and perhaps defining) constitutional rights. Furthermore, recent scholarship casts
even in a bill of rights and the
serious doubt on any special connection between rights
of the constitution.
judiciary, suggesting that the articulation of rights fits within a political view
and
See especially, Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998)
Dinan, Keeping the People 's Liberties 10.

—

,

39

—

the bulk ot the Federalist Papers to the institutional forms of the

Constitution. Madison's most famous discussion of this

51

comes

new
widely cited

in the

s
'

Federalist Paper. Federalist 51 begins by asking

practice the necessary partition of

down

44

in the Constitution?"

constitutional boundaries

is

power among

Madison says

how we

the several departments as laid

that the first reliance

on maintaining

supplied by “exterior provisions.” That

on maintaining constitutional forms comes from

reliance

are to maintain “in

is,

the primary

the large republic,

federalism, the nature of representation, and so forth, which sustain the
constitutional polity by structuring politics in a particular way.

these devices

fail,

interior structure

their

we must

of the government as

that

its

lest

“by so contriving the

several constituent parts

mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other

places.”

in their

may, by

proper

45

While power
Madison's
its

trust in auxiliary precautions:

However,

first

is

separated,

it

must also be checked. Lest the

legislature,

concern, encroach upon the powers of the executive, or overstep

constitutionally limited bounds, the executive should be fortified with a

negative (the veto) against the legislature. The negative, however, should not be
absolute, lest the executive, although the weaker branch, overstep

constitutional limits.

While a written constitution

powers of government and

clearly enumerating the

itself,

44

The

“self-enforcing.”

What

Federalist Papers, No.

45

Ibid, at

is

is

needed

is

a great

its

its

improvement

limitations,

it

is

in

not, ol

to order the Constitution, to give

it

life,

51, 288.

Constitution in
288. For a discussion of the solutions Madison rejected, see Burt, The

Conflict, 47.

40

so to speak, in such a

maintaining

its

way

that the various parties

under

it

will

have an

interest in

boundaries: “But the great security against a gradual

concentration ot the several powers in the same department consists in giving
those

who

administer each department the necessary constitutional means and

personal motives to resist encroachments of the others .” 46
point

Madison argued, “The

constitutional rights of the place .”

that those

who

of the

interest

hold office under

man must

To

drive

home

this

be connected with the

47

it

Constitutional limits will be maintained in

will

have an

interest in enforcing its written

provisions; indeed, an institutionally structured self-serving interest! Tushnet has

insisted that the political branches, of

which we are so suspicious, often have

“incentives” for adhering to the Constitution, which aptly captures Madison's

idea.

The branches of government themselves,

often referring to the text of the

Constitution to answer particular questions, would police the Constitution's

boundaries

was

in their political capacity

to limit

power by

the Constitution

structure, not

would be

through the framework. The larger design

narrow

legal rules.

As Jack Rakove

interpreted and enforced primarily by

political branches. In fact, as

Rakove argues, Madison,

like

argues,

way of the

most Federalists,

thought the “[r]eal interpretation of the Constitution would occur as decisions
^4g

taken within government gradually settled

its

operations in regular channels.”

At the same time, Madison recognized

government

46

Ibid, at

289.

Ibid, at

290.

47

... the exposition of the laws

41

that “in the ordinary course

of

and the constitution devolves upon the

judicial branch.” But, he insisted, this did not

way, the

came

final arbiter

to “the limits

insisted, as

many

make

49

To

that

Court was,

particularly

in

any

when

it

of the powers of the several departments.” Here Madison

future presidents would, that none “of these independent

to declare their sentiments

on

that

give that power to the judiciary, Madison argued, was not only to

department "paramount

in fact to the legislature,

intended,” but, even more problematic,

legal

that the

on the meaning of the Constitution,

departments has more right than another
point .”

mean

document. Yet, can

this

was

it

be avoided?

which was never

to render the Constitution a

As Stephen

Griffin suggests,

mere

“The

experience of American constitutionalism shows that you can maintain the written
quality of the constitution only at the expense of abandoning the

framework

character of the document and you can maintain the framework character of the
constitution only by abandoning the idea that

must occur through formal amendment .”
be open to question, but he

is

50

all

important constitutional change

Griffin’s point about

amendment may

certainly right to highlight the tension

between the

“text” of the Constitution and the “framework” character, which does

forth a kind

conflict

48

of constitutional

politics,

open

to the possibility

seem

to call

of constitutional

and change by way of the framework.

Jack Rakove, Original Meanings Politics and Ideas
:

in the

Making

oj the Constitution

(New

York: Knopf, 1996)345.
44

Annals of the First Congress

,

1,

1789 (June 16

interesting to note that the “great” presidents

all

lh

and I7

lh

advocated

).

See also Rakove, 348.

their

It is

power of constitutional

interpretation against the Court, often going so far as to engage in constitutional politics and

own “constitutional vision,” which, as reconstructive presidents, all became
dominant. See Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams
to (Jeorge Bush (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
articulating their

1141

Griffin,

American Constitutionalsim 4
,

1

42

The

point

wish

I

to address is twofold:

Madison

insists

upon a

political

Constitution policed by the separation of powers. Not only would
the Constitution

be maintained, once the system of checks and balances was

set in

motion, but the

exposition and interpretation of the Constitution would be done by these
very

same branches of government

—and primarily by

the legislature and executive.

This framework character of the Constitution invites the

speak

how

to, create,

and

settle constitutional issues, raising

they do so. At the

same

political

branches to

important questions of

time, the very logic of checks and balances also

gives rise to the notion of judicial review. Interestingly, Madison does not refer to
judicial review in Federalist 51, his

most prominent discussion of checks and

balances. But the nature of judicial review itself seems to be part of the

institutional logic

he spells out

in Federalist 51.

It is,

seemingly, the judiciary's

check on the legislature and the executive. But, paradoxically,
to elevate the judiciary

“the unique

politics

power

above the

even

if

check appears

the judiciary

is

given

to enforce the Constitution" as the “Constitution structures

and government."

legalist gloss,

and executive

legislature

this

if that

51

Moreover, such a move gives the Constitution a

seems

latent in the

document

itself.

The power of

judicial review “arises circumstantially, literally through the chronology of

action

—

yet absent any conflicting vision,

document

51

itself.”

it

expresses the latent intent of the

Checks and balances seem

to give rise to judicial review.

Ibid. 45.

52

Ibid.

As Robert Scigliano has suggested, “[T]he answer

does the Constitution give the final authority to interpret
Court. There

is

no

to the question

its

practical alternative, if the constitutional plan

Court and the Presidency

,

17.

43

we posed— To whom

provisions?--must be: the Supreme
is

to

be followed.” The Supreme

which coupled with

the legal Constitution, leads to judicial supremacy.

Can an

independent judiciary exercising judicial review be placed within the
constitutional

framework

Those who

insist

rather than

on a

in constitutional exposition

sort

above

it?

of departmentalism, or coordinate construction,

seek to relocate a discussion of constitutional

interpretation in the context of the separation of powers.

move, however,
judicial review

on the notion

judicial review

be problematic.

still

It is

if

we make

that the

it

is

Court

is

this

not simply that

a check on the other branches of government, but that

is

Constitution (as

may

Even

it

based

is

peculiarly suited to the task of interpreting the

law). In our

day we tend

as an essentially preventative check; that

to think

is, it

of the separation of powers

effectively, if inefficiently, puts the

brakes on governmental power. Such a view of the separation of powers comes to
us from

Woodrow Wilson and

other Progressive critics, and fails to notice the

peculiar effectiveness of the separation ?

3

It is

between different branches of government, but
structured in a

manner

that

this logic is to impart the

makes them

not simply that

that the

''

is

divided

branches themselves are

suited to their particular tasks

34
.

To

follow

Court with the constitutional function of passing on the

constitutionality of legislation, as Laurence Tribe suggests.

it,

power

As

Tribe would have

the separation of powers gives rise to a sort of judicial finality in that the Court,

Woodrow

Wilson, Constitutional Government

in the

United Stales

(New York: Columbia

University Press, 1910). As Wilson said of Madison’s “Newtonian” system:
tied

up

in

a “nice poise,” held

in

It is

a

government

“inactive equilibrium.”

54

Martin Diamond, “The Separation of Powers and the Mixed Regime” in his As Far as
Republican Principles Will Admit (AEI Press, 1992) 58-67. See also Jeffrey Tulis, The Rhetorical
Presidency (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Jessica Korn, The Power of Separation

American Constitutionalism and the Myth of the
Press, 1996)

and Daniel

Stid,

Legislative Veto (Princeton: Princeton University

The President as Statesman Woodrow Wilson and the Constitution

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998).

44

unlike the explicitly political branches,
interpretation/

finger

5

We

is

suited to the task of constitutional

need not agree with Professor Tribe, but he does put

on a peculiar problem. To put the question

in the

his

idiom of modern

constitutional thinking, can judicial review be separated
from judicial supremacy?

How this has

worked out

in practice is

an empirical question that

is

taken up

extensively in the chapters that follow, but conceptualizing
the Constitution in
political

terms

lets

us unlink judicial review from the legal Constitution.

again on Murphy's formulation,
interpretation

from the

it

allows us to separate the

what ol the Constitution.

o begin to sort this out

I

want

to turn first to

“who of

We can then situate

review within the separation of powers rather than above
I

To draw

judicial

it.

two early constitutional

debates in the Congress: (1) the removal debate and (2) the debate over the

first

national bank. These two cases are illuminating as they are actual attempts by the

Congress and the executive,

led

by Madison,

to

engage the Constitution. They

further illuminate Madison's thinking and demonstrate

how

his thinking

worked

out in actual cases, which, in turn, raises questions about the institutional capacity

of the various branches of government
political

^

and

to

speak

to constitutional questions in

legal ways.

Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional

Law

Foundation Press, 2000).

45

,

third edition,

volume one (New York:

both

Madisonian Constructions: Constitutional

The tendency

Politics

to regard the Constitution as a legal text
leads us to focus

constitutional law often at the expense of the Constitution
itself

56

.

law

taken to be the equivalent of constitutionalism. So

is

much

on

Constitutional

we

so, in fact, that

are preoccupied by the Court and judicial review and.
thereby, pay less attention
to

how

in

ways

meaning

constitutional

that

is

shaped by the

political

branches of government

do not even come before the judiciary, or how judicial power

historically situated."

Such a narrow tocus neglects

constitutional development,

crucial

itself is

moments of American

where constitutional questions were

settled either

by

the political branches or through the interaction of the political branches,
the

and the Court

public,

Constitution.

might

The

58
.

Constitutional law

political

branches are also

critical

here and recognizing this

development of constitutional law within the

try to locate the judicial

view of the

only part of the working

is

political Constitution. If

we

turn to the early debates

meaning of the Constitution, they occur primarily between
legislature as well as within these branches.

president's removal

power and

we

larger

on the nature and

the executive and the

Think of the debates over the

the establishment of the national bank

551

These

.

debates touch on central issues of constitutional interpretation and development,

56

As Sanford Levinson

least to reject the

says,

judged by the Constitution
'

7

“To

reject the ultimate authority

of the Supreme Court

is

binding authority of the Constitution, but only to argue that the Court
itself rather

than the other

way around.”

not in the
is

to

be

Constitutional Faith 43.
,

Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues 23 1-274.
,

58

This suggests a deeper point that

is

often neglected by our focus on the judiciary, and that

underpinnings of judicial power. Judicial independence

political

may depend,

in

is

the

one way or

another, on the compliance of the other branches. Gerald Rosenberg, “Judicial Independence and

Power” Review of Politics

Political
59

The

54:

369-98

(

1992).

repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 by the Judiciary Act of 1802

but one

I

do not take up

for reasons

of space.

46

is

also a prime example,

but in no

way

moments

ot constitutional development, the judiciary

center on judicial interpretation and exposition. In
these central

These “Madisonian moments” show us a
an easy distinction between law and politics that
judicial supremacy.

Whether

it

is

was

political Constitution that rejects

is

so central to the claims of

constitutional structure, an institutional clash

between the branches of government over constitutional

development ot constitutional meaning
that these devices are political

Constitution.

we

terms,

if

we

interpretation, or the

in non-interpretive

ways of speaking

Most importantly,

essentially silent.

to

ways, the key point

is

and maintaining the

conceptualize the Constitution in political

will not see constitutional questions as simply legal questions to be

resolved by the judiciary and thus will not share the fears of proponents of judicial

supremacy over
first

politics

and indeterminacy

instance, the Constitution

politics

based on

its

may

in

regard to the Constitution. In the

be upheld (including rights) by ordinary

institutional design (as a republican

constitutional questions are raised (even about the

branches speak to these, but there

is

form or government).

meaning of rights) the various

nothing that makes such debated

constitutional questions the sole province of the judiciary.

settled

by the

political

mean

may

of events, be settled by the courts, but that does not

they must be settled by courts. Indeed, in

may remain

Such questions may be

branches without ever turning to the judiciary. They

also, in the ordinary course

If

many

instances such questions

fundamentally unsettled.

Viewing these

early cases of nonjudicial exposition should enable us to

glimpse more fully Madison's

political Constitution

47

and the way

in

which

constitutional questions are taken up through the
interaction of the constitutional

framework—through

politics.

As Whittington

argues,

needs to be supplemented with a more explicitly
distinct effort to understand
text ."

60

Whittington

which develop

is

one

political

that describes a

and rework the meaning of a received constitutional

focusing on what he calls “constitutional constructions,”

constitutional

meaning

in a political rather

Here, “political" refers primarily to the fact that

even while assuming

“The jurisprudential model

it

is

fidelity to constitutional text.

constitutional construction

is

more

notion of judicial interpretation;

it

done

than a legal fashion.

in a nonlegal setting,

At the same time,

creative than the narrower and circumscribed

not simply nonjudicial interpretation, but an

is

attempt to construct constitutional meaning from a broad and occasionally unclear
text.

Constructions are attempts to address questions of constitutional governance,

not settle legal issues.

Unlike jurisprudential interpretation, construction provides
for an element of creativity in construing constitutional

meaning.

Constructions do not pursue a preexisting

deeply hidden meaning

in the

if

founding document; rather,

they elucidate the text in the interstices of discoverable,
interpretive

meaning, where the text

underdetermined

as

to

be

incapable

exhaustive reduction to legal
interpretive

task

is

to

rules.

the

limit

so broad or so

is

of

In

possibilities

meaning, even as some indeterminacies remain

60

Keith Whittington, Constitutional Construction,

5.

Constitutional
61

Commentary

Whittington, Constitutional Construction

,

5.

48

but

of textual

61
.

See also Bruce Peabody, "Nonjudicial

Constitutional Interpretation, Authoritative Settlement, and a
Vol. 16: 63 (1999).

faithful

such cases, the

New Agenda

for

Research"

It is

tempting to think of Madison's early attempts

from the Congress as constitutional constructions

seems

to adhere to a distinction

between law and

at constitutional interpretation

62
.

Yet, Whittington at times

politics that reinforces the

judiciary's connection with the Constitution as legal text: the judiciary seems to

be the primary enforcer of constitutional boundaries
judicial review.

By

contrast, the political branches

way of the

constitutional visions by

in a negative sense

by way of

advance larger scale

creative task of constitutional construction.

So while

the political branches advance constitutional development, the judiciary

seems

be the guardian of constitutional

to

historically

63
.

But the

line

limits.

Perhaps

is

are speaking to constitutional issues. That

deeper point, but

We

distinction.

it

is

is

done

in

ways

that

do not neatly

see this vividly in Bruce

is

is

not always clear

not to say that

not structured by the Constitution;

is

works out

not always a clear one. This

so at least partly because the line between “law” and “politics"

constitutional politics

it

Whittington attempts to draw between constitutional

“interpretation" and constitutional “construction"

when we

how

this is

fit

it is,

which

is

the

the “law” and “politics”

Ackerman's work on

constitutional

change. According to Ackerman, key constitutional developments occur by way

of constitutional

politics

where the people

Constitution in favor of a

new

(as the

constitution.

people

Ackerman's work moves

the Court and a formal view of constitutional text (Article

62

In a

alter the existing

V)

to see

far

how

beyond
our

similar vain, Louis Fisher has long spoken ot coordinate construction, which,
Madison's own thinking. However, 1 draw on Whittington s notion ot constitutional

somewhat

often captures

construction

in that

of the Constitution

it

seems

in

way

a

to

fundamentally emphasize the

that Fisher

does

political against a

merely legal vision

not.

Constitutional
Whittington, “Presidential Challenges to Judicial Supremacy and the Politics of
2001.
Meaning,” Polity Volume XXXIII, Number 3 Spring

63

49

politics

—

in extraordinary constitutional

Constitution. Yet even

Ackerman

moments

—shapes and

returns quickly to a legal

alters

our

view of the

Constitution with the judiciary enforcing the (new) Constitution. His “theory

on judges,

relies excessively

for

all

his

examination of the president and the

people, to read the meaning of constitutional revolutions and act accordingly.

judges, in the end,
the Constitution ."

who

64

read the tea leaves of constitutional transformation into

Thus

constitutional politics

rare

is

and we return

model of the Constitution. Ackerman himself ultimately seems
settlement of constitutional change by the judiciary.

a constitutional vision

Court? This

It is

is

to the legal

to call for a legal

What happens, though, when

put forward and accepted, but never ratified by the

may happen when

power, by way of the veto,

a president offers a narrow view of constitutional

that is never contested in the

Jackson did during the bank war). Or,

in a similar vein,

Court (as President

what happens when

constitutional argument persists even after the Court has spoken? Constitutional

politics

of this

example

—do

sort

—

persistent contests over abortion rights or federalism, for

not easily

fit

this

model. In many cases

we have

lingering conflicts

without a clear and settled legal view of particular constitutional questions (even

if

we have

and

a multitude of theories that

in fact are settled,

If

we

64

us

by the Constitution

if

how

such issues should be

we just

read

it

settled,

correctly).

recognize the Constitution as a governing framework, the fact that

we might have
is

tell

conflicting constitutional visions or unsettled constitutional issues

not necessarily disturbing.

The Constitution

George Thomas, “New Deal Originalism,"

Polity

50

is

a broad and occasionally

Volume XXXII, Number

1

(Fall

2000) 157.

indeterminate text. There are not always “right' answers to constitutional
questions, and such issues

—

often involving "creedal passions”

—

are naturally

going to be the subject of much dispute (and revision ). 65 Moreover, the
Constitution itself often leaves judgments to the political branches:
particular kind of politics as

should expect that
time: what

is

we

will

at

moment

Constitution naturally has

as

it

calls for a particular settlement.

have competing constitutional views

taken to be settled

well be altered at another

to

much

its

one moment
in time.

As

—

that

Thus we

change over

or not even important

—may

a framework of governance, our

shortcomings— it

is

imperfect. But this

is

not going

be overcome by a particular theory of constitutional interpretation perfectly

implemented by the Court

(or

implemented by the Court

to settle the issue).

is

calls forth a

it

even a decidedly wrong theory of interpretation

when we attempt

It is

an institutional framework of governance as law

and reduced
example,
settle all

to legalities that

we

insist that to serve its

such question. But

Constitution as law.

And

that

to treat

what

can be coherently settled

run into problems. Alexander and Schauer, for

primary mission as law, the Constitution must

this insistence

like so

stems from their positing the

much of modern

constitutional theory, their

preoccupations run the risk of theoretical abstraction.

Much of modern

constitutional theory, for example, prescribes a particular role for the Court

the great defender of rights, say

— but does so without ever bothering

to

—

as

examine

the Court's historical performance in this regard. Constitutional theorizing that

more informed by

65

political science,

Samuel Huntington, American

Politics:

is

paying attention to constitutional design and

The Promise oj Drsharmony (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1981).
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how

the system has actually worked, will allow us to better
get at these important

As Graber

constitutional questions.

puts

it,

“rather than ask[ing]

the role of the judiciary be,' the imperfect constitutionalist

what

roles has the judiciary actually played .”' 66

branches as well.
but that

it

is

It is

in a

way

that

is

utterly

.

.

‘what should

would want

to

know'

this applies to the other

much of constitutional

not just that so

normative

And

.

theory

is

normative,

divorced from our real-world

constitutionalism. Assertions that the judiciary must act as the guardian of the

Constitution, otherwise

we

will be lost, are voiced, in blithe ignorance of

rarely the judiciary has ever saved us

from ourselves. And so

constitutional theory treats the judiciary in an idealized world

all

how

too often,

(how

it

will

work

in

perfect theory), while examining the political branches from a real-world

perspective. Constitutional theory

oi the Constitution

than with looking

actually functions

and

at the

67
.

how

Mark Graber, “Our

far too

preoccupied with

its

perfect theories

our Constitution does not measure up

ways

in

to

them, rather

which our system of constitutional governance

Let us then turn to examine

illustrate the functioning

b6

is

some Madisonian moments

of this system.

(lm)Perfect Constitution” Review of Politics 5

52

1

:

86, 101 (1989).

to

The President
In

’s

Removal Power

1789 the

First

Congress, which of course included

many

delegates to

the Constitutional Convention, debated whether officials
in the executive

branch

—who had been appointed with

the advice and consent of the Senate

could be removed by the president alone. Madison argued that the
Constitution

was not eminently

clear

on the matter, but

the Constitution in such a

way

that the legislature

ought to construe

as to give the president the sole

power of removal.

Madison's conclusion was not simply based on interpreting Article

II's

vesting

clause as requiring this solution. For Madison, the Constitution was not self-

evidently clear on this point and

it

was

the task of the Congress to settle such

disputes, laying the ground rules for future interpretation and setting a clear

precedent so that ordinary politics would not be absorbed by such constitutional
questions. Said Madison,

Constitution

is

other difficulties, the exposition of the

frequently a copious source [of difficult questions]

continue so until
precedents”

“Among

—

its

meaning on

in this case the

all

.

.

and must

great points should have been settled by

precedents of the Congress. Madison did not see

the legislation Congress drafted giving the executive the sole

67

.

power of removal

as

Christopher Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

2001

).

Eisgruber, for example, begins with the notion that our Constitution

governance, but then very quickly argues
their notions
historically).

that

is

a

framework of

judges should interpret the Constitution based on

ofjustice (with very little concern about how this has actually worked out
Normative concerns are deeply important and are a fundamental part of

constitutional theory.

Still,

such normative concerns can take into account our constitutional

Hadley Arkes, Beyond the Constitution (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990); Sotirios Barber, The Constitution of Judicial Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1993); and Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
Whereas leading legal thinkers like Ronald Dworkin, Freedom 's Law (Cambridge: Harvard

history. See,

University Press, 1996) rarely connect their thinking with our constitutional history.
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merely advisory, but rather sought

to settle a constitutional dispute

—and

settle

it

by way of legislative construction of the Constitution. William Smith
of South
Carolina objected to this construction, insisting that the consent of the
Senate was
necessary to remove an appointee as
place.

In

drawing out

his argument.

it

was necessary

Smith pointed

him

to appoint

to Federalist 77,

in the first

where none

other than Alexander Hamilton, Madison's great collaborator as Publius,
argued
that the Senate

his

was necessary

argument a step further

House
was

—had no business

in doubt.

“to displace as well as appoint.” Smith then pushed

in insisting that the

Congress

—

particularly the

deciding the matter. Given that constitutional meaning

in

Smith suggested

that this

was preeminently a judicial

question.

Rather than illegitimately attempting to expound on the Constitution, Smith
thought the Congress should wait

be

question

came before

the judiciary to

69

settled.

Madison
to be, the

itself

insisted that the judiciary

was

not, nor

could

which the

to

last

arguments would lead us

is,

has not right to expound the constitution; that whenever

doubtful,

declare

it

have been meant

primary expositor of the Constitution. “But the great objection drawn

from the source

68

until the

you must leave

its

meaning.”

70

it

to take

its

that the Legislature

its

course, until the Judiciary

For Madison, the Congress had as

much

meaning
is

called

right to

is

upon

to

determine

Ih

1789 in William T. Hutchinson, William M. E. Rachal,
Madison (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
James
and Robert Rutland, eds.. The Papers of
Meanings 349.
Original
Rakove,
1962) XII, 290-291 See also

Madison

to

Thomas

Jefferson, June 30

,

.

—

69

—

Gary Jacobsohn notes that the consensus in Congress unlike Madison’s argument did not
question “the finality of the judicial determination of constitutionality,” although that is not quite
the same things as endorsing it. The Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspiration
123.
70

Annals of the

First

Congress

/,

519-52

1

(June

54

1

7,

1

789).

,

constitutional

could even

meaning

come

as the judiciary; indeed, he doubted whether “this question

before the judges ."

71

Madison's argument here

is

often taken as

the great defense of departmentalism in constitutional interpretation

be so, but

we must

departmentalism

is

taken to

of its constitutional power;
Constitution that apply to

final authority

As

it

mean
that

that

is, it

is

is

the governing

branches themselves are structured

In this instance, the

it

may

in part to

Ibid.
7:

Court

is

not the

here. Instead,

Madison

Madison’s view seems

all

the branches and the

maintain the Constitution, they

to the Constitution; indeed, the idea

maintaining the Constitution.

71

of the

well be on issues addressing

framework over

is

Constitution and being so bound are obligated to

In fact,

the primary interpreter

73
.

Madison's argument

clearly not

may

Congress (or any branch) can touch upon constitutional questions.

the Constitution

may speak

is

interprets those provisions

specifically

This

departmentalism. In some guises

each department

on Congress' power, although

the judiciary. But this

insists that the

we mean by

be clear on what

72
.

that they are

it

and not

bound by the

to the other branches.

to suggest that “interpretive plurality"

If

such a task were vested

See also Rakove, Original Meanings

,

all

in a single

is

central to

body, the

348.

Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues 231-279. Agresto's departmentalism seems to be more

along these lines as well, insofar as he puts emphasis on the dynamic of the checks and balances
and interaction between the branches. The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy 99-102.
,

Gary Jacobsohn suggests that Lincoln’s views on judicial review, properly understood,
in this light. The Supreme Court and the Decline oj Constitutional Aspiration, 95-1 12.

also put

it

77

See Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1989) for one such view. Also, Charles Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John
Marshall and the Rule of Law (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996). Hobson suggests
that Marshall’s “defense of judicial review fully agreed with the “departmental’’ theory of
constitutional interpretation, according to which each of the three co-ordinate departments ot
government had final authority to interpret the Constitution when acting within its own sphere of

duties and responsibilities,” 67. Although, Corwin,

construction.”
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who

coined the term, surely meant “coordinate

chances of error and misgovernment would be
multiple institutions, the Constitution

more

likely to get

principle

greater

it

it

right.

As Madison

departments ?”

I

more

And

in

making out

beg

to

the limits of the

we

are

know, upon what

do not see

Congress

that

any one of these departments has more

is

We

to

right than

should even note that

in

largely defining executive power.

For Madison the Court had no special relation

goes some way

powers of the several

again, “If the constitutional boundary of either be brought into

another to declare their sentiments on that point .” 74
this case

I

vesting this task in

be adhered to and

likely to

argued, “But,

By

can be contended, that any one department draws from the constitution

powers than another,

question,

is

far higher.

showing us

to the Constitution,

that he did not see the Constitution as

“law”

which
to be

enforced mostly by the courts. Madison fully recognized that the Constitution

would contain ambiguity and indeterminacy,
alone should give clarity and

branches

75
.

Instead,

final

meaning

Madison thought

but that did not

mean

to the Constitution

over the other

that Congress' construction

preferable in this matter. His argument

is

the Court

would be

a reminder that the Constitution

is

not

only about limitations, but also about constitutional power and creating a

workable government. He thought the

up with a workable solution

legislature

would be

to this constitutional question,

the best place to

drawing on

come

its

experience to craft a competent solution to an immediate problem. This also

shows us

that

Congress may speak

to constitutional

meaning

in

ways

that

do not

accept the dichotomy between “law” and “politics” or between “interpretation"

74

Annals of the First Congress

/,

519-521 (June

56

17,

1789)

my

emphasis.

and "construction,” even while taking

Madison brought

this to bear in the

fidelity to the Constitution

"Decision of 1789”:

if

very seriously.

Congress’ construction

ot the Constitution “is the true construction of this instrument, the
clause in the
bill is

nothing more than explanatory of the meaning of the Constitution, and

therefore not liable to any particular objection on that account.” Here Madison

seems

to be

speaking distinctly of congressional interpretation as clarification and

insisting that Congress’ interpretation ought to stand

interpretation, but because

is

it

it

is

likely that

the question will

it

is

depend on

If,

Congress'

on the other hand, the

to exercise

is

is

it

it

power of

[the

submitted to the discretion of the Legislature, and

its

own

merits."

Whittington's construction, which Madison

judgment of Congress

not because

the correct interpretation.

Constitution “is undecided as to the body which

removal],

—

76

is

This sounds

much more

like

saying depends on the political

to create a constitutional settlement. Either

Madison Congress' construction of the Constitution should
guide future questions of constitutional meaning on

way,

settle the

77

this point.

for

matter and

Thus,

constitutional politics from the Madisonian perspective should settle

constitutional meaning, giving us precedents that

While

this is a political solution,

it

is

one

would guide even

that attempts to

fit

the judiciary.

within the

constitutional framework. Madison's solution lays forth a prudent and practical

75

See Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, "On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation.”

76

The Armais of the First Congress

1,

1

789- 1791, 464, 46
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course of constitutional governance, but one that
squares with Article

and thus

is

rooted in a larger constitutional vision. But what

just reducing the Constitution to a particular

interpretation— and passing that along;
calls forth.

it

is

The framework character of the

possibility ot disputes

meaning

the

is

II

concerns

so important

not

is

— by construction or

framework the constitutional

text

Constitution, holding out the

between the branches, moves us

to focus

on the

persuasiveness (and even political viability) ot answers to constitutional
questions
rather than acceptance of the answers

imposed by a single branch

given the chance that a single branch could get

unworkable

it

—

especially

wrong or come up with an

solution.

The Bank of the United States

We
Madison
law

see a reliance on nonjudicial precedent and settled meaning from

as President

in 1816.

Bank

when he signed

Second Bank of the United States

into

Madison, of course, had argued against the establishment of the

First

ot the United States in the First Congress. In this great debate over the

nature of the Constitution and

Thomas

11

the

When

how

to properly interpret

it,

Madison joined with

Jefferson against his one-time ally Alexander Hamilton.

78

From

the Court later addressed the President’s removal power. Chief Justice Taft turned to

Madison's arguments

in

the House.

Myers

v.

United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). This power was

qualified in later Court decisions regarding the President’s
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial duties, Wiener

v.

power

to

remove

officers performing

United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) and

Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 ( 1935). See also Fisher, Constitutional
Dialogue, 238 and Dean Alfange, “Separation of Powers: A Welcome Return to Normalcy?” 58
The George Washington Law Review 668 (1990).
78

“But the proposed bank could not even be called necessary to the government; at most it cold be
James Madison, "The Bank Bill, House of Representatives 2 Feb. 1791," in
Philip Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds.. The Founder's Constitution, Volume Three (Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 1987) 245. And “A bank there is not necessary, and consequently not authorized by

but convenient.”

this phrase.”

Thomas

Jefferson, "Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a

National Bank, 15 Feb. 1791," 246.
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Congress, Madison argued that the Constitution did
not grant the national

government the power ot incorporation and,

therefore, the

government could not

incorporate a national bank. Jetterson echoed this
argument from the executive

branch as Secretary ot

State.

Hamilton, also from the executive branch as

Secretary ot the Treasury, insisted that the national government,
relying on the

"necessary and proper clause,” had the power
constitutional interpretation

is

79
.

While the debate over

fascinating in and ot

concern. For our purposes, the compelling point

is

itselt,

it

is

not our primary

that a coordinate constitutional

construction between the executive and legislative branches settled constitutional

meaning on

this issue (at least tor a time).

are interesting in that they

articulating constitutional

function

is

—a saying "no”

show

us

meaning

to

Madison

s

and Jefferson's arguments

members of Congress and
in a

way

that limits their

power. This negative

governmental power by drawing on the Constitution

not just a judicial function. But there

is

an even more revealing point, which

altogether neglected by the proponents of judicial supremacy.

understand the constitutional framework,

government
particular

in relation to

moment. As

the executive

we must view

is

really

the branches of

one another and examine what each

the Court

To

is

doing

essentially a reactive institution,

depends upon the actions of the executive and

is

at a

role

its

legislature, suggesting variation

across time, forcing our thinking about any particular institution to be

contextually sensitive. If the Court, for example, has a broader vision of

constitutional permissiveness than the Congress or the president, then

74

it

Alexander Hamilton, "Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank, 23 Feb. 1791"
and Lerner, The Founder's Constitution, 247-250.

59

will

in

Kurland

rarely

—

if

ever

—be positioned

to strike

down

acts of

Congress as

unconstitutional. Conversely, if we have a truly activist
Congress and president

with a broader view of their power than the Court has,
then

much more

active Court

80
.

Even

we

are likely to see a

the terms “activism” and “restraint”

in relation to the specific actions

of the

political branches.

must be seen

Thus, the Court

may be

a defender of constitutional limits and rights at a particular time,
given a particular

Congress and president, but

it

may

not be at a later time. These are empirical

questions, not simply questions of theory and logic.

Against Madison's and Jefferson's objections, the
established the bank and

alone, however,

was only

it

was signed

was not enough

settled over a period

into

First

Congress

law by President Washington. This

to settle the issue; in fact, the constitutional issue

of decades

81
.

Indeed, this construction,

Madison

later said,

had undergone ample discussions in its passage through the
several branches of the Government.
It had carried into
execution throughout a period of twenty years with annual
legislative recognition

of

.

.

and with the entire acquiescence

the local authorities, as well as of the nation at large;

to all

of which may be added, a decreasing prospect of any

change

opinion adverse to the constitutionality

in the public

of such an institution

80

.

all

82
.

Mark Graber, “The Jacksonian Origins of Chase Court Activism" Journal of Supreme Court

History Vol. 25 No. 2 (2000) 18-19.
81

Gerard Magliocca, “Veto! The Jacksonian Revolution
Nebraska Law Review 78: 205-262 (1999).
8

in

Constitutional

Law”

University of

Madison quoted in Gary Rosen, American Compact: James Madison and the Problem of
Founding (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998) 172. See also, Charles Warren, The
Supreme Court in United States History, I7H9-IH35 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1922,
1926) 517-518, for Madison’s criticism of Marshall’s McCulloch opinion.
"
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Today we turn
question;

addressed

we

to

In

.

it

decision in

McC

ulloch

v.

Maryland as
if

settling this

the Court has

an interesting way, though, the question of whether the national

government could charter
time

s

take a constitutional dispute to be settled only
83

it

Marshall

a

bank was

came before Marshall and

settled

the Court.

and was taken

to be settled

by the

As Marshall himself recognized

in his

opinion, “It has truly been said that this can scarcely be considered as
an open
question, entirely unprejudiced by the former proceedings of the nation respecting
it.

The

principle

contested was introduced

at

been recognized by many successive

history, has

upon by

now

a very early period of our

legislatures,

and has been acted

the judicial department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of

undoubted obligation ."

84
It

would have been wholly shocking

if

Marshall had

decided the case other than he did, given the constitutional politics that had

83

In

discussing McCulloch perhaps the leading constitutional law book, Gerald Gunther and
,

Kathleen Sullivan, Constitutional

Law (New

York: Foundation Press, 1997) thirteenth edition,

gives a history of the debate prior to McCulloch and speaks of scholarly debate since McCulloch

,

but does not speak of Jackson’s veto and the effective settlement of the issue for several decades

seemingly against Marshall’s opinion. Gunther and Sullivan acknowledge
decision, important as

is,

it

was no more

speaking of the national legislature’s
bank, 99.

Two

the

ability

that ’’the

McCulloch

end than the beginning of the debate.” Yet, they are
to reach local affairs and not the power to establish a

leading books by political scientists fare no better. David O’Brien’s Constitutional

Law and Politics (New

York:

W.W.

Norton, 1998) fourth edition, gives a similar history and

suggests that Marshall’s interpretation seems correct and has been confirmed by subsequent Court

opinions
(

1

.)

— namely. The Legal Tender Cases

Court missing

how

the other branches

turning to the Court. Lee Epstein and

CQ

(

1

884) and Katzenhach

v.

Morgan

(1996). But this

eclipses a large portion of our constitutional history (1819-1 884) and (2.) focuses again on the

seem

to

have settled a

Thomas Walker’s

vital constitutional

Constitutional

questions without

Law (Washington,

D.C.:

Press, 1998) fourth edition, gives a history of the conflict prior to Marshall’s opinion but says

nothing of what came after 1819. This from two leading empirical political scientists! Murphy,
Barber and Fleming, American Constitutional Interpretation give a history of the conflict and
,

Jackson’s statement rejecting Marshall’s opinion. But then this book specifically seeks to give an
alternate view of the constitution and questions of constitutional interpretation, rejecting much of
conventional understanding.
84

McCulloch

v.

Maryland A Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316, 401 (1819).

61

already addressed the question (and given his
interesting about Marshall's opinion for us

Marshall insisted that
vital parts, is to

own

is its

inclinations ).

86

And

What

is

claim to judicial supremacy.

the constitution ol our country, in

be considered .”

85

its

most

interesting

and

then continued, “But [the question] must be

decided peacefully, or remain a source of hostile legislation, perhaps of
hostility

of a

still

more

serious nature; and

can the decision be made.

On

the

if

it

is

to be so decided,

by

Supreme Court of the United

constitution of our country devolved this important duty .” 87
point,

we

this tribunal alone

States has the

From our vantage

take Marshall at his word. But subsequent history belies Marshall's

argument. The Court's opinion did not cease constitutional argument on the
question. Just over a decade later, the debate

rejected Marshall's

McCulloch opinion and

constitutional. Presidents

Van Buren and

constitutional “reconstruction ,”

multiple occasions-a

88

insisted the

bank was not

Polk, “articulated” Jackson's

with President Tyler specifically vetoing-on

new bank on

settled for a large portion

was rejoined when President Jackson

similar grounds.

The

constitutional issue

of the nineteenth century against the bank, even

McCulloch was never overturned (allowing

it

to

was

if

be resurrected by twentieth-

century constitutional law while ignoring our actual constitutional history).
“[President] Tyler's vetoes prevented the dismantling of Jacksonian Democracy's

major

8'

At

political

least

not a state
8<
’

achievements. Those same vetoes, however, blocked a case

on the question of whether the national government could establish
may tax that bank once established was an open question.

McCulloch

at

400-401.

87

Ibid.

62

a bank.

Whether or

challenging the bank's constitutionality from reaching
a Supreme Court packed

with Jackson

s

anti-bank partisans. Thus, Tyler

may have

inadvertently saved

A/t( ulloch trom the dustbin ol history and denied
Jackson's

would have been

may be
in

its

greatest victory .”

89

The point

is

movement what

that constitutional

meaning

settled over time, particularly with important
constitutional questions,

ways

that cannot be divorced

likely to

depend upon the

constitutional vision

political forces

from

political forces

— with

settled

its

which support

it,

Such settlements themselves

politics.

issues by

90
.

Nor does

meaning

mere proclamation. To

— may only be

as stable as the

leaving open the possibility that there

the judiciary

seem

run— whether judicial

institutionally capable

insist, as

is

the constitutional

workable system of government which

no such

of resolving such
that

to place a higher

value on absolute clarity than the “true" meaning of the Constitution

how

is

or

Alexander and Schauer do,

constitutional meaning, once settled, should not be revisited

wrong), as well as to ignore

are

of the day, suggesting that a particular

thing as “authoritative settlement” in the long

otherwise

and

(if

we

get

it

framework establishes a

mean

that particular

These early debates on constitutional meaning are notable,

particularly to

will almost certainly

constitutional settlements will be reopened.

our modern

88

tastes, in that the judiciary plays

such an insignificant role

in

them.

Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make. Also, Whittington, “Presidential Challenges
Supremacy and the Politics of Constitutional Meaning.”

to

Judicial
8V

Magliocca, “Veto!,” 212. See also Mark Graber, “The Jacksonian Origins of Chase Court

Activism.”

w As

Scott Gant’s defense of judicial supremacy recognizes. Gant qualifies his version of judicial

supremacy saying

that, well,

nothing

is final.

Yes, but

if that is so,

then

why do we

really

need

authoritative judicial settlement? If constitutional questions can be reopened by the other branches

or by the public, then

why

close them by the judiciary?

63

Here we have the great early debates about constitutional
exposition and
governance, absent (mostly) the great expositor of the
Constitution— the
judiciary.

Yet, Madison's political Constitution does not
reject judicial

interpretation ol the Constitution,

final interpreter

of the Constitution

worry

that judicial interpretation

an

quoted

oft

it

letter to

only rejects the notion that the Court
in

91

an authoritative way

might inexorably lead

John Brown, he made evident

Still,

.

to judicial

is

the

Madison did
supremacy. In

this concern!

In the State Constitutions

and indeed in the Fed[eral] one
no provision is made tor the case of a disagreement in
expounding them; and as the Courts are generally the last in
also,

making ye
refusing

decision,

to

it

character.

This

paramount

in

law,

makes

fact

stamp

to

the

the

to

them by refusing or not

results to

execute a

it

Judiciary

final

its

Dep[ar]t[ment]

which was never

Legislature,

intended and can never be proper

with

92
.

For Madison constitutional meaning would be settled across time by the
political interplay

between the branches, an

limits of the Constitution.

41

While judicial review might seem
in

fact, in that

Federalist 51 which

would

to
it

How

in

ineluctably from the very notion of checks and

those terms. In his classic exegesis of checks and

discussed above, Madison never even mentions the judiciary.
very discussion Madison rejects a means similar to judicial review. One notable

solution to keeping the majority

independent of the majority

—

1

in

that

check. Madison says,
is,

undemocratic branch of government,

of the society

to create “a will in the

is

itself.”

The Court,

that

that great “countermajoritarian” institution,

Madison was genuinely perplexed by

community

It

seems

can scarcely be

the notion of judicial review. Other than

Hamilton’s Federalist 78 perhaps the most prominent reference
,

Alexander Hamilton, “If the judges were not embarked

would pronounce

In

as an unelected and

suspiciously independent of society, a solution unacceptable to Madison.

doubted

also maintain the

Moreover, tor Madison “this essentially creative task

balances, Madison does not discuss

balances

activity that

in a

in

is

Federalist 16, also by

conspiracy with the legislature, they

the resolution of such a majority to be contrary to the

supreme law of the

land,

unconstitutional, and void.” The Federalist Papers 85.
,

42

Madison

Virginia,’”

to

John Brown, October

Murphy

et. al.,

12, 1788,

“Observations on the ‘Draught of a Constitution for

American Constitutional Interpretation 279. Madison's argument must
,

also be separated from arguments for legislative supremacy, the type that John Bannister Gibson

made

in

Eakin

v.

Raub. Legislative supremacy,

64

too,

was unacceptable.

does not expose a

failing in the constitutional design;

constitutional system.

Madison

between the different bodies

s

and

settle constitutional

to the task or

on the Constitution. Intimately connected with
the system

would work

represents a working

system brought forth mutual interaction

to construct

no one branch was peculiarly suited

it

supreme

in

this point is

in a political rather than

narrowly

meaning, while

terms of a

final say

Madison's view

legalistic

that

manner.

It is

not simply that the legislature and the executive might rely on prudence
as well as
principle in construing the Constitution, but that the very

dynamic between them

lends the system a political nature, which makes any easy distinction between
constitutional law and constitutional politics rather tenuous. In the absence of
judicial review, though,

role here

it

is difficult

to see

how

the Court

would play much of a

94
.

We may

best keep judicial review and judicial

supremacy

distinct

one another by placing judicial review within the constitutional framework

from

I

sketched above. This key distinction between judicial review and judicial

supremacy gets conceptually

blurred, however.

of the Constitution as law akin
us judicial supremacy. Here

supremacy and the

sn

94

I

to ordinary law;

will take

The
it

is

crucial step occurs in thinking

this transformation that yields

up the crucial

link

between judicial

legal Constitution.

Whittington, Constitutional Construction,

While Madison himself

is

conspicuously

I.

silent

on the matter, the very logic of checks and

balances gives rise to the notion of judicial review, which lends

at least

some credence

notion of the Court as the primary enforcer of our Constitution.

To add

to the confusion,

himself gave

light to this

view during the debate over the

Bill

to the

Madison

of Rights, saying the courts would

bulwark against the executive and legislative branches in preserving the peoples' rights
New Right v. The Constitution (Cato, 1986), 24. Especially, Barry
Friedman, “Dialogue and Judicial Review” 91 University of Michigan Law Review 4: 577-682

act as a

Stephen Macedo, The

(1993).

65

Judicial

Supremacy and

the Legal Constitution

In their defense

of judicial supremacy, Alexander and Schauer argue

"if a multiplicity of bodies says

multiplicity of laws, or,

same

law.

And

if

.

.

.

more

what the law

is,

then there

is

likely to

that

be a

precisely, a multiplicity of interpretations of the

knowing what

necessary conditions to legality

the law

itself,

is

and knowing

how

to

comply

are

then multifarious law and multifarious

interpretation are at odds with the rule of law itself." 95 Hence, the Constitution's

meaning must be
Schauer

settled

by a single body.

turn, not surprisingly, to

In

making

Marbury. The Court

assertions, has also turned to Marshall's opinion.

recently put

Our

this

As

argument Alexander and

itself, in

Justice

making

similar

Kennedy most

it:

national

experience teaches that the Constitution

when each

preserved best

both

the

Constitution

part

and

the

determinations of the other branches.
interpreted the Constitution,

it

is

of the government respects
proper

When

and

actions

the Court has

has acted within the province

of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty
96
the law is

what

to say

.

The Legal Constitution
Marshall’s opinion

was
law.

the

first

It is

is

and greatest

cited

by those invoking judicial supremacy because he

articulator

this assertion that is

of their central premise: the Constitution

key to any notion of judicial supremacy.

proponents of judicial supremacy also turn to the separation of powers

—

Alexander and Schauer, Justice Kennedy, and even Marshall do

95

Alexander and Schauer, “Defending Judicial Supremacy:

A

And

—

City of Boerne

v.

Flores

at

535-536. See also. Cooper

66

v,

while

as

the argument

Reply” Constitutional Commentary

Vol. 17: 455-482 (2000), 482.
96

is

Aaron 358 U.S.

1

(1958).

there, too,

depends on the notion

that the Constitution is law. Conceptualizing
the

Constitution as law' leads to the insistence upon judicial
supremacy and

skepticism of nonjudicial interpretation;

it

is

this

view of the Constitution

that

leads us to a Court-centered focus on constitutional law at
the expense our
historical constitutional development.

Edward Corwin

insisted,

along these

three propositions, and added that

1

2

it

“can

lines, that judicial review' rested

rest

on

upon no others.”

That the Constitution binds the organs of government;
That it is law in the sense of being known to and

3—

by the courts;
That the function of
interpreting the standing law appertains to the courts alone,

enforceable

so that their interpretation of the Constitution as part and
parcel of such standing law are alone authoritative, while

those ot the other departments are mere expressions of
97
opinion.

Corwin's formulation, as we
Marshall's

own

will see, bears a striking

syllogistic reasoning in

what Marshall did

resemblance

to

Marbury. Corwin further noted, though,

not: the third proposition

is

not readily apparent, or even

accepted. In fact, the third proposition suggests that judicial review and judicial

supremacy must go

down

explicitly in

together, a point Marshall

Marbury (although he says

seems
as

to hint at, but

much

himself suggested that the second proposition “needs

in

does not lay

McCulloch).

to be

Corwin

shown,” although

it

no

“registered in the Constitution itself."

97

Although

this, too,

can be questioned.

Edward Corwin, “ Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review,” 103 and Court
Over Constitution discussing Federalist 78 in this regard, 8.
,

98

Ibid. 103.

67

is

Judge Gibson certainly rejected both the second"
and
rejected judicial review, even if his followers
like
limit

and thus

James Bradley Thayer would

review to the “clear mistake' rule and thus plea for
judicial

Madison

We

third propositions

restraint.

100

certainly rejected proposition 3, while at times
accepting proposition 2.

might add names

to the

infinitum but the point
,

is

assumes the Constitution

list

of those rejecting propositions 2 and 3 ad

that the third proposition only

is

law

in the

word, which proposition 2 also hints

makes sense

if

one

ordinary and not the political sense of that

at

(although

it

may

be qualified). Thus.

Corwin's proposition 2 could cut both ways: read one way,

it

may

review into the Madisonian separation of powers; read another,
proposition 3 and gives us judicial supremacy. In

this,

it

it

fit

judicial

blends with

replicates Marshall's

very opinion in Marbury.
the "what ot the Constitution"

It

the Court.

By beginning from

is

— making

law, then the

"who of interpretation"

the premise that the Constitution

proponents of judicial supremacy
say what the law

is

insist that

it

is

is

law, the

the province of the judiciary to

constitutional interpretation a judicial function and

the Court the primary enforcer of the Constitution; indeed, interpretation itself

becomes

101

a legal enterprise.

Proponents of judicial supremacy demand that the

Constitution's meaning be clear, conclusively settled, and binding on

Court

44

is

the interpreter of law,

Gibson does accept

because the power
1,1,1

is

it

is

Harris,

If the

given an exclusive link to the Constitution,

judicial review of state laws

when they

conflict with federal law, but only

clearly derived from Article VI of the Constitution.

See also on Thayer, Barber, The Constitution ofJudicial Power, 78-9

101

all.

The Interpretahle Constitution 20.
,

68

1

is

leading to an insistence that the Court's interpretation of
the Constitution must, of
necessity, bind the other branches of government, settling
the law.
1 he insistence

Marshall

s

thinking.

on the
‘

From

legal Constitution

A

development.
as such, the

constitution

constitution

is

is

me draw on

a law

103

“empowered

decide that the act

to

aimed

to

which “ordinary

repugnant

real

1112

it

was

the judiciary.

if

itself and,

legislative acts

question

[to the Constitution].”

addressing this question, Marshall mustered his considerable
logic to insist that

in

to restate this

binding the government

True enough. But, as Bickel noted, the
is

development

Alexander Bickel

at

a paramount law

must conform.”

the central

review ineluctably follows and even,

this judicial

pushed, judicial supremacy. Let

is

skills

is

who

is

104

In

of deductive

While Marshall does not wholly

rule out

Now, we might

readily add, even eagerly concede, that Marshall was often driven by the
of his opinions and that this is as much the case in Marbury as any where else.
Marshall’s opinion does not establish
in the here and now of 803
the power of

political context

And even

if

—

judicial review, even
if

if

Marshall did not explicitly

argument clearly

1

—

Marshall himself wields the power with great political astuteness, and even
insist

upon

judicial

supremacy in Marbury the logic of Marshall's
which makes the argument for judicial
,

articulates the legal Constitution

supremacy possible. It may well be that the modern doctrine of judicial review (and its merger
with judicial supremacy) was not fully developed until the latter half of the nineteenth century,
its

logic

is

but

articulated by Marshall in Marbury. Marshall gives us the legal Constitution and thus

emergence of constitutional law as we know it today. This is perhaps his
His opinions that expounded on the Constitution from the bench give rise to
constitutional law, making him, in the words of his most recent biographer, “the definer of a
nation.” See especially Mark Graber's articles on the Marshall Court. “The Passive Aggressive
Virtues: Cohens v. Virginia and the Problematic Establishment of Judicial Power" Constitutional
Commentary 12: 67-92 (1995); “Establishing Judicial Review: Schooner Peggy and the Early
7-25 (1998); “Federalists or Friends of Adams:
Marshall Court,” Political Research Quarterly 5
” Studies in American Political Development (1999); “The
Politics,
Party
Court
and
Marshall
The

clears a path for the

greatest significance.

1

Problematic Establishment of Judicial Review”

Supreme Court

in

American

Politics:

New

in

:

Howard Gillman and

Cornell Clayton, eds.. The

Institutionalist Interpretations

(Lawrence: University

Press of Kansas: 1999).
1(11

Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (New Haven: Yale University

69

Press, 1962) 3.

that the other

branches can reach such questions, or that
they must adhere

Court's reading, his logic tends

to the

in that direction 105
.

Marshall's formulation begins with the
writtenness of the Constitution:
“Certainly

all

those

who have framed

written constitutions contemplate

them as

forming the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation, and consequently the
theory of every such government must be. that
an act of the legislature, repugnant
to the constitution, is void .” 106

makes

the Constitution

the Court the

legislature,

power

come

to say

far so

good. Marshall then begins his

no surprise

what the Constitution means. “If an

and oblige them

question “attentive consideration .” 108

It is

that

void, does

to give

to

From

it

it,

act

of the

notwithstanding

effect ?”

107

its

To which

here he proposes to give the

precisely at this point that Marshall

to ordinary law.

duty of the judicial department
to particular cases,

is

says this cannot be.

compares the Constitution

move

before the Court, so to speak, and, in doing so,
gives

repugnant to the constitution,

invalidity, bind the courts,

Marshall

So

“It is

emphatically the province and

say what the law

must of necessity expand and

is.

Those who apply the

interpret that rule.

If

rule

two laws

105

Clinton, Marbury v. Madison; Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of Modern Judicial Review (New
York: Basic Books, 1986) 80-84; and Hobson, The Great Chief Justice, all insist that Marshall’s
opinion is much narrower than it has been made out to be by twentieth century proponents of
judicial activism. For them Marshall was simply claiming the right to interpret the judicial power

and not

to authoritatively settle the

of other scholars

meaning of the Constitution for the other branches. A number
of Marbury, yet insist that Marshall did not claim that

reject this specific reading

was necessarily the sole and authoritative settler of constitutional meaning. See Hadley
Beyond the Constitution Harris, The Inlerpretable Constitution Barber, The Constitution

the Court

Arkes,

;

;

ofJudicial Power.
106

Mur bury

at 177.

70

conflict with each other, the courts

is,

must decide on the operation of each.” 104 That

the court must determine which conflicting rule
governs the case: the law or

the Constitution. This, Marshall tells us,

And

rather obviously,

it

we

the Constitution— supreme

is

“the very essence of judicial duty.” 110

follow Marshall's formulation, the Court must prefer

law—to

an ordinary act of the legislature.

If

it

were

otherwise, the Constitution itself would be an absurd attempt to
limit a power that
is

illimitable; “it

would give

the legislature a practical and real omnipotence.”

Marshall's argument moves so swiftly to
intuitively correct that

we

his beginning point. That

doing

this,

is,

that the Constitution

Marshall claims that the Court

(legal) Constitution."

say what the law

is;

2

is

him unless we stop
is

The Constitution

is

to question

akin to ordinary law.

By

the (authoritative) interpreter of the

As Marshall himself frames

(2)

1

conclusion and seems so

its

are likely to agree with

1

it:

(1)

It is

the Court's duty to

law; (3) Therefore,

it

is

the Court's

duty to say what the Constitution means. For Marshall's argument to work, the
Constitution must be viewed in legal and not political terms. This has led Sylvia

104

Mar bury

at 178.

110

Ibid.

71

Snowiss
in

I

to venture that “Marshall transformed
explicit fundamental law. different

kind trom ordinary law. into supreme ordinary law.
different only

hinking ot the Constitution as law. then, leads us

between “law” and

language ot the Constitution

becomes

branches

political

is

—

makes us

skeptical of

in regard to the Constitution. If the

the language ot law, then the Constitution

a technical legal grammar.

review added the law-politics distinction

American constitutionalism. This

“The establishment of judicial

to the conceptual foundation

distinction

was

authority to define the limits to government .” 114

on the very Madisonian separation of powers

was just

to

of

the justification for the court's

It is

legalist formulation lends serious support to judicial

12

113

the special province of those tutored in the law and constitutional

grammar becomes

1

degree ."

draw a neat distinction

“politics," which, perhaps not tenably,

and the so-called

politics

to

in

do

in this

way

that Marshall's

supremacy and even draws

so.

premise that Judge Gibson refused to grant Marshall

in Eakin v. Raub saying in
come before the Court. have said that Gibson disputed the
second premise of Marshall’s syllogism. To flesh this out let us view Marshall's syllogism: Major
It

this

effect that the Constitution does not

premise:

“It is the

A

,

1

very essence of judicial duty” to decide between conflicting laws. Minor

between a law and the Constitution is simply a particular variety of a conflict
between laws. Marshall’s conclusion: It is the essence of judicial duty to decide on a conflict
between the law and the Constitution. This, of course, inevitably required the judiciary to
premise:

conflict

expound upon

the Constitution.

written constitution and nothing

argument and

it

was on

Marshall's argument
in

a point of logic that

that the Constitution, properly speaking,

syllogism crashing down. But
“ Marbury

Madison
University of Chicago
v.

:

all

is

such that

it

rests

particular within that constitution;

is

it

upon the premise of a

is

a purely logical

Gibson disputed Marshall’s reasoning. Gibson

insisted

not like ordinary law and, thus, brought Marshall’s neat

of this has been ably argued elsewhere. See Dean Alfange

Jr.,

Defense of Traditional Wisdom” Supreme Court Review 1993 (Chicago:
Press, 1994) 413-444 and Robert Faulkner, The Jurisprudence of John
In

Marshall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968)203-212.
112

114

Snowiss, “From Fundamental

Law

to

Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property

Supreme Law of the Land,”

and the

University of Chicago Press, 1990) 189.
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5.

Limits of American Constitutionalism (Chicago:

Law,

Politics,

The

and the Separation of Powers

distinction

between law and

claims to judicial supremacy.

between law and

distinction

And

as

politics,

it

it

politics

so tar as the Constitution

may

Constitution's legal nature

—and, from

questions— he does leave a space
of the judiciary.

In

doing

this,

is

the heart of Marbury and

the judiciary that gets to

is

draw

this

thereby “rule the political branches by

defining the outlines of their duties,” making
authority

is at

it,

in essence, first in “dignity

and

concerned. While Marshall plays up the

there, judicial authority

on

for political questions that are

legal

beyond the reach

Marshall gives breathing space to Madison's more

overtly political Constitution. In the famous “political questions” passage,

Marshall

insists,

“the province of the court

individuals, not to inquire

in

which they have

how

is,

solely, to decide

on the

1

16

of

the executive, or executive officers, perform duties

discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or

the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be

court."

rights

which

made

are,

by

in this

This applies to the legislature as well:

Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures
which are prohibited by the Constitution ... it would become the
painful duty of this tribunal ... to say that such an act was not the
law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited, and is really
calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government,
to undertake here to inquire into the degree

be to pass the

and

to

tread

line

on

which circumscribes the

legislative

pretensions to such a power.

115

grounds.

1

17

necessity,

would

judicial department,

This court disclaims

all

117

,

16

its

Faulkner, The Jurisprudence of John Marshall 200. Also, Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property

and the
1

of

Limits of American Constitutionalism.

Marbury

at 170.

McCulloch

at

423.
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Questions ot constitutional power are questions of law and
are properly before the
Court; questions ot

left to

how

power should be exercised (questions of politics)

are

the political branches. Insofar as the Constitution has
a political and non-

legal realm, Marshall

and

that

seems

to see the free interplay

legislative, at least) as determinative

At

first

of constitutional propriety.

glance judicial review intuitively coincides with this system of

checks and balances:
branches. This

may

it is

the judiciary s check

on the

legislative

and executive

well go with the constitutional framework. But

as easily with Marshall's legal Constitution (even as

exceptions).

of the branches (executive

it

makes

The very notion of checks and balances seems

a

it

nod

does not go

to political

to give rise to the

notion of judicial review. But the more famous arguments for judicial review, the

ones that

we have

judicial review as

digested over the years from Hamilton and Marshall, do not see

one check

in the

midst of many. They see

it

as the check that

maintains the Constitution because they see the Constitution as law.

Following the general analysis of The Federalist Papers we might note
,

that those dealing with the judiciary

(numbers 78

to 83)

“do not quite

fit

into the

whole.” Rather, the treatment of the judiciary “stands somewhat apart from the
rest

of the book, just as the judiciary stands somewhat apart from

Federalist Papers as
,

and

insists

upon

its

we have

1

18

politics.”

The

seen, rarely refers to the Constitution's legal status

institutional

arrangements as maintaining

Hamilton's discussion of the judiciary

in the last

its

primacy.

few Federalist Papers

And

yet

,

published, incidentally, in the second bound volume and not in the newspapers,

118

James Stoner,

Common Law and Liberal

Theory (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996)

197, second passage quoting David Epstein.

74

treats the Constitution as primarily a

parchment

barrier, as so

much

law, with the

judiciary enforcing the parchment. Let us see
Hamilton's famous formulation:

The

interpretation ot the laws

of the courts.
judges

A

constitution

is

is,

a fundamental law.

as,

the proper and peculiar province

and must be regarded by the
therefore belongs to them to

in fact,
It

meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act
proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen
to be
an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which
has the
ascertain

its

superior obligation and validity ought, ot course, to
be preferred;
other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred
to the
statute, the intention of the people to the
intention of their
19
agents
or, in

1

.

The Constitution
Constitution

law

is,

and,

is

if

what the Court says

the Constitution

what the Constitution means.

do just

this.

“neither

Hamilton

FORCE

or

is

WILL

in the earlier Federalist

is

It

if

the Court

Hamilton does not

set

it

law, as Hamilton says, then the Court gets to say

is

the Court’s “proper and peculiar province" to

faithful

Papers the

may
up

or at least the Court gets to say what the

this,

suggesting that the judiciary has

but merely judgment."

emphasized, when the judiciary

Even

it is;

quick to hedge

Hamilton's formulation, “the

terms.

borrow Charles Evans Hughes' phrase, the

controls, but, to

is

Still,

the judiciary

guardian of the Constitution .”

—

the Court

seems

interpreter

of constitutional meaning.

legislative

and executive invasions becomes an instrument

1

19

rj>

to

—and notably
be the

In this regard, the Court's

up primary responsibility for constitutional

The Federalist Papers, No. 78, 435.
The Federalist Papers, No. 78, 433, 438.

75

Whereas

seen in legal

is

be checked by the other branches
terms

120

in

dynamic of the Constitution was

political

discussed the Constitution

in these

is,

final

check against

that enables

it

to take

interpretation. Thus, questions

of

constitutional meaning, in

most cases, become

the judiciary, constitutional

law

1

legal questions, resolvable only

meaning becomes coterminous with

by

constitutional

1

In

.

Hamilton's and Marshall's readings, the Court becomes
the primary

enforcer of written constitutional limits; the Court makes
the Constitution binding

on the government.
At the same time, both Hamilton

s

and Marshall

on another aspect of the separation of powers

s legalist

that gives

arguments draw

weight to the peculiar

relationship between the judiciary and the Constitution— at least
legality, as they do.

its

While the separation of powers brings

governmental power, as we noted

earlier,

it

also

was

its

task.

"

The Federalist Papers

,

for

we

insist

upon

mind checks on

instituted for effective

governance: each branch was institutionally designed
of

to

if

to

meet the peculiar nature

example, speaks of a unitary executive

designed to meet the needs of executive duties and a plural and bicameral
legislature to foster democratic deliberation

in

branches, so that

“The

law

in the

government. This

to

its

its

independence

particular task within the operation of the

“executive” power must be delegated to the executive. In

national courts thus not only judge under the laws but magisterially preside over them."
,

122

— namely

this point out

not to say that powers are rigidly separated between the

is

all

— pointing

Faulkner, The Jurisprudence of John Marshall 20
122

Hamilton also draws

speaking of the institutional design of the judiciary

and learning

121

123
.

1

See especially, Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues.

As Flamilton argues

in

Federalist 70 “Those politicians and statesman
,

who have been

the most

celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justness of their views have declared

in

favor of a single executive and a numerous legislature. They have, with great propriety, considered

energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded
in a

this as

most applicable

single hand; while they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to

deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to

secure their privileges and interests,” The Federalist Papers

76

,

392. See also Nos. 57 and 71

giving us

checks and balances,” the Constitution clearly did not
embrace such a

rigid rule of separation.

But

balances in this regard. Here

I

I

have already spoken extensively on checks and

wish

emphasize the power of separation.

to

checks and balances make the government

make
a

way

it

competent.

safe, separation

If

of powers helps to

Like the other branches, the judiciary

is

constructed in such

as to call forth those virtues required to the art of judging,
as Hamilton

describes them. Judges, unlike

all

other high offices, serve by appointment and

during good behavior, insuring their independence, so as to enable them
better to

perform

their peculiar task.

character and learning;

it

For Hamilton
a small

is

integrity with the requisite

this

number

knowledge

of

means men of a

men “who

” 126
to

sit

particular

unite the requisite

on the bench. Based on

their

learning in the law and their subtlety of mind, on their reasoning spirit and

independence form

political pressure,

judges

may justly

claim to be uniquely

suited to the task of constitutional exposition. If the Constitution

training

down

and by

is

law, by

institutional design the judiciary is uniquely positioned to lay

the intricacies of constitutional

Moreover, we might say

that

it

is

meaning and

stick to

such interpretations.

their task alone, as the other branches,

constituted as they are, are not suitable for such delicate work. Thus, in

“construing the Constitution, the judge performs a political duty through the

124

Dean Alfange,
Normalcy?”

Jr.,

Jessica Korn, The
126

“The Supreme Court and

Power of Separation,

The Federalist Papers, No. 78

institution

at

the Separation of Powers:

A Welcome

19.

439. Although, as Dahl says, the Court

and justices are often chosen

Return to

for their politics.

285.

77

is

“’’Decision-Making

itself a political

in a

Democracy,”

exercise of a technical duty ."

1

'7

The

result

of this

is

to

draw

the Court closer to

the Constitution than the other branches.

When

the

separate judicial

when

function and

establishment performs

its

distinct

serves as a complicating element in the
system of checks and balances, the judiciary is but one of the three
it

branches of the government and as such is unexceptionable. But
still another level— transcending its other
functions, and implied
the technical

alone

—

knowledge needed by

this

at

in

branch of government

the judiciary acts as special guardian of the principles
of

the Constitution

128

.

Marshall himself relies heavily on the legal nature of the question

in

justify the judiciary's authority in resolving the dispute.

insists,

and again,

that

whether Marbury

the judiciary alone, as

vested or not,

is,

it

is

is

entitled to his

Marshall

appointment

is

Marbury

a question for

a question of law: "The question whether a right has

in its nature, judicial,

and must be

tried

by the judicial

Marshall draws on his distinction between law and politics and
legal questions are,

Court

130
.

by

their nature, questions for the judiciary.

He

insists that

also insists

inverse: political questions, by their nature, have no place before the

But

downplays

17

again

129

authority ."

upon the

to

in the final

pages of his decision, the section most read, Marshall

this distinction

and posits

that the Constitution itself is

Ralph Lerner, The Thinking Revolutionary: Principle and Practice

in the

paramount law

New

Republic (Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 1987) 124.
128

Ibid.
129

nu

130.

Marbury

at 167.

"The conclusion from

this

reasoning

political or confidential agents

rather to act in cases in

can be more
specific duty

is,

that

where the heads of the departments

of the executive, merely to execute the

which the executive possesses

will

a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing

perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But
is

are the

of the President, or

where

a

assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty,

seems equally clear

that the individual

laws of his country for a remedy.”

who

considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the

Ibid, at 166.

78

it

whose meaning must be discovered by

the judiciary

131

These two threads are not

.

necessarily contradictory, but they emphasize a difference in
the scope and
of the judiciary. In the

circumscribed;

it

it

first

instance, judicial

power

power seems narrow and

addresses narrow legal questions and appears to

(as neatly as

fit

can) into the idiom of Madison's checks and balances as political
devices. In

the second, the very

meaning of the Constitution becomes

thus speaks to the judiciary alone;

be intended; that

is, it

makes

it

nearly asserts what

who

Madison

said could never

the judiciary superior to the legislature.

proponents of judicial supremacy have seized on
those

a legal question and

this

The

second thread, whereas

plead for judicial restraint tend to look to the

first strand.

Now

it

may

well be that Marshall's rhetoric carries him on in this direction, even though he

would

may

still

recognize the boundaries of political questions

132
.

The other branches

reach constitutional issues, so long as they are political and not legal,

although the crucial point, surely,

is

who

says what a “legal" question

Jefferson's greatest objection to Marshall's

that the

Court had said that

it

Marbury opinion,

let

is.

us recall, was

could order the executive to deliver Marbury's

appointment by way of a writ of mandamus. Jefferson's outrage stemmed from

131

"If the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution

of the

legislature; the constitution,

both apply.” Ibid,
132

Marshall’s

and not such ordinary

act,

is

superior to any ordinary act

must govern the case

to

which they

at 178.

later

And

decisions on the Court seem to bear this out.

Congress might constitutionally

limit the Court's

power

to hear cases

Marshall saw that the

and thereby

limit the

Court’s

decided constitutional questions. He prudently recognized the power of the political
branches and the limitations of the Court, even if his own logic might push against such a
recognition. As Stephen Griffin argues, “since the Constitution structures politics and government,

ability to

giving the judiciary the unique power to enforce the Constitution
judiciary the most powerful branch of government. Since this

of constitutional law

is

necessarily narrow.” Griffin,

79

is

is

tantamount to making the

not tenable politically, the scope

American Constitutionalism 45.
,

the tact that he thought this

was

a matter ot executive discretion and, therefore,
a

political question. Marshall, of course, thought
otherwise

Following

Schauer
that aren

issues

insist that the

t

proponents of judicial supremacy

this,

Court must

133
.

like

settle all constitutional

Alexander and

questions

—even those

clear. In tact, the authoritative settlement ot
unclear constitutional

becomes one of the Court’s most important

Constitution

is

functions, “insofar as the

susceptible to divergent view about what

it

means

...

tunction ot the Constitution remains unserved .” 134 Such settlement
task, venturing that the

one could say

is

an important
the Court's

scope of constitutional law should be ever larger; indeed,

that constitutional questions are judicial questions.

advocates deny that the other branches have

much of a

These

role to play in determining

constitutional meaning. Alexander and Schauer argue, for example, that the

president should be consistent with prior Court opinions on constitutional issues

when he

signs or vetoes a law; to act otherwise

Constitution

135
.

Laurence Tribe even goes so

should not veto a law because he thinks

of hyperbole. Tribe has suggested
structure of our system of

that

it

is

undermine the

far as to insist that the

executive

unconstitutional. In an extraordinary

such an act

government”

to

in that

it

is

“an abuse of the fundamental

“unilaterally

.

.

.

deprives the

court of their unique Constitutional function: to pass on legislation that

m

Walter Murphy, Congress and the Court: A Study

>

in the

fit

American

is

not

Political Process (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1963) 7-19.
134

|1S

Alexander and Schauer, '‘On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,” 1377.
Alexander and Schauer, “Defending Judicial Supremacy," 47

Barry Friedman

who

follow the Court once

it

Press,

2001

.

Even those

like Scott

Gant and

has spoken. Gant, "Judicial Supremacy” and Barry Friedman and Michael

Dorf, “Shared Constitutional Interpretation"

Chicago

1

think the other branches can speak to the Constitution, suggest that they must

Supreme Court Review 2000 (Chicago: University

).

80

ot

obviously unconstitutional .” 136

shows

that

it

is

An

historical understanding

utterly appropriate, indeed

it

is

of the executive veto

the very basis of the veto as

originally conceived, that the president veto legislation that he thinks
goes

the legislature's constitutional limits

judiciary

may speak

“[the] executive

legislature

Yet, as Tribe

to constitutional issues.

and

to

would have

do what they are assigned

must only make laws and not question

may

undermines our constitutional system: “At stake

whom

this,

to do,

the Court's interpretation of

not even venture nonbinding

opinions as to the Court’s constitutional interpretation. To do

effect

only the

do does not include constitutional interpretation .” 138

those laws' constitutionality. The legislature

on the binding

it,

Alexander and Schauer echo

legislative officials should

and what \hey are assigned

The

137
.

beyond

...

is

so.

Tribe says,

not simply an attack

.

.

of the Constitution, as construed by the Court, upon those

the people elect to public office

—those whose oaths

to

uphold the

Constitution as the supreme law of the land can be enforced in no other

through Supreme Court review .”

139

This insistence

is

way

than

not backed up by empirical

evidence, but rests solely on the notion of the legal Constitution. Tribe even

suggests that the oath to uphold the Constitution sworn by both the executive and

legislative branches

136

amounts

Laurence Tribe quoted

Constitutional

206 on

Law

in

to

an oath to follow the Court's interpretation of the

Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 48. See also Tribe, American

third edition,

,

volume one (New York: Foundation

Press,

2000) especially

1

18-

the separation of powers.

137

For a discussion of Jackson’s transformation of the Veto power, see Magliocca, "Veto!” See
James Ceaser, Presidential Selection: Theory and Development (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979); Scigliano, The Supreme Court and the Presidency and Skowronek. The

also,

;

Politics Presidents
138

I3y

Make.

Alexander and Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,” 1367.

Quoted

in

Gary Jacobsohn, The Supreme Court and the Decline oj Constitutional Aspiration

133.

81

,

Constitution and not to look to the document in their

proponents of judicial supremacy seriously

own

right. If

in this, legislators

we

take the

should never look to

the Constitution or even be concerned with whether
the laws they are passing are

constitutional

—they

are simply not equipped to

answer such questions

140
.

While

playing up the separation of powers in this regard. Tribe subverts
the Madisonian
vision ot

it.

The separation of powers becomes

articulates the Court's

are,

it

the Court's

would seem, no checks on judicial

constitutional

violations,

even

—and only

we

amendment. Worse,
are at

its

mercy.

if the president, the

It it

if

relation to the Constitution.

There

interpretation other than formal

them wrong, we have nowhere

Congress, and the people recognize the

Such a conception of judicial
It

—

whereby Tribe

only the Court prevents constitutional

gets

legal Constitution with a vengeance.

miracle.

the vehicle

The Constitution

interpretation,

is

fault.

to turn,

This

is

what the Court says

Corwin has noted, “invokes

the

it is.

a

supposes a kind of transubstantiation whereby the Court's opinion of

the Constitution

.

.

.

The focus on

becomes

[the]

very body and blood of the Constitution .”

141

the Court and the Constitution as law leads these legal

scholars to neglect questions of constitutional maintenance, history, and

development. Consider Tribe's (and seemingly Alexander and Schauer's)
rejection of the presidential veto

140

A

position,

on constitutional grounds, suggesting the veto

Alexander and Schauer remind

FDR pushed when trying to overcome
New Deal legislation, but not one he

us, that

Congress’ doubts about the constitutionality of some

accepted when the Court rejected that same legislation on constitutional grounds.

the

name

New

wrongly decided..
141

And

if

we

follow

Deal Constitutional revolution should never have occurred, as the Court, in
of stability and settlement, should have adhered to its past decisions even if they were

their logic, the

Corwin, Court Over Constitution 68.
,

82

may

only be used for political reasons

142

The

.

great irony, of course,

use ot the presidential veto on other than constitutional
grounds was
constitutional development.

And

the further irony

is

that the

is

that the

itself a

major

development came as

President Jackson objected to the rechartering of the
national bank on both
constitutional and policy grounds, doing the very thing
that the proponents of

supremacy say cannot be done. While such defenses of judicial

judicial

supremacy

are extreme, they are not altogether divorced

Hamilton's legal formulations of the Constitution and
the judiciary

law .”

143
.

Alexander and Schauer put

all

its

from Marshall's and
peculiar relationship to

of this quite simply:

“We

call

it

144

Conclusion: Dueling Constitutions

Madison's constitutionalism suggests
in a far

finality,

broader realm than that within which the courts operate.

even as a matter of prudence, necessary

settlement, as

logic.

that constitutional politics operate

is

so often asserted? This

The opposite might

in fact

is

be true.

Is

judicial

to provide authoritative

an empirical question, not a matter of

What

if

the development of

constitutional law as coterminous with constitutionalism has

meant the frequent

recurrence to constitutional issues where the Court does not truly provide for
authoritative settlement, but rather invites continual dispute on constitutional

meaning and whether

142

the Court got

right?

it

For Alexander and Schauer the president

may

Could a more

political settlement last

veto legislation on constitutional grounds

following past judicial opinions and not exercising independent judgment;

probably an obligation for the president to strike

down

in fact,

there

if

he

is

is

laws the Court has determined to be

constitutionally suspect.
143

144

Corwin himself was speaking of Marshall's argument

in

Marbury. Court Over Constitution 68.

Alexander and Schauer, "Extrajudicial Interpretation," 1387.

83

,

longer, in that

it

must reach consensual settlement between the branches?

ot constitutional politics

between the branches of government a

Is

a sort

part of our

145
constitutional system, even one that connects the Constitution
to the public?

Constitutional politics

suggests.

146
It

may

may be

less

tumultuous and more frequent than Ackerman

be that the process of maintaining constitutional boundaries

and articulating constitutional meaning

supremacy would lead us

to believe.

is

a

much

richer process than judicial

These questions

will be taken

up

in the

chapters to follow, not just to investigate the claims of judicial supremacy and the
prevailing myth, but to better understand our Constitution.

An

historical

and empirical analysis

will let us see if the

Court has,

in fact,

acted as the authoritative settler of constitutional meaning. Such an analysis will
also

let

us get at the presuppositions of judicial supremacy: (1) That judicial

review implies judicial supremacy. But must a strong and independent judiciary
exercising judicial review necessarily lead to judicial supremacy? If

then

we may

distinguish empirically

— and not

judicial review and judiciary supremacy. (2)

that cares about constitutional limitations,

and the people are eager

to overstep

absence of judicial supremacy.

just conceptually

The judiciary

is

it

—between

the only institution

whereas the president, the Congress,

such limits and will eagerly do so

If neither

does not,

of these claims

is

in the

borne out empirically

(and they are usually posited as fact rather than demonstrated) then the case for

145

The research I'm proposing only focuses on

be that judicial supremacy does not work

and thereby bind the

states in

at

an authoritative manner. So

interpreting the Constitution and not being
146

We

the national

government and national law. It may
may well work against state law
do not take up the issue of states

the national level, but

bound by other

the People: Transformations.

84

I

interpretations.

judicial

supremacy

rests primarily

central to the Constitution as law.

understood

in

upon an

And

if

insistence that judicial settlement

we

reject that the Constitution

is

must be

such terms, then the argument for judicial supremacy
exists on a

logical plane completely divorced

from the actual functioning of our

constitutional government.

As

a polity

we may

give primacy of place to the Court in determining

constitutional meaning. But even if this

that

is

is

underinvestigated

is

the Court's role

true— and
is

all

at

political basis to judicial

revise this concept at later

judiciary. This

developments

an empirical question

development

will very likely

of the branches of government are doing. While we may

accept a sort ot judicial supremacy

overlooked

is

subject to change over time and thus

historically contingent. Patterns ot constitutional

depend upon what

it

one moment

power even

— suggesting an often
these moments— we may

at

moments depending upon

the very actions of the

draws our eye toward important constitutional issues and
that are not, properly speaking, legal but political.

85

CHAPTER 2
CONGRESS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND
CIVIL

j_he

Fourteenth Amendment:

Th e C e n trality of Constitutional

The Fourteenth Amendment

may view
this

THE MEANING OF THE

WAR AMENDMENTS

offers a unique prism through

constitutional politics. Unlike

amendment, by way of section

Politic

which we

most provisions of the Constitution,

5, explicitly invites

congressional

enforcement (and hence interpretation):
"The Congress

shall

have power

to

enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.” For those
1

who
sort

hold that the Court alone must interpret
the Constitution, section 5

of embarrassment. 2 Constitutional language

amounts

to an admonition, as Justice

Kennedy

that is

aimed

at

is

a

Congress

recently suggested, to enforce

the Court's reading of the Constitution and
not the Constitution itself (as

construed by Congress). 3

meaning, as
legal

seems

and the

Fifteenth

1

it

It is

terrain ripe for contests over constitutional

to pit judicial

political

Amendment's

supremacy and departmentalism, the

constitutions, squarely against

section 2 poses the

The Constitution of the United

4

one another. (The

same dilemma.)

States of America.

_

Christopher Eisgruber, “Judicial Supremacy and Constitutional Distortion" Sotirios
Barber
and Robert George, eds. Constitutional Politics: Essays on Constitution Making,
Maintenance, und Change ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 72.
3

City oJ Boerne

v.

Flores 52

1

U.S. 507 (1997).

4

John Finn, “The Civic Constitution: Some Preliminaries,” Sotirios Barber and Robert
George, eds, C onstitutional Politics Essays on Constitution Making, Maintenance, and
Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 54-60 (discussing the distinction
between what he calls the “juridical” Constitution and the “civic” Constitution). See also
William Harris, The Interpretah/e Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1993).
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Not

surprisingly, just such a conflict
occurred shortly after the

Amendment's

ratification

new amendments
on

its

own

that the

when Congress passed

to the Constitution. In

constitutional vision.

The

doing

a series of acts to enforce the

Congress necessarily

so.

acts themselves

were attempts

meaning of the amendments would not be
subverted

given the emerging violence and
resistance

to the

American federalism these amendments wrought

5

The

ensure

in the South,

dramatic changes

.

to

relied

in

constitutionality of

these acts, and by implication Congress'
constitutional interpretation of the
Civil

War amendments, came

before the

Supreme Court under

appointed Chief Justice Waite. But the Court’s

Waite himself, hardly

meaning was arrived

settled the matter

at,

6

initial

we must examine

constitutional

the political branches and not just

the Court; the interaction between these
branches

settlement

newly

opinions, given by

To understand how

.

the

is

the key to constitutional

7
.

Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1997), 308-317; Harold
William Wiecek, Equal Protection Under Law (New YorkHarper and Row

Hyman and
1982).
"

Whether the Court got the meaning of the 14 th and 15 th Amendments right,
and how its
interpretation of them has changed according to the times, is still
heavily debated. A number

of scholars

Supreme Court got the I4 lh and 15 th Amendments wrong; while
trimmed the expansive powers of Congress in a correct interpretation of

insist that the

others insist that

it

these amendments. For a discussion of the political nature of the debate
over Reconstruction
itself, and its evolution on the Court, see Pamela Brandwein,
Reconstructing Reconstruction

The Supreme Court and the Production of Historical Truth (Durham- Duke University Press
1999).

Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall (Durham: Duke University Press); Akhil Amar, The Bill
of Rights (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals William
Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988). Charles
;

Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, IR64-IRRR

most vehemently

that the

Court got

it

right.
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(New York:

Macmillian, 1987) argues

The

story begins with the Slaughterhouse

stake in these cases

was a

state

it

is

at

law that granted a monopoly to
the Crescent

City Live-Stock Landing and
Slaughter-House

beginning point because

Cases (1873). 8 Although

the

first

Fourteenth Amendment. As such,

I

Company,

it

is

a necessary

case in which the Court interpreted
the

suggest

it

represents the beginning of

Congressional-Court debate over the meaning of
the amendment and not the
judicial solidification ot the

Slaughterhouse C uses
fourteenth

may

Amendment

s

amendment,

as

Bruce Ackerman argues. 9 The

indeed give Supreme Court approval to the

constitutional legitimacy, given

ratification, but this is only part of the story.
Scholars

on the constitutional

politics of the Civil

beginning with Dred Scott and moving

and fifteenth Amendments. This
profound constitutional and

10

Ackerman

have frequently focused

Reconstruction era,

to the ratification

change

calls for

it

peculiar

of the Fourteenth

not surprising as this period witnesses

political

focusing on the Supreme Court;
politics.

is

War and

its

that

can hardly be appreciated by

an examination of constitutional

points us in the right direction by suggesting the

importance of constitutional politics for framing and establishing the

amendment. Yet, Ackerman sees

As we saw

in

politics for

Ackerman,

8

Chapter

1,

constitutional politics

after

which we return

Slaughterhouse Cases 16 Wall. 36
,

the politics as ending with Slaughterhouse.

(

is

an extraordinary form of

to ordinary politics

and the

legal

1873).

'

Ackerman,
Iu

IVe the

People Transformations. 211.
.

Ackerman, We the People. See William

Lasser, The Limits

ofJudicial Power (Chapel

University of North Carolina Press, 1987) and Donald Grier Stephenson,

Count New

York: Columbia University Press, 1999)81-106.
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Hill:

Campaigns and the

model

ol the Constitution,

where the Court once again takes the primary

responsibility tor interpreting and enforcing
constitutional meaning.
that this misses a crucial constitutional

meaning of the amendment:

I

venture

development about the nature and

constitutional politics, albeit

on a smaller

scale,

continued after the Slaughterhouse Cases as the
Congress (often with the
,

support of the executive branch) attempted to articulate
a broad reading of the

C

ivil

War Amendments

that

was met with skepticism from

the Court.

We did

not return to ordinary politics or simple Court enforcement
of the Constitution
in 1873.

Ackerman's account

is

odd on another

level as well.

He

sees the

constitutional politics of Reconstruction as a constitutional
transformation—

which embraces “substantive due process'— that
(until

we

is

then enforced by the Court

get the next "constitutional transformation" in the constitutional

politics ol the

New

Slaughterhouse

C

Deal

era).

But Justice Miller's majority opinion

ases (a 5-4 decision), which

Ackerman

in the

sees as solidifying

this constitutional transformation, hardly supports the constitutional vision the

Court

later articulates.

In

Slaughterhouse Miller upheld a monopoly granted to the Crescent
,

City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co. (which the Louisiana
legislature

bestowed

after

being bribed by the company) noting that

violate the terms of the Fourteenth

Amendment's

it

did not

privileges and immunities

clause, due process clause, or equal protection clause. Miller's opinion, in fact,

eviscerated the "privileges and immunities clause," which read that "All

persons born or naturalized

in the

United States and subject to the jurisdiction

89

thereof, are citizens ot the United
States and the State wherein they
reside.

State shall

make

or enforce any law

which

shall abridge the privileges

immunities of citizens of the United States ^]"
divided citizenship into two categories
the Fourteenth

Amendment

He

state

and

1

Reading

this clause. Miller

and national

— and argued

that

only protected those privileges and
immunities

which were bestowed by being
citizen).

—

No

a citizen of the United States (and not
a state

then insisted that most privileges and immunities
of citizenship

(such as the right to choose your trade) were derived
not from our national
citizenship, but Irom state citizenship.

claim that making butchers pay a fee

and Slaughter-House Co. (given
without due process.

He

its

1

'

Miller then quickly dismissed the

to the

Crescent City Live-Stock Landing

monopoly) deprived them of property

then held that the equal protection clause was aimed

primarily at the “newly emancipated negroes” and not butchers

Fourteenth

Amendment

that the

citizenship under the Fourteenth

all

wrote dissenting opinions (and

Field

Court had badly misread the nature of

Amendment, which, they

argued, bestowed

citizens with the fundamental rights and privileges of citizenship by

making them United
to U.S. citizenship).

11

Swayne

was joined by Chief Justice Chase, Bradley and Swayne).

and Bradley both argued

all

Thus, the

did not apply to the butchers.

Justices Field, Bradley, and

Field's dissent

13
.

The United

States citizens (thus state citizenship

These fundamental

States Constitution.

Slaughterhouse

rights, then,

Amendment XIV,

at 74.

13

Ibid, at 81.

90

Section

I.

was only

incidental

were not contingent upon

state citizenship (as Miller
held).

Moreover, both Field and Bradley
found the

monopoly granted unconstitutional-drawing
on

the privileges and

immunities clause, the due process clause,
and the equal protection clause, as
various parts ot a

granting ot a

whole— as

monopoly

it

did not serve a legitimate public
purpose: the

no way served as a genuine "health”
regulation, but

in

merely transferred public power
constitutional vision

company

to a private

Ackerman speaks

of,

concedes)

—

In this

which comes

nineteenth century police powers jurisprudence,
the various dissents

14
.

especially Field's (a point

than Miller's majority opinion.

is

way. the

to represent late

far better represented

Ackerman himself

As Ackerman

argues, "the

Lochner Court was doing what most judges do most of
the time:
the Constitution, as handed

What

Reconstruction.

is

down

to

odd here

them by
is

that

by

interpreting

the Republicans of

Ackerman

is

arguing that an

opinion of the Court solidifies a constitutional transformation
based on the

Republican Congress constitutional vision, but does so

seems

to subvert the very

misses

this

Ibid, at

87-88 and

at

1

19-20.

change

that

I

suggest that

Ackerman

comes

Swayne went so

after the

Slaughterhouse

far as to call the Civil

War amendments

a

Charta, which fundamentally altered the relationship between the states and the

national government.
15

vision.

an opinion that

because he ends the story too soon, and thereby neglects the

significant constitutional

new Magna

meaning of that

in

Ackerman, We the People, 280.
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decs, on.

16

The Slaughterhouse Cases may,

as

Ackerman

acceptance ot the Fourteenth Amendment's
legitimacy by
the

Supreme Court, even while acknowledging

sharply divided over the

1

1870-1883. What's more,
political branches, not

all

Court

nine justices of
itself

was

Amendment's meaning. This debate over
meaning

a central constitutional development,
and

extraordinary politics of

that the

argues, represent an

860-1868. but
this

simply

it

was not

settled in the

more ordinary

in the far

is

politics

of

debate occurs between the Court and
the

among

the justices, or with the

newly appointed

justices articulating the Reconstruction
Congress’ constitutional vision.

We do

not quickly return, after the Slaughterhouse
Cases to a legal articulation of
,

constitutional meaning. Indeed, the very
the Court s opinion,

is

meaning of the amendment, despite

debated within Congress, between the Congress
and

the Court, and within the Court itself as

it

modifies and clarifies

its

interpretation in subsequent opinions.

Subv erting Congress’ Constitution bv

As

Indirection: Reese

violence erupted in the South (and in

Reconstruction governments and the

move

controlling Congress realized that the Civil

much

and Cruikshank

ot the North) against

to black equality, the

Republicans

War Amendments would

not be

self-enforcing. In response to this, and with the strong approval
of the Grant

Administration, Congress passed a series of enforcement acts from 1870-

’

Howard Gillman, The

Constitution Besieged: The Rise

Powers Jurisprudence (Durham: Duke University

and Demise of Loehner Era Police
and "The Collapse of

Press, 1994)

Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the ‘Living Constitution' in the
Course of American State-Building” Studies in American Political Development II: 149-189
(1997) offers a far more persuasive telling of the constitutional vision of the Court during this
era.
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1872.

The Acts were an attempt

to give

sustenance to the newly ratified

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the
terms of which were being evaded

by black codes, intimidation, and outright

machinery

to

implement the

amendments through both

acts

the

newly created Department of Justice and
the

which we

1

of the Fifteenth Amendment

of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
necessarily put

1

forward, even

ot

Congress established the

and bring rigorous enforcement of the

tederal courts. In attempting to enforce
section

and section

17

rejection.

it

indirectly, a

will take

view ot the amendments' meanings

up below). The various enforcement acts revealed

congressional determination to secure these freshly

stemmed from

(the specifics

a determination to capitalize

won

rights.

on black suffrage

adding numbers and an important constituency

to the

Some of this

in the South,

Republican coalition.

Republicans were just as motivated by a principled constitutional
vision: they

were determined

to see that the

Union did not return

Constitution as articulated by the infamous

to the pre-Civil

Dred Scott

decision.

A

War

scant few

years alter these amendments ratification, they were already being ignored
or
interpreted so as to limit their power. In reaction to this, congressional
debates

over enforcement represent a principled constitutional debate about the

meaning ol Section
whereby

1

of both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,

the majority in Congress took the text of the Constitution seriously

and, in doing so, offered a principled constitutional vision that included a

robust view of constitutional rights. Congress’ attempt to protect

1

Hyman and

Wiecek, Equal Protection Under the Law, Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals, 327;
Herman Belz, The American Constitution: Its Origins

Alfred Kelly, Winfred Harbison, and

93

constitutional rights in this period

determined

The

C

to thwart

inescapable, and

is

it

is

the Court that

Congress' protection of constitutional

seems

18

rights.

ourt as Principled Protector
of Constitutional Rights?
In

continued

begun

United States

Reese and United States

Cruikshank

v.

19
,

the Court

subversion of the Reconstruction Congress’
constitutional vision

its

in the

v.

Slaughterhouse Cases. The Court took

this a step further in these

cases as each dealt with Congress' enforcement
powers under the Fourteenth

and

Amendments

f ilteenth

amendment.

In

doing

in addition to the substantive

so, the

meaning of each

Court severely limited Congress' enforcement

power. Both Reese and Cruikshank took up the constitutionality
of provisions

of the most important Enforcement Act,

that

of May 1870, which was

generally aimed at protecting the right to vote. The act was
entitled

enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to vote

of the Union

.

.

.”

and

set penalties for state officials

vote on racial grounds, or for private persons

who

who

,

One might

11,

denied the right to

conspired to prevent the

(New York: W.W.

Seventh Edition

to

in the Several States

exercise ol this right. While these parts of the act were aimed

and Development Volume

"An Act

argue, as Michael Less Benedict does, that the Court

at

implementing

Norton, 1991) 346-350.

was merely

articulating the

Constitution, which didn’t allow for such sweeping congressional legislation, even if it were
rights enforcing. This is plausible, but irrelevant for the general argument for the judicial

protection of rights.

Dworkin

Defenders of judicial supremacy

insist that the

like

Laurence Tribe and Ronald

Court, unlike the political branches, as

will, will protect constitutional rights, in

doing

so, they

it

is

insulated from popular

do not argue

that the

Court will

misinterpret the Constitution so as to protect rights that are not there. Rather, they argue that
political

branches have no reason to protect

rights,

independence, can rely on principle to protect

more

while the Court, blessed with

rights. It’s a general proposition that

likely to protect rights than legislatures. But

it’s

Courts are

not clear that this general proposition

is

empirically borne out. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987)
and Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); Laurence Tribe,

American Constitutional Law

third edition,

volume one (New York: foundation

94

Press, 2000).

the Fifteenth

intent

Amendment,

the Act also

of hindering any citizen

made

it

a crime to conspire with the

in the full exercise

of any right or privilege

granted by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, which was
aimed
protecting the "privileges and immunities
of citizenship" in section

Fourteenth

Amendment

In Reese, the

(justified

Supreme Court took up

and 4 of the Act, which made

deny the

right to vote.

charged with refusing

1

it

for asserting, “

I

.

.

he Fifteenth

it

from giving preference,

.

municipal elections inspectors were

of a black man, William

opinion tor the Court

of suffrage upon anyone.” Rather,
States,

5).

the constitutionality of sections 3

to receive or count the vote

s

of the

a crime for any official or any person
to act to

wo Kentucky

Garner. Chief Justice Waite

memorable

by way of section

1

at

is

perhaps most

Amendment does

not confer the right

simply “prevents the States, or the United
in this particular, to

one citizen of the

United States over another on account of race, color, or previous
condition of
1

servitude.”-'

Waite then went on

to find sections 3

Act unconstitutional, as they were not confined

upon

rights based

Recognizing the

to

and 4 of the Enforcement
infringements of voting

“race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” 21

right not to be deprived

of the vote based upon race, Waite's

opinion thereby recognized Congress' power under section 2 of the

amendment

19

to enforce this

United States

v.

more

Reese 92 U.S. 214
,

limited right (rather than the general right to

(1

876) and United States

v.

Cruikshank, 92

U S S42

(1876).
2U

Reese

at

217.

21

Robert Goldman suggests Waite didn't explicitly find sections 3 and 4 unconstitutional, but
found them “insufficient." Reconstruction and Black Suffrage: Losing the Vote in Reese and
Cruikshank (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001 ) 100.
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vote). Yet, that

seemed

to

be exactly what Congress was doing

enforcement Act of 1870, as sections
preceded sections

and

3

Hunt pointed out

in a

of sections

2,

1

and

4, explicitly

and 2 of the

act,

which

directly

addressed the issue of race.

compelling dissent,

if

As

Justice

sections 3 and 4 are read in light

then they are limited to denying the right
to vote based

upon race and therefore are within
Fifteenth

1

in the

the clear confines of section 2 of
the

Amendment. 22 Waite, though, gave an over broad view
of a

congressional statute in order to find that statute
beyond the scope of
congressional power. 23

Odder

still is

the fact that Waite's opinion did not
specifically find

sections 3 and 4 of the Enforcement Act unconstitutional,
instead

them

insufficient.

24

it

So they were no longer good law, but what was

constitutional reason

what principle did the Court offer

—

first

the

for rejecting

Or, what constitutional guidance did this offer the legislature?
suggested, as a necessary

found

them?

As have
I

step for the Court to authoritatively settle

questions of constitutional meaning,

it

must

lay

down

fully theorized

constitutional opinions that give the political branches clear constitutional

guidance.

As

a corollary, the Court must follow

precedents to provide for

its

stable constitutional meaning. Waite's opinion, though, cuts in

" Reese

at

two

directions.

24 -242 (Hunt dissenting).
1

David Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 1789-1888 (Chicago: the University
of Chicago Press, 1985) 393-394, Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals 336, Scaturro, The Supreme
Court 's Retreat from Reconstruction (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000) 4 Goldman,
,

1

,

Reconstruction and Black Suffrage 90- 00.
,

24

Though Waite does invoke language

statute.

Reese

at

1

that hints at the unconstitutionality

2 17.

96

of the whole

To borrow Cass

Sunstein's language, Waite's opinion

both narrow

is

and

wide, both shallow and deep Sunstein describes the theoretical
grounding of

Court opinions as deep or shallow-, and
the range of cases the opinion
applies
to as

cases

narrow or wide. So a deeply theorized
opinion
is

that applies to a range

of

both a deep and a wide opinion.
Alternatively, a "case-by-case"

approach renders shallow and narrow
opinions— that
almost no theoretical grounding
legislative activity

to

defend

beyond the current

interpreted the Fifteenth

its

case.

results

is,

an opinion that gives

and does not apply

to

26

In this language,

Amendment widely and

deeply:

it

Waite

conferred the right

not to be discriminated against based upon
race in the exercise of the franchise

and nothing more. His wide and deep reading
spelled out very clearly the

meaning and terms
in the future,

stake (that

ol the fifteenth

Amendment and how

is, it

right at

only bestowed a right not to be discriminated against).

his clear constitutional rule,

legislation, enforce this (narrow) right.

Waite therefore found sections

wanting because they were not clearly hewed
they were not based, that

Fifteenth

would be applied

even while offering a narrow view of the constitutional

Congress could, then, by appropriate

Given

it

Amendment)

is,

to the

amendment

s

3

and 4

meaning

upon race (which came under the purview of the

but general discrimination (which did not). 27

Presumably, Congress could re-pass the

narrowing the terms of the

legislation,

making

statute to racial discrimination,

this issue clear

and the Court

Sunstein, One C use ut u Time: Judieiul Minimalism un the Supreme Court (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1998) 10-14.
26

Ibid. 17.
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by

would

find

it

constitutional. If this

is so,

we have an emerging

dialogue between Congress and the Court
wherein the Court

Congress

to clarify the constitutional basis

constitutional guidance in doing so.“ x But
Justice Hunt,

we can

not so simple. If

is

is

the Court

(

constitutional

that

it

power without

must do what

it

explicitly

to these

hemmed

denying

had already done.

asking

we

it

clear

follow

what the Court was asking of

Congress, as Congress had already limited the
statute

way of statutory misconstruction,

is

of the statute and giving

it

easily doubt that this

constitutional

1 hus,

that

in

very terms.

29

Congress'

power:

it

told

Congress

under the cover of judicial

minimalism, the Court rejected Congress' constitutional
vision, but did so

way

that did not bring

opinion

and

let

off the two

at least partly

striking

down
I

it

-8

Reese

at

indicted, but left the constitutional question

open. This

is

vague

hardly a principled constitutional opinion

a crass political act of Congress.

he question ot constitutional clarity and principle

Handed down

the

same day

is

even more

as Reese, the

new Chief

2 16.

Charles Fairman argues,

of Sections 3 and 4
But

in a

into explicit conflict with Congress. 30 Waite's

men

prevalent in Cruikshank.

27

By

in

"It

is

not to be doubted that

if

Congress had enacted the substance
would have been affirmed.”

apt language, the validity of the legislation

to be doubted, because there is a powerful argument that Congress had already done
and the Court had ignored it. Reconstruction and Reunion. 1864-88, 257. For a
general critic of Fairman, see Curtis, No State Shall Abridge, 00- 05.
it

is

just this

1

"9

"By

1

the words ‘as aforesaid,” the provisions respecting race and color of the

second sections of the
sections.” Reese at

statute are incorporated into

and made

a part

first

and

of the third and fourth

242 (Hunt dissenting).

1(1

Belz suggests the opinion was appropriate as

it

clearly limited congressional action to the

terms of the amendment. Yet he does not take up the fact that Congress, in sections and 2 of
the act, had already done this. The American Constitution 358. As Currie argues, “the Court
I

,

got around this difficulty by proclaiming
statute.”

The Constitution

in the

Supreme

.

.

.

that

it

had not power

Court, 1789-1888, 395.

98

to rewrite an

overbroad

Justice again wrote the opinion
of the Court, but did so in a

way

that skirted

the constitutionality of the
Enforcement Act, even while expounding
upon the

meaning of the Fourteenth and

Fifteenth

Amendments.

In the

wake of one of

the bloodiest events of Reconstruction,
the Colfax Massacre, federal
officials

indicted nearly 100 whites for
“conspiring" to deprive two black
constitutional rights.

7 ot the act,

The Court's opinion

which made

it

ultimately turned

on sections 6 and

a crime for private citizens to conspire
to deprive a

citizen of rights protected by the
Constitution or federal law.

Waite

s

men of their

At

opinion seems consistent with the notion that
the Court

provide stable constitutional meaning (by following

its

first

is

glance.

likely to

precedents) as the

opinion rested squarely on the notion of “dual
citizenship" recently articulated

by the Court

in

Slaughterhouse, following Miller's opinion, Waite
divided the

rights ot citizenship

clause

state

and the

and federal

those recognized in the “privileges and immunities

due process clause ot the Fourteenth Amendment
31

The

rights.

and the

by the

states.

protection.

like

were

Such

A

all

rights

state.

based upon

state citizenship

the right to

and therefore protected

do not come under fourteenth Amendment

conferred by virtue of being a citizen of the United States and

do come under Fourteenth Amendment
Congress can protect under section

5

11

at

Freedom of speech,

handful of rights— the right to protection on the high seas, for

example— are

Cruikshank

into

vast majority of rights. Miller had argued, are

held by virtue of being a citizen of a
vote,

—

549.

99

protection.

These are the

rights that

of the Fourteenth Amendment. All other

rights are protected

power.

32

This

is

state

and beyond the reach of congressional

true, as well, for section 2

we saw

which, as

by the

in

of the Fifteenth Amendment,

Reese did not confer the
,

right to vote, but the right not
to

be deprived of one's vote on the basis
of race.
C uses, the

made

it

Court's reading of the Fourteenth

much ado

about nothing:

it

alteration

was

Amendment was meant

now

that

the Slaughterhouse

Amendment,

to

paraphrase Field,

essentially left intact the dubious

citizenship articulated by Chief Justice
the Fourteenth

As with

Taney

in

view of

- the very view

Dred Scott

to overturn!

The only dramatic

blacks could be citizens of the United States
(and were

therefore protected in the few rights of citizenship
thereby bestowed).

Once
question was:

federal

W aite divided
Were

rights into federal

and

the rights allegedly violated here, rights protected
by the

government and therefore subject

to

Congress' power under section 5

ol the Fourteenth and section 2 ol the fifteenth

two extraordinary

Amendments? Here Waite

did

things. First he turned to an analysis of the indictments

themselves and not section 6 of the enforcement

were based upon. He then suggested

amendment

state protection, the

rights)

that

act,

two of the

which the indictments

rights (First

and Second

were only protected against the federal government and

not the states, so they were beyond the reach of the statute in this case. 33

Remarkably, Waite

which held

relied

on Marshall's Barron

Unless the

Baltimore opinion

that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states,

question of whether section

1_

v.

1

and ignored the

of the Fourteenth Amendment had

state first fails to protect

them, which came out of

100

in 1835,

later opinions.

fundamentally altered

this relationship (as

many

within Congress

framed the amendment argued), leaving
Marshall's opinion a
of pre-Fourteenth

Amendment jurisprudence. 34

cavalierly asserted that

construction [Barron

v.

it

was now “too

Baltimore ].”

35

late to

A

Instead.

who had

historical relic

Waite rather

question the correctness of this

constitutional

amendment was

reduced to nothing based on a prior Supreme
Court precedent! Waite then

concluded

that the Fourteenth

and Fifteenth Amendments only protected
one

from being deprived of rights based upon race
and then only against
state action. 1

he trouble with the indictments, Waite argued,
was that the

alleged deprivation of rights

nor was

it

official

was not

clearly asserted to be based

upon

race,

a direct result of state action. 36

What

is

most remarkable about Waite's opinion

is

that

he reaches out

broadly to expound upon the nature and meaning of both
the Fourteenth and
fifteenth

Amendments, and,

interpretation of these

but he does

all

” Cruikshank

at

'

in

doing

amendments

of this indirectly. In

so, rejects

much

of the congressional

as put forward in the Enforcement Act;

fact,

Waite doesn't even question the

553.

4

Ibid, at 552.
35

Ibid.
36
It

“is

nowhere alleged in these counts that the wrong contemplated against
was on account of their race or color.” Ibid at 555.

these citizens

101

the rights of

constitutionality ot section 6 of the
Enforcement Act. 37

indictments wanting: although the
clear implication

He merely

finds the

that not only is this

is

section of the act unconstitutional,
but that Congress' broader
reading of the

meaning of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments
minimalist judicial opinion that delivers
explicitly declared unconstitutional. 38

upon the

maximum

invalid. This is a

is

results.

Nothing

At a glance the opinion seems

s

terms, narrow and shallow. But this

offers a fully theorized

which

to rest

particular facts of the case and does
not address the broader

constitutional question or give us a
constitutional rule to follow;

Sunstein

is

is

not truly so.

it is,

in

The Court

view of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,

rejects Congress’

view as articulated

enforcement acts and

in the

severely limits Congress' ability to enforce the
amendments, if we follow the
logic

of Waite's opinion.

trouble

is

We

might say

that all

of this

is

simply dicta, the

that the reasoning is not superfluous but central
to the Court's

narrow conclusion. Waite can only find the indictments “wanting"
based upon
his reading of the

amendments (which

rejects Congress' reading)

and his

finding of section 6 of the Enforcement Act overly broad (although
he does

not explicitly find

it

unconstitutional). This

is

a masterpiece of judicial sleight

The Court's opinion is so sly on this fact that Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal, Harold Spaeth,
and Thomas Walker, The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions, and Developments
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1994) do not even list United States v. Cruikshank as a Court
decision holding an act of Congress unconstitutional (because it does so by indirection
rather
than explicitly) 96. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 604; Belz, The
,

American Constitution 357;
,

Currie, The Constitution in the

Smith, Civic Ideals 334-336,
,

Indeed,

all

discuss

it

all treat

in explicit

Supreme Court 395-397; and

the opinion as striking

,

down an

terms of the constitutional vision

it

act

of Congress.

offered up and not the

narrow holding.
'

8

“It

follows that they [the indictments] are not good and sufficient law.” Cruikshank

102

at

559.

ot hand, not clear reasoning
based upon constitutional principle—
a sleight of

hand,

we ought

to notice, that allows the
Court to deny, rather than enforce,

constitutional rights that Congress

Congress

directly, the

was

Court makes

gets the feeling that the Court

is

it

s

constitutional view.

not just the narrow result,

is

if

By

Congress

not taking on

One

to respond.

to disallow the rigorous

Congress attempted

to

conform

to the

Moreover, the Court's broad constitutional
view,
celebrated and becomes the basis of
future

Supreme Court opinions which
meaning

difficult for

determined

enforcement of the amendments even
Court

trying to protect.

far

more

explicitly speak to constitutional

39
.

Principle

and Precedent

Court and Congress

in

As Charles Warren

argues, "viewed in historical perspective

can be no question that the decisions

in these cases

.

there

.

were most fortunate. They

largely eliminated trom National politics the negro
question

which has so long

embittered Congressional debates; they relegated the burden
and the duty to
protecting the negro to the States, to

served to restore confidence

Chief Justice Waite,

in the

whom

they properly belonged; and they

National Court in the Southern States .” 40

in the tradition ot

himselt to deliver the Court's opinion

Marshall and laney, had taken
in these

it

upon

highly visible and hotly

contested cases and he was rewarded, by and large, with praise. While

we can

hardly be so sanguine as Warren, he does put his finger on something

'

Michael Les Benedict, “Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court,"

Supreme Court Review 1V7H (Chicago: University of Chicago
4U

Warren, The Supreme Court

in

United States History, 608.
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Press, 1979).

important: politics. Waite’s opinions
are most celebrated because
they signal a

from a constitutional vision

retreat

beginning to finding taxing as
local politics.

the

it

that the country

was growing weary of and

threatened an ever increasing national
role in

Rogers Smith suggests

that

“Chief Justice Waite's opinions

Supreme Court were redolent of the Northern
Republican

continued

Court

civil rights struggles.” 41

opinions,

s

is

Goldman reminds

key

The changing

retreat

political tide, not

to getting at constitutional

for

from

simply the

development. Robert

us that in Reese and Cruikshank important
as they were,
,

only two sections ot the various enforcement
acts were found unconstitutional

and those sections, based on the Court's opinion
(with

I'll

little

Reese were re-passed
,

modification) shortly after the decision was handed

take up below).

power

in

42

to enforce the

The point

is

that at this

terms of the Civil

meaning of those amendments was
Conceptually,

we might

still

moment

in time.

War Amendments and

down (which

Congress's
the very

an open constitutional question.

characterize this as a

movement from an open

(or

unsettled) constitutional question to a constitutional dialogue
about that

meaning.

1

lived as

his initial constitutional dialogue

it

was,

is

illuminating.

How

between Court and Congress, short

did Congress and Court conduct

themselves? Against the persistent insistence

that the

conduct

its

41

4

itself in a

reasoned manner and base

Court

is

more

likely to

decisions on constitutional

Smith, Civic Ideals, 336.

Goldman, Reconstruction and Black Suffrage, 109. See also Robert Goldman, A Free Ballot
and a Fair Count: The Department ofJustice and the Enforcement of Voting Rights in the
South, IR77-IRV3 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001 17.
"

)

104

principle, the evidence here
suggests that

We

this particular case.

and Cruikshank

it

fares far

worse than Congress

have already seen the Court’s shortcomings

in this regard.

to get

While "the country needed elementary

attention to the debates in Congress
indicate that

such instruction from Congress than the
Court

insist that the

Court was

“consideration [to the Civil

much

most responsible,”

the

scholarship on the Civil

Reese

in

instruction ... to explain basic
propositions about the Constitution as

stood,

43
.

it

was

more

While Fairman

War Amendments]

this is

far

norms embraced by

went out ol

44
.

Recent

the Reconstruction Congress

it

whims

supremacy

way

it

to enforce the constitutional

in the legislation

we have

provides for constitutional stability against the

ot the legislature. After

insist that the

important function, even

44

in

the Court does not act as a principled defender of

constitutional rights, perhaps

unpredictable

its

War Amendments

the Civil

been examining. Hven

43

tries to

Congress was not only concerned with producing a clear

constitutional vision, but

judicial

likely

given by the

simply not borne out

War Amendments and

then

it

impress upon us the high-minded constitutional
debate that took place
Congress.

in

it it

all,

the leading proponents of

Court's settlement function

gets the Constitution

wrong

46
.

is its

most

Thus, even

if the

Contrary to Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 273.
Reconstruction and Reunion, 278.

45

Curtis, No State Shall', Aniar, The
Fourteenth Amendment: Ackerman,

of Rights', Smith, Civic Ideals: Nelson, The
Hyman and Wiecek, Equal Justice Under
Law, Scatturo, The Supreme Court 's Retreat hrom Reconstruction. Even Raoul Berger's
account of the Fourteenth Amendments confronts one with the seriousness with which
Congress took up constitutional questions. Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of
the Fourteenth
4<>

Amendment

(Liberty

Bill

We

the People:

Fund

Press, 1998) second edition.

Alexander and Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation.”
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Court did not defend constitutional
principle,

at least

constitutional settlement, avoiding
the chaos that
left to

the Congress. This

is

stable constitutional vision

it

provided for

would come

if

things were

not evident. Congress adhered to
a remarkably

from 1865-1874. As

Hyman and Wiecek

demonstrate. Congress moves from general
principles to particular
applications in order to enforce constitutional
norms as,

they are resisted.

lacks stability in

This

is

This vision

its

itself is stable.

reflected in

enforcement powers. That began

to

Supreme Court spoke on

these issues

it

ruikshank

War Amendments and

.

It

Court opinions.

We

is

circuit

far

more

its

might be suggested that once the

—and much

generously so than the

less

pronounced a uniform view allowing

constitutional meaning. This

later

the Court that

Supreme Court justices, were

48

(

—

is

change with the Slaughterhouse Cases

and then with Reese and

Courts

it

Supreme Court opinions themselves. Early

receptive to Congress’ reading of the Civil

ircuit

this,

treatment of these amendments.

court opinions, which included sitting

C

Against

nearly every turn,

at

plausible in that

we

for the settlement of

see dissenting justices join

see this most vividly in Justice Bradley, a sharp

dissenter in the Slaughterhouse Cases. Bradley initially offered a robust

reading of Fourteenth

Amendment

circuit court opinions

and

47

48

Hyman and

in his

rights

and Congressional power

Slaughterhouse dissent,

but then, a few

Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law.

Smith, Civic Ideals 327-330; Belz, The American Constitution 355.
,

4V

49

in his

Live-Stock Dealers

Slaughter-House Co.,

’

,

and Butchers Association
'

15 F.

Cas 649.

106

v.

Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and

years alter Slaughterhouse

in his circuit court

,

opinion

in

forward the logic that Chief Justice Waite
would rely on

Cruikshank
in his

50
,

he put

Cruikshank

opinion, which flatly rejected Bradley's
Slaughterhouse dissent. This

culminated

Bradley's opinion for the Court in the
Civil Rights Cases of

in

1883 (which

we

will take

up below). 51

1 he trouble with this

constitutional

view

that

it

neglects the evolution of

meaning under the Supreme Court (and not just
changes

individual justices' opinions).

in (

is

The Court may follow

its

precedents (as

in the

it

did

ruikshank ), as proponents of judicial supremacy
would suggest, thereby

providing for stability in constitutional meaning.
But the precedents

themselves gradually spin out constitutional meaning
consistent with past cases,

provide for more

Congress does.

is

not required by them.

that,

while often

The Court does not

expounding constitutional meaning than the

stability in

In tact, in these cases, the Court's exposition

seems

less

principled (both in the sense ol being based on constitutional
principle and in
the sense of offering rule-based opinions that the political branches
can clearly

follow).

down

As we have seen from Reese and Cruikshank,

a clear constitutional rule. For the Court to authoritatively settle

constitutional questions and bind the other branches to

must give us wide and deep
question before

it,

rulings.

The Court must

not simply the case before

it.

United States

v.

Cruikshank 25
,

F.

707 (1874).

107

its

interpretation,

it

settle the constitutional

Alexander and Sherwin

suggest that authoritative settlement “is precisely to

50

the Court does not lay

settle the

question what

ought to be done.” 5 " For the proponents
of judicial supremacy, authoritative
settlement

is

necessary for the Constitution to function
as law. Principled and

fully theorized opinions are
necessary to this settlement function.

them, Alexander and Sherwin argue,

which

is

we

will get instability

Without

and indeterminacy

detrimental to the very nature of law.

It is

doubtful, though, that the

generally) acts in this fashion.

Even

Supreme Court always

if

the Court lays

decisions, particular circumstances will bring

new

(or

even

down broad

rule-based

cases under those terms and

the Court will need to address them. So, in
a limited sense, there will always

be a revisiting of constitutional questions. This

What

is

troublesome for such theorizing

clear rules in the case before

it:

Even

it

we wanted

to

when

—

or citizens for that matter

fact that the Court, in

already done. Indeed, there

decisions: the Court

political will

51

52

Civil Rights

is

Reese seems
,

is

members of

—“what ought

to

to tell

little

guidance, exemplified

Congress

to

do what

it

has

nothing particularly principled about these

hardly offering us principled reasons against the

of Congress. One might

Cases 109 U.S.
,

tell

abide by the Court's interpretation of the

Constitution in these cases, these opinions give us

by the

53
.

the Court does not pronounce

Reese and Cruikshank do not

Congress or the executive branch
be done.

is

not terribly problematic

is

flip this

on

its

head: the Court seems to

3 (1883).

Alexander and Sherwin, The Rule of Rules,

12.

s

Although one does wonder if this itself cuts against the kind of authoritative settlement
Alexander and Sherwin argue for. Indeed, do they end up saying: “follow the Court, whatever
the Court says.” This may not provide any stability, or any “true settlement." The Rule of
’

Rules

,

13-15. In fact,

we might wonder

if this is

applied to the Court, so that the Constitution

108

is

simply the “gun

man

theory of the law”

whatever the Court says

it

is.

be evading a principled constitutional
vision by

way of faulty

statutory

construction and ducking the constitutional
issue, even while waxing
poetic

about constitutional meaning. There

may

indeed be passive virtues and

excellent reasons for judicial minimalism, 54
but they are antithetical to the

most prominent arguments

for judicial

supremacy. Rather than giving us

authoritative settlement, these opinions
leave the constitutional question
unsettled, or in a state ot constitutional dialogue
at best. Yet,

such unsettlement or dialogue leads

to constitutional anarchy.

Court had offered a broad constitutional
itself,

would have been enough

joward

it

rule,

it

is

not clear that

is

And even

if the

doubtful that that, in and of

to settle the constitutional issue.

a Constitutional Set tlement: the Congressional
Election of 1874

Perhaps the most important development on the road to
constitutional
settlement occurred in

November

ot 1874

when

the Reconstruction

Republicans were ousted from control of Congress by the Democratic
Party.

By

the time Reese and Cruikshank were decided by the Court
in

clear that there

Individual

members of Congress,

for the various

alarmed

was much congressional opposition

at the

to the

1

876,

it

is

not

Court's opinions.

especially Republican holdovers

who

voted

Enforcement Acts and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, were
Court

s

construction, but Congress as a whole

to leave this with the Court.

The

seemed content

constitutional questions raised by the

enforcement acts and the Court's opinions were hardly

4

settled at this point,

Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (New Haven: Yale University Press,
One Case At a Time and Keith Bybee, “The Political Significance of
Legal Ambiguity: The Case of Affirmative Action" Law and Society Review Volume 34,
1964). See also Sunstein,

Number

2 (2000).
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but the change in Congress
represented a seismic shift in the
political

landscape that cleared the
to 1874, the

way

for constitutional settlement.

From 1870

Republican-dominated Congress passed legislation

ot the Court

were bound

that a majority

viewed as constitutionally suspect. The
Court and the Congress
to contest constitutional

meaning as

the Congress

deemed

constitutionally permissible things that the
Court viewed as constitutionally

impermissible.

I

hus the Court rejected Congress’ broad
constitutional vision

by finding parts of the Enforcement Act
unconstitutional. The precondition
this clash

was Congress' aggressive stance

in protecting

substantive vision of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
lag that occurs

between the passage

pronouncement upon
C ongress

s

view

its

constitutionality,

ol the fourteenth

legislation wanting, the

ot legislation

and enforcing

for

its

Amendments. But given

the

and the Court's

by the time the Court acted

to limit

and fifteenth Amendments by finding

(new) Congress was no longer articulating

its

this view.

After the Democrats gained control of the House of Representatives
and
officially took their seats in 1875,

stance, nor passed

suspect,

5"

new

it

neither supported the old Congress's

legislation that the Court

not because a majority of the Congress decided to adhere to

Supreme Court opinions per

se,

but because the

Republicans as well as Democrats

— had a

Amendments, which coincided (more
the

dominant constitutional vision

Sections 3 and 4 which were struck
the Court.

viewed as constitutionally

different

or less) with the Court's. Simply put.

in

into

alignment with the

Reese were repassed, but never came before

Goldman, A Free Ballot and a Fair Count.

110

— many

view of the Civil War

Congress moved

in

down

new majority

majority of justices on the Court.

By

What was

a constitutional contest dissipated.

the time the Court explicitly found
the Reconstruction Congress's

handiwork unconstitutional,

it

was confirming, not

majority view in Congress. So
constitutional

meaning

we

to a state

traverse from a period of contested

of unsettlement and

dialogue back to a state ot uncontested
meaning. In
the generation of constitutional

ultimately arrived

Congress

I

’v

he

disputing, the (new)

meaning and

partial constitutional

this.

Congress

is

central to

the constitutional settlement

at.

Last Stand

last

waning days

great act of the Reconstruction Congress took
place in the

ot the Forty-Third Congress, just before the
official change in

power. 1 he Civil Rights Act ot
Senator Charles Sumner,

1

875, passed in honor of the recently deceased

who had been

trying to pass such legislation for

years, put forward a constitutional vision that the incoming
Congress had
interest in detending.

Congress
to

I

his constitutional vision

into direct conflict with the Court. Yet, based

this transitory

on the only Court case

speak to the relevant constitutional questions when the act was passed. The

Slaughterhouse Cases

,

was not

this

Supreme Court opinion was
while

many members make

be expounded upon: alone

5<>

would bring

little

Scaturro, The

it

a forgone conclusion.

So while the

referred to. Congress does not just follow

reference to

it,

because the opinion

settles nothing.

Supreme Court 's Retreat From Reconstruction

,

1

5.

itself

it,

even

needs to

The most

controversial sections of the Civil
Rights Act outlawed racial

discrimination in public accommodations
based on a broad reading of

Congress

section 5

s

power under

the Fourteenth

Congress was clearly interpreting section

of the

1

Amendment.

In this case.

Amendment— the

privileges

and immunities ot citizenship, due process
of law. and equal protection— and
reaching out. by

way of its enforcement power,

reading of Fourteenth
C

ivil

Amendment

much

Rights Act,

on

their

legislation

it

Constitution

Congress

must

is

upon
in

s.

I

hese

conformity with

th

in 13

Frank Scaturro, The Supreme Court

's

Constitutional Jurisprudence (Westport:

to

[its

making

be bound by

it

comes

it,

to

reading] of the

members of Congress thought

its

no matter w hat the Court had or had not

Which could have been rooted
Justice Under Law.

in constitutional

and when

conformity with

the

of

to Slaughterhouse. In

to legislate,

s

and not the Court
in

members engaging

some members refused

called

legislate ...

Congress should act

The congressional debates on

own, as well as referring

reference to this Court opinion,

arguing that

57

like the earlier debates, reveal a
high level

constitutional discussion, with the

interpretation

rights.

to vigorously protect its

that

interpretation of the Constitution

said. Just as assuredly, other

Amendment

as well.

Hyman and

Wiecek, Equal

From Reconstruction: A Distortion of
Greenwood Press, 2000) 15. See also Congressional

Retreat

Record Forty Third Congress, 2 nd Session

Part III (1874) at 1791. Mr. Boutwell, “I am not
disposed to discuss the Slaughter-house decision, as it is called. It will stand legally and
,

politically for

what

case like that,

if

in

it

is

worth.

It

related to a particular case. In that case and in every other

there shall be another case like that,

which the opinion was rendered, and therefore

when
case;

1

it

come
is

to consider

new

for

it

is

law; but

myself

I

it

is

not law

beyond

propositions.” Boutwell then insisted

“it is

not law beyond the

not law with reference to the rights of the states generally, and certainly

for the Senate

when

the Senate

is

engaged

in

the case

dismiss that case as a legislator

considering a question which

is

is

not law

a different

question from that on which the court passed." Boutwell then offered a reading of the
“privileges and immunities clause” akin to Field and Bradley’s dissents, although never

mentioning them, the logic of which squarely rejected Miller's majority opinion,

112

at

1793.

congressmen

insisted that the

Congress was bound by the Court's
59
opinion.

Yet there was debate over just what
being bound by the Court's opinion
entailed:

how

did the prior opinion speak to
this particular constitutional

issue? In answering this question.
Congress

Court's opinion, weighing

own

it,

at

was compelled

to interpret the

times, against the Constitution,
and against

past actions. This Congress

was perhaps unique

in that

many members

its

in

1875 had acted as tramers of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth

Amendments. Surely they should know

amendments

as

as the Court? In this vein, a

much about

the intent of these

number of Senators and

representatives insisted that Congress must go
forward despite the

Slaughterhouse
others viewing

bound by

C uses,

it

some viewing

the opinion as constitutionally wrong,

as indeterminate, but

the Constitution, not the

insisted that the Slaughterhouse

all

agreeing that Congress should be

Supreme Court. 60 Other Congressmen

Cases presumptively made the

unconstitutional and that Congress ought to be

59

bound by

Congressional Record, Forty Third Congress, 2" d session. Part

confess that

I

am amazed

that in the face of the plain

immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment],

Supreme Court of the United

in

act

the Court's

111 at

1792. Mr. Thurman, "1

language of this section (privileges and
the face of the solemn decision of the

States adverse to this proposition [Civil Rights Act]

it

yet

is

pressed upon the Congress of the United States, and we are asked to do what the language of
the Constitution does not authorize us to do, and what the solemn decision of our Supreme

Court declares
60

we have no power whatever

Ibid, at 1792.

to do,” at 1792.

construction of the Constitution
to support the act, arguing that

motivation of the Fourteenth

61

Still

.

even

others cited the Slaughterhouse
Cases

this

case recognized that the primary

Amendment was

black equality, which

is

precisely what the Civil Rights Act,
targeting public accommodations,
trying to achieve.

6

'

The Slaughterhouse Cases did not give
Congress clear

guidance here. While placing most rights under
the prerogative of the
Miller

was

states.

opinion had clearly stated that the “one
pervading purpose found

s

War Amendments,

the Civil

and firm establishment ol

[in

was] the freedom of the slave race, the security

that

freedom, and the protection of the newly-made

freeman and citizen from the oppression
of those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over

Would

the Court, a congressional exercise of

power

be enough to justify, for

that admittedly intruded into the

796. Much of the debate expounded upon the Constitution
itself, with no reference
Supreme Court, with many congressmen making reference to the “plain
meaning of the

Ibid, at

to the

this last part

1

Constitution upon

its

and adding, "that every judicial exposition of that instrument
when the Court supported their argument, but not relying on

face

sustains this reasonable view,

the Court's opinions alone, at 1797. Others expressed

was unconstitutional given

sympathy for the Act, but insisted it
their reading of the Constitution: “I entertain, as strongly as
any

Senator, the sentiments which have inspired this

bill; and in the present unhappy condition of
our constitutional power to support any bill
calculated to protect the colored people of the South or to restore order in that
distracted
section. But
cannot go beyond the limits of the Constitution" at 1861. One Senator

the South,

I

would go

to the

extreme

limit ot

1

(Carpenter) noted the vexing question of judicial supremacy against departmentalism,
treating
the question of "who interprets?" as an open question, but noting that all agree
that the

Supreme Court

settles legal questions when they are given jurisdiction in particular
casesby the legislature, as a way to invoke their rights. He then noted that the
Slaughterhouse Cases settled this issue for those bringing suit (if not for Congress as a

that

is,

general rule),

at

1862.

on the enforcement

He

thus rejected the Civil Rights Act, given the Court's various opinion

acts, as

it

would "involve

certain to be defeated", at 1863. In these

the colored

man

in litigation in

which he

same debates Senator Edmunds accuses

is

the

opponents ot the Civil Rights Act (and the various previous acts) of willfully misreading the
War Amendments obstructing their meaning at every turn, and acting as if the
Constitution had not, in tact, been amended. He discoursed, at great length, on the nature of
rights and equality under the Constitution without a single reference to a Court opinion, at
1869-1870.
Civil

Scaturro, The

—

Supreme Court's Retreat From Reconstruction,

1,1

Slaughterhouse Cases

at 71

(my

italics).
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1

14-128.

domain of the
to

states (under pre-Civil

War

terms)? This was, after

be remedied by [the Amendments].” 64
The Court's opinion on

ambiguous, not because

it

is

we have seen— but because

all,

“the evil

this score is

an undertheorized opinion—quite
the contrary as
it

did not specifically take up this
constitutional

question. Court opinions, no less than the
Constitution, lend themselves to
legitimate interpretive debate. This

is

not a nihilistic pronouncement that

opinions are infinitely interpretable, but recognition
that as constitutional
debates are olten about particular acts, there
readings of just
the

how

Congress wanted

Supreme Court’s

may

be multiple plausible

a past opinion applies to different
circumstances.
to defer to the Court's

decision, the result

is

Even

if

judgment, given the nature of the

a constitutional dialogue. Rather than

broadly settling constitutional issues with the stroke of a
pen. Court opinions
are likely to be

1

his

may

worked out

in the

give and take of constitutional dialogue.

be constitutional dialogue on the road

but in this case, far

more than a Court opinion

Congress and the Court
In relying

the Congress

—

necessary— for both

to settle this contested constitutional question.

on Court opinions

to guide

its

constitutional interpretation,

must inevitably read those Court opinions and, thereby, venture

into constitutional interpretation in

will not offer clear guidance

Members of Congress may

most cases

(as the opinions

themselves

on the exact issues before the Congress).

indeed turn to the Constitution to help them

construe a Court opinion; in

Ibid, at 81

is

to authoritative settlement,

fact,

assuming

.

115

it

were

to

follow Court opinions.

Congress may need

to interpret

Court opinions

interprets the Constitution in order
to apply

in the

them

very

way

that the

to particular acts. If

Court

we

follow the logic of Alexander and
Schauer, and other proponents of
judicial

supremacy,

this itself is to enter

forbidden terrain. Accordingly, the
Congress

should not venture any opinions on
constitutionality, as

Court and the Court alone: “legislative

officials should

this is the

job of the

do what they are

assigned to do, and what they are assigned
to do does not include
constitutional interpretation .” 65

the judiciary in this case.

is

The Constitution becomes

The whole

point of authoritative judicial settlement

that opinions "supplant the reasons

who wish

to follow the terms

the sole province of

upon which they

are based .”

66

Those

of settlement are "no longer required to consult

the reasons behind the settlement in determining

required not to heed those reasons

from

if,

how

to act, they are also

their perspective, those reasons

conflict with the terms of settlement .” 67 But as

we have

seen. Court opinions,

especially on constitutional questions, do not necessarily
operate in this way.

At a deeper

level, if

Congress

is

simply

to follow the latest judicial

pronouncement, we may go

far to

undermining the Constitution (and

constitutional norms) in the

name

of

requires

65

more than enforcement by

upholding

Constitutional maintenance

the judiciary.

Alexander and Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,” 1367.

<’ <
’

it.

Alexander and Sherwin, The Rule of Rules,
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13.

The Court and the Emerging
Constitutional Settlement
This constitutional dialogue between
the Court and the Congress
was
replaced by a univocal Court, as
Congress retreated from the sweep of
Reconstruction. The Democrats took
control of the House
(

ruikshank were handed

1876 seemed

down

to signal the

shortly thereafter, and the

end of Reconstruction

in

1875, Reese and

Compromise of

politics altogether.

It is

tempting to say that the unsettled constitutional
questions over the meaning of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth

politic tor nearly a decade,

the (

ivil

Amendments, which had convulsed

were

finally settled in Justice Bradley's
opinion in

Rights Cases (1883), which struck

Rights Act ot

875 and brought an end

1

suggests something like

[the Fourteenth],

protection

it

down

however, so

tar as

it

Well, not quite.

paved the way

As

I

in a series

effect

fully

and 2 of the Civil

of that

this

that these issues

“With

by

does not capture the dynamic that

tor settlement: the Court's opinion stood because

elections returns of 1868:

settled

of eight cases between 1876 and 1884." 68

have argued,

Ackerman suggests

Warren

Amendment

and definitively

the political sentiment of the nation and not because

opinion.

1

concerned the negro race for whose

had been primarily adopted, were

Waite and his Court,

sections

to this divisive public debate.

“The meaning and

this:

body

the

their hold

were

it

was

it

reflected

the Court's

truly settled in the

on national power reconfirmed

the consolidating election. Republicans in the White

House and Capitol

in

Hill

l,s

Warren, The Supreme Court
whose work has done so much

in

United Slates History 600. Even Michael Kent Curtis,
Congress, suggests that “after
,

to resuscitate the Reconstruction

rulings by the high court” the constitutional issues were settled. Properly parsed this might be
true, but this issues

were not

settled just be judicial decision.

117

No

State Shall Abridge. 170.

took aggressive steps to pack
the Supreme Court with
vindicate their

new

vision of the

Union"

men who would

61
’

Yet Ackerman

story in 1873 with the (odd)
affirmation of the Fourteenth

Slaughterhouse.

He misses

appointees led the charge

that

in

some of these

tries to

end the

Amendment

in

putative transformative

overturning the Republican
Congress's and

President Grant's constitutional
vision— namely. Waite and Bradley,
both

appointed by Grant and confirmed by
a Republican Congress. Nor can
that, after

in

1

in

1

say

a lag. these justices were articulating
a view based on the realigning

election of

end

we

7
1

860.

"

Serious public debate on these
constitutional issues did not

883 with the Court's opinion,

860 with a

political realignment.

constitutional view

on the

in

1

868 with a consolidating election, or

The Court did

political branches,

not impose

its

nor did the political branches

bring about their desired constitutional
vision by

way of Court

appointees.

A

serious constitutional debate between the
Congress and the Court occurred

trom 1868-1874 on these
with a change

paved the way

in the

issues.

It

was

the change in Congress

(combined

presidency with the famous “compromise of 1876")
that

lor constitutional settlement.

The Court may well have been

the leading voice in constitutional interpretation
after these events, but that

M

Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 211.
,

7

"

See John Gates, The Supreme Court and Partisan Realignment (Boulder Westview Press

1992) 51-52.

was by and

large because

it

was

in

agreement with the Congress. 11

ordinary course of events, the Court
constitutional meaning, especially

the governing majorities'. But that

when
is

authoritatively settles constitutional

by the

well act as the primary expositor
of
its

view coincides, by and large, with

a far cry

from arguing

meaning when

that

that the

meaning

is

Court

contested

political branches.

I

eight

may

In the

his is reflected in the Civil Rights
Cases.

members of the Bench,

that the Fourteenth

Amendment

not private discrimination).

interpretation of section

power under Section

5.

1

down

struck

Bradley's opinion, for

sections

and 2 of the Act, arguing

1

only protected rights from state invasion (and

The Court

explicitly rejected Congress'

of the amendment, as well as

its

reading of

The Fourteenth Amendment only prohibited

its

state

discrimination, not private discrimination, and Congress, under
section

could only act to preserve rights against
constitutional

meaning of section

Congress' power under section

1

state

of the Fourteenth

had been

5,

abridgment.

left to

72

5,

While the

Amendment and

implication in Cruikshank,

the Court explicitly spelled this out in The Civil Rights Cases. Congress'

section 5

power was severely hemmed

right to interpret the Constitution

“corrective," giving

1

Warren argues

that

it

on

its

in,

denying Congress,

own;

its

in essence, the

power was rendered

the ability to protect rights only if the states were

confidence

in the

Waite Court was high:

"When

it

is

recalled that in

every year from 1850 to 1873 (with the exception of the five years of the war) there had been
Congressional legislation proposed in serious derogation of the Court’s powers, the practical

immunity from assault which occurred form 1873 to 1884 is a notable feature in its history.”
But even this is premised on the change in Congress; it reflects the fact that the Court is in
line

with Congress. The Supreme Court in United Stutes History. 563.

1

19

involved

in their denial.

earlier that year in

7

’

This further spun ou, the logic
the Court had offered

United States

Haris.”

v.

In

Bradley had once embraced a far-reaching
view of the Civil

like

Amendments and Congress's

Ku Klux Act of

ability to enforce

more

fully

develop

Woods

in the Civil Rights

only protected rights against

first failed to

that the

Furthermore. Congress could act only
protect rights.

Rights Cases.

However much

the Slaughterhouse Cases

—thw

itself

in line

'

at

1

I

Ibid, at 13

United States

Woods

in

v.

Harris

106 U.S. 629

,

United States

v.

Hall 26
,

F.

(

1

882).

79

(

7<>

Harris

at

rejected as a

637.

77

Ibid at 643, 639, and

the states themselves

basis for the act

more

was

of Reese, because the
Harris clearly

built

fully articulated in the Civil

arted the constitutional vision of the

7

7

Amendment

opinions— like Reese. Cruikshunk. and

.

Cases

if

to acts against blacks.

these

Reconstruction Congress, they were

74

was

The Thirteenth Amendment

upon Reese and Cruikshunk and was

'

Fourteenth

Bradley would

75

conspiracy charges were not limited

Civil Rights

that

did not. as Waite said in Reese,
confer a

it

rejected, in a statutory construction
reminiscent

'

War

conspiracies to deprive

view

state action (the Fifteenth

constitutional basis of the act as
right to vote).

made

articulated the

Cases

who

them, found section 2 of the

1871 unconstitutional. 75 The Act

citizens ot their rights a crime.

1883

Haris. Justice Woods,

64 -642.
1

120

1871).

with the political consensus of

New

Vie

York Timex, for example,
claimed that Justice Harlan's

famous lone dissent
paper." But

it

in the Civil Rights

went on

to say. "the

Cases was "a learned, candid,
and able

tendency during the war period
was toward

the construction he favors.
Since (hen a reaction has set
beneficial!.]”

HARLAN'S
popular will

The Court's opinion "has

will hardly unsettle

at the time, but

it

seemed

reflected by Justices Bradley and

Supreme Court justice

.” 78

to

in.

satisfied public

it.

This

is

not only reflected

perhaps best

Woods. Both of these justices (Bradley

sitting in circuit

and

Woods

would come before

uses.

C

in

I

the

Supreme Court

as a

as a circuit court judge)

had given the Fourteenth Amendment a
broad-based reading
that

far. is

judgment, and Justice

The Court's opinion
embrace

which, so

in a

controversy

as part of the Slaughterhouse

here both justices embraced the logic
that would

later

be articulated

Bradley's Slaughterhouse dissent, rejecting
Miller's distinction between the

"privileges and immunities" of state citizenship
and the "privileges and

immunities” ot United States citizenship. Yet Bradley
himself would
implicitly reject this reading in his circuit court
opinion in Cruikshank , which

served as the doctrinal basis ot Chief Justice Waite's
opinion for the Supreme
Court.

Woods had

further spelled out the “privileges and immunities"
of

United States citizenship

in

United States

v.

Hall offering, after
,

corresponding with Bradley, a broad reading ot the “privileges
and

immunities
secured

78

Quoted

ot United States citizenship,

in the Constitution.

in

Scaturro, The

He went

Supreme Court

's

121

which included

all

rights expressly

further in saying that Congress, by

Retreat from Reconstruction

.

129.

My

way

italics.

of section

5.

could enforce these rights
agamst “insufficient” state
protection

and not just overt discrimination.

on the Thirteenth Amendment
interpretation

(

Ml

fall

was squarely

In fact.

do

to

all

Woods

argued. Congress could rely

of this! This early constitutional

rejected by Bradley and

Woods

in

Harris and the

Rights Cases. These justices might
have been adjusting their views
to

into line with

Supreme Court precedents

as part of the Court's settlement

(unction. Still, such an alteration
should at least lead us to

putative insularity of the

Supreme Court from popular

congressional vision in the early

1

wonder about

opinion.

The

the

shift in

870s. combined with the Court's
reading,

was

the basis of the later constitutional
settlement. These developments were

key

to

shaping the constitutional meaning of
these amendments.

meaning, forged
settled,

even

amendments.

it

in the constitutional politics

of 870-76.
1

that

the politics of this era subverted the
original

It

we

is this

inherit as

meaning of these

79

Hyman and Wiecek offer an insightful line of analysis along these
lines. They suggest that
the passage of each subsequent enforcement act
and amendment led the Court to read them in
reverse order, which subsequently narrowed their
scope rather than widening it. So the
Thirteenth is read in light of the Fourteenth, rather than
vice versa. Each successive act was
more specific than the prior, but this was due to southern intransigence
and not Congress’s
desire to abandon the broader readings. By being more
particular. Congress hoped
"

to thwart

the

wide spread evasion of

amendments and various enforcements acts. One result of this
was the almost total eclipse of the Thirteenth Amendment, even though
it was initially offered
as far more than a formal end to slavery. Another result was
that congressional acts helped
the

pave the way for the “state action” doctrine the Court would later apply.
While each new act
at bringing an end to southern resistance, it also began
to reveal just how deep
Congress s commitment to enforce the amendments would have to be. Real enforcement
of
the amendments, it became evident, would require a substantial
federal commitment in local
politics— something never before seen. Facing this, it seems that many steadfast
supporters of

was aimed

the Civil War amendments blinked. The Republican constitutional vision
altered as the costs
of that vision became apparent. This altered constitutional vision coincided with the
Court's
own articulation of constitutional meaning (which itself might have been driven by this
realization).

122

Interestingly, the Civil Rights

culmination of these developments

Cases c an then be seen as the

in constitutional

meaning: the Court only

articulated a clear and fully
theorized constitutional vision
of the Civil

Amendments when
pronounced

that vision

was shared by

the Congress.

It

War

boldly

(the earlier) Congress’
misinterpretation of the Fourteenth

Amendment and

limited

its

amendments, when

power

to

enforce the terms of any of the
Civil

a national consensus

embraced such a reading.

In

an

interesting twist, in these cases, as
public support for Reconstruction
(and

constitutional vision) began to wane,

it

was

(the

it

was

the Court

who went

the Court. This

is

the democratic impulse.

along with the democratic impulse.

countermajoritarian tendency here,

it

is

on the

part

If there is

of the prior Congress, not

the judicial thesis transposed: these

members of Congress

adhere to a principled defense of constitutional
rights and a willingness
protect such rights even while

it

cost

them

its

lame-duck 1875) Congress

who, arguably, supported the Constitution
against

And

War

politically.

Against

this,

to

an

insulated Court outpaces southern resistance:
“on the issues of the rights of

American
devoted

citizens, the

Supreme Court was more

to a restricted states rights interpretation

some southern Democrats.

80

A

royalist than the king,

more

of the Constitution than even

truly countermajoritarian Court,

concerned

with rights and constitutional principle, would have upheld
the Civil Rights

Act ol 1875 against a nation

that

seemed determined

amendments.

80

Curtis,

No

State Shall Abridge,

!

70.

123

to ignore these

new

We might push

is

even further as

We should

judicial supremacy.

acts

this

it

relates to the typical

notice that Congress by

view of

way of these

various

pushing a robust and principled
constitutional vision of rights
that the

Court

that great protector

early Court opintons

do

of rights-seems

this

intent

on strikmg down. The

by clear statutory misconstruction
and

sidestepping the broader constitutional
issues to reach decisions that
go
against the enforcement of
congressional acts without explicitly
finding them
unconstitutional

articulations

81

These opinions are not highly
principled,

of constitutional questions. Nor are
they

clearly reasoned

rights protecting.

Nor do

they lead to constitutional settlement.
The opinions themselves evolve. They

may

well build upon one another in a
consistent way. each

developing the

(partial) logic

of the prior opinion

to a

new opinion

wider area and a more

general level ot constitutional articulation.
However, this evolution of
constitutional

I

arbroughp

meaning by way of Court opinions
a year after Harris

Supreme Court came very close

is

not so simple. In Ex Parle

and a mere eight years
to

after Reese, the

saying that the Fifteenth

Amendment

conferred the right to vote, which was explicitly
rejected in these earlier
opinions. Yarbrough

1870

that

was based on

the

two sections of the Enforcement Act of

were found wanting (rather than

explicitly declared

unconstitutional) in Reese. 1 his time the Court explicitly
upheld the action.

8

I

A

As David Currie

Court

s restrictive

suggests, even while rejecting Congress’ broad constitutional
reading, “the
interpretations ot the Constitution

were unavoidable, but by manipulating

the statutory issues of coverage and severability the
Court went out of
the enforcement authorities after it was too late politically to

its

way

to incapacitate

expect Congress to

by enacting narrower statutes.” The Constitution
s

~

Ex Parte Yarbrough

,

I

10 U.S. 651

(

1884).

124

in the

Supreme

fill

the

gap

Court. 1789-/888, 402.

What

RUSe
right.

is

more, the Court explicitly took
up the right

unecl uivoca lly stated that the
Fifteenth

This was reiterated

in Justice

to vote.

Amendment

Woods' opinion

before. But Miller's opinion
stated that the Fifteenth

in

Waite's opinion

m

confers no such

Harris just the year

Amendment

“does,

propio vigore, substantially confer
the negro the right to vote,
and Congress
has the power to protect and
enforce that right ." 83 Just as
suspicious that the Court

is

more principled than

deeply skeptical of the proposition
that

its

we

the Congress,

constitutional vision

This strongly suggests that “finality
of interpretation

outcome— when

indeed

it

should be

is

we
is

should be

more

stable.

hence the

exists— not of judicial application of
the

Constitution to the decisions of cases, but
of a continued harmony of views

among

the three departments ." 84

When

constitutional questions are disputed,

the political branches play a crucial
role in the development and
settlement of

constitutional meaning. Attempts by the
Court to impose a constitutional

settlement in the absence of a shared consensus

and even lead

to the conflict

are so fearful of.

thought.

8
'

and chaos

Taney’s attempt

to

that

may promote

unsettlement

proponents of judicial supremacy

do just

this in

Dred Scott

is

food for

also not clear that the clash of constitutional
visions, including

It is

the modification and evolution of doctrine, leads
to constitutional instability

or chaos.

Nor

is

it

clear that the solidification of constitutional meaning,
under

Ibid at 665. Miller does, just before, note that

the Fifteenth

Amendment does

discriminated against
vote.” See also
84

85

in

it is quite true that, as the Court
said in Reese,
not confer the right to vote, but only the right not to be

the vote, that

it

may

“operate as the immediate source of the right to

Goldman, Reconstruction and Block Suffrage,

Edward Corwin, Court Over Constitution

1

15.

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938).

Seidman, Our Unsettled Constitution, 161.

125

the rubric ot Court opinions,

is

always desirable. This suggests

constitutional maintenance requires

it

It

the Constitution

commitment

a

sustain

itself.

is

more than judicial enforcement,

more than

to be

a formal

constitutional promise of the Civil

have seen, could not endure without

ot the Civil

Even

it

the Court

unlikely to

it is

As

difficult to

imagine

that

it

could have,

the forging of a

would have acted

to

more

when

the Court

is

uphold these early

it

is

promise of

much of

vested with the sole responsibility of

enforcing constitutional limits, our constitutionalism

more

we

limited

in itself, sustained the early

constitutional rights for black citizens. Contrary to so

constitutional theory,

as

political will for

and Congress's view of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,

acts

not

settlement.

witnessed a retreat from the original

War Amendments and

constitutional vision.

full

we

especially

War Amendments,

political support.

constitutional principle began to flag,

meaning

mechanism of legal

to constitutionalism exists only in the
Court,

The

that

is

likely to be less secure,

so.

Conclusion: The Subtle Vices of Authoritative Settlement

Even

it

the Court gets the Constitution wrong, proponents of judicial

supremacy are tond

ot quoting Justice Brandeis: "in

most matters

important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that
right."

Yet, they often

fail to

it

it

is

more

be settled

note Brandeis' subsequent sentence: "But in

cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative

practice

8<
’

Burnet

is

v.

practically impossible, this Court has often overruled

Coruna Jo Oil

<&

Gas

Co., 285 U.S. 393,
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406

(

its

earlier

1932), Brandeis dissenting.

decisions.

I

he Court bows to the lessons of
experience and the force of better

reasoning!.]"

87

settlement for settlement's sake

Still,

constitutional value than constitutional
principle or

is

deemed

meaning

proponents of judicial supremacy. 88 Morally
speaking,

to

to

be a higher

many

this slights

constitutional principles for the evasive value
of closing constitutional

questions and

is difficult to

more concerned with

reconcile with the notion that the Court
will be

constitutional principle than will the political
branches

or the people. This seems corrosive of
constitutionalism because

Congress
(even

to be

it

tells

the

unconcerned with the Constitution once the Court has
spoken

Congress thinks the Court got the Constitution wrong). But,
most

it

importantly,

it

is

unlikely to provide for authoritative settlement in
real terms.

So we end up with a

distorted view of constitutional meaning, as well as the

evolution, distortion, and evasion of past settlements.

It

gives us the vices of

authoritative settlement with none of the virtues.

We

see just this in the Congress's debate over and passage of the Civil

Rights Act ot 1964, as well as the Court's upholding that Act

Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach

of 883
1

that

Cases held
5.

Given

Ibid, at
88

loom so

that

v.

McClung. And

large in this debate.

Congress

may

that this decision

it

is

As we have

in

Heart of

The Civil Rights Cases
seen. The Civil Rights

not reach private discrimination under section

had not been overturned, even

if

the Court had

407-408.

Alexander and Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,” 1371.
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limited

its

reach and some

Congress and the Kennedy
rest Title

itle

I

II

members had
(later

clearly rejected

89
it

— many

Johnson) Administration were reluctant

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on
Congress* section

II

in

to

power, as

5

prohibited racial discrimination in public
accommodations,

much

as

the Civil Rights Act of 1875 had done.
If the Civil Rights Cases had
settled
constitutional meaning,

I

itle II

was

unconstitutional if it rested on the

fourteenth Amendment. To get around this
settlement Congress and the

Administration advanced the argument that Congress
could reach private
discrimination in public accommodations by
rather than

by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. This move was

Congress rested the Civil Rights

legislation

thought the Court would uphold

it

interstate

commerce.

1

it,

to

that

civil rights, but

Supreme Court opinions

The

it

was regulating

that

interstate

commerce

many thought had been wrongly
willing to take a principled

were precluded from doing so

adhere to Supreme Court precedent. Yet, Title

the

84

on

thought

was regulating

it

Many members of Congress were

constitutional stand

it

he ironies abound. Everyone knew Congress was

because of a past Supreme Court opinion
40

all politics:

on the Commerce Clause because

not because

regulating civil rights, but insisted that

decided.

way of the Commerce Clause

upheld

it

II

in

order

of the Civil Rights Act and

were not consistent with the Civil

was itself altered by Supreme Court opinions.
Maryland several members of the Court were prepared to reject the Civil
Rights Cases out right. Constitutional doctrine was in the process of evolving on the Court
surely in relation to political changes
and was not simply held stable.
state action limitation doctrine

Moreover,

in

Bell

v.

—

90

Congressional politics played a part as well, as the legislation was shifted to a more
accommodating committee, away from southerners resistant to the legislation. Lucas A.
Powe, Jr. The Warren Court and American Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2000 ) 234 - 238
.
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RlghtS CaSeS While the >' managed
to get around the Supreme
Court's narrow
•

view of section
that Title

opinion

power

II

5 (limiting

it

to state action), the

ultimately rested upon

in 1883.

to pass

.

was

indirectly rejected

There Bradley insisted

.

.[the Civil

“no one

that

Rights Act of

Constitution betore the adoption of the

Commerce Clause argument

1

will

by Bradley’s
contend that the

875] was contained in the

last three

fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments].” 91

As

Amendments

the

[the Thirteenth,

Commerce Clause was

of the original Constitution of 1787, Bradley
rejected any notion

Congress the power

wrong on
in

to reach civil rights.

this score, or

we might

Now, we might

say that the

ivil

Rights

C

it

think Bradley

Commerce Clause

such a way as to outrun the past decision. 9 ' but either
way

the logic ol the (

that

we

part

gave

was

has evolved

are evading

uses even while engaging in the pretence of

upholding them.
In a rare

said

the

so

moment of lucidity. Counsel

for the Fleart

of Atlanta Motel

what everybody knew: “the argument of counsel [Archibald Cox] and
of

government

that this is

much hogwash;

some way

that the

done

burden on interstate commerce

to relieve a

purpose of Congress was

to pass a

is

law [by] which

or another they could control discrimination by individuals in the

United States.

The redoubtable Archibald Cox,

as Solicitor General arguing

1,1

Civil Rights
>2

Cases

at 10.

The Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence

itself

transformation since Bradley’s opinion, culminating

had undergone a fundamental
United States v. Darby and Wickard

in

Filburn. For a discussion of these changes, see Barry

v.

Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal
1998) and Edward White, The Constitution and

Court (New York: Oxford University Press,
New Deal (Cambridge: Harvard University

the

Press, 2000).

Richard Cortner, Civil Rights and Public Accommodations The Heart of Atlanta and
University Press of Kansas, 2001 ) 15.
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the government's case, refused to touch
the section 5 argument, insisting that
Title

was nothing

II

but a regulation of interstate

upholding the Act, the Court indulged
reach the Fourteenth

this fiction:

Amendment argument

solid constitutional tooting.

commerce.
felt

it

it

Out of a feigned respect

for

provided

Court precedent, the
fiction. Just

how

supportive of constitutionalism and constitutional principles?
This gives

So

settlement.

it

is

is

not even in line with past

difficult to say, yet again, that the

Court acts

principled constitutional tashion than the Congress, or that
stable settlement than the political branches. Perhaps

the promise ol the Civil

took action:

this

opinions

Commerce Clause

as the

us a distorted view of constitutional meaning that

more

its

unnecessary to

Court and the Solicitor General perpetuated a constitutional
is this

In

in this

War Amendments was

Congress acted

it

in a

provides for

most importantly,

only realized

when Congress

to protect constitutional rights.

time Congress' action was upheld by the Court,

it

more

And

was done on

while

the

somewhat dubious grounds of Congress's commerce power.
The consequence

is

that the current

Court has persisted

reading of Congress's power under the Fourteenth

that

it

enforce

in part

its

Morrison

94
,

v.

Flores and most

the Court rejected Congress' ability to

reading of constitutional rights and, in doing so, rested

on the Civil Rights Cases of 883.

more depth

44

v.

(I

1

in

United States

Chapter

v.

5.)

And

this,

even
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will

its

examine these cases

after a series

Morrison 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
,

narrow

Amendment and claimed

alone speaks for the Constitution. In City of Boer ne

recently in United States

in a

opinion

in far

of Warren Court cases

went some way

to rejecting the logic

of the Civil Rights Cases

95

Again, this

should lead us to be skeptical of claims that
the Court provides for stable
constitutional

Boerne

meaning by adhering

most remarkable as

is

it

to

its

precedents. Kennedy's opinion in

insists that the

preserver ot constitutional meaning

— without

Court

is

the principled

offering evidence for this

sweeping proposition ." 6 Oddly, though, Boerne struck
down an
Congress

that

went out ot

its

way

to protect the rights

minorities— The Religious Freedom Restoration Act

act

of religious

(RFRA

97
).

the Court offered a far narrower view of constitutional
rights. If

congressional debates over
at all clear that the

Court

is

RFRA

of

In

we compare

with the Court's opinion in Boerne

more

in fact a

place

its

,

it

is

not

principled defender of the

Constitution than the Congress. And, yet again. Court opinions do
not provide

any more

these cases evolve and change as

more).

meaning than Congress. Court opinions

stability lor constitutional

RFRA

was passed,

much

as congressional attitudes (if not

because the Court had offered a

after all,

in

new

reading ot the “tree exercise clause'' and Congress (perhaps acting too
deferentially )

98

was requiring

the courts to return to an older reading.

And

while Boerne drew on the Civil Rights Cases the reading that opinion offered
,

95

H<

See especially Katzenbach

n

Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).

Robert Nagel, The Implosion oj American Federalism

2001
v.

v.

)

92-93.

And Carolyn Long,

Religious

(New York: Oxford

University Press,

Freedom and Indian Rights The Case of Oregon
:

Smith (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000) 227-250.

One could

power under

think

RFRA

section

5.

unconstitutional on other grounds, without rejecting Congressional

Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, “Congressional Power and

Religious Liberty after City of Boerne

v.

Flores ” Supreme Court Review 1997 (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1998).
98

Neal Devins, “Congress as Culprit:

Crusade” 5

1

How Lawmakers

Duke Law Journal 435 (200

1

).

Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress

was

rather different than the reading
offered by the immediate

Warren Court

precedents, shifting, once more,
constitutional meaning to the current
of the

Court."

We are,

appears, once again in a state of
constitutional dialogue.

it

The Congress appears

reluctant to accept the Court's
reading of section 5, as

passed the Violence Against
Court, tor

its

part, struck

Women

down

it

Act on similar grounds as RFRA. The

the act in Morrison relying
,

on Boerne.

It is

not clear, though, that the Congress will
accept the Court's constitutional
interpretation or

throughout

its

claim to judicial supremacy. The

this chapter, will

result, as

I

have argued

almost certainly depend on the political give
and

take between the branches ot government giving
us a sort of “living

constitutionalism

where constitutional values

are argued over

and realized

through political debate and not mere judicial
pronouncement. This current
struggle will be taken up in Chapter

n

5.

See Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics 264-265.
,
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CHAPTER 3
PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE SUPREME
CONSTITUTIONAL DISCONTINUE, DIALOGUE COURT
AND DWFT
Either the court must be the final arbiter
of what the law is. or else some
means
must be found to correct its decisions. If the
court is the final and conclusive
authority to determine what laws
Congress may pass, then, obviously, the
court is
e real ruler of the country, exactly the
same as the most absolute king would
be.
Robert LaFollette
i

—

'Any citizen whose

liberty or property

stake has an absolute constitutional

is at

right to

appear before the Court and challenge its
interpretation of the
Constitution, no matter how often they have
been promulgated, upon the ground
that they are repugnant to its provisions
When the Bar of the country
understands this, and respectfully but inexorably
requires of the Supreme Court
that it shall continually justify its decisions
by the Constitution, and not by its own
.

.

precedents,

guaranties

.

we
.

.

.

shall gam a new conception of the power
of our constitutional
What we need is constant and unrelenting professional
criticism

judicial opinions,

and constant and unrelenting insistence

reasoning shall be judicially corrected.’'

In the spring

— Everett Abbott

that judicial errors

2

of 1895, the Supreme Court struck down the newly
3

passed national income

tax,

held that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act did not

apply to a virtual monopoly of sugar manufacturing, 4 and used

same

uphold an injunction against a labor

act to

explosion

in reaction to these cases

of judicial power

of

of

in a

5

strike.

this very

The public

sparked a great debate about the nature

democratic society. The Court was accused of

1

Quoted in Barry Friedman, “The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The
Lesson of Lochner” 76 New York University Law Review 1383 (200 ), 1446.
1

Quoted in Charles Warren, The Supreme Court
Brown, 1926).

in

United States History, 1836-1918 (Boston:

Little

Pollock
4

v.

Farmers Loan and Trust Company,
'

United States

5

In

Re Debs,

1

v.

E. C.

Knight Co., 156 U.S.

58 U.S. 564

(

1

1

895).
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1

58 U.S. 60

(1895).

1

(

1

895).

defending “the propertied class"
6
against labor, of injecting

personal

its

preferences into law, and of illegitimately
usurping democratic power.

Against populist views of democracy
and emerging Progressive thought,
the very nature of judicial review

was

suspect, leading to distinctly

“countermajoritarian" criticisms of the Court.
The period from roughly

1895 to 1925
took aim

is

at its

unique

in this

way, as much of the criticism of the
Court

anti-democratic nature. Teddy Roosevelt
captured this

sentiment in his “Confession of Faith," insisting
that “the
the Progressive

program

himself was deeply

is

first

the right of the people to rule.” 7

critical of

essential

And

of

Roosevelt

judges, voicing skepticism of judicial

review, and, with characteristic subtlety, suggesting
that judges ought to

come
I

into line with the political branches:

do know

that

one can put the fear of God

Friedman persuasively argues. Progressive

"I

may

not

in judges."

know much
8

law, but

As Barry

criticism of the Court,

which

highlighted the centrality of popular rule, was quite different
from
criticism of the Court that focused on

Constitution. During the

New

(mis)interpretation of the

its

Deal period, as

we

will see in the next

chapter, critics of the Court generally focused on the fact that

misinterpreting constitutional meaning.

judicial

6

power and independence per

se

1

it

was

he problem was not necessarily

—

the fact that the Court

was

Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, 1X36- IV 18, 702.

Sidney Milkis and Daniel Tichenor, “Direct Democracy and Social

Campaign of 1912” Studies

in

American

Justice: the Progressive Party

Political Development, 8 (Fall 1994): 282-340, 329.

8

Stephenson, Campaigns and the Court: The Supreme Court
Columbia University Press, 1999) 130.
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in Presidential Elections

(New

York:

overturning democratically enacted
legislation-but that

were not grounded
era,

its

in the Constitution properly
read. In the

interpretations

Progressive

though, the very legitimacy of the Court
was questioned. Indeed, the

traditional narrative

of this period paints the Court as overturning

democratically enacted legislation in favor of

Holmes famous

Justice

its

economic

dissenting opinion in Lochner

predilections.

summed up

this

countermajoritarian critique:

I

word

think the

‘liberty,’ in the

th

Amendment, is perverted
held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and
fair man

when

it

14

is

necessarily

would admit

that the statute proposed would infringe
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law. 9

Holmes' dissent captured Progressive

criticisms of judicial

power

in its

insistence that the proper stance of the Court ought to be
deference to

democratic

will.

Court

that the

This critique was

itself

was

insistence that the Court

which a

all

biased, a sentiment captured in

s

in its insistence

Holmes'

opinions rested "upon an economic theory

“The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.

Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”

10

Revisionist scholarship has

much of the

traditional narrative

v.

New

York

,

198 U.S. 45. 76

made Holmes’ easy

insinuation

— and

of a biased judiciary overturning

democratically enacted legislation

Lochner

more powerful

large part ol the country does not entertain" and culminating in

his pithy aphorism:

y

the

(

— problematic.
1905).

10

Ibid, at 75.
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It is

not at

all

clear that

the Court

much

was simply

injecting

its

personal predilections into the law,
so

as holding to traditional constitutional
understandings that were

themselves coming to be deeply problematic
as both the
national government

first

states

ventured into regulating economic

and the

life."

Revisionists persuasively situate the
so-called Lochner Court as defending
the eroding constitutional order
against dramatic constitutional change,

and not as the lackeys oi the propertied
to suit their particular interests.

class, twisting constitutional

law

1

-

According

to revisionists, this early

understanding of the Constitution was altered

in

'The Constitutional

Revolution of 1937," a revolution that essentially
changed our

tundamental constitutional commitments and abandoned
the old
constitutional order. Revisionist scholarship in this

way

is

linked to a

regimes understanding ot American constitutional
development:
the old constitutional order giving

Whereas

way

traditionalist accounts see the

constitutional understanding and the

Marshall

our

New

its

sees

Deal Constitution.

Lochner era as a corruption of

New

Deal as a restoration of John

Constitution, revisionists view 1937 as the creation of a

s

constitutional order with

11

to

it

own fundamental commitments and

new
13

vision.

See especially Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise
of Lochner

Era Police Powers Jurisprudence (Durham: Duke University
12a
-

A

view

that

Press, 1993).

even seems to be shared by Roscoe Pound

Law Journal (1909), where

in his famous "Liberty of Contract" Yale
he accuses the Court of adhering to an outdated and unrealistic

jurisprudence.
13

See Howard Gillman, “The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of

a Living Constitution in the Course of

Development

(

American State-Building" Studies

in

American

Political

1997); Bruce Ackerman, lie the People: Transformations (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1998), G. Edward White, The Constitution

and the New Deal (Cambridge:
New Deal Court (New

Harvard University Press, 2000), and Barry Cushman, Rethinking the
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But tor

the talk of the

all

revisionist accounts like

struggles of the

Court

New

Ackerman’s tend

Deal years

to focus

on the constitutional

to illuminate the rejection

of the Lochner

Constitution and the articulation and
construction of a new-

s

constitutional regime.

American
Besieged

came

Lochner era and the Lochner Court,
leading

The

New

Deal

is

constitutional development.

is

to be

seen as the centerpiece of

Howard Gillman’s The

Constitution

an important exception, but he focuses
more narrowly on what

known

as substantive due process, leaving
out large swaths of

constitutional doctrine.

change during the

New

And

while almost

all

Deal reach back to

accounts of constitutional

this period, the specifics

of

constitutional conflict remain unexplored.
Constitutional-regime accounts

of constitutional development treat the

New

Deal as a continuation of

Progressive era constitutional conflict.

I

his

is

troublesome because there were, as Friedman notes,

important differences between these periods
leveled against the Court. But, far

1925 belies the notion

that

the period of

1

895-

dramatic moments of constitutional politics

meaning, giving us new

constitutional understandings, and that such

unusual events. The discontinuities

sit

terms of the criticisms

more importantly,

result in the recreation of constitutional

era do not

in

moments of upheaval

in constitutional

are

thought during this

easily with critical realignment theory, attaching the Court to

York: Oxford University Press, 1998). See also the exchange between Howard Gillman and
Robert Lowry Clinton in Political Research Quarterly over the Marshall Court.
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14
the governing coalition of the 1896
election,
or with a reconstructive

president

who

15
fundamentally reshapes constitutional
commitments.

While constitutional

conflict

with clashes over the

between the

New

ot the Court, this

and

New

16

to a

head

in the early

Deal criticism of the Court and the Progressive
critique

was

a thirty year long era of constitutional
uncertainty

over the content of our most fundamental

but one that lingered, giving us neither a failed

constitutional revolution,

'

a crucial constitutional

constitutional reconstruction.

in the last chapter,

17

1870-1883,

moment, or

this suggests that these so-called periods

constitutional change ot 1937 does have

ot the old Constitution, and the

is

a clear

Moreover, when combined with the period

"ordinary politics" are fraught with constitutional struggle.

story

1930s

Deal, and while there are obvious links

flux: a national "debate

commitments,"

may have come

its

And even

of

if the

roots in Progressive criticism

emergence of a “living Constitution," the

not as simple as the Court defending the old order while the

political

branches and the public articulating a

new

constitutionalism that

eventually triumphs.

This period witnessed neither an evolutionary unfolding of

Supreme Court opinions

14

that

Robert Dahl, “Decision-Making

attempted to “update" our constitutional

in a

Democracy: The Supreme Court

as a National Policy-

Maker” Journal of Public Law (1956).
15

Ackerman, We the People ( 1991 and 1998) and Keith Whittington, “The

of Judicial Supremacy"

in

Political

Foundations

Sotirios Barber and Robert P. George, eds. Constitutional Politics:

Essays on Constitutional Making, Maintenance, and Change (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2001

).

Whittington, “The Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy, ”270.
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understandings, nor a great

moment of “punctuated

equilibrium” that

resulted in dramatic change. Here,
revisionist and traditional accounts

have something
1 raditionalists,

were often

one another, as

to teach

I

argue, reveal that

in conflict

I

argue

in the

next chapter as well.

Supreme Court opinions

in this period

with one another and went back and
forth in their

understanding. This period was riddled with
constitutional uncertainty,

which,

same

in part, is

what

lent credibility to

charges of “judicial bias." At the

time, the traditional narrative of an
undemocratic Court usurping

power

is difficult

to sustain

if

we view

the Court and the political branches

(especially Congress) in relation to one another,
as the Congress itself

often invited judicial and executive construction
of legislation (as with the

Sherman

Antitrust Act), deferring, in part, to the Court.

18

This period witnessed the national government's

first

attempt to regulate the national economy, an attempt that has
described as

state-building,

which displaced

of American constitutionalism. But

this

change

great

come

to be

traditional understandings

in constitutional

understandings occurred, by and large, through the political process, even

while leaving constitutional understandings incomplete. Indeed,

1

18

Ackerman, We the People

On

(

1

it

is

998).

legislative deference to the judiciary, see

Mark Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty”
See also Howard Gillman, “How Political Parties
Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891”

Studies in American Political Development

Can Use the Courts to
American Political Science Review Vol.

7.

96, No. 3 (2002) (noting that various acts of Congress

further extend national jurisdiction from state courts, placing the federal courts at the center of
political disputes.

challenged

Congress

in the

Coincides with increase
Courts

—

in

governmental activity general, which

often with the approval of Congress

to realize the Court’s role here.

— so

See also Warren. 685-689.
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that

we must

is

then being

see the actions of

interesting to note that during
this era of constitutional
activity,

which

witnessed four amendments to the
Constitution, a period matched
only by
the Civil

War and Founding

eras

20

the

,

most important constitutional

changes occurred not by way of formal
amendment, but
arena.

in the political

This chapter focuses on three key
areas of national regulation-

antitrust legislation, the regulation

labor relations

of railroad

rates,

and the regulation of

arguing that the Congress (as well
as the executive

at

times) and the Court were engaged in
a constitutional dialogue of
sorts
at times, a

contentious one) that often

undetermined. In striking

left

constitutional

Congress

to explain

often qualified

more

itself,

the reach of the

fully the intent

making

were

Congress

in

law—clearer. The

often asking

of the law. Congress,

in turn,

actions— and

its

Court often followed such
times, resulted in Court opinions

at

itsell

often intentionally

le ft

ambiguous meaning

in essence, to the

to be resolved

Court's judgment. So even

the Court limited the reach of congressional acts,

is

or finding

tension with one another. Yet, in passing legislation,
the

by the Court, deferring,

it

was

the constitutional basis of

congressional qualifications, which,
that

meaning open or

down laws passed by Congress

particular applications unconstitutional, the
Court

(if,

much

to public

when

dismay,

not clear that the Court was truly thwarting congressional will and

settling the constitutional issue against the Congress, as is so often

See especially, Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American Stale
Administrative Capacity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981).
•>o

David

E. Kyvig, Explicit

and Authentic

Acts:

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996).
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Amending

the

US

:

The Expansion of National

Constitution,

1776-1995

suggested.

2

On

'

constitutional

meaning

government and,

meaning

in

the contrary, these three areas
indicate the
is

clearly follow

constitutional

its

own

state,

Court

to

working out individual cases

that

do not

precedents or theorize deeply and fully
about

meaning

deep changes

which

itself often leaves constitutional

to guide the

Congress and president.

The tension and uncertainty during

due

in

shaped by the interaction of the
branches of

further, that the

an unsettled

way

in legal thought,

this era,

no doubt, are

in part

with the emergence of Roscoe

Pound's "sociological jurisprudence," the
Brandeis Brief, and general
criticism of what has

legal historian

come

to be

dubbed

"classical legal thought." Thus, as

William Wiecek suggests, "the Court had
established two

bodies of doctrine," but ones riddled with
"doctrinal inconsistencies" that

could not long coexist. 22 But the
occurred largely because ot

shift in legal

politics.

1

he

intervention and the persistent attempt to

reconsider

I

its

and constitutional thought

demand

make

tor

more governmental

the Court clarify itself or

thought were a result ot the political demands of the day.

he reworking ot constitutional thought during the Progressive
era was a

result ot

its

particular politics, namely, the insistence that the

regulate the national

government

economy, intervene on behalf the of laborer,

the consumer, and the like,

constitutional authority.

all

It is

George Lovell, “As Harmless

protect

of which required a more expansive view of

the particular historical clashes rooted in the

as an Infant: Deference, Denial, and Adair

Studies in American Political Development

,

14 (Fall

v.

United States”

2000) 212-233.

William Wiecek, The Lost World oj Classical Legal Thought (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001

)

164.
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politics ot the

this period,

day

that

shaped and reworked constitutional
meaning during

and such a reworking was based
upon the

political imperatives

of the time.

Woodrow

Wilson's great Constitutional
Government in the United

States reveals just such thinking,
as

James Madison,

calling

upon us

Constitution— which holds us

to

it

reads as an extended argument
with

drop

this archaic

in "inactive

equilibrium”— in favor of

Darwinian evolution: the Constitution must
change
ol the day.

Newtonian

to

meet the demands

23

Yet,

it

is

not without irony that this reworking
of

constitutional thought occurred, by and large,
through the Madisonian

separation ol powers.

constitutional

I

meaning

rue,

in a

it

did not allow for the neat "evolution" of

lorward-looking

direction, but neither did the

—

that is progressive

Madisonian Constitution hold us

in “inactive

equilibrium.”

Ihe Riddle of Antitrust: Congress,
In

the Court, and the

Sherman Act

1890 Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act, which made

"contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of
trade" illegal.

against growing concentration in industrial relations,

protecting the market, but has perhaps best

come

to

was seen

The Act,

in part as a

way of

be seen as a symbolic act

aimed

to satiate public desires for action against the "trusts" while leaving
the

larger

meaning

ot the Act to be

worked out by

the executive and especially the

Daniel Stid, The President us Statesman: Woodrow Wilson and the Constitution (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1998) and Eldon Eisenach, The Lost Promise
of Progress ivism

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994).
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courts

24

After

.

against

all,

in the

it

the Act

was passed with

Senate and none

outline ot antitrust policy.

in the

virtually

no opposition (one vote

House), casting doubt on the Act
as a clear

The Act provided

the

government the opportunity

to

take action against such restraints
on trade, prosecuting the businesses,
particularly the trusts, attempting to
restrain trade to

gam

a competitive advantage

or fix prices to their benefit. These
cases, fieshed out over

more than a decade,

were among the most high-profile cases of
the day, with prosecutions under
the
Act brought by the executive branch— much

to the attention

of the public and the

media. Yet, while the administration had
primary responsibility for bringing
prosecutions, the Court was called upon to
interpret the reach of the Act and
constitutional application.

must be

left

when Corwin
off the mark.

bench
the

26
.

open

As

the sponsor of the Act himself put

it,

the application

25
lor the Courts to determine in each
particular case .'’

Thus

refers to the “judicial legislation” surrounding
antitrust, he
It is

is

not far

Congress, though, that invited such policy making from
the

And, as Corwin himself notes, when Teddy Roosevelt breathed

government

its

s antitrust

prosecutions and, in time,

policy, the Court

moved

life into

overwhelmingly upheld such

into line with his reading

of the Act.

Donald Morgan, Congress and the Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1966)
Melvin Urofsky and Paul Finkelman, A March of Liberty: A Constitutional History
oj the United States, Volume II: From 1877 to the Present (New York: Oxford
University Press.
142. See also

2002) 535. Scott James argues

that the act merely federalized the common law, which only limited
"unreasonable" restraints upon trade, but was reinterpreted by the executive branch for largely

political reasons. Scott James, "Prelude to Progressivism: Party Decay, Populism,
and the Doctrine
of 'Free and Unrestricted Competition' in American Antitrust Policy, 1890-1897" Studies in

American

Political Development, 13 (Fall 1999): 288-336.

"5

Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty,” 52. James notes that the Act was misnamed, as
Sherman's original intent was altered by the final bill, "Prelude to Progressivism," 294.
26

Edward Corwin, “The Anti-Trust Act and

the Constitution,” 282.
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1 he Court's first foray into
the field

know

as the “Sugar Trust Case,” the

Sherman Act

to prevent the

came

in

1

895. In what

was popularly

government sought an injunction under
the

American Sugar Refining Company from
acquiring

four competing sugar producers in
Pennsylvania, which would give

ninety-eight percent of the sugar market
in the United States.

EC

in

Knight was the

time

first

it

control of

The Court's opinion

touched on the Sherman Act, and

tor the Court with only Justice Harlan
dissenting.

it

in

an opinion

Chief Justice Fuller found the

Sugar Trust beyond the reach of Sherman
Act. Fuller's opinion upheld the

Sherman Act

as constitutional by essentially

Congress Commerce Power. And
led

him

to

it

was

merging

his reading

conclude that the Act did not apply

it

with his reading of

of the

Commerce Power

that

to the case at hand. Fuller's

reasoning in Knight drew a distinction between
“commerce” and

manufacturing,
to

insisting that the reach

of the

Commerce Power

manufacturing, which was traditionally reserved for the

reasoned that the

Commerce Power, and by

states.

did not extend

Thus Fuller

extension the Sherman Act, did not

apply to manufacturing or those things that only had an “indirect”
effect upon

commerce. Congress, Fuller argued, did not
such areas, a reading which

at least

in fact intend the

found some support

in

Act

to touch

upon

Senator Sherman's

view: the Act goes "as tar as the Constitution permits Congress to go, because

it

only deals with two classes of matters: contracts which affect the importation of

goods

into the United States,

affect the transportation

which

is

foreign commerce, and contracts which

and passage of goods from one State

Congress of the United States can go no

144

farther than that.

It is

to another.

The

claimed by no one

that

7

can ."’ Moreover, Attorney
General Richard Olney

it

noted that "any
question

effects

."- 8

literal

that

application of the provisions of
the statute

that

was seen

many of the Sherman

as an inherent part of the

out of the

Sherman Act (which were one and
its

Commerce Power

in a familiar position

dissenter, forcefully objected to this
reading of both the

—and

is

Act's supporters embraced, and
one even

shared by Attorney General Olney. w
Justice Harlan,

Knight

argued the case,

Fuller offered a formal distinction
between direct" and •indirect"

on commerce

and one

who

the

same

Commerce Power and

in Fuller's reading).

seeming limitation of the Sherman

of lone

Act— was

the

Yet the reach of

itself

quickly

qualified in subsequent cases.

I

he

move away from Knight

is

important, as

it

paved the way

for far

more

regulation of antitrust than the opinion itself
would seemingly allow and suggests
a far

more complex

relationship between the Court, the Congress,
and the

executive than leaving

traditionalists like

it

with

E. C.

Knight would suggest. As

Owen

Fiss notes,

Alan Westin end the discussion with Knight giving
credence
,

to

such claims that the Court was willfully anti-democratic
and bent on curbing
congressional power against any kind of economic regulation

30
.

But

not end with Knight; indeed, the Court almost immediately
qualified

antitrust

its

does

broad and

deep construction of the Commerce Clause.

7

8

Morgan, Congress and the Constitution

,

144.

James, "Prelude to Progressivism," 313.

29

Ibid.

154-155.

Owen Fiss, The Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State (New York: MacMillian, 1994) 14.
See also Alan l-urman Westin, "The Supreme Court, The Populist Movement and the Campaign of
1896" The Journal of Polities, Volume 15, Number (1953). This is true, too, of Donald
Grier
I

I
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The Court's opinions

that

immediately followed Knight

895, though, lent credence to Westtn's
claims that

1

constitutional

First, in

meaning

tax.

as

,

The Pollock opinion caused
to

time)

was an unconstitutional

them from

distinguish

896 even went so

tax

explicitly overturn these precedents,

earlier cases

far as to

While Pollock

not escape notice that

its

was

its

constitutional.

attempt to

was unpersuasive. The Democratic Platform

say that not only was "Pollock in error, but
that

itself is

who have

beyond the scope of our

uneasy relationship

circumstances under which the opinion

itself

to past

ever

analysis,

it

sat

it

on

should

precedent and the peculiar

was rendered

Stephanson

(New

''direct"

more of a public opinion storm than Knight.

far

departed from previous rulings issued 'by the ablest
judges
that bench.

(less

run counter to Supreme Court
precedents—one dating back to

While the Court did not

1

at the

Founding generation-that suggested such
a moderate

the

in

was manipulating

Pollock the Court held that a national
tax on incomes over $4,000

was seen

it

of

to protect the propertied
class against ordinary citizens.

than one percent of the population
31

it

in the spring

Jr., C ampaigns and the Court: 7 he US.
Supreme Court
York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 17.

— where

the switch of

in Presidential Elections

I

down a section of the income tax provision of Wilson-Gorman
894, distinguishing between a tax on income and a tax on real estate, which
he
equates with a direct tax and, therefore, read it as unconstitutional. Attorney
General Olney
petitioned for a direct rehearing, suggesting the executive branch did not
buy the Court’s opinion
'

ln

Pollock

Tariff Act of

and sought

to

the Court stuck

I

1

change

it

immediately

provisions of the income tax, but

Hylton

v.

United States

(

1

(Fiss, 97). In Pollock

doing

so,

II (1895) the Court stuck down all
seemingly rejected early Supreme Court opinions—

v. United States (1881 )— thus revealing how
the
precedents and putting the lie to the notion that it alone

796) and Springer

judiciary does not always follow

can provide

in

its

own

Moreover, the Court, under pressure from Congress, public opinion, and the
in Flint v. Stone Tracy Company ( 909) prior to the
enactment and ratification of the 16 th Amendment (which, of course, made the income tax
stability.

President upheld a similar tax on corporations

constitutional).

very same year!
32

'

Moreover, the switch

How

is

in

votes (and reasoning) from Pollock

this authoritative settlement? (Fiss 77).

Stephenson, Campaigns and the Court 126.
,

146

1

1

to

II

occurred

in

the

a single justice

to be skeptical

changed the outcome

such a

in

of easy claims of judicial

far

reaching case-should lead
us

stability against the
political fluctuation

of the Congress.

Perhaps even more important was
In re Debs, where the
Court upheld an
injunction against the Pullman
Strike.
the

American Railway Union staged

car.

The

Under

the strike a "conspiracy''

appearance ot bias

Olney prosecuted Debs,
before the

and United States Attorney General

the terms of the

and "combination"

in favor

Sherman

to hinder trade.

Antitrust Act. calling

Adding

to the

of capital and against labor was the
fervor with which

a fervor that

Supreme Court

Eugene V. Debs,

a strike against any train
carrying a Pullman

strike crippled rail transportation

Olney sought an injunction under

the leadership of

that very

was not

term

voted against the Sherman Act while a

in

£

as readily apparent in his argument
C. Knight. Indeed.

Olney himself

member of Congress and expressed deep

skepticism of the law. writing to a friend that
he believed both the income tax and
the

Sherman Act

“to be no

good

” 33

The Supreme Court upheld

the injunction,

leading Westin to note with superb irony that
this was the government's
successful criminal prosecution based upon the
Sherman Act.
thus struck

trust[.]

did not, in

down

not the

oil trust,

Westin overstates
tact,

did not distance

The Supreme Court

or the sugar or beef or steel trusts, but the union

his case, as Justice

Brewer's opinion for the Court

uphold the injunction based on the Sherman Act
itself

from the lower court, which did

Westin, 27. See also Stephenson,

"first

19.

34

Ibid.
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—

—even though

it

but on the constitutional

grounds

that the state

right in noting the

must be able

to preserve order. 35

£.

C

Knight, the

intrude into the realm of
manufacturing, which
the states, no matter

power

how much

to put

down

constitutional foundation

power under

the

is

surely

uneasy-perhaps even contradictory-notion
of national power

within the Court's optnions. In

national

Westin. though,

it

might affect

a labor strike

was

Commerce Power

was

constitutionally reserved for

interstate

was seen

commerce, while

to be extensive,

not clearly articulated. 36

Sherman Act continued

could not

even

in

Debs.

if its

The reach of national

to riddle the Court,

which,

in turn,

engaged Congress.
In three cases shortly after E.
C. Knight, the Court upheld
prosecutions

under the Sherman Act
lor

I

that, as Fiss argues,

eddy Roosevelt's more aggressive

with Knight/
of the

“trust busting"

and are not easily squared

1

In

Trans-Missouri and Joint

Sherman Act

one another.

helped pave the doctrinal foundations

to railroads

Traffic, the

openly engaged

in price-fixing

1 he railroads contested that the right
to

arrangements was part of their

right to contract

government from intervening against them.

Court upheld applications

engage

agreements with

in

such price-fixing

and therefore precluded the

In the Court's opinion in both Trans-

Missouri and Joint Traffic Justice Rufus Peckham, most
famous for upholding
,

liberty ol contract

the

”

in

Lochner

Sherman Act applied

In re

Debs

at

,

fell

into line with the

to all “restraints

on

government's position that

trade," including contracts to limit

599.

John Semonche, Charting the Future: The Supreme Court Responds
IH90-1920 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978) 2 18.
,7

Fiss,

Troubled Beginnings,

I

19-121.
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to a

Changing

Society,

trade, adopting a per se reading

of the Act. 3 ’

In part.

Peckham’s opinion was

distinguished from £. C. Knight in
thal the railroads were dearly
engaged in

transportation— a form of commerce—
and thus

fell

within Knight

v

distinction

between "commerce’' and “manufacturing.”
And Peckham even invoked a notion
of "direct" and "indirect." noting

on

interstate

commerce and

that price-fixing

therefore clearly

fell

schemes had a "direct” impact

within the terms of Knight. Yet.

a question remained that sat uneasily
with another

emerging

line

of constitutional

thought, articulated in Allgyer and the
soon-to-be decided Lochner case: what
justified the intrusion into “liberty of contract”
here?

the railroads were different.

As

the

industries.

doubt

The very next

that

“highways of the nation” they were uniquely

affected with a public interest, marking

allowing governmental regulation

Peckham’s answer was

in

them

ways

year, though,

off, say,

from bakers, and thus

would not be extended

that

Addyston Pipe brought

to other

this logic into

40
.

In this case, six manufacturers of cast iron pipe colluded
together to fixprices,

deemed

competition.

necessary, as in the two railroad cases above, to prevent ruinous

Peckham again wrote

for the Court, only this time he

unanimous Court. The opinion upheld
so

it

had

Traffic.

38

to get

around

E. C.

commanded

the government's action, but in order to

United States

v.

Trans-Missouri Freight Association,

1

66 U.S. 290

(

1

to fall

896) and United States

Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).

See James, "Prelude

to Progressivism" arguing that the government's reading of the

Act was based on the electoral
40

Addyston Pipe and Steel Co.

politics
v.

do

Knight and expand upon Trans-Missouri and Joint

Following the logic of Knight, the pipe manufactures would seem

of 1896.

United States, 175 U.S. 21

149

1

(1899).

Sherman

a

v.

under ihe distinction between
“commerce” and "manufacturing” (they
were,
all,

making goods) and

therefore not

the Court's reading of the

C ommerce succeeds

Manufacture

to

is

come under Congress' Commerce Power

Sherman Act. As

manufacture, and

all

or

Fuller had reasoned there.

is

" 41

not a part of

it

He went

on:

transformation— the fashioning of raw
materials

mto a change of form for use. The functions
of commerce are
different. The buying and selling
and transportation incidental
thereto constitute commerce. If it
be held that the term includes
regulation ot

after

the

such manufactures as are intended
to be the

subject of commercial transactions in
the future, it is impossible to
that it would also include all
productive industries

deny

that

contemplate the same thing. The result would
be
would be invested, to the exclusion of the
States,
regulate

In

.

.

.every branch of

Addyston Peckham held
.

human

industry

that “certain kinds

that

Congress

with the power to

42
.

of private contracts

already stated, limit or restrain, and hence
regulate interstate

.

.

.

directly, as

commerce

Private companies could not take up this
governmental function, one that

Congress had legitimately taken up
I

he power

to regulate

passing the Sherman Act:

in

such commerce, that

prescribe the rules by which

it

shall

is,

the

be governed

power

to

vested in

is

Congress, and when Congress has enacted a statute such
as the one
in question, any agreement or combination which
directly operates,
not alone upon the manufacture, but upon the sale,
transportation
and delivery of an article of interstate commerce, by preventing
or
restricting

its sale, etc.,

that extent

and

to the

thereby regulates interstate

same extent trenches upon

national legislature and violates the statute

4

E. C.

Knight

at

1

42

Ibid, at 14.
45

Addyston

44

Ibid, at

at

229.

241-242.
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44
.

commerce to
power of the

the

.'

,43

While

this logic

might technically get Peckham around

the Court s formal distinction
between

somewhat capricious— and
doctrine.

As Harlan had

E. C.

Knight,

it

showed

“commerce” and "manufacturing”

be

to

raised grave concerns about the
stability of the Court's

insisted, dissenting in E. C.

Knight

,

why

should

our eyes to the fact that a virtual monopoly
on the manufacture of sugar
ineluctably, going to have an impact

on

its

sale in interstate

we

close

is.

commerce ? 45

Surely

such a concentration of power affected commerce
as much as the price-fixing

scheme

in

Addystun. Peckham's logic

in

dissent in Knight than Fuller's majority

joined

it.

Indeed,

Peckham

at

one point

Addyston shares more with Harlan's

opinion—yet, perhaps oddly, both justices
in the

opinion seemed to suggest that

Congress Commerce Power was plenary: “The reasons which
may have caused
the framers of the Constitution to repose the

commerce
itself."

46

Peckham

in

Congress do

not,

Such a reading was
s

power

however, affect or

to regulate interstate

limit the extent

clearly inconsistent with Knight.

of the power

And,

just as surely,

opinions seemed to expand the logic of Trans-Missouri and Joint

Traffic in narrowing the notion of "liberty of contract.

governmental power

to limit liberty

being affected with a public

was deemed

'

In these

two opinions,

of contract was due to the nature of railroads

interest. In

Addyston the Commerce Clause

to limit the right to contract

,

itself

(whether affected with a public interest

or not).

Addyston then, seemed
,

to

pave the way

for a far

more expansive

regulation of antitrust than Knight or even the later railroad cases.

45

E

C.

Knight

at

44.
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And Teddy

Roosevelt began a highly public campaign

to enforce the

Sherman Act most

notably bringing a suit to prevent the
merging of the Great Northern and Northern
Pacific Railroads in Northern Securities

another, Swift

&

Co.

above were

still

This 1905 case, combined with

United States reopened the reach of the
Sherman Act and

v.

,

Commerce Power,

the

47
,

leaving

good law.

it

unclear whether the newly decided trio
of cases

48

In

Northern Securities the Northern Securities
,

Holding Company was created under charter
traitor state

these

was
In

two

its

loose corporation laws

“combination

briet betore the Court, the

government

in nearly

anything and everything

sense that

that will defeat the

Champion

v.

in the

law

that

Ames and going on

embracing nature of
by

tor the express

this Court.

this

Gibbons

v.

often as the

purpose of merging

between them. So

of trade” under the terms of the Sherman Act?

in restraint

spoke ot the commerce power

way

—

New Jersey— known

railroads and, thereby, putting an end to competition

this a

its

for

in

cited these earlier cases, but also

plenary terms: “Congress can regulate

can prohibit and prevent

it

its

use in a

Congress may constitutionally enact,” citing
argue that “the ‘penetrating and

to

power has often been
Ogden."

w

stated, explained,

The Court upheld

all-

and emphasized

the government's

application ot the Act, but split on the reasoning, leaving the state of antitrust (and
the

4<>

47

48

meaning

Addyston

Commerce

Northern Securities Co.

And

Swift

sales

Clause)

in disarray.

Harlan's opinion for only four

228.

at

&

United States
4V

of the

(

Co.

v.

v.

United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).

United States, 196 U.S. 375

1898), which limited Congress’

of out-of-state

cattle, not

seeing this

1905)

movement

At 305. The government’s brief referred

here had a direct affect on interstate

(

power

to

E C.

commerce

152

itself

seemed

at

odds with Hopkins

to regulate interstate

as part of the flow of interstate

Knight once, but only to note

(at 3 15).

v.

commerce on stockyard
commerce.

that the action

justices sat with the logic of the
government’s position, as well as
Trans-Missouri

Joint Pipe and Addyston even
,

if

,

threw off some of the limitations

it

Peckham's opinions. Harlan reasoned

would have a

direct impact

on

that the

interstate

,

in

combination of these two railroads

commerce,

limiting competition and

necessarily operating as a restraint upon
interstate trade. Not only did this
bring
the action under the

Knight,

it

was

Sherman Act.

the impact

and manufacturing)

that

for Harlan,

upon commerce

was

much

as he had argued in E.

(not the distinction

central to governmental

C

between commerce

power under

the

Commerce

Clause. Justice White dissented on just this issue.

White suggested

this case did not fall

Commerce C lause, because
stock case.

in a stock

The Northern

White adhered
Congress

not. properly speaking, a railroad case, but
a

this

to the distinction

to reach all

of £ C. Knight suggesting
,

allow

intrude on the constitutionally reserved powers of the states

to a formal distinction that

Harlan

actual investment, in any substantial sense, by the

Company

in the

was, in form, such a transaction,

it

stock of the two constituent companies.

was

not, in fact,

Harlan, behind the formality of a stock acquisition,

Ibid, at

that to

such transactions would throw of all limits on the

was no

Northern Securities

acquired the railroads

the states and not by Congress. In this.

Tenth Amendment. White thus clung

rejected: “there

Company had

might have an “indirect" effect upon commerce,

was properly regulated by

Commerce Power and
in the

was

Securities Holding

swap, and while

the action itself

it

under the Sherman Act or the

353-354.
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one of that kind .”

it

was

50

For

a combination in

It

restraint

of trade: the company was created. Harlan
pointed

purpose and no other. The Court could not
ignore
restraint

on trade made the Sherman Act

Drawing on

his dissenting opinions in Trans-Missouri

unreasonable

restraints

on

trade. In all

Securities need not go so tar as

on trade were made

White disagreed.

and Joint

on

all restraints

Traffic,

White

trade, but only

of these railroad cases (though Northern

was not about

it

and the inevitable

applicable. Here, too.

reasoned that the Sherman Act did not apply to

restraint

this fact,

out, for this very

trade) the agreements leading to

to preserve the industry

and bring order

to the

market, they were thus reasonable restraints on trade,
permissible under this
construction ot the Sherman Act (and

some

least

Commerce

—

Clause)

tooting in the legislative record, referring to the

reasonable

against

unreasonable

Brewer held

in

common

law and

' 1

restraints

on

Cleveland Administration had partly embraced
Justice

a reading that finds at

trade,

and one

that the

51
.

favor of the government, but wrote a separate

concurrence rather than joining Harlan's opinion and agreed with White's
construction of the Sherman Act. This was a construction, in
partly shared, though Attorney General Philander

restraint ot trade as used in the act

the Northern Securities Holding

trade

51

32

52

total [.]”

Company

53

Morgan, Congress and the Constitution, 140-159.

53

Ibid, at

at

30

1

363.
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all

that “the

restraints

But Brewer,

Roosevelt

words

in

whether

like Roosevelt,

as an “unreasonable” restraint

.

Northern Securities

Knox argued

extend to any and

reasonable or unreasonable, partial or

fact, that

on

saw

The multiplicity of opinions
their

logic—offered

the

Commerce Power. But

government
the Court, as

in

Northern Securities

little

it

restraints

on

the tension in

guidance on the meaning of the

did in the earlier cases, essentially

into line with the government's
reading of the Act.

whether the Sherman Act applied

—and

to all restraints

Even

so,

it

came

was unclear

on trade or only unreasonable

trade. Shortly after the decision, the
Roosevelt Administration

brought suits against Standard Oil and the
American Tobacco

Company

that

were

as publicly visible as the Northern Securities
suit had been. Moreover, Roosevelt

saw

the

Sherman Act

as applying to contracts, combinations, or
conspiracies that

lead to unreasonable restraints on trade, which

would be determined by

government under the reach of the Commerce Power, departing
from

the

earlier

readings of the Act. Restraints on trade that were reasonable,
that brought order to
the market and

were deemed

to

be

in line

with the public

interest,

were not

impermissible under the terms of the Act. Arguing before the Court,
the

government
4

this case.

itself

suggested

for Roosevelt,

if

this

the Act were so constructed,

were worked out

55
.

to a

would

still

apply to

should be determined on a case-by-case basis by

the executive branch, but such an approach required an

Court as well, leading

it

ad hoc approach from

"patchwork ot often conflicting opinions" as the

The Taft Administration continued

the

details

the suits and adhered to

American Tobacco at 12. A brief partly written by James McReynolds, who would later join
horsemen” in drawing formal distinctions about the commerce clause, distinguished the
1

the “four

case

at

E C.

bar from

Knight and even called for

a practical, case

by case, evaluation of interstate

commerce.
Loren Beth, The Development oj the American Constitution (New York: Harper and Row, 1971
There is a question of whether TR’s reading was consistent with the original terms of the

141.

Sherman

it certainly shows that the Act itself left this discretion to the executive branch
through the courts, to enforce the Act's terms. See Richard Wagner, "A Falling

Act, but

by relying on

it,

155

the distinction between
unreasonable and reasonable
restraints on trade as well,
a

reading of antirus, which
Taft himself had articulated
as a circuit judge in
the

AMyS,0n

C3Se

°»

'

Tobacco the Court, under
optnions
,

by Chief justice White, recently
elevated

to the seat

by Taft, came into

the outlook evolving in
public opinion at large, as
reflected in

Roosevelt's recommendations on
the

how the

trust

question ."

56

Indeed,

Sherman Act, leading

Scott

James

opinions.

White's opinion announced what
came

was

first

remarkable

abandoned
distinction

all

in these various

Court

be

known

as the “rule of

articulated in his dissents in
Trans-Missouri and Joint

in

Northern Securities.

of whether the government could
reach a holding company under

the terms of the Act (which, again,

embraced

his dissents in these cases,

the

Commerce

which had adhered

Clause), White

to the federalism

between commerce and manufacture, permitting
the government
unreasonable restraints on trade, even those
that would,

language of Fuller

the

to

and was the basis of Brewer's concurring
opinion

this issue

much

is

7

reason," which

regulate

i,

to "see judicial

acquiescence to the more political
branches of government"

On

Theodore

Court opinions themselves track
perfectly with each
Administration's

construction of the

Traffic

"with

line

like Fuller

Commerce

s

to

in the

Knight opinion, only “indirectly" affect
commerce. But.

had done

in Knight,

White read the Sherman Act as embracing

Clause, insisting that there was no “right" to
engage in a contract

Out: The Relationship Between Oliver Wendell
Holmes and Theodore Roosevelt” Journal of
Supreme Court History Vol. 27 No. 2 (2002),
Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, The

221 U.S.

I

American Constitution 422. Standard Oil Co.

(1910) and American Tobacco Co.

v.

S7

James, "Prelude to Progressivism," 292.
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v. United States,
United States, 221 U.S. 106(1911).

to

“unreasonably” restrain

trade.

Congress' regulation— under the

on

trade.

Much

like in

Thus

there

was no

legitimate liberty objection to

Commerce Power—of an

unreasonable restraint

Northern Securities the government
sought
,

to prevent a

holding company that would, inevitably,
restrain trade and competition.
Once

more, the Court came into

some

with the Administration's position. This
brought

line

settlement to the area of antitrust— with the
Court conforming to the

political branches'

view— but

Commerce Power

a relic of history.

I

interstate

part ol

seemingly

the E. C. Knight reading of the

left

he opinion, though, only settled the meaning
of the Sherman Act, while

the reach of the

unclear.

it

Commerce Clause— and

the applicability of Knight-vras left

Could the government reach any such

commerce

commerce

restraints that

had an impact on

(thus marginalizing E. C. Knight ), or only those
that were

itself

(thus adhering to Knight s distinction between

commerce

and manufacture)? The unsteady tension was compounded by the Court's

unanimous opinion

in Swift,

where

it

upheld that a combination of meatpackers

came under Congress Commerce Power,

as their activities.

the Court, were within “the current of commerce.”

theory was utterly

at

odds with

E. C.

earlier

Knight

manufacturing and commerce, as well as

its

's

Holmes reasoned

for

The current of commerce

formal distinction between

insistence that Congress

may

only

reach those things that have a “direct" rather than "indirect” affect upon

commerce.
case, also

Two

sit

other cases from these years, the Lottery Case and oleomargarine

uneasily with E. C. Knight as they seem to countenance the

Commerce Clause

as a sort of federal police power,

157

which was

flatly rejected in

Kmghl.

1 he oleomargarine case

is

especially troublesome as

it

upheld an

extensive congressional tax on yellow-colored
margarine (a tax that was hard to
read as a revenue measure, as uncolored
margarine was barely taxed), which

entered the forbidden territory of
manufacture
Indeed, the tact that the
police

at

power was

from

t. t

Commerce Clause was

at the root

odds not only with

if

E. C.

Knight's reasoning prevailed. 59

not the equivalent of a federal

of all the Sherman Act cases, putting these
two cases

Knight but the
,

latter

cases as well. This

Knight would not have been so troublesome

discarded. But

if

it

move away

had merely been

wasn't. Throughout this period, the Court
never reconciled the

it

"current of commerce” theory with the logic of

£

C.

Knight even while
,

it

drew

on both strands of thinking. 60
This has led Robert McCloskey

to

observe “that the Constitution forbids

those departures trom laissez faire that the Court disapproves,
and permits those

departures from laissez faire that the Court thinks reasonable and
proper.

obviously

this is not a legal “rule" in

any understandable sense of the word, but a

statement of policy, or rather an assertion of the power to determine

went on

to note that this

seeming inconsistency makes

sustain the illusion that the judicial yes or no

commands, and

58

Champion

it

becomes

And

is

it

61

it.”

And

“harder and harder to

based on inexorable constitutional

easier and easier for observers to see that judicial

Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) and Meray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 ( 1904), as
Food and Drugs Act of 1906 ( Hipolite Egg Co. v United
States, 220 U.S. 45 (191 1)) and the Mann Act (Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913)).
v.

well as opinions upholding the Pure

^
60

61

Beth, The Development of the American Constitution, 156.

Hammer v.

Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1919).

McCloskey, The American Supreme Court,

100.
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he

review

is

operating as a subjective and
quasilegislative process.” 62 This was.

fact, just the

charge that was leveled against the Court
by Progressive

While the justices may not have been as
suggest, constitutional

meaning was

in

critics.

sinisterly political as traditional
accounts

in a state

of drift and disarray. Caught

between new conceptions of constitutional
government and the old constitutional
order, the Court

in articulating

was often

and

at sea, offering little

settling constitutional

altered their reading of the

guidance

to the political

meaning. Yet the

Sherman Act and

at

political

branches

branches too

times turned to the Court to work

out uncertain constitutional questions, adding
to this constitutional flux and

even while engaging

in a sort

of constitutional dialogue.

example, clearly applied the Sherman Act
Clayton Act
labor ...

is

in

this out,

63

the Court, for

Congress responded with the

1914, which partly exempted labor from antitrust, stating
that

not a

exemption was

to labor,

When

drift,

is

commodity or

article

of commerce.” Yet

how

far-reaching the

not so clear, as Congress, once more, invited the courts to
sort

both as to what was 'lawful" activity and specifically permitting
courts to

issue injunctions

property right.

it

necessary to “prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a

When

the Court upheld a labor injunction under the terms of

the Act, both Pitney’s opinion allowing an injunction given this particular case

and Brandeis'

dissent,

denying the injunction's

62

Ibid.
61

(’

4

Loewe

v.

Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908)

Wiecek, 160. Corwin, “Anti-Trust,” 286, Lovell,

159

1

12.

validity,

were plausible readings

given the Act's ambiguity. 65 This
back and forth persisted
without resolution and.
struck

down

at times,

with stunning inconsistency, as

articulated

most

fully in E. C.

seemingly abandoned, were dusted off and
offered anew
in 1918.

down

Amendment argument,
powers of the

as well.

67

Chief Justice Taft

first

states, and,

but

if

of a

heavy tax

I

aft s

if the

not use

its

power

in

opinion, though in his dissent in

Amendment argument and even

if

more

Hammer
its

power

drew on

v.

Dagenhart

to tax,

which

Hammer ’s

Tenth

movement of goods

vividly, in the

in

goods themselves might be

—

the evil here

was

such a fashion. Oddly, even

Hammer

he took issue with

cited the oleomargarine case as

justifying the Congressional regulation of child labor.

dialogue,

,

the products themselves were safe

labor— then Congress could

Holmes joined

Knight which,

secondly, distinguished this tax from the
oleomargarine

commerce by way

deemed unhealthy,”

the Ienth

the Court

saying that Congress could not. by indirection,
reach the

tax the Court had upheld. Congress could
prohibit the

child

in

Congress then re-passed a child labor law
under

the Court struck

interstate

when

of politics

the Child Labor Act of 1916. citing
(he formal distinctions between

commerce and manufacturing

66

in the clash

We

see a similar drift and

government's establishment of the

Interstate

Commerce Commission.

’

in

Duplex Printing v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). See Ken Kersch, Discontinuous Development
American Constitutional Law: Civil Liberties and Civil Rights in the Twentieth Century (New

York: Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming) 236.

Day

tried to distinguish

from the

likes

prevent harmful goods from moving

of the oleomargarine case, by saying

in interstate

commerce,

but not

goods

that

Congress could

that were, in

unharmful— and nothing about the products produced with child labor was harmful
See Walter Murphy, Congress and the Court: A Study in the American Political Process
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).
themselves,
per

se.

160

j he Reach

oi the ICC: Constitutional
Dialogue

The

Commerce Act of

Interstate

Commerce Commission, was
industry and did so by

the

way of an

first

1887, establishing the Interstate

national attempt to regulate the railroad

administrative agency, which

time. Traditional accounts suggest that
this

was thwarted by
as

it

attempt

first

was novel

at national

at the

administration

a hostile Court that severely circumscribed
the ICC’s power, just

deliberately distorted the

Congressional intent

Sherman Act

in establishing the

to

make

ICC, much

it

toothless.

like antitrust,

Yet

was not

perfectly clear and, indeed, allowed Congress
to avoid hard choices by creating an

administrative agency with vague guidelines, which
invited the courts to enter the
arena.

As one

scholar noted. “Congress was not troubled by the
Court’s railroad

decisions and showed

little

inclination to strengthen the

But when the Congress did make

its

opinions, the Court often followed

ICC during

intent clear, often against past

suit. In fact,

the

ICC

itself

the 1890s.”

68

Supreme Court

was established

against a Court opinion that limited state regulation of railroad rates to
intrastate
travel, therefore

making

clear that interstate rate regulation

would require

national

regulation.

The Court, though, was
doctrine that

is at

itself in the

midst of working out constitutional

odds with revisionist accounts

of constitutional thought during

that reflect a coherent structure

this period, or the notion

constitutional regime. That's not to say that there

1,7

68

Drexel Furniture

Bailey

v.

James

Ely.

Company 259
,

was not

of a clearly delineated
a central notion of legal

U.S. 20 (1922)

The Supreme Court under ChiefJustice Melvin Fuller (Columbia: University of

South Carolina Press, 1998) 92.
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thought during this period, but that this
structure of thought

itself

was fraught with

tensions and discontinuities that
needed to be worked out. often leaving
constitutional doctrine at odds with

itself. In

Gillman

Constitution was besieged during this
period. But, as

we

the chapter,

should remember that

this constitutional struggle

this

culminated

was

s

I

apt phrase, the

noted

beginning of

at the

a thirty-year long struggle.

in the Constitutional

Revolution of 1937.

given the unsettled and drifting nature of
constitutional thought for over
years,

is

it

hard to see the

New

is

best,

an uneasy relationship to

v.

Illinois

its

own hallowed

Munn

,

Chief Justice Waite had insisted

whether such

rates

not the Court.

the proper

that, as railroads

to be

made by

Indeed, Waite insisted that for relief of laws

remedy was

we

was a

state regulation, the logic

set

by the

a key question over the next several decades.

states or the

Munn

itself

v.

Munn

specifically dealt with setting rates for storage in grain elevators,

the railroad, but

public interest.

it

94 U.S.

1

While the

ICC— would
was severely

13 (1877).

upheld the logic of the states setting rates

The Court

the legislature,

of determining the

Munn

Illinois ,

were cloaked

disagreed with,

to “resort to the polls, not to the courts." 71

reasonableness of rate regulation— whether

if

at 134.

162

v.

which were held next

to

was clothed with a
Chicago &N. W R Co 94

the industry

did uphold rate regulation of fares in Peik

U.S. 164 (1877).

Munn

Munn

judgment of setting rates— particularly the notion of

were “reasonable" or not— was

regulation in this case

become

precedent, the 1877 case of

69

interest, the

71

settlement.

,

with a public

°

norm of constitutional

clearly evident in the realm of rate regulation
as the Court maintained, at

In

69

thirty

Deal era as a unique constitutional moment:
a rare

instance ol constitutional politics amidst the

This

While

limited, just over a decade
later, by a Court decision
holding that rate regulation

could not be vested with administrative
bodies as a
legislature itself

must determine

last resort: that either

rates or the administrative

agency must allow

judicial review to determine the
•'reasonableness” of the rate. 72
this logic out

more

In It t

Justice

1

Brewer

fully in a series

C incinnati,

v.

The Court spun

in the 1890s.

and Texas

Pacific Railway

had the power

it

a

power could

the Court declined to extend

Company

to fix rates

it

so

73

far.

Although,

ICC

in fact, the

under the

that the state

itself did not

commissioners or

railways are authorized by their legislatures to
establish general rates for

"it is

all

railway[.]

We make

the exertion of no general

exertion ot any

power

a specific basis

when

power

no such claim.” The ICC went on
to

prejudge or

to fix rates,

to fix rates in general[,]” but the

it

deems those

power

rates to be unreasonable.

noted that the Act prohibited "unjust discrimination

to

nor

is

it

all

to say,

the

remedy cases on

74

Still,

the Court

in rates,” prohibited

undue

and unreasonable preference, and prohibited railroads from charging
more
short runs than tor long runs. While the

Commission might have

entorce the terms ot the Act, that did not give
give

72

7?

it

it

the

power

the

Company

ICC

Pacific Railway

Cincinnati,

New

Orleans,

and Texas

(1896).

163

v.

for

power

to set rates,

the final say in construing the statute. Indeed, the Interstate

Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railroad
v.

,

not be construed by the terms of
the Act and

had such a power "in the sense

classes and tor

for

that "there is nothing in the act
fixing rates.” Vesting the

commission with such

it

Orleans,

rejected the ICC’s claim that

887 Act, noting

argue that

New

of ICC cases

the

to

nor did

Commerce Act

Minnesota 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
,

Company

it

167 U.S. 470 501

had explicitly exempted intrastate
shipments from the terms of the Act
and the
reach ot the Commission, with
Congress itself explicitly adhering to
the Court’s

reading of

its

Commerce Power.

construed in a

same

way

In Cincinnati,

to protect the market,

period, and therefore only

aimed

at

much

New

Orleans the 1887 Act was
,

as the

Sherman Act was

in this

“unreasonable rates,” a word of art,

subject to judicial determination.

his reading

I

seemed consistent with Congress'

“ruinous competition”

among

the railroads and bringing

interstate travel, a tactic the railroads

favored this

move

in part

interest in preventing

some order

to rates in

themselves favored. True, the railroads

because they preferred national regulation to

state

regulation, but this also suggests a key difference
between congressional action

and

state action: the interests

in protecting the

of each were

1

hus,

when

was not thwarting

which were often

the Court struck

and

its

distinction

states

had

down

state

at

little

it

interstate

and

finally stepped into this realm, as

seemed

will take

up below,

Wabash adhering
,

75

it

Ibid, at

Wabash,

St.

Louis

&

Pennsylvania Railroad Co.

164

v.

Illinois ,

I

to the

did so for reasons often

486.
18 U.S.

557 (1886).

it

to invite

Even when Congress

74

75

rates,

did not attempt to regulate intrastate

intrastate regulation.

I

to bring

laws regulating railroad

legislation followed the Court's ruling in

between

interest

odds with national

national public policy. In fact. Congress itself

this judicial determination, as, at first,

rates,

The

market as such, or ordering competition, but wanted

rates into line with state interests,

interests.

different.

at

odds with

state regulation, in the

Congress often called
It

was on just

clashed. In IC C

’

was not making

v.

name of a

national market, but even here

forth judicial determinations

this issue

of “reasonable.” 76

of “reasonableness”

Alabama Midland Railway,

a general claim to set rates;

it

that the

Court and the ICC

the

ICC once again

did,

however,

insisted that

insist that

it

it

was

vested with the power to say what was
“reasonableness and unreasonableness,

and

justice

injustice, preference, advantage,

the terms of the Act. These were terms the

determine, as

it

was vested with

the

regulation in

Commission was competent

power of construing and enforcing

which, “Congress has adequately provided
reasonable

and prejudice, disadvantage” 77 under

for[.]”

78

was

the statute,

The Court's construction of

Alabama Midland Railway which
,

claim,

to

rejected the ICC's

7g
also plausibly in line with the nature of congressional
acts.
Acting

under the long haul/short haul provision, the ICC had ordered
the railway

to cease

charging a greater rate for a shorter distance of travel (thus charging
the shipper a
higher rate for a shorter distance). Turning to section 4 of the Act,
which
prohibited differential charging "under substantially similar circumstances
and

conditions for a shorter than a longer distance over the same line,” the Supreme

Court struck

down

insisting that the

the order, rejecting the ICC's construction of the statute and

Act

itself

allowed for lower rates for longer distances (or higher

rates for shorter distances) if

7<
’

it

was required by competition. The Court’s reading

Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, IX36-IV37 (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1991).
77

This insistence repeated, almost verbatim, the ICC’s argument

159-160).
78

At 161.

165

in

Cincinnati.

New

Orleans

(at

emphasized the "substantially similar
circumstances," noting

that

more remote

shipping destinations, even though
shorter, might be serviced by only
a single
carrier, justifying a higher cost 80
In this, the
.

Court once more read the act as

essentially “market reinforcing.” Moreover,
the Court pushed this in insisting
that

courts hearing appeals from the

ICC were

Commission, which allowed courts
on

own

their

not tied to the factual findings of the

to investigate

further highlighting the Court's

and weigh the

move

to

facts

of the case

determine notions of

"unjust” and “discriminatory” rates, and even
articulating a "fair rate of return,"

which

it

down

then got bogged

In these cases, the

framework
properly

laid out in

left to

in articulating just

Munn which

essentially said that such questions

,

was

articulating a logic that

venerable precedent and working to undermine
congressional action,

The

Interstate

it

s

this constituted.

Court was surely shifting from the constitutional

the legislature and not the Court. While

overruled, the Court

policy.

what

was

it.

at

Munn was

were

not explicitly

odds with Waite's

Yet, viewed against

hard to say that the Court was simply thwarting popular

Commerce Act

itself invited judicial interpretation in its

very ambiguity and was very likely “designed more to placate antirailroad
agitation than to establish strict control over the roads .” 81

Orleans the Court had extended an invitation
,

to

And

Congress

in Cincinnati,

to clarify the

New

meaning

of the Act: given the separation of powers, one could not assume

that

had confirmed an agency with

were not clearly

74

80

Alabama Midland Railway, 168

legislative

U.S. 144

(

power

1897).

Ibid at 163.

81

Ely,

The Supreme Court under Melvin Fuller, 9

166

1

(rate fixing) if

it

Congress

When

bestowed.

Congress amended the Act

did not confer the

ICC

on

the

ICC

And when Congress

in the

1903 with the Elkins Act.

it

still

with rate-making power. The
Elkins Act did prohibit secret

rebates and required the railroads
to
later enforced.

in

file their rates

finally did

Hepburn Act of 1906, under

with the ICC. which the Court

bestow clear

rate

making

authority

the appeal of Teddy Roosevelt,
the

Court upheld the power. 82
The Hepburn Act bestowed upon the
Commission
the

first

rates.

time, allowing

it

The Act was not

rate

to declare existing rates unreasonable

,

Elkins Act and did not. Moreover, the Court
itself

Congress once

it

had made clear

UUnois Railroad Company

that

it

vested the

New

to clarify the issue

moved

ICC with

for

and prescribe new

a challenge to the Court's opinion in
Cincinnati,

Orleans so much as a qualification, as Congress
had a chance
in the

making power

this

into line with

power. In

ICC

v.

1910, the Court upheld the Commission's rate-

in

making power and even went so

far as to say that

it

would confine

itself to

questions of law, deferring to the agency's judgment on
questions of fact. With
Justice

Brewer alone

in dissent, the

Court noted that

it

would not “under

of exerting judicial power, usurp merely administrative functions by
a law administrative order

power has been wisely

exercised.” In

Waite’s insistence from
legislature

and not

upon our conception

to be

Munn

,

setting aside

as to whether the administrative

some ways,

that questions

the guise

this

echoed Chief Justice

of policy were questions

for the

second-guessed under the guise of judicial review. And,

no doubt, the Court had been severely

criticized throughout this era for doing just

Semonche, Charting the Future 209.
,

167

that-as Roosevelt and others
Yet the Court did defer

pohcy
in

to

ICC

regard to

engage

to the legislature, here,

The Court did

clear.

rate

criticized the Court's
antidemocratic tendencies.

i,

stepped

in

and made

its

not retreat from substantive
review altogether-cither

making or

in substantive

when

state rate

review of some

could be necessary in future cases
and.
in later cases. Judicial
intervention

making. The Court insisted

rates, to

make

in fact, the

of this

sort

sure they

that the

need

were reasonable,

Court did find against the ICC

was not altogether unwelcome.

In

passing the Mann-Elkins Act the Congress
even called for a continued judicial
role in this regard.

and

carriers

to

Commission
interstate

condemn

the

power

commerce,

interstate rates.

rate s

While giving the ICC power

suspend

rate

changes by the

short-haul/long-haul distinctions, granting
the

to intrude into the

the

to

realm of intrastate rates

Congress gave the ICC

But even here

this

in the

name of

virtually full control over

power was subject

to judicial

review of the

reasonableness.” In response to such developments,
the Court,

much

set

as

it

did in antitrust, started to fashion a more expansive
view of federal power, even
it

wasn

t

if

easily reconciled with past opinions, or always
consistent with future

ones. In the Minnesota Rate Cases the Court suggested
that congressional
,

regulation ot intrastate rates, and even preemption of state
rates, might be

acceptable with a showing that "adequate regulation of interstate
rates cannot be

maintained without imposing requirements with respect to intrastate rates
which
substantially allect the lormerf.]

in the

I

he Court took this even further the next year

Shreveport Rate Case holding that the ICC could reach wholly intrastate
,

O-I

Minnesota Rate Cases 230 U.S. 352, 433 (1912).
,

168

rates

it it

could show

course, the Court

still

that

such rates actually burdened
interstate commerce.

held wide

sway

in

Of

determining whether such burdens
had

been met.

A
the Court,

leading scholar of American
political development has
suggested that

moving with

administrative

discretion

state.

public sentiment,

The Court's “actions suggested

more cautiously so

political pressures lor change,

in the

new

state

on

its

own

as to

move

and

that in

terms .”

recognized congressional power

When

clarify that power.

to say that this

was recognizing

84

The

that

doing

so,

it

would readjust

in its earlier decisions, but
called

Congress did

so, the

Court often

left

—

on Congress

regulation and what

was

That's not

the contrary.

with one another

and the constitutional

It

was precisely

of the Court (as

this state

of drawing boundaries upon

I've noted).

w hat was

of

As

the Court

a “reasonable”

not, critics often saw' the Court's distinctions as

arbitrarily overturning democratically enacted legislation.

opinions were rooted

to

a recognition of constitutional indeterminacy— that

to the vociferous criticism

in the task

position

unclear, to be filled in by the executive

branch, the administrative agency, or by the courts.
constitutional unsettlement

its

fell into line.

in tension

intent in regard to national regulation

reach of its power was frequently

mounting

Fuller Court, though, had already

was an easy unfolding of constitutional meaning.
On

and congressional

was engaged

would now use judicial

with, rather than against, the

C ourt opinions and constitutional doctrine
were often

added weight

it

the basis of the

in strong jurisprudential tradition,

Stephen Skowronek, Building the

New American

Stale:

if the

and even

Court's

if the

The Expansion of National

Administrative Capacity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981
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Even

)

261

Court was

acting within the contours of
this doctrine, critics, as
Friedman argues,

nonetheless perceived vast and
incomprehensible indeterminacy
doctrine."

85

Charges of judicial

will,

lawmaking, and

bias, resonated

of the Court saw these principles
as being applied

critics

in the

in

because

unpredictable ways.

Indeed, Progressive critics of the
Constitution like Herbert Croly
were

questioning these very principles,
offering an alternate view of the
Constitution
(and democracy) and calling upon
judges to defer to the legislature

operated within the bounds of "reasonable"
disagreement.

As with

when

it

antitrust, this

decades long struggle reveals profound
discontinuities within constitutional

which remained

doctrine,

in a state

of constitutional

drift.

We see this, just as

evidently, in struggles over the regulation
of labor and "liberty of contract”

The Ebb and

How of

Due Process

The year 1908 was,
1895, as

I

it

again handed

in

down

many ways,

as an explosive a year for the Court as

a troika of opinions that set off political
debate.

he Court invalidated C ongress prohibition ot
“yellow dog contracts,” 86 applied

the

Sherman

Antitrust Act to labor,

8

and invalidated a congressional attempt

to

hold employers responsible for employee injury as beyond
the reach of Congress’

commerce power.

In reaction to this trio ot opinions, particularly
at the height

Friedman, “The Lesson of Lochner,” 1405.
86

87

88

Adair

v.

United States. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).

Loewe.

Employers

Liability Cases. Also, in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Court
enjoined a
from proceeding against a corporation on the grounds that the law was
unconstitutional. In the wake of Young, the states appealed to Congress and President
Roosevelt,
who took up the issue and Congress, in 1910, passed a statute forbidding the issue of such an
state officer

injunction, unless

it

circuit court judge).

was heard in a court with three federal judges (one of whom must be
The Elkins-Mann Act, see Warren, 717.
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at least a

of Teddy Roosevelt's popularity,
bias against labor.

constraining trade

The

the Court

fact that the

was accused of man, testing

Sherman Act was applied

was cynically viewed

as evidence, if

it

Court's anti-labor animus. This was
compounded by the

down

a section of the

Erdman Act of

"in response to the Pullman Strike
of
a

measure

to secure labor peace.” 8 " In

1908 opinions and

what Congress
labor,

its

neutral political arena

in a sort

Adair struck

fact that

1898. which itself was passed
by Congress
1

894 and was defended by

many minds,

Court would have

and thereby engaging

to labor in

were needed, of the

this link

1895 opinions was a testament to the

tried, the

a strong

its

its

supporters as

between the Court's

fact that

no matter

say, siding with business against

of lawlessness, entering the putatively

on behalf of business against

labor.

And

at

the time, these

opinions were given far more play than Lochner,
the case that came to symbolize
the era.

The connection

to

Lochner though,
,

is

important in Adair not only in that
,

it

drew on

liberty ot contract," but in that

—

dissenter of Lochner

now, have thought

that

Adair was authored by

that other great

Justice Harlan. Critics of liberty of contract, both
then and

Harlan

his dissenting opinion in

s

majority opinion in Adair was inconsistent with

Lochner authored just three years
,

Harlan had voted to uphold a

New

earlier. In

York maximum hours regulation

Lochner

for bakers as

a legitimate exercise of the state's interest in protecting the health
of the worker.
In

Adair however, Harlan struck down Section 10 ot the Erdman Act, where
,

Congress prohibited railroad companies from blacklisting members of railroad
unions or requiring employees to sign “yellow dog” contracts, which promised

Fiss,

Troubled Beginnings, 166

.
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that the

liberty

tension

employee would not join

of contract and
is

cited, even.

easily reconciled.

Cushman have shown,

a labor union.* In doing so.
Harlan relied on

As

Peckham's opinion

in

revisionist scholars like

Lochner. This apparent

Gillman and Barry

Harlan, even though dissenting in
Lochner essentially
,

shared the majorities' framework

91

In

.

Lochner, Harlan thought the

hours law was a legitimate health
regulation, clearly aimed

maximum

preserving the

at

health ol the worker and not tampering
with one's liberty of contract for
arbitrary
reasons. Congress' attempt to prohibit
“yellow dog" contracts, on the other hand,

served no legitimate public interest:

employee and employer. Moreover,

it

was a mere prohibition against both

the standard for Congress

was

itself

the

higher

than for the states, as Congress, given the
constitutional thought of the time, had

only enumerated powers, not a general police
power (like the

states).

Thus.

Congress' prohibition of “yellow dog" contracts would
have to be tied neatly
regulation of interstate

standards of the day

it

commerce— a

claim that was difficult to

make by

to a

the

92
.

The government s defense of Section 10 illustrates the unsettled state of interstate
commerce,
drew upon the Court's recent commerce clause opinions: “The right of individuals
or

corporations to

make

to regulate interstate

as

contracts and do business is at all times subservient to the power
of Congress
commerce, and common carriers are subject to greater control than private

individuals by the State or Congress ... on account of the public nature
of such business” (at 64).
;l

Gillman, Constitution Besieged, Barry Cushman, Rethinking the

New Deal

Court 109-138.
,

Although, as a side note, the Court was responsive to Congress' broader reading of commerce
on
occasion. After it struck down an act regulating both interstate and intrastate employment
relations
as part of interstate commerce, in a second Employer's Liability decision, the Court
upheld a
congressional re-enactment that made the law applicable to employees in interstate commerce
only, falling into line with Roosevelt's insistence,

in a private letter to Justice Day, that if the
Employer's Liability case persisted, "we should not only have a revolution,
but it would be absolutely necessary to have a revolution, because the condition of the worker
would become inoperable." Urofsky and Finkleman, The March of Liberty, 579.

reasoning of the

first
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Even

it

we may

see the constitutional doctrine underlying
Harlan's

opinions, revealing that they are not logically
inconsistent,
see that disagreements over what

not—just

was

a “reasonable” regulation and

as surely

what was

as in antitrust and rate regulation— lead to
charges of arbitrariness. This

judicial pricking ol lines

—

delineating what

governmental power and what was not
state.

we can just

—

was

left

The apparent disconnection between

a legitimate exercise of

constitutional doctrine in a shifting

social

demands and

constitutional

thought only added to Progressive criticism of a shifting
Court. Presidents

Roosevelt and Wilson began to articulate

viewing the president
included a general

s

new

constitutional standards, not only

constitutional authority tar

more expansively, which

call for constitutional adaptation.

As Roosevelt

suggested: the

Constitution "must be interpreted not as a straight jacket, not as laying
the hand of

death upon our development, but as an instrument designed for the

life

and

healthy growth ol the Nation." Wilson echoed this thinking, calling for Darwinian

adaptation ol principles to changing social conditions, a

by the

likes

the law in

of Roscoe Pound. Dean of Harvard

ways

Law

call

School,

that rejected the old constitutionalism

which was taken up

who began

by taking

to recast

into account

social conditions. Writing immediately after the Adair decision in the Yale

Journal Pound asked:
,

"Why do we

Law

find a great and learned court in 1908 taking

the long step into the past of dealing with the relation between employer and

employee

in

railway transportation, as

were farmers haggling over the

n

if

the parties were individuals

sale of a horse."

'

Pound, "Liberty of Contract," 454.
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93

Such

—

as if they

criticism resonated

strongly with public sentiment, which
refused to simply accept the

Court
at

reading ot the Constitution, urging

s

new

legislation

and thinking

odds with (some) Court opinions. But the Court's
prominent

Irom the
(even

it

"judicial

tact that

Congress

itselt

and deferred

tacitly)

In

We

to judicial determinations,

was

stemmed

making

criticisms of

legislation far

more

see both of these strains in the liberty of
contract cases.

Adair Harlan struck down the prohibition of “yellow dog”
,

contracts, finding that Section 10 of the

Erdman Act was

regulation ot interstate commerce: the end Congress

was

role also

that

often called upon such judicial
intervention

lawmaking" with the overturning of congressional

difficult to sustain.

Supreme

not, in tact,

Harlan had, as

aimed

at interstate

we have

which was often

at

commerce, but

at

was

trying to reach

labor relations.

seen, a broad conception of the

odds with

not a proper

Commerce Power

his brethren's reading, but he

saw Congress'

prohibition of yellow dog contracts as an attempt to encourage union
organization, which therefore favored one class over another. 94 Such a

move

violated due process:

The

right ot a person to sell his labor

upon such terms as he deems
same as the right of the purchaser of labor
to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor
from the person offering to sell it. So the right of the employee to
quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same
proper

is,

in essence, the

as the right of the employer, for

the services of such employee.

w hatever

reason, to dispense with

9>

Harlan then insisted that “any legislation

that disturbs that equality is

an arbitrary

interference with the liberty of contract which no government can legally justify

>4

Fiss,

Troubled Beginnings.
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in

a tree land." % Justice

McKenna

dissented, insisting that the

commerce

agreed with Harlan's general framework,
but

Erdman Act was an acceptable

not a suspect species of class legislation—
as

passed, in the

wake of the Pullman

Strike, to

regulation of interstate

it

was

promote labor peace as

preventing the disruption ot interstate commerce
due to labor
difference between

share the

same

and Peckham

McKenna's

dissent and Harlan's majority

constitutional framework,

s

much

majority opinion in Luchner

essentially

—

strife.

part

of

The

opinion-as they

like Harlan's dissenting

opinion

points to two interrelated problems

that resulted in continual constitutional struggle
rather than settlement. First, the

intent ol laws regulating labor

was not always

clear.

as with other aspects of economic regulation

This resulted

—

in part

—

in continual

disagreement on the

Court, and oft, in whether any particular enactment was within
the accepted

bounds of constitutional

propriety.

Even

if

the justices

were working out of a

coherent constitutional framework, each particular judicial determination of the
constitutionality ol legislation

was open

to

charges ot being arbitrary. Most

importantly, for our purposes, this led to a continual enactment of legislation that

probed the boundaries ol constitutionality against unclear Court opinions. Even
while Court opinions often offered broad-based constitutional principles, the

Court

itself

was

split

on specific applications and,

fluctuating, giving the legislature

little

therefore, appeared to be

guidance. This case-by-case approach

invited a sort of perpetual constitutional strife, requiring the Court to act on a

” Adair

at

174-175.

96

Ibid, at 175.

175

case-by-case basis— applying particular sets
of facts to each

case— than

Court of last resort settling broad based
constitutional questions

Take Muller

Oregon

v.

w

work, or laundries,

women

in factories,

,

in this

mechanical

hour work day. What's more, the Court's opinion
was

to a ten

unanimous and written by

97

Decided the very same term as Adair

case the Court upheld an Oregon statute limiting

as a

Justice Brewer, a leading proponent of liberty
of

contract and, though otten forgotten in our age,
a leading proponent of

women’s

equality (along with Justice Sutherland, another
Court "reactionary”). Muller

famous,

in part, for the celebrated

Brandeis Brief, where the future justice

compiled a mountain ol sociological data
deleterious effects upon

women,

state

A

working hours had

is,

later, in

Thus limiting

reasonable— regulation of health.
's

framework

Coppage

v.

— found

women's

Kansas

,

is

if

work

day.

was a general

it

still

a direct

health and thus

the Court struck

down

Robert Nagel argues that

w

v.

Oregon

The reasoning seemed

law, applicable to

this, in fact, is

how

all

in

at

1917, where

it

upheld a

odds with Lochner. Yet,

workers, distinguishing

the Court operates, revealing that

it

it

from class

is

not truly

capable of judicial supremacy. Constitutional Cultures: The Mentality and Consequences of
Judicial Review (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

99

a

viewed as sound constitutional doctrine. More

the Court's decision in Bunting

general ten-hour

98

It is

“yellow dog" contract regulation, relying squarely on Adair and Lochner

puzzling

97

that long

the regulation of hours and

few years

suggesting that both were

even

show

—working from Lochner

enough connection between
upheld the law.

to

the perpetuator of the species.

women's hours was an acceptable— that
plausible that the Court

is

Muller

v.

Bunting

v.

Oregon 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
,

Oregon 243 U.S. 426
,

(1917).
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based legislation, the Court

Adkms

v.

(

hildren

Bunting arguing
,

Holmes

who

's

that

on

itself later split

this logic. In the

Hospital the dissenting justices drew on
the logic of
,

it

was not

m

consistent with Lochner

reiterating his dissenting opinion in

Lochner

that the

Bunting Case and the Lochner Case and

Lochner Case was thus overruled sub

silentio.

was a difference between Bunting and Adkins,

minimum wage

wages— the
thus a far

while the former regulated

it

was

This was not

I

,,m

have always supposed

As

Taft argued,

if

there

that the latter regulated a

maximum

hours.

A

regulation of

in

Adkins— was

regulation and not justified as a matter of health,

whereas hours regulation might plausibly
constitutional reasoning,

me

impossible for

“It is

very heart of liberty of contract, Sutherland reasoned

more obtrusive

just

was Chief Justice Taft

it

,

shared the Court's general framework, insisting
that

to reconcile the

1923 case of

it

be.

But even

it

we

accept this as sound

reveals the tact that Court opinions themselves invite

dispute as to their meaning, as they can usually be read to favor different

outcomes. Sutherland insisted
liberty

of contract, because

it

minimum wage

that a

was not

on

this,

but either reading

was

other the multiplicand.”

m Adkins
101

v.

102

The

upon

it

it

—

plausible. Taft,

regulation of hours and wages as the

women was

a valid health regulation.

distinguish the case from Lochner or rest

clear

for

same

He

his opinion

a violation of

could either

was

actually not

on the other hand, saw the

thing:

“one

is

fact that justices

who

shared the same

the multiplier and the

Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).

Ibid, at 564.

102

Ibid.

Gillman suggests a crucial distinction between maxim hours laws and minimum wage

laws, as the later lacked any connection with a public purpose under the Lochner Era Court’s
constitutional reasoning. The Constitution Besieged,
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constitutional frame work-Taft and
Sutherland, Harlan and

and Harlan— disagreed with

its

implementation

Court opinions themselves do not

in specific

McKenna, Peckham

cases illustrates

how

settle constitutional questions,
but invite dispute

about past cases, constitutional power, and
line drawing. These various
judicial
responses to persistent legislative probing
of the contours of constitutional

meaning were not
This

is

not to reject revisionist accounts of the
Lochner Era, which suggest

that the justices

concerns.

easily of a piece.

were motivated by jurisprudential rather than
crass

On the

contrary,

reject the role taken

I

find these accounts persuasive. This

up by the judiciary

in this regard. Rather,

it

is

is

political

not even to

to suggest that

the judiciary does not operate as the authoritative
settler of constitutional

even when we
statutory

invite judicial determinations

and

and constitutional meaning. Congress often

ambiguous manner, or leaves

in

to ‘assault' judicial

power or

drafts legislation in an

not, as

Court to flesh out. As

legislative alternative to the

judicial control ol railroad strikes that had been

law was

to flesh out

regarded to Section 10 of the Erdman Act,

even though the Act was ostensibly a

Strike, the

on the Court

difficult questions for the

George Lovell persuasively argues

Pullman

call

meaning

expanded

in

system of

connection with the

Karen Orren suggests, an attempt by Congress

to place the courts ‘under siege.' Rather,

Congress

included provisions that expanded the powers of the courts by giving judges

important but vaguely defined oversight and enforcement responsibilities.” 103

Viewing the Congress

103

Lovell,

“As Harmless

in relation to the Court, the

as an Infant," 223.
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Court

is

not simply striking

down

a popular enactment of Congress.

On

the contrary, as

Mark Graber

suggests, the Congress often defers to
the Court, letting the Court sort out
difficult
constitutional issues rather than taking

both the ICC and

them up

itself,

much

as

it

did in the case of

antitrust.

Focusing our eye more closely on congressional

intent,

we

get a better

understanding of the Court, revealing a dynamic
where constitutional meaning

moves back and

torth

between the branches. As Lovell

Act was not as prolabor as
Court's ruling in Adair as

it

it

made

is

is

illustrates, the

Erdman

out to be and thus not as at odds with the

usually

made

out to be. In

fact, the bill

was drafted

by Attorney General Richard Olney,

who had

vigorously argued for the

government's power

Pullman

Strike,

in reaction to.

to put

At multiple

down

points.

the

Congress rejected provisions

been much more clearly "prolabor,
injunction from courts, which

did not do

this.

which the Erdman Act was

was

that

would have

especially in explicitly removing the labor

labor's

most frequent demand

104
.

But the Act

Neither, though, were supporters of the Act happy with the

Court's reading. Even Olney wrote that “the inability of the Supreme Court to
find any connection

between the membership of a labor union and the carrying on

of interstate commerce seems inexplicable." 10 This helps account
’

for the fact that

the constitutional issues in this area were often muddled, rather than clearly

settled (either against

Congress or

This persistent back and

shifting,

happened with

in

favor of it).

forth,

an attempt

to

state regulation as well, as

179

draw

lines that

we saw

seemed ever

with the Court's

upholding of a

expanded

maximum

hours law for

women

Bunting and seemingly reversed

in

,

Adkms was handed down, former

in

Muller which was than
,

Adkins

Secretary of State and

Root, a trusted advisor to TR, but one
said in an address at the

in

who was

American Law

m The very year that
New

York Senator Elihu

often sympathetic to the Court,

Institute that,

"the confusion, the

uncertainty" that beset constitutional law
"was growing from year to year" and

making

mere "guess work." 107 Root noted

it

presenting the ALI's far

Hung

which was aptly

Complexity."

It

mid

uncertainty,

was

it

of affairs while

project of giving the law a coherent
structure, the

particular report of

the

this unsettled state

to late

titled,

"The Law’s Uncertainty and

1920s brought a respite from such conflict and

short lived.

Conclusion
In Constitutional

wrote that

in the

United States,

each generation ot statesmen looks

interpretation

free

Government

which

will serve the

to the

Woodrow Wilson

Supreme Court

to

supply the

needs of the day.” Yet Wilson did not

wheeling adaptation, as he went on

to say,

call for

"the safety and the purity of our

system depend on the wisdom and the good conscience of the Supreme Court.

Expanded and adapted by
must

be; but the

interpretation the

manner and

IU6

Warren, The Supreme Court

Which

is

in

entire

system of government.”

108

108

In the

United States History 715.
,

the equivalent ot a state case, as

it

was

a Congressional regulation within the District

of Columbia.
107

in the Constitution

the motive of their expansion involve the integrity,

and therefore the permanence, or our

105

powers granted

Wiecek, The Lost World oj Classical Legal Thought.
Wilson, Constitutional Government

in the

United States, 158.
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midst ot this

even went on
that

was

at

call for

to

evolutionary adaptation, with Darwin as
interlocutor, Wilson

embrace a narrow reading of the Congress'
Commerce Power

odds with the Keating-Owen child labor

act passed

administration. Noting that "the real difficulty has
been to

under his

draw

the line

the process of expansion and adaptation ceases
to be legitimate and

mere

act ot will

to the specifics

his point,

on the

becomes

a

government, served by the courts .” 109 Turning

of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce

to illustrate

Wilson asked, "May [Congress] also regulate the conditions
under

which the merchandise
matter of interstate

who

felt

produced w'hich

is

commerce? May

and factory? Clearly
lawyer

part of the

where

not,

I

is

presently to

become

regulate the conditions of labor in the field

it

should say; and

I

should think that any thoughtful

himself at liberty to be frank would agree with

Wilson not only signed
just this, he forced

it

into

the subject-

law the child labor act which,

me .” 110

albeit ambivalently, did

through the Senate. Wilson's ambivalence on

symbolizes the uncertainty of the age: an age fraught
discontinuities, partial dialogues and a state that

is

w ith

Yet

this

question

constitutional

best characterized as

constitutional drift.

Whereas the Congress of the Reconstruction
constitutional vision (that

it

era had a reasonably clear

ultimately retreated from), the Congress of the

Progressive era was mired in constitutional and political uncertainty.

“patchwork” attempts

at

constitutional questions;

Its

regulation often invited the Court to flesh out the larger

on occasion,

it
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was almost an

invitation to judicial

supremacy, as when one senator debating the
Sherman Act argued:

how we

are ever going to

know whether

that

were

at

do not see

this bill is constitutional or not until

has been referred to the Supreme Court."

pronouncements

"I

1

it

1

But, just as surely. Court

odds with the

political imperatives

of the day were

not simply accepted. Rather, the unsettled and
contested state of constitutional

meaning during

this era

mirrored the political struggles of the

about constitutional meaning are rooted

which has even been described

in the

concrete politics of the times

as a “search for order.”

1

12

Revolution ot 1937” finally brought order and settlement

power

to regulate the

to unsettle the

New

economy,

Deal,

it

at least until

attempted unsettlement

If the

“Constitutional

to the

government's

President Ronald Reagan's attempt

opened up other areas

over constitutional meaning persisted. The

day— as disputes

New

are, in turn, the subjects

in

which the

Deal settlement and Reagan's

of the next two chapters.

110

Ibid., 171.
1

1

112

Morgan, Congress and the Constitution
Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order

,

1

54.

(New York:

182

Hill

political struggle

and Wang, 1977).

CHAPTER 4
DISCONTINUITIES IN THE “CONSTITUTIONAL

REVOLUTION OF
After the Supreme Court struck

Act

in

Schechter Poultry Corporation

down

v.

1937”

the National Industrial Recovery

the United States, Franklin

Roosevelt delivered an extraordinary radio
address
the

most important decision “of

my

lifetime

.

.

in

which he called Schechter

.more important than any decision

probably since the Dred Scott case.” The Court
would soon hand
defeats finding

much of the

legislation at the heart of the

unconstitutional. Roosevelt, though,

was

Delano

New

FDR a

The problem

interpretation of

a staunch opponent of

amending

FDR was

remember one more
years to

come

Justices

who would

right. Fie

thing.

were

be

if

is

is.”

Development

,

1

1

in

the

concede

“And

meaning would depend upon

it

is

if in the

the kind of

An amendment,

rather than

Roosevelt was only partly being

1

that the

an amendment were passed, and even

Howard Gillman, “The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and

'Living Constitution’

to

this in a “fireside chat”:

what the Justices say
2

it

would be

on the Supreme Court bench.

sitting

framers or you might hope

'

Even

pushed

to be ratified, its

the rest of the Constitution,

1

already

it

not with the Constitution, but with the Court's

the Constitution, for Roosevelt,

Court's interpretation was

it

the

This was fundamentally a clash of constitutional visions.

it.

amend

1o

for

of

Deal

Constitution to clearly grant the national government
power he thought
had.

series

what
sly:

like

its

he refused

the Rise of the Notion of the

Course of American State-Building” Studies

in

American

Political

(Fall 1997).

Bruce Ackerman,

We

the People: Transformations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998)

327.
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to believe that the Constitution

finger squarely

was

really

would then be subject
Robert Jackson,

state of

3

but he put his

formal amendment to the Constitution that

to judicial interpretation.

As Roosevelt's Attorney General

later elevated to the Court, explained, “it

to clarify

mind.

it is,

on the problem. For FDR, what was needed was
a fundamental

shift in constitutional thinking, not a

more words

what the justices say

more words,

but

it

Thus Roosevelt refused

is

be possible by

not possible by words to change a

concede

to

may

that the current

Court should

determine constitutional meaning, insisting instead that the
Court should adapt
itself to

the Constitution properly understood.

The ensuing

struggle between Roosevelt and the Court, the “Court-

packing plan," and the Court's abrupt
debate.

1

view

this struggle

constitutional settlement.

and

large, as

shift

remain the subject of intense scholarly

over constitutional meaning through the lens of

The “Constitutional Revolution of 1937"

is

seen, by

an extraordinary constitutional moment, a rare instance of

constitutional politics, even while there

constitutional change in this period.

4

is

serious disagreement over what drove

Writing

in the

New

Republic shortly after the

Court's famous switch, the redoubtable Edward Corwin argued that “American
constitutional law has

first

and

last

undergone a number of revolutions, but none

so radical, so swift, so altogether dramatic as that witnessed by the term of Court
just ended.

when

3

Ibid.,
4

1

have

in

mind only

the results so far recorded in the actual decisions;

the logical possibilities for the future of these holdings are considered, the

329.

See especially on

this,

Ackerman, We the People: Transformations.
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impression

left is,

of course,

still

more

striking.”

"Constitutional Revolution of 1937” has
constitutional

moment, a

transformation,

rare instance

come

5

to

And, indeed, the
be seen as an extraordinary

of constitutional politics and

6

that reordered

our constitutional commitments by
solidifying

expansive national power while simultaneously
placing the Supreme Court

in the

role of protecting civil liberties. 7 Scholars
have thus situated the

in a

way

Deal

frames twentieth century American constitutional
8
development. The

that

Court's protection of “fundamental rights” in the
century

5

New

from the

Corwin on

initial

the Constitution

,

latter

half of the twentieth

sketch offered in Carulene Products footnote 4
to the

Volume Two,

Press, 1987) 369.

edited by Richard Loss (Ithaca- Cornell University
3

(

Scholars, ot course, continue to argue over what drove constitutional
change

in this

period.

So-

called internalists like Barry

Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court The Structure
of a
Constitutional Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press,
1998) argue that the change was
largely based on legal thought, while externalists like Bruce
Ackerman, We the People:
:

Transformations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) and We the People:
Foundations
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991) argue that the change was forced
by political forces
external to the Court.

Here, as

argue below, traditionalist accounts and revisionist account seamlessly merge.
For
Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Supreme Court from Taft to
Burger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar
the
I

traditional accounts see, for example,

of

Law (New

York: Viking, 1956) and “The Core of Free Government, 1938-40: Mr. Justice Stone
and 'Preferred Freedoms’” 65 Yale Law Journal 5 (1956), Robert McCloskey, The American
Supreme Court second edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), and William
Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Rehorn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). For
,

leading revisionist accounts see Howard Gillman, "The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism
and the Rise of the Notion of the 'Living Constitution' in the Course of American State-Building”
Studies in American Political Development
(Fall 1997), “Preferred Freedoms: The Progressive
Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence” Political
Research Quarterly Vol. 47, No. 3 (September 1994) and The Constitution Besieged: The Rise
,

I

I

,

and Demise

oj Lochner

Era Police Power's Jurisprudence (Durham: Duke University Press,
Ackerman, We the People: Transformations and We the People: Foundations Stephen
Griffin, American Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1998). There is even, arguably, an emerging post-revisionist synthesis. See Barry Friedman,
"The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner" 76 New
1993),

,

York University Law Review 1383 (2001) and “The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five” 12 Yale Law Journal 153 (2002).
1
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Court

recent invalidation of a Texas statute that
prohibited homosexual

s

sodomy— is
regime

seen to flow inexorably from the commitments
of the

9

as a coherent "constitutional regime"

meaning during
American

is

treats the

misleading.

The

The Court's

unsteady

politics

Deal revolution

of constitutional

constitutional development. Constitutional change
during this period
radical, swift,

and dramatic than other periods of

constitutional struggle and change, but the difference
10

New

period are not so tar removed trom the ordinary
course of

this

may have been more

.

Deal

.

This chapter argues that scholarship which

kind

New

state, as

is

one of degree, not of

constitutional jurisprudence prior to the

we saw

in the last chapter, as

it

New

Deal was

in

an

both adapted to emerging

constitutional thought and adhered to an older constitutional vision.
While these

two strands were not always

in outright contradiction prior to the

constitutional visions that each strand rested

New

Deal, the

upon were fundamentally

irreconcilable.

f

DR

s

constitutional vision

drew heavily on progressive

constitutional

thought, insisting that the Constitution must adapt to the times: "They [the

opponents of the

8

On

New

Deal] do not

know

or realize that the Constitution has

Ken Kersch, Discontinuous Development in American Constitutional Law: Civil
and Civil Rights in the Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press,

this see,

Liberties

forthcoming).

^United States

v.

Carolene Products 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) and Lawrence
,

v.

Texas

U.S.

(2003).
10

Barry Friedman, “The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of

Lochner,"

is

one of the few scholars

to

draw

a distinction

between

the different criticisms leveled at the Court in each period.

186

this

two periods,

particularly in

changed with the times
principles

changed

which

in

it

...

We revere

it

and have an affection for

reflects, but in its material applications

it

because of the

of necessity has

it

keeping with the changing times and conditions.”

1

In offering an

adaptable view of the Constitution that would allow the
national government to
regulate the

economy

in

inherited constitutional

Given the economic

expansive ways,

meaning

crisis, the

FDR was

attempting to unsettle

as articulated by the Court (at least at times).

debate was

past (and the programs put forward

more

much

sharper than

far reaching), but

it

it

had been

in the

was very much

a

continuation of the constitutional debate that the country had been having
for over

And

three decades.

vacillating in

its

the Court itself

was seriously divided on

opinions and constitutional view as

it

the debate,

struggled with the

expansion of national power, revealing the already eroding foundations of
constitutional

several

meaning

prior to 1937.

waves of New Deal

legislation in such a short period

simmering constitutional debate
In the

But there

is

11

Quoted

in

a tendency to overplay

of a Justice Sutherland,

FDR

this

and the

this.

The vision of an adaptable

was fundamentally

who saw

at

odds with the

the Constitution's

Howard Gillman, “The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and

Notion of the 'Living Constitution’
12

of time brought

political branches, as recent scholarship has

Constitution, rooted in progressive thought,

jural reasoning

down

their initials aims, suggesting a constitutional dialogue

of sorts between the Court and the
12

in striking

to a head.

ensuing struggle over constitutional meaning,

Congress partly modified

shown.

The boldness of the Court

Barry Cushman, Rethinking the

in

the Course of

New Deal

Court.
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meaning as

the Rise of the

American State-Building,” 23

1

fixed.

13

There was

little

room

Supreme Court

Justice. Robert

Supremacy

New

the

.

Dealers

As Attorney

for dialogue.

Jackson put

“knew

it

in

General, and soon to be

The Struggle for Judicial

that the constitutional doctrine

on which they

were relying had theretofore won adherence
from only a minority of the Court.
But they acted on
triumphed:

it

trom conviction as well as necessity.” 14
By 1941,

New

the

this

view

Deal had resolved the basic questions of
economic

1

control.”

Constitutional meaning in the areas of federal-state
relations and the

'

national government's reach under the

Court came into

line

Commerce Clause was

settled

when

the

with Congress's and the President’s constitutional
views.

This has been aptly characterized in revisionist
scholarship as a

constitutional transformation

ot

American

meaning

state-building.

liberties, this constitutional

'

'

decades),

it

opened up another area

in a state ot constitutional flux.

the Court at the center of a

in the

course

Yet, while this settled one area of constitutional

(at least for several

and indeed remains

and the repudiation of “originalism”

New

that

remained

Rather than firmly situating

Deal Constitution where

it

would

protect civil

transformation invited perpetual debate about the very

As Sutherland noted

in a vigorous dissent against the Chief Justice’s opinion
"A provision of
hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two distinctly opposite
does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing at another
:

the Constitution,
interpretations.

time.”

Hume

It

it

is

Building and Loan Association

v.

Blaisdell,

290 U.S. 398, 448-449

Robert Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy: A Study
Politics (New York: Knopf, 1941)78.

in

a Crisis

in

(

1

934).

American Power

1

Robert McCloskey, The American Supreme Court second edition (Chicago: University of
Press, 1994)
19.
,

Chicago
16

17

1

Ackerman, We the People: Transformations.
Gillman, “The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the ‘Living

Constitution’

in the

Course of American State-Building.”
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meaning and legitimacy

of the constitutional order (and the
Court's role

18

therein).

When

the

New

Deal justices abandoned guardian review of the

Constitution by the Court, the central question became
the proper scope of
judicial

power

in relation to constitutional rights.

14

This debate has dominated

constitutional law and jurisprudence for the last
60 years and remains as the

fundamentally contested jurisprudential issue
Court.

20

This chapter argues that

Revolution of 1937, making

it

is

in legal scholarship

and on the

this, too, is central to the

Constitutional

very difficult to treat the

New

as a coherent constitutional regime

which

New

solidifies the

Deal revolution

American

State

while carving out an area of "preferred freedoms" protected by the Court. 21
That
the Constitutional Revolution of 1937

economic questions, or

removed

the Court

patrolling the boundaries

from deciding

between the

states

and the

national government, while inviting the Court to take up the protection of civil
liberties has

become

development. In

18

a virtual truism in

American

this analysis, traditional

See Kersch, Discontinuous Development

in

constitutional and political

and revisionist accounts of the

American Constitutional Law: Civil

New

Liberties

and

Civil Rights in the Twentieth Century.
1

’

G. Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal (Cambridge: Harvard University
2000 ).
20

For the Court’s most recent argument picking up
U.S.

_l

this quarrel, see

Lawrence

v.

Texas

Press,

,

(2003).

Both Gillman and Ackerman, along with numerous others,

treat the

New

Deal as a new

Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a National Policy-Maker’’ Journal of Public Law 288 and Keith Whittington, “The
Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy” in Sotirios Barber and Robert P. George, eds..
Constitutional Politics: Essays on Constitutional Making Maintenance, and Change (Princeton:
Princeton University Press 2001 ) and To Say What the Law Is (Princeton: Princeton University
constitutional regime.

See also Robert Dahl, “Decision-Making

in a

,

Press, forthcoming) situating the Court within a regimes understanding.
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Deal merge: both agree that after 1937, the Court's
job was to protect
liberties.

The expansion

ot state

power and

civil

the immediate recognition of

judicial deference led to a serious reevaluation
of the judicial role: state-building

and the search
coin.

of the same

Yet, the reconstruction ot civil liberties in the
course of American state

building

Court

tor judicial protection ot rights are
opposite sides

is

presumed more otten than

detailed.'^

s role in articulating civil liberties is

But

precisely

this recasting

of the

where agreement about the

Constitutional Revolution of 1937 ends.

It is

not a coincidence that in the

justices and legal scholars

wake of this

were fundamentally preoccupied with grounding

judicial power. Skepticism of judicial will

critique of the

Old Court;

constitutional rights in a

for

such

rights.

This

is

constitutional change

it

was

at the heart

of the

New

Deal

fundamentally shaped the post 1937 search for

way

that

made

it

difficult to foster a firm

foundation

evident in the three most prominent attempts to ground

judicial discretion in constitutional interpretation, as initially put forward by

Justices Stone, Frankfurter, and Black. These attempts are united in that they

all

begin with the question of judicial discretion and attempt to define
constitutional rights in a

way

that tethers judicial

power, rather than providing

constitutional principles that guide judicial interpretation. This

22

22

move,

at the

very

Gillman, “Preferred Freedoms,” 626.

New American
American Political Development 16 (Spring 2003), 61-87, 85. Kersch notes that
Gillman’s “Preferred Freedoms” is a prominent exception that "considers in a developmentconscious way the relationship between contemporary civil liberties and the new American state.”
See Ken Kersch, “The Reconstruction of Constitutional Privacy Rights and the

State” Studies in

,

But even Gillman, as Kersch suggests, and as

model of constitutional development,

I

argue below, essentially repeats the “progressive”

86.
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core ot the

New

Deal constitutional revolution, remains the subject
of

constitutional struggle, casting doubt

on the reconstructive enterprise of

situating the Court as the guardian of civil
liberties (as

economic
I

now

distinguished from

rights).

hus revisionist scholars of American constitutional
development

Howard Gillman cannot

like

so easily cast the Court's protection of “unenumerated”

privacy rights as part ot the New' Deal Constitution, rejecting
the putative

"double standard”
Constitution.

—

it

Roe then Lochner—as inapposite under
,

4

Indeed, this chapter claims that the

New

the

(New

Deal)

Deal revolution placed

the toundation ot "civil liberties” in an essentially contested state.
Moreover, the

various jurisprudential strands that

come

out of the

New Deal— as

by Stone, Frankfurter, and Black— are unlikely candidates

exemplified

for furnishing the

theoretical underpinnings of the Court's later privacy decisions.

Thus scholarly

preoccupation with justitying the judicial protection of "unenumerated rights,”
or a

more exacting

level

of protection for some rights rather than others,

including charges of “judicial lawmaking" and cries of a "double standard”

remain resonant as well as potent precisely because of the dilemmas

:4

Gillman. "Preferred Freedoms,” 649-650. Ackerman,

Griffin, American Constitutionalism

,

162

.
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We

at the heart

the People: Transformations 390,
,

of New Deal constitutionalism. 25 So when Gillman
argues

that disputes

over

the source ot [fundamental] rights have
been transparent surrogates for debates

over the nature and scope of judicial power,” 26

this is a result

of the

discontinuities brought forth by the “Constitutional
Revolution of 1937.” In
tact, this

chapter argues that the return ot “original intent,” as
exemplified by

Judge Bork and Justice Scalia, with

its

lawmaking" aimed against the Court’s
has

its

critique ot “judicial activism

and

articulation of these very privacy rights,

roots firmly in the constitutionalism of 1937. 27 Original
intent and

preoccupation with cabining judicial will
historical trajectory.

is

a viable strand of the

New

its

Deal's

Here the ghost of Lochner, and the critique of protecting

unenumerated or substantive
because of the thinking

rights, continues to

at the heart

this unsettled inheritance

of the

remain powerful precisely

of New Deal constitutionalism. Tracing out

New

Deal revolution

illustrates

how

See Barry Friedman, “The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five.” Friedman gives a persuasive history of this academic
obsession, which, he argues, is rooted in the progressive critique of the Lochner Court. Friedman
argues, though, that this obsession

is

inapplicable to the constitutional debates, including the

public reaction to judicial decisions, which follows the

should get over
suggest that
the results

New

Deal

era.

It

may

well be that

we

dilemma, as Friedman argues, but is advice to “liberals” at times seems to
they should stop worrying about justifying judicial review in such terms and focus on
do you like the outcome? Elsewhere, “The History of the Countermajoritarian
this

—

The Lesson of Lochner,” 1390. Friedman argues that judicial review should
terms of public acceptance of judicial outcomes than the “legal” reasoning
such decisions are based upon. But even this move would seem to take us back to debates about
Difficulty, Part Three:

be justified more

Roe and Lochner.
this is the true
26

in

isn't

Rue perhaps,
,

just as illegitimate under these terms as

“lesson of Lochner” then this old debate remains just as potent

Gillman, “Preferred Freedoms,” 624.
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Lochner was? So

if

(at least in this area).

constitutional debate

works

in fits

discontinuities and conflicts in

thus placing the

New

and

some

starts,

revealing constitutional

areas even while other areas are settled,

Deal constitutional revolution

in the

flow of 20th Century

American

constitutional development rather than at the center.

Ihe Court

as Catalyst: Provoking Constitutional Conti in

On May

27, 1935,

on what became known as Black Monday, the Court

unanimously invalidated the National

Lemke Act on mortgage

Industrial

moratoria. Attention focused immediately on the

Schechter decision, striking

down

the

NIRA

reading of the delegation of powers and the

profound implications
Chief Justice Hughes

for future

first

the President, allowing

New

him

immediate

far as to call

in its entirety, as the

Court's

Commerce Power would have

Deal legislation.

28

Writing for the Court,

found that the congressional delegation of power
to establish fair trade

was an unconstitutional delegation
even went so

Recovery Act and the Frazier-

it

codes for a trade or industry,

of power. In a concurring opinion,

“delegation running riot.”

threat to congressional delegation,

to

29

Cardozo

The opinion was not an

which was key

to

many New Deal

agencies, as the Court focused on the lack of guidelines in this particular

Robert Bork, The Tempting oj American: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Free
Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth

Press, 1990), Raoul Berger,

Amendment

(Liberty Fund, 1998), second edition, and Antonin Scalia, “Originalism:

Evil” 57 University of Cincinnati

Law Review 849

Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent,

The Lesser

(1989). Keith Whittington, Constitutional

and Judicial Review (Lawrence: University

Press of Kansas, 1999) offers a more principled argument for original intent, grounding

it

principles of popular sovereignty and the nature of a written constitution, rather than as a

in

the

way

to

limit judicial will.
28

2y

The

'hot oil" cases struck

down

sections of

NIRA, Panama

Schechter Poultry Corp. v United Stales, 295 U.S. 495, 553

193

Refining

(

1935).

Company

v.

Ryan

(1935).

delegation of power, which,
presumably, could be easily overcome
in future
legislation that

many

In tact,

opinion

was more

carefully drafted.

in the administration

s true

the act itself

were quietly happy

importance was found

C lause— particularly given

And

that the

to see

in its construction

was
it

of the

Court was not compelled

go

set to expire.
30
.

The

Commerce

to reach this

constitutional question, as the act could
have been held unconstitutional on

delegation-of-power grounds alone.

Rather than stop there, though. Hughes found
that the Schechter Poultry

C orporation was a local operation engaged
the reach of national

power under

the

in

production and therefore beyond

Commerce

Clause.

wages, hours and working conditions was part of
the
so the corporatism of the
competition.

would

To evade

at feet interstate

NRA

went, in

its

The regulation of

NIRA

regulatory scheme,

attempt to bring order to industrial

the regulatory scheme, as the Schechter brothers
had.

commerce

as

it

would undercut

the price of poultry in the

national market and, thereby, undercut the income of
farmers. Hughes, however,

found that the Schechter Corporation was not engaged
While, no doubt, the poultry had

commerce,

it

“came

“commingled” with

removed

to

come trom

to rest” in the

out ot state and

moved

borough of Manhattan, where

the other property of the State of

commerce.

in interstate

New York

Brooklyn where the chickens were slaughtered

it

in interstate

was

and was

for local use

“Neither the slaughtering nor the sales by defendants were transactions

0

Homer Cummings,

for example.

11

Schechter

at

543.
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.

in

mterstate commerce."’ 2

Hughes continued, “The undisputed

facts thus afford

warrant for the argument that the
poultry handled by defendants
slaughterhouse markets was

was thus

commerce per

commerce,”

se,

was

how

far

commerce

does the commerce power reach

but are not of

most famously
that

I

commerce and

in the last chapter.

those things that affect interstate
interstate

interstate

34

Under

commerce

Case by Chief Justice

this rule.

are part of local production, have

regulation of the states police powers, not Congress'

federal authority

the authority of the state over

its

practically

all

fall

under the

commerce power.

“If the

enterprises and transactions

upon

interstate

commerce, the

the activities of the people, and

domestic concerns would exist only by

sufferance of the federal government

.

.

.

32

Ibid.

”

all

said to have an indirect effect

would embrace

Fuller,

“directly” affect

only an “indirect” effect on interstate commerce and
therefore

which would be

Ibid, at 543.
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as

but are not themselves part of

commerce. Wages and hours, which

clause were constructed to reach

it,

Congress, in regulating

commerce, may only regulate those things which

commerce

that “directly”

those things that only “indirectly”
affect

articulated in the 1895 Sugar Trust

drew upon

to those

if?

Here Hughes drew on a distinction between
those things
affect interstate

not regulating

or things that were part of the
“current of

the question was,

things that affect interstate

at their

a 'current' or ‘flow’ of interstate
commerce, and

in

subject to congressional regulation."”
If Congress

interstate

no

Otherwise, as

we have

said, there

would be

virtually

we should have

no

limit to the federal

power, and for

all

practical purposes

a completely centralized
government.” 35 Hughes' construction

of the commerce power drew
heavily on inherited modes of
legal though,

were being challenged by the
direct

New

tha,

Deal lawyers. The distinctions
between

and indirect effects and between
commerce and manufacturing found

strong jurisprudential support
in past cases like £. C.
Knight and

Hummer v.

Dagenhart and. as recent scholarship has
shown, was very much

a

structure of constitutional thought
in the early 20" century. 3

pan of the

1

generation ot scholars like Corwin and
Alpheus
this

same

Mason

'’

Yet. as an earlier

argued, there were, in

period, competingjurisprudential
strands that had been articulated by

none other than Hughes himself sitting as
an associate justice
previous chapter).

(as argued in the

37

In the

Shreveport Rate Case, for example, Hughes'

opinions seemed to cut against the “direct/indirect"
effects

paramount authority always enables

it

rule:

Congress’

to intervene at its discretion for
the

complete and effective government of that which has
been committed
care, and, lor this purpose

and

to this extent, in response to a conviction

national need, to displace local laws by substituting
laws of

United States
Schechter

at

v.

E C.

546.

Knight, 156 U.S.

Though Hughes

6

Howard Gillman, The

I

its

of

own. The

(1895).

did cite his opinion

local matters could be regulated if they

to its

had an impact on

Constitution Besieged: The Rise

Powers Jurisprudence (Durham: Duke University

in the

Minnesota Rate Cases noting
commerce.

that

interstate

and Demise ofLochner Era Police

Press, 1994).

Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Supreme Court From Taft to Burger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
Edward Corwin, “The Anti-Trust Act and the Constitution,”

State University Press, 1979) and
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successful working of our
constitutional system has thus
been

Moreover. Associate justice Hughes
seemed

made

possible .”

to suggest that the
necessity

38

of

congressional regulation was a
judgment that Congress must
make: "In such
cases, Congress must be
judge

opinion

in

Schechter points

of the necessity of federal action." 3
Hughes'
''

in a different direction:
"It is not the

province of the

Court to consider the economic
advantages or disadvantages of
such a
centralized system,

provide tor

" 40
it

it is

sufficient to say that the Federal
Constitution does not

And. Hughes

left implicit, this

was

a determination to be

reached by the C ourt and not the
Congress.
In

making

its

case before the Court, the government
lawyers were

attempting to build on this second strand
of thinking by situating the Schechter
Poultry business within the “current”
or “flow” of interstate

commerce

outlined in Swift Shreveport and by
Chief Justice Taft in Stafford
,

Corwin

,

insists that “the Court's application
here [in

between

’direct'

and

'indirect' effects

upon

v.

as

Wallace.

Schechter ] of the distinction

interstate

commerce

represents an

attempt to revive a precedent forty years old,
and one which subsequent
adjudication had almost completely discredited ” 41
This overstates the case. The

period was one of constitutional and jurisprudential
flux, which

Supreme Court opinions

that are often at

odds with themselves.

Houston. East and West Texas Railway Co.
Pacific Railway

which
'

itself

Company

drew on

v.

Shreveport

41

Schechter

at

at

35

Swift.

1

549.

Corwin, “The Schechter

reflected in

In the first

v. United States. 234 U.S.
342 (1914) and Texas and
United States. 234 U.S. 342 (1914), (known as the Shreveport
Cases)

sl

40

is

Case— Landmark,

or What?”, 35

197

decades of the 20* century,
the Court was not giving
clearly reasoned op.nions
.ha, lay ou, constitutional
doctrine in such a

would only grow worse
argued

in Stafford,

in the

way

years 1935-1941.

As Chief justice

upon

are clearly non-existent.” 42

it

Was

judgment

its

such a matter unless the relation
of the subject

effects

gu.de lawmaking. Th.s
Taft had

a case which augured well
for the "current” of
commerce

theory. "This court will certainly
not subst.tute
in

as

for that

to interstate

this the

case

of Congress

commerce and

in

its

Schechter? Such

questions had to be puzzled out from
the various strands of the
Court's
opinions, pulling constitutional
doctrine in different directions
and allowing for

a variety of plausible readings
depending upon the particular facts of
the case

and which portions of a particular
opinion one wanted
Cardozo's concurring opinion, joined by
Stone,

While he did not embrace the conceptual
indirect

eftects,

distinction

he did suggest a serious limit

to

to

is

emphasize.

suggestive

in this light.

between "direct" and

Congress' power even under

the notion of the "current of commerce.”
Cardozo reasoned that: "There

view ot causation

and what

is

that

would

obliterate the distinction

local in the activities

would go beyond

of commerce.” 43 Reasoning

the limits of the

commerce power: "The law

to considerations of degree. Activities local
in their

to the operation

v.

Schechter

Wallace 258 U.S. 495, 52
,

at

national

in

such a fashion

is

not indifferent

44

From

here he turned

of the Schechter Poultry Co.: "To find immediacy or
directness

42

Stafford

is

a

immediacy do not become

and national because of distant repercussions.'

interstate

41

between what

is

1

(1922).

554.
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here

is to

find

it

almost everywhere.

If centripetal forces are
to

be isolated to the

exclusion of the forces that oppose
and counteract them, there will
be an end to

our federal system.

Hughes pushed

this

argument further than Cardozo

in

rejecting the notion that extraordinary
conditions might allow for extraordinary

measures: “such assertions of
extra-constitutional authority were
anticipated and
precluded by the explicit terms of the
Tenth Amendment.” 46 In

this

way, the

Tenth Amendment became a prohibition
on national power, as was mostly
articulated in

Hammer* 1 Such

earlier readings

limit.

constitutional struggle

constiutitonal power: the

rather, they

flexible

was not

easily reconciled with

of the commerce power, which seemed

The ensuing

power;

a reading

New

to

Hughes’

preclude just such a

was precisely about

the limits of

Dealers were not claiming extra-constitutional

were claiming

that the Constitution

must be read

manner, which had potentially grave implications
for the

distinction

fully

between the “police powers” of the

states

in a

traditional

and the commerce power

ol the national government. In Schechter, the
Court, including credentialed
liberals

like Brandeis,

Cardozo, and Stone, was unwilling to abandon

altogether the distinction between federal and state authority
in the regulation of

commerce. Even while many

interstate

—and some seemed happy

of Schechter

would not be governed by

New

to see the

Ibid.
45

Ibid.
4b

Ibid, at 529.

Hammer

v.

N1RA

put to

the Court's opinion. Indeed, after a

44

4

Deal lawyers were deeply skeptical

Dugenhurl 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
,
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death— FDR

few days of

silence, he delivered an impassioned address
to the nation, the peroration of

which
to the

insisted that in the

wake

ot the Court's opinion

horse-and-buggy definition of

interstate

“we have been

commerce.”

had been percolating tor over three decades was coming
In the

was forced
that the

wake of the Schechter
to

New/ Deal w/as seeking
1 his

round ot legislation was

whose neglect

unconstitutional.'

is

far

making

more

summer of 1935

New

Deal.

As Barry Cushman

argues, this

carefully drafted and litigated than the earlier

Still,

the ensuing debate reflected profoundly different views

in the doctrinal

tension between Court

doubtful that the outcome would turn on more carefully

(partly because

Wagner Act

many thought

Guffey Coal Act was much more contested

easily passed

it

was

in light

Congress

mining industry (although Congress provided

in the

unconstitutional), the

of Schechter. The Guffey

Act fixed the price of coal and regulated wages and production

Ackerman, We

,

ot legal craftsmanship helped result in their being found

0

it

of traditional

partly reflected in the acts passed after Schechter

crafted legislation. Thus, while the

49

that Roosevelt

to dismantle the very framew/ork

of the Constitution, partly reflected

4S

that

to a head.

Ackerman suggests

opinion,

what became known as the second

opinions,

The dispute

sharpen his constitutional vision and "put the country on
notice

constitutionalism.

acts,

48

relegated

in the coal

that the provisions

of the act were

the People.

Ackerman, We the People 306.
,

5U

Ken Kersch,

notes that the

lawyers and thus finds
the

New

it

Wagner Act was

in fact

difficult to believe that the

Constitutional Revolution as

drafted largely behind closed doors by

Act played quite the democratic ratification of

Ackerman makes

American Constitutional Law.
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out.

Discontinuous Development

in

separable: should the regulation
of
fixing provision need not be).
in that

it

wages be found

The scheme

itself

unconstitutional, the price

was remarkably

like the

regulated an industry by allowing
the trade associations
themselves to

promulgate codes

who chose

to

that

would be met by those within

remain outside of it would be subject

dilemma of delegating governmental power

the association, while those

to taxation.

Given

to private associations

regimen ol corporatism, as put forward
unanimously by the Court

many

NIRA

the

under
in

this

Schechter

within Congress and the administration
doubted the Guffey Act’s

constitutionality .'

1

Others were more sanguine. Schechter
dealt with a

quintessential^ local industry, while the coal
industry was of unquestioned
national scope, the subject ol intense labor
disputes, and in clear need of
regulation,

all

ol

which could justify Congress' reach

even while leaving Schechter wholly
Attorney General
the act, he

push

it

intact.

Homer Cummings was

demurred as

to

its

a letter to the committee urging

its

Oddly, though, when Roosevelt’s

called before Congress to testify

constitutionality: “advising the

through and leave the question

constitutionality in

in this particular case,

it

to the courts .’”

to resolve

52

subcommittee

on
‘to

Roosevelt himself sent

any doubts about the

bill's

lavor, "leaving to the courts, in an orderly fashion, the

ultimate question of constitutionality .” 53

The Court lound the act unconstitutional

—

albeit in a

much more

divided

fashion than the Schechter case, revealing the constitutional gulf on the Court as

S|

Cushman, Rethinking

the

New Deal

Court,

1

59.

52

Ibid. 159.
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it

touched on national power. Writing for the Court,
Justice Sutherland echoed

Hughes reading

ol the

that the regulation

Commerce Clause

of wages and production was a local activity
beyond the

reach of Congress’
[act] primarily falls

commerce power: “The

effect

of the labor provisions of the

upon production and not upon commerce. [Production

purely local activity.

It

is

a

follows that none ot these essential antecedents
of

production constitutes a transaction

commerce .” 54 Sutherland
in

as put forward in Schechter finding
,

in or

forms any part of interstate

then spun out, far more thoroughly than Hughes had

Schechter the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” affects
as
,

Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. “The word

it

bore on

“direct',”

Sutherland reasoned,
implies that the activity or condition invoked or blamed
proximately not mediately, remotely, or

—

shall operate

collaterally

—

to

produce the

effect.

It

connotes the absence

ot an efficient intervening agency or condition.

extent of the effect bears no logical relation to
I

And

its

the

character.

he distinction between a direct and an indirect effect

turns, not

upon the magnitude of either the cause or the
u^on the manner in which the effect has

effect, but entirely

been brought about.

The

distinction Sutherland

indifferent to actual

5

was offering up was a formal

economic consequences. But

distinction,

which was

for Sutherland, a constitutional

principle could not change in relation to a different set of economic facts.

The

5J

Ibid. 160.
54

Carter

v.

Carter Coal Co. v United States, 298 U.S. 238 (1936).

In fact,

Sutherland offered a

long exposition on the very nature of the Union and the Constitution to situate his reading of the

Commerce Power.
55

Ibid, at

307-308.
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economic

crisis the

country was facing, a point noted
again and again

Deal's sweeping legislation, did not,
the

in

the Constitution,

it

BlaisMI two years

It

does not mean one thing

different thing at another time.' 06 This

tact that

was just

vigorous dissent

before:

"A

provision of

at

one time and an entirely

as true for the regulation of

Congress was attempting

national consequence in Schechter and

little

this in a

hardly necessary to say. does not admit
of two distinctly

is

opposite interpretations.

commerce. The

New

any way. change the principles underlying

government's power. Sutherland had noted just

against the Chief Justice's opinion in

in (he

to regulate a small industry

was now,

in Carter,

of

attempting to

regulate a large-scale national industry did not alter
the fact that in each case

Congress was attempting
sphere, to wit

all

Such

—production. Such

an area traditionally anchored within the local

local evils over

effect as they

“[

1

Jhe conclusive answer

may have upon commerce, however

indirect.

An

importance.

does not

alter its character.”

New

the province of the

which the federal government has no

secondary and

It

was properly

regulation

and not the national government.

states

are

to reach

is

that the evils

legislative control

extensive

it

may

increase in the greatness of the effect adds to
57

be,

.

is

its

This dashed the slim hopes of some

Dealers that the reach of Schechter would prove limited. Sutherland’s

opinion, moreover, distinguished Carter and Schechter from the “current of

commerce”

doctrine as put forward in Swift. “In the Schechter case the flow had

ceased. Here [Carter]

56

57

Home
Carter

it

had not yet begun. The difference

Building and Loan Association
v.

Carter Coal

at

v.

Blaisdell,

309.
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is

not one of substance.

290 U.S. 398, 448-449 (1934).

The

applicable principle

is

the

same ."

58

Sutherland's opinion did not contradict

the "current of commerce" doctrine,
but. as

As

Taft had put

Constitution

it

earlier. ‘‘The application

in the

incidents of great interstate

characterize the

it

is in

tension with

it.

of the commerce clause of the

Swift Case was the result of the natural
development of

commerce under modern

interstate

Corwin argues,

movement

conditions..

.

it

.

refused to permit local

movement, which taken alone were
as such.

I

he Swift Case merely

intrastate, to

fitted the

commerce

clause to the real and practical essence of modern
9
business growth .""'' The current
of

commerce

cases suggested a flexibility that would not be bound
by

Sutherland's more formal distinction between "direct" and
"indirect” effects.

While many of the current of commerce opinions
direct

and

indirect

toward Congress'

regulations of

their collective thrust points

ability to regulate those things that

commerce, thus putting them
(as well as

commerce,

are littered with references to

Hammer

and

at

E. C.

Cardozo seized upon

have an impact on national

odds with the logic of Schechter and Carter Coal

Knight).

this in a dissenting opinion.

Cardozo did not

explicitly reach the question of Congress' regulation of production, as he found

that the price-fixing provisions

and he did

were well within the reach of Congress' power,

not, given the question before the Court,

need

of the constitutionality of wages and hours regulations
opinion reads as a virtual dissent on

58

this issue as

it

Stafford

v.

Wullace

at 5

1

8-5 19 (which Justice Sutherland joined).

204

in this case. Still, his

takes explicit

Ibid, at 306.

59

to reach the question

aim

at

Sutherland

s

analysis and lays out a rudimentary reading
of the

Clause that became central
Court's

initial articulation

New

to the

Dealers' constitutional vision, as well the

of constitutional change.

Mining and agriculture and manufacture

are not

commerce considered by themselves, yet
to that commerce may be such that for the

interstate

relation

Commerce

protection ot the one there

is

need

their

to regulate the other.

Sometimes it is said that the relation must be ‘direct’ to
bring that power into play. In many circumstances such
a description will be sufficiently precise to

meet the
needs of the occasion. But a great principle of
constitutional law is not susceptible ol comprehensive
statement in an adjective. The underlying thought

merely

this, that

the

Taw

considerations of degree

Cardozo, drawing on a theme

is

60
.

that

vision, insisted that circumstances

was

at the heart

of FDR's constitutional

must matter and

that

circumstances

pace Sutherland, influence our reading of the Constitution.

was based on

is

not indifferent to

past readings of the Constitution as he, too,

drew on

A

survey of the cases shows that the words have been
interpreted with suppleness of adaptation and flexibility

invokes

it.

.

.

What

is

as broad as the need that

the cases really

mean

causal relation in such circumstances
intimate and obvious as to permit

it

is

is

that the

so close and

to be called direct

without subjecting the word to an unfair or excessive

There is a like immediacy here. Within rulings
most orthodox, the prices for intrastate sales of coal
have so inescapable a relation to those for interstate
sales that a system of regulation of the one class is
strain.

the

60

Carter

v.

Carter Coal

at

327.
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then,

Fie insisted that this

“current of commerce” cases:

of meaning. The power

may

the Court's

necessary to give adequate protection to the
system of
regulation adopted for the other 61
.

Cardozo
period.

s

opinion

As much

is

redolent of the uneasy state of constiutitonal law
in this

as Sutherland, he

is

drawing on past Court opinions, even

while offering an alternate reading of the Constitution.
This same conflict was
evident in United States

v.

Butler,

handed down months before Carter which
,

struck

down
I

he

the Agricultural Adjustment Act in

entirety.

AAA was part ol the early New Deal's novel attempt to bring order

to the national

were subject

government

its

economy.

In this

scheme, processors of agricultural products

to a national tax unless they

set rates,

which were higher,

agreed to purchase the products
in

an effort

to

at

maintain the farming

communities' purchasing parity with manufacturing products. The question
before the Court was whether such a scheme of taxation was consistent with

congressional power to “lay and collect taxes for the general welfare.”

was

this

seemingly open-ended clause limited

power of Congress, which

said not a

word about

Congress' spending power was broader than
this

scheme

to the

for the general welfare, or

was

its

it,

First,

subsequently enumerated

agriculture? Second, even

clearly

if

enumerated powers, was

rather, a tax

aimed

at the benefit

of a particular class (which might be a troublesome species of class-based
legislation)? Justice

61

Owen

Roberts' opinion for the Court,

the years, held that Congress'

power

within the scope of

enumerated powers; yet he

its

clearly

to tax

Ibid, at 328.

206

much

ridiculed over

and spend was not limited

still

to matters

managed

to find

that the processing tax

was beyond

the reach of Congress' power. In not

limiting Congress ability to tax and spend tor
the general welfare to those
specifically

enumerated powers, the Court was putting forth a
Hamiltonian over

a Madisonian reading of the clause in this long-standing
constiutitonal debate.

But Roberts then declined

address the issue of spending for the general

to

welfare: “But the adoption of the broader construction
[Hamiltonian] leaves the

power

now

to

spend subject

62

Roberts then continued,

“We

are not

required to ascertain the scope of the phrase 'general welfare
of the United

States' or to determine

within

it.

scheme
“The

to limitations .”

I

his

whether an appropriation

was so

in aid

of agriculture

falls

tor the Court, Roberts argued, because this particular

ol taxation tor the benefit ot agriculture violated the

act invades the reserved rights of the states.

It is

Tenth Amendment.

a statutory plan to

regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers
64

delegated to the federal government .”
limitation

Hammer

on

v.

federal power,

much

Dagenhart which,
,

as

as

Reading the Tenth Amendment as

Hughes had

we have

in

a

Schechter Roberts drew on
,

seen, limited the congressional reach

of power to prohibit child labor because the Tenth Amendment reserved the
regulation of production to the states. This reading of the Tenth

crucial, not

simply because

because, so read,

62

61

United States
Butler

at

v.

it

was already

was a substantive

it

Butler 297 U.S.
,

1,

limit

66 (1936).

68.
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Amendment

is

the subject of contentious debate, but

on

federal power.

While

this

was not

made

explicit in Butler

authority to act

—

it

,

was

in

Hammer

regulating interstate

:

even where Congress had the

commerce,

for

example

—

could not

it

reach those things that were reserved to the states; thus the
amendment was
tact a substantive limitation

even on

Stone's famous dissent
judicial power,

which

is

what would become the

is

remembered most
in that

vividly for

came

to

As

I

discussion of

its

Stone's dissent identified

central preoccupation in criticism of the

Court: the proper scope ot judicial power.
chapter, this question

enumerated powers.

explicitly

perhaps appropriate,

in

up

will take

New

in part

Deal

two of this

dominate constitutional discourse once the

expansive reach of national power was

settled.

Tenth Amendment, Stone

Congress has the power

insists that if

Rather than focusing on the

to lay

and

collect taxes tor the general welfare, as the majority opinion seemingly

concedes, then that power must also include the power
therein. “It

is

a contradiction in terms to say that there

the national welfare, while rejecting any

power

to

to

is

a

impose conditions

power

to

spend for

impose conditions reasonably

adapted to the attainment of the end which alone would justify the
expenditure."

6

^

The Tenth Amendment argument would reappear,

as

would

Stone's dissent in the coming confrontation between the political branches and
the Court. In the meantime,

York

64

Ibid.
in

state

it

was

minimum wage law

Though Cardozo

later

in

the Court's decision striking

More head v. Tipaldo

a

New

drew the most

ire.

drew on Butler's Hamiltonian reading of the general welfare clause

the Social Security cases, revealing

how Court

opinions

may

rather than simply settling the constitutional issue before them.
65

that

down

Butler at 85.
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be puzzled out

in

future cases

creating,

FDR

said, a

no-man's land were neither the

states nor the national

government could regulate the economy. Stone's dissent
illuminating in touching on the Court

of judicial

will:

Amendment
rightly avoid

“Unless

we

are

now

s

is

particularly

fluctuation as he reiterated his suspicion

to construe

and apply the Fourteenth

without regard to our decisions since the Adkins case,
its

reconsideration even

if

it

were not asked.

We

we could

not

should follow our

decision in the Nebbia case and leave the selection of the method of solution
of
the problems to

Constitution has

insisted that

which the
left

Nebbia

statute

is

addressed where

it

v.

New

York which upheld a
,

inconsistent with the Court's earlier

state regulation

minimum wage

— most notably Adkins— adhered

way

that

should uphold the current

minimum wage

of the price of

made

it

to a distinction

between public and

Nebbia the Court
,

case and. thereby, explicitly reject

its

precedents. For Stone, Tipaldo and Butler both revealed the

problems of judicial power.
that

the

opinions. These earlier

private that the Court had rejected in Nebbia. Thus, following

(now bygone)

me

to

them, to the legislative branch of the government .” 66 Stone

milk, redefined the public/private distinction in such a

opinions

seems

It

was not just

were properly vested with the

that the

Court was making decisions

legislature, but that the Court's

were not always consistent. Cushman persuasively suggests

that

own

actions

Nebbia

,

authored by Justice Roberts, was inconsistent with Tipaldo but that the Court
,

was not considering

the broad constitutional question

only the narrow question of whether the

66

Quoted

in

Mason, The Supreme Court From

New

Taft to

209

—

as Stone called for

— but

York law could be distinguished

Burger

,

107.

from the Court's

earlier precedent in Adkins. Roberts, thinking

voted with the majority on

this

narrow question, even

thrust ot his reasoning in Nebbia. This

inconsistency, but for our purposes
constitutional law in this period.

it

And

may

if

it

it

could not,

pulled against the

rescue Roberts from charges of

illustrates the unsettled nature

of

the Court only adds to the confusion.

While the Court was surprisingly not an

explicit issue in the

1936 election,

its

opinions were actively debated as Congress continued to legislate on the
issues

67

and the broader constitutional debate continued. 68

Constitutional Revolution as Evolution

Congressional Interlude
Recent scholarship has suggested
legislation,

cases,

that the

second wave of New Deal

which would be upheld by the Supreme Court

was informed by these

shortcomings.

As

in a

second round of

early cases and thus attempted to avoid their

Peter Irons notes, “all of the

Wagner Act draftsmen were

lawyers. In this regard, the drafting process differed sharply from those which

produced the

NIRA

and

AAA,

bureaucrats, and lobbyists."

problems

that beset early

legislation

and a sloppy

69

in

which lawyers took a back

This has led

New

Cushman

to suggest that

Deal legislation were a

legal strategy in pursuing

seat to politicians,

result

many of the

of poorly crafted

and arguing cases before the

67

Roosevelt doesn’t mention the Court, but as Ackerman and Leuchtenburg suggest, opponents
mention FDR’s constitutional vision, making the Court’s interpretation of the constitution critical

to the election.
68

Leucthenburg,

Ackerman
<>y

“When

Thesis,” Yale

Peter Irons, The

the People Spoke,

What Did They Say?: The

Law Journal

2077

New Deal Lawyers

108:

(

Election of 1936 and the

1999).

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982) 227.
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Court

New

70

In contrast, in drafting the

.

Deal),

Leon Keyserling,

Senator Wagner's

a

Wagner Act

(the centerpiece of the

young Harvard Law' graduate working on

staff, carefully laid

out a “Findings and Policy" explaining

the purpose ot the legislation and squarely rooting

commerce

theory. This itself

was handed down while

was

it

in reaction to the

the legislation

members of Congress were deeply

was being

in the “current

,

Schechter decision, which

crafted.

Even while many

bill

attempted to distinguish

the logic of Schechter. In defending the legislation. Senator

earlier opinions permitting the regulation

practices that created a burden on interstate

Chief Justice

really part

the

power

of

I

alt: "It

to distinguish this

commerce,

them

more

legislation,

matter

how

second round of legislation from the

NLRA's

careful than the

of which many

was

the legislation

NRA

in the

should not overlook the

" Barry
1

Irons,

Cushman, Rethinking
The

of unfair labor

Wagner even quoted

likely to obstruct, restrain, or

the

New Deal Lawyers

,

first

NRA

drafted,

72

burden

it, it

itself

it

if

is

it

were deeply

round, the lawyers

its

fact that the administration

New Deal Court

232.
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first

were

round of

skeptical. Still,

no

imagine the Court

difficult to

adhered to

has

In attempting

constitutionality before the courts

lawyers arguing the

upholding the likes of the Wagner Act

We

71
.

from

Wagner himself

to national supervision or restraint ."

drafting and then arguing the

certainly

commerce

it

Congress deems certain recurring practices, although not

interstate

to subject

of

skeptical of the Act's constitutionality given

Schechter the legal craftsmen drafting the

drew on Hughes'

second

reasoning in Carter.

was,

in essence.

drawing on a

line

of constitutional thought

would give justices

that

like Stone.

Brandeis, Cardozo. and Hughes (and perhaps Roberts)
a reason to uphold the
legislation

by rejecting the Court's immediate precedents. So even
while the

government was

tar

more

was staking out was not

making

caretul in

case, the constitutional ground

its

easily reconciled with the Court's earlier

New

it

Deal

opinions, however careful the government would be to draw
such fine
distinctions. 1 he constitutional divide

was widening,

not narrowing.

Round Two
Unlike

which
the

to

in Schechter, the

NLRB

had carefully selected

test

cases on

defend the constitutionality of the Wagner Act. the central case being

NLRB

Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp

v.

industrial enterprise with holdings in

73
,

Jones and Laughlin was a large

numerous

As

states.

framed the case, Jones and Laughlin was an integrated

raw materials and transportation holdings

the

steel

NLRB

lawyers

manufacture with

in various states. Materials

were

shipped into a Pennsylvania plant where they were processed and then (more
than

75%) shipped

out of the state as part of interstate commerce. Under the

terms of the Wagner Act, the

NLRB

regulated production and working

conditions as part o/ interstate commerce. The regulation of working conditions

was

central, the

government contended,

to preventing labor strife

which would disrupt the flow of interstate commerce

72

’

in a direct

and

strikes,

way. This was

Ibid. 233.

Though

as Justice

upheld, no matter

McReynolds noted

how

carefully the law

remote and indirect interference with

powers reserved

to the states

is

in dissent,

was

it

is

difficult to

imagine these cases being

crafted, given the Court's earlier reasoning:

interstate

commerce

or a

more

"A more

definite invasion of the

difficult, if not impossible, to imagine."

all

put forward as an appropriate exercise of Congress’

commerce power.

In

arguing the case before the Supreme Court, the government's
greatest problem

was overcoming Schechter and Carter

NLRB

,

the latter

handed down while the various

cases were moving through the courts. In both Schechter and
Carter the
,

Court had insisted upon the distinction between commerce and manufacturing:

Congress may regulate commerce and those things

may

not reach production. Plausibly, Junes

distinction.

that directly affect

and Laughlin offered

While the movement of goods had come

had not yet begun

commerce and
not seeking a

in

to a rest in

it,

but

it

a factual

Schechter and

Carter the goods here were part of the "current of
,

thus were within Congress' reach.

from the direct-indirect

full retreat

1

hus "the government was

effects formula

and the

doctrine of dual federalism, but rather a shifting emphasis by the Court from

those principles to the principles embodied in the stream of commerce cases." 74

Yet even

if

these two strands of

Commerce Clause jurisprudence were

not flatly

contradictory, they were surely in tension with one another, as Hughes' opinion

for the

Court would

illustrate.

Just before the Court

handed down

its

opinion

Constitutional Revolution of 1937 had already begun,

down West Coast

Hotel

Company

v.

Parrish.

in

Jones the

when

,

the Court

The opinion by

handed

the Chief Justice

explicitly overturned the line of cases upholding "liberty of contract." Parrish

was handed down
reelection in 1936.

74

in the

Even

wake of FDR's Court packing
if

the case

was

in fact

plan and landslide

decided prior to the

Richard Cortner, The Jones and Laughlin Case (New York: Knopt, 1970).
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announcement of the Court-packing
the Court in the lace ot politics

—

plan,

all

the

it

looked like a dramatic reversal for

more

so, as the

Court had just

reaffirmed the doctrine of “liberty of contract” the
year before in Tipaldo.
resting

decision squarely on the Adkins case, which was

its

overruled.

and

The switch has

led to great

former insisting

internalists: the

thought and not mere

our purposes the point
constitutional

is

meaning

that the

Court reversed

day.

It is

this

at this

The

distinction

time, between

is

change had

roots

its

too sharply drawn. For

members of the bench

political branches.

change

unlikely that

politics.

itself

75

While

was based on

as well as

legal thought

was

in the

the political imperatives of the

FDR's Court-packing plan was

the immediate cause of

the Court's shift and, in fact, the Court's shift very likely drained the plan of

public support.

committed

76

Still, after

the election of 1936,

to his constitutional vision

As FDR himself later

line.

presented the plan.

I

of

itself in the face

the essentially contested and fluctuating nature of

between the Court and the
midst ot change,

explicitly

arguments between so-called externalists

political pressure, the latter arguing that the constitutional

in legal

now

FDR

and determined

confessed, “1

its

was even more
to

move

the Court into

made one major mistake when

I

first

—the

did not place enough emphasis on the real mischief

kind of decisions which, as a studied and continued policy, had been coming

s

This

is

politics.

I

not to reject the fact that the Court

is

very

much

driven by legal thought and not mere

find the revisionist accounts offered by Gillman,

Cushman, and White,

few, persuasive on this question. I’m emphasizing the fact that even

if

to

name

but a

the Justices are driven by

law, the Court does not act as the authoritative settler of constitutional meaning, particularly
its

constitutional vision

legal

formula

that

is

when

under siege. As Gillman suggests, the Court abandoned a corroding

was proving unworkable.
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down from

the

Supreme Court.” 77

Sheldon Goldman notes
appointees after 1937
his

New

that policy considerations

in a deliberate

drove most of FDR's judicial

attempt to remake the courts in line with

Deal constitutional vision. 78 So while constitutional
change and

solidification did not occur at

that

Yet, even if Court packing itself failed,

came

one moment

in 1937,

it

was

into line with Roosevelt's constitutionalism.

the Court, ultimately,

The beginnings of the

Constitutional Revolution of 1937 point us toward a settlement
of government

regulation ol the economy, the very nature of this settlement,
as

it

nods

to

expansive governmental power, opens up new constitutional terrain
with more
questions than answers.

We

Parrish, especially as

is

it

see the beginnings of this in Hughes' opinion in

combined with

In rejecting the line of cases in

the recently decided Tipaldpo

,

speak of freedom of contract.”

famous dissenting opinions

in

Hughes

his opinion in

Jonas and Laughlin.

Lochner Adair Coppage Adkins and
,

insisted,

79

,

,

“The Constitution does not

Hughes

Liberty,

,

said,

drawing on Holmes'

Lochner and Adkins was necessarily subject
,

the “restraints of due process” and then posited that “regulation which

reasonable in relation to

its

subjects and

is

adopted

in the interests

to

is

of the

Gregory A. Caldeira, "Public Opinion and The U.S. Supreme Court: FDR'S Court-Packing
Plan" American Political Science Review Vol. 81 No. 4 December 1987,

1

150.

Quoted in Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone, 444. See also Michael Nelson, “The President and the
Court: Reinterpreting the Court-packing Episode of 1937’’ Political Science Quarterly Vol. 103
No. 2 (1988).
8

Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection From Roosevelt Through
Reagan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) 35. Goldman suggests that presidents pick
judges to further their agenda along three
their personal agenda.

While

1937 his policy agenda

—

that

all
is,

lines: their

policy agenda, their partisan agenda, and

three of these figured into

the

FDR's

earlier judicial selections, after

advancement of substantive policy goals

judicial selections.
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—dominated

his

community

is

due process.” 80

Hughes cleared

In this,

the

way

for

governmental

regulation of working conditions at the state
level and very likely at the national
level as well, as he signaled (following
Stone's dissent in Tipaldo) that

governmental intervention would not longer be subject
private/public distinction.

to a rigorous

Thus one of the arguments against

regulation ol working conditions, that

by subjecting private industry

it

was an

intrusion

on

the

NLRB's

liberty

of contract

to regulation without a public purpose,

constitutional nonstarter in the

was

wake of Parrish. Whether Hughes' opinion was

a complete break with liberty of contract and substantive
due process
subject ol

much

scholarly debate.

But whatever the specifics,

about the proper scope ol judicial power as
review, a point that becomes more vivid

opinion

in

Jones and Laughlin. Writing

Hughes' opinion began the second

it

it

is

the

began a debate

signaled a retreat from guardian

when drawn
for the Court

together with Hughes'

two weeks

after Parrish

in

Parrish

,

it

open

is

and Laughlin opinion was;

it

is

to

,

front of the constitutional revolution of 1937

by altering the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Again, as with
of contract

a

question

how

liberty

far-reaching Hughes' Jones

best seen, like Parrish as the beginning of
,

revolutionary change and not the end. Hughes found that the activities of Jones

and Laughlin clearly

fell

under the scope of the Wagner Act, insisting

that “it is

a familiar principle that acts which directly burden or obstruct interstate or

foreign commerce, or

11

West Coast Hotel Co.

v.

its

free flow, are within the reach

Parrish 300 U.S. 379. 391 (1937).
,

80

Ibid.
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of congressional

power ."* 2 Even

the casual reader of

Hughes' opinion can clearly see the
reliance

on the "current ot commerce theory."
Drawing on the

specifics

of production.

he continually places them as part
of a larger process. Yet Hughes does
not bind
congressional regulation to the “current of
commerce theory” alone.

We

do not find it necessary to determine
whether these
features ot defendant s business dispose
of the asserted
analogy to the ‘stream of commerce'
cases.

The

instances in which that metaphor has been
used are but
particular, and not exclusive, illustrations
of the
protective

power which

the Government invokes in
support of the present Act. The congressional
authority
to protect interstate

obstructions

deemed

not limited to transactions which can be
an essential part of the flow of interstate

is

to be

or foreign

commerce

Hughes then continued,
and

(

arler

commerce

C

oal.

is

the

in

power

Cushman
of

81

‘

its

commerce

what appears

84

And

that

is

power, Hughes

that the

power

to regulate

insisted, “is plenary

‘no matter

w hat

and may be

the source of the dangers

.”’ 85

argues that given the particular facts of the case and the “current

theory,''

Hughes could have simply distinguished Jones and

New

National Labor Relations Board

v.

Deal.

Jones and Luughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,31 (1 937).
v. Wallace and argued that Schechter and

government drew heavily on Stafford

Carter were not applicable.
83

Ibid at 36.
84

be a specific rejection of Schechter

principle

commerce

White, The Constitution and the

brief, the

to

to enact ‘all appropriate legislation' for ‘its
protection

exerted to protect interstate

it

83
.

The fundamental

and advancement."

which threaten

commerce from burdens and

Ibid at 36-37.
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In

Lau%hlin from Schechter and Carter Coal and
fact flirt

the

with this option, leading

wake of Hughes'

were

good law

still

them not

opinion,

86
.

commerce power and

move

to limit

extended so as
that to

many

there.

is

in

others to suggest that even in

thought both Schechter and Carter Coal

more, after stating

insisting

in the light of

to

embrace

upon

its

this

broad recasting of the

plenary nature, Hughes then began a

our dual system of government and

effects

embrace them,

obliterate the distinction

in

upon

commerce

interstate

view of our complex

between what

is

national and what

(

arter C oal

,

was

may

not be

so indirect and

society,

completely centralized government ." 87 This insistence
Schechter and

And Hughes does

such an expansive reading, noting: “the scope
of this power must

be considered

remote

Cushman and

it

Rather than overturning these cases,
Hughes simply found

What

controlling.

left

is

itself,

would
local

effectually

and create a

while nodding to

a manifest departure insofar as

it

abandoned the

formal distinction between direct and indirect affects and between

manufacturing and commerce, which

commerce"

theory.

intellectual

life

alongside the “current of

Here, Hughes' opinion drew on the logic of Cardozo’s

dissent in Carter Coal.

our national

sat uneasily

“We

are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of

and deal with the question of direct and

vacuum.

88

No

more, the Court

said.

indirect ef fects in an

But even

this

short lived, as the Court began to spin out the scope of national

very

s<
’

87

much

in line

Cushman, Rethinking
Jones and Laughlin

with Congress' and

the

New Deal

FDR's

Court 169.
,

at 37.
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opinion would be

power

that

was

early assertions of national power;

indeed, under the Court's cases
after 1937
in

1935-37 was

now

much

that

was once unconstitutional

constitutional.

Round Three
The emerging scope of national power
became much
Stone's opinion in United States

v.

Darby and

clearer in Justice

Justice Jackson's opinion in

IVu kard v Filburn. Amidst the
Court's opinions

in

1937. Congress and the

administration passed laws that were
of questionable constitutional validity
the early

New

repudiated in

Deal cases were

1

937. While in

so as to distinguish

it

from

still

some

earlier

good

law— and

if

they had not explicitly been

cases Congress was careful to tailor
the law

laws

that

were struck down,

in other

instances, such as the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 89 and the

Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, 90
difference after 1937

was

it

that the

virtually repassed the existing legislation.

Court was moving into

line

with

congressional and executive views of national power,
particularly as
able to appoint justices

who

it

FDR

was

shared his constitutional vision. The real revolution

took place after 1937, drawing heavily on one
fissured though

The

line

was, but fashioning these cases

of past constitutional cases,

in

such a way as to

dramatically increase the scope of national power and outline
the contours of

New

Deal constitutionalism.

1

hus the Court situated revolutionary adaptation as

no more than evolutionary change. The

real revolution

on the Court took place

88

Ibid at 41.
81

The 1938 Act was based on Congress' commerce power, not its power to tax and spend, but
how far reaching the commerce power was. The new AAA was upheld

wasn't clear at the time

Mulford

v.

Smith (1939).
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it

in

as the Court reworked.

soUo

voce, prior decisions in
such a

way

as to

dramatically expand the scope
of national power. Furthermore,
this reworking
Ot past cases

was presented

as an evolutionary adaptation
rather than a

revolutionary change.
In Darby, the

directly regulated

Court upheld the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938. which

working conditions

in the

form of hours and wages and

prohibited the shipment of products
in interstate
standards.

I

his

was

clearly a

Congress the power
regulate

commerce

that violated the set

sweeping regulation of production,
giving

to regulate production directly
as part

commerce. Stone's opinion drew

in part

of its power

on Hughes'

in

to

Jones and

Laughlin, arguing that Congress' power
over commerce was plenary:

Whatever
infringe

their

some

motive and purpose, regulations of
commerce which do not

constitutional prohibition are within the
plenary

on Congress by the Commerce Clause." 91

In taking

power conferred

up the question of whether

Congress may prohibit the shipment of goods
manufactured under substandard
labor conditions. Stone offered a
that

more expansive view of the Commerce Clause

went beyond Jones and Laughlin,

insisting that these “principles

of

constitutional interpretation have been so long and
repeatedly recognized by this

Court as applicable
for repeating

v.

Commerce

them now were

Which was upheld
United States

to the

in

it

Clause, that there would be

,

3

1

2 U.S. 100,

occasion

not for the decision of this Court twenty-two

Sunshine Anthracite Coal

Darby

little

I

1

5

(

1

94

Company
1

).

v.

Adkins (1940)

years ago in
insisted

Hammer

on the

v.

Dagenhart .” 92 There, as we have

distinction

between commerce and manufacturing,
allowing

congressional regulation of
manufacturing only
interstate

(

commerce.

It

was

the logic the Court

arter Coal. What’s more, in

Amendment

seen, the Court

Hammer

if

it

had a direct effect on

drew on

in

both Schechter and

the Court had insisted that
the Tenth

could be read as a direct limitation
on national power, so as to limit

even Congress enumerated power
under the Commerce Clause

upon things— namely production-that
were
partly

drawn on

in

it

touched

the states. This logic

was

Robert’s opinion in Butler. Here Stone
dismissed this logic,

asserting that the Tenth

limitation

left to

if

Amendment was

but a truism and not a substantive

on national power. Stone then squarely
overruled

Hammer

v.

Dagenhart. While he did not explicitly overrule
Schechter and Carter Coal,
could scarcely be doubted that they
is

simply no way

cases. Stone

partly

truly

to reconcile

even insisted

drawn upon,

abandoned

‘'has

in this

Cardozo's dissent

in

now

Darby

's

lacked

all

constitutional footing. There

constitutional logic with these earlier

that the logic

of Hammer, which both these cases had

long since been abandoned .” 93 But

very case! In

it

fact.

Darby

sits

its

logic

was only

uneasily both with

Carter Coal which allowed for congressional
regulation of
,

those things that have a significant impact on interstate
commerce, and with

Hughes' Jones and Laughlin opinion which
with the direct/indirect affects

rule).

Indeed, Stone's break from Jones

92

Ibid.
v
’

reiterated that logic (both breaking

Ibid at 116.
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and

Laughlin was clearest
Congress'

in asserting that there is

no

real judicial limitation

Commerce Power. Whereas Hughes made

oi'our system" and held out that

it

was

still

a

nod

upon

to the "dual nature

the responsibility

of the Court

to

police that line. Stone insisted
that "the motive and purpose
of a regulation of
interstate

ol

commerce

are matters for the legislative

which the Constitution places no

given no control.” VJ Darby

A

guardian review.

made

point, if

exquisitely clear in Wickard

it

restriction

judgment upon the exercise

and over which the courts are

clear that the Court

needed reaffirmation

would no longer exercise

was made

at all. that

95
,

Justice Jackson, Roosevelt's former
Solicitor General and the author of
the

Struggle Jor Judicial Supremacy confirmed
the judicial
,

retreat, explicitly

acknowledging, against the backdrop of this struggle,
the Court's acquiescence
to national

power. Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938, an act

extraordinarily similar to the 1935 Act struck

down

in Butler,

Congress gave the

Secretary ot Agriculture the power to institute
quotas on crops
here,

was

the

Roscoe Filburn had exceeded

than he was allotted, but used

excess wheat

quota by sowing more wheat

to feed livestock

on

his farm, not shipping the

commerce. Nothing had moved

in interstate

commerce. Yet Jackson

it

this

% The twist,

in interstate

insisted that this did not matter. Jackson’s logic

permitted Congress to regulate what was once a purely local matter. The
line

Ibid at 115.
;5

Wickard
I

v.

Filburn, 3

1

7 U.S.

I

I

I

(1942).

he constitutional footing was altered, but

states

still

invaded the notion of powers reserved to the

by way of the Tenth Amendment.
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to

be drawn here, Jackson insisted,
was a line for Congress
Court. This

was

far

removed from even Cardozo's

“to find proximity here

to find

is

an end to the middle

New

national control, but

still

patrol.

insisted

1

the

upon outer

field.

about judicial review: when was
all

everywhere."

It

draw and not

the

insistence in Schechter that

was

to

do just

this,

bringing

Deal years and those cases that
permitted expansive

Wickard abandoned the

question seemed

it

to

it

But

limits,

which the Court would

this retreat raised a

profound question

proper to exercise such a power?
The

more pressing

as the constitutional arguments
of 1934-

9 3? testified to an extraordinarily
powerful national government. But were

there limits and constitutional boundaries
the Court should continue to

maintain? While these questions were settled

Deal cases
vision

in 1941

and 1942

—when

in the

the Court

culmination of the

moved

into line with

New

FDR's

so tar as they touched upon governmental
power to regulate the

economy and

the constitutional balance of power between
the states and the

national government, this

was only

part

of the

picture. Indeed, as

I

take up in the

following section, the settlement ot these questions
provoked a growing
constitutional debate about constitutional limits and
judicial

power

touched on individual rights (now distinguished from economic

would be contested

for the next several decades.

as they

rights) that

Not only were such

constitutional questions not settled by the Constitutional Revolution
of 1937, the

quest to outline such rights and ground them in

product of this constitutional transformation. 47

n

Gillman, “Preferred Freedoms.”
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some manner was

itself

a

The Court

Search of a RoIp

in

The Court's

retreat

from economic issues raised a
central question about

the Court's role. Stone's
criticism of judicial

amounted

to

a plea for judicial restraint.

dissent, "the only check

upon

power

As Stone

in his dissenting

eloquently put

[the Court's] exercise of

power

is

it

opinions

in his Butler

our

own

sense

of sell-restraint. For the removal
of unwise laws from the statute
books appeal
lies not to the courts but to
the ballot

government ."

them

98

Stone took square aim

ol sitting in

constitutionality.

that the

to the process

at the

of democratic

majority of justices and accused

judgment of the wisdom of government

The Court. Stone

to the legislative branches,

too. that the

and

Court

itself

insisted,

knowing

must

that they

reject

policy, not

any such

may be misguided,

its

role, deferring

but knowing.

could be. Stone went further and rejected any
notion

Court was the peculiar guardian of constitutional

limits:

But interpretation ot our great eharter of government
which proceeds on any assumption that the
responsibility for the preservation of our institutions

is

the exclusive concern ot any one ot the three
branches
of government, or that it alone can save them from

destruction

is far

more

likely, in the

'obliterate the constituent

long run, to

members' of 'an

indestructible union of indestructible states [.]' 99

Stone’s plea for judicial restraint was rooted in his view of a flexible
Constitution that must grant the government power to actually govern.
In this

Stone saw the Constitution as a living law

Butler
99

at 79.

Ibid at 87-88.
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that could not be

cabined by rigid

formula, but must
Judicial restraint

make accommodation

was

also a tacit

to the “felt necessities

acknowledgment

pragmatism of the day: Stone's plea was
that

in part

of the times .” 100

to the legal realism

driven by a frank recognition

judges were inevitably influenced by their
personal predilections, as he

termed them elsewhere, which should make a
judge
restrained in the exercise of judicial

power

all

the

more conscious and

101
.

Revisionist scholarship on the constitutional
thought of the

years helps us situate Stone

new

and

s critique of judicial

role for the Court in the course of

Gillman

s

scholarship has

shown how American

twentieth century, culminating in the

New

restructuring of our constitutionalism.

into the twentieth century,

“limited

power— residual

American

10

'

power and

the

New

Deal

emergence of a

constitutional development.

state-building in the early

Deal years, led

to a

dramatic

Throughout the nineteenth century and

Gillman characterizes the Constitution as one of

freedoms .”

103

National power was limited by

way of

enumeration, while rights were what remained after the legitimate use of power.

Corwin famously described
rights.

I

raditionally, then, the

government:

why was

power would

turn

100

""
I<L

"n

104

understanding as an island of power

this

in a sea

of

burden was not on the rights bearer, but on the

the state exercising

its

power? Limiting governmental

on whether such a use of power was legitimate and not

Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Supreme Court from
Alpheus Thomas Mason, Hurlun Fiske Stone:

Tuft to Burger, 140.

Pillar

of the Law (New York: Viking, 1956).

Gillman, The Constitution Besieged.

Gillman, “Preferred Freedoms,” 625.

Stephen Macedo, The

New

Right

v.

the Constitution (Washington, D.C.: Cato, 1989).
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individual rights per
there

Rights were not, in the modern idiom,
trumps

se.

was a presumption

engaged

one had the

that

in legitimate regulation.

unenumerated

rights.

Under

guardian ot constitutional

right, unless the

which called upon

governmental exercises of power (whether

them as legitimate or

Yet

government was

Enumerated powers, by implication, implied

this constitutional vision, the

limits,

105
.

at

to continually

scan

the national or state level), probing

What would

illegitimate.

it

Court acted as the

later

by dubbed substantive due

process for example, Edward White argues, was
orthodox guardian review, "that
of searching for the

boundary between permissible

legislative restrictions

and

impermissible legislative usurpations .” 106 The dramatic
expansion of

governmental power culminating
constitutionalism by

in the

moving beyond

by implication, unenumerated

was a frank recognition

of

New

Deal era challenged traditional

a limited view of enumerated

rights). Indeed,

powers (and

Stone's plea for judicial restraint

sweeping governmental power. Yet,

if

the

government's power was expansive, would there be any judicially enforceable
limits or

was

It is

the judiciary to stay

in this

its

hand

in all

cases?

context that Stone developed what Gillman calls the “general

powers-preferred freedoms” model

107

If the task

.

of judges was once to limit the

scope of governmental power by examining the purpose of legislation, with the

removal of these limitations on
the

development of individual

legislative

rights that

power, the task of judges would

governmental power could not reach.

Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University
106

White, The Constitution and the

New Deal

,

now

266.
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Press, 1985).

be

Thus while

now

state

power was once

be concerned with

treedoms during

the preoccupation of courts, the courts

civil rights

this era is well

and

liberties.

development ot
to a traditional

Stone's development of preferred

known. Revisionist accounts

easily with traditional accounts ot civil
liberties

would

and rights

Gillman's

like

after 1937-41

.

sit

In the

and

liberties

arguments, revisionist accounts amount

and progressive

retelling

of constitutional history, as

civil rights

\i

Carotene

Products footnote 4 was the unquestioned foundation of New
Deal
constitutionalism, which easily incorporates substantive rights
of “privacy” and

"personhood.”

108

Traditionalists insist that the Court, after 1937,

John Marshall's jurisprudence from a
constitutionalism. Alpheus

political-economic

dogma

was

restoring

thirty-plus year aberration of laissez-faire

Thomas Mason

captures this sentiment, “Dictated by

rather than by the Constitution, the

commerce

clause

decisions marked a shrinking departure from Chief Justice Marshall's bold

concept of the commerce power, a gratuitous betrayal of the grand design of the
Constitution he extolled and enforced.”

109

Mason's reading of the Marshall Court and
motivated by laissez-faire
justices

dogma

—

While

to

especially

w ith

107

108

the “demonization” of these

to

Mason’s insistence

that

claim for the Court a special responsibility for

safeguarding the political processes. For unless

this

might disagree with

the characterization of the Court as

—they would be immediately sympathetic

Stone “was beginning

revisionists

it

primary mechanism for obliging government

stepped

in,

interferences with

to control itself

might render

Gillman, “Preferred Freedoms.”
Kersch, "The Reconstruction of Constitutional Privacy Rights and the
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New American

State.”

free

government a sham." 110 The corollary of
expansive

state

power was

the

construction ot preferred freedoms that
were judicially protected. Thus both
traditionalists

liberties

and revisionists root the modern protection
of civil

with the Court's bifurcated standard of
review

Revolution ot 1937

first

rights

in the Constitutional

sketched in Carotene Products footnote

constitutional change of 1937-41.

part

And

4.

Gillman or an Ackerman might not demonize a
Justice Sutherland,

go along with the canonization of a Brandeis as

and

1

while a

1

they readily

of the legitimate

112

Revisionist accounts of the emerging

judicial role as rooted in the constitutional change
of this period are difficult to

distinguish from traditionalist accounts.

FDR

from the debate over

s

I

hus Barry Friedman's insistence that

[court packing] plan

came

of the courts. Tremendous power having been ceded
the plan

was

the point at

vision of the role

to the national

at the

government,

time referred to the

emergent role of the Court as the defender of individual
sits easily

new

which the country balked. The accretion of government

power threatened judicial independence, which

account

a

1

liberty."

13

Friedman's

with a traditional account like William Leuchtenburg's, which

sees the Court's extension of the Bill of Rights in the decades after 1941 as rooted

109

Mason, The Supreme Court from

Taft to

Burger 99.
,

Alpheus 1 homas Mason, “The Core of Free Government, 1938-40: Mr.

Justice Stone

and

‘Preferred Freedoms, ”'604.
1

1

1

111

Though Gillman does

get in a

few good shots

White, The Constitution and the

New

at

Sutherland

Deal.

Barry Friedman, “The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics”

148 University oj Pennsylvania
labeled "post-revisionist,"
"traditionalist," but has

Law Review

in that

begun

to

4 (2000), 1046. Though Friedman might properly be

he takes revisionist scholarship seriously and yet

merge

the insights of both.

Lessons of Lochner.”
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See especially,

in this

is

not a

regard,

“The

Revolution of 1937. 114 The settlement of the
government's

in the Constitutional

power

to regulate the

economy,

view suggests,

this

entails the intimately related

settlement of judicial power: henceforth, the
Court shall act as the protector of
civil liberties.

the

first

issue did not settle the second issue, but

coincidence,

wake of the
judicial

My argument questions this constitutional

I

opened

settlement. Settlement of

it

up.

not a

It is

argue below, that the most vexing constitutional
question

Constitutional Revolution of 1937

power—even

in the protection

was how

of individual

to legitimately

rights.

This

by the scholarship ot Herbert Wechsler, a one-time law
clerk

in the

ground

itself is typified

to Stone,

and his

search for "Neutral Principles” in constitutional adjudication.
Wechsler captured
the central

dilemma

that

life

we defend

—

rooted to the historical development of American

wake of 1937: "The problem

constitutionalism in the

can

is

a judicial veto in areas where

civil liberties area, personal

time condemn

it

in the areas

the

illegitimately basing

New
its

First

thought

as

it

is

it

1

14

helpful in

unhelpful?”

1

How

American

at the

same

15

often called, has long haunted legal scholars.

Deal's telling of history, with the Lochner Court cast as

jurisprudence on economic preferences rather than the

Constitution, legal scholars were forced to wrestle with

1

it

became:

Amendment, and

where we considered

The ghost of Lochner,
Having digested

freedom.

we

for all of us

"how

objective judicial

William Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn, 237-258.

|S

Quoted

in

Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Rehorn 234. See
,

also,

Friedman, “The Birth of

an Academic Obsession.” Again, Friedman points to the historical contingency of this dilemma,
but that itself hardly

makes

it

less

powerful

constitutionalism, other than to suggest that

review, leaving the preoccupations of the

if

it

was

the preoccupation at the heart of New Deal

we should

New

forge a

new understanding of judicial

Dealer’s behind us. But this opens the possibility,

surely, for a return to older understandings of the Constitution as well.
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decisions should be reached."

L °chner Court was bad,

Griswold

1

16

If

how does one justify

Connecticut or Roe

v.

substantive due process as embraced
by the

v.

Wade ?

the so-called privacy cases of

Scholars in American political and

constitutional development have linked
this development to the
constitutional

transformation of the
treated the

to confront

New

Deal years. The earlier generation of
legal scholars

Lochner Court as an

historical aberration

seeming inconsistencies between the progressive

and the modern Court's active use of judicial
power

on the

and was therefore compelled

historical

in

critique of

cases like Roe. Focusing

development of the Constitution, scholars of American

constitutional development resolve Wechsler's
the constitutional change of 1937,

which

is

dilemma by

explicitly recognizing

taken to legitimate the retreat from

Lochner while simultaneously embracing Griswold and
Roe as

new

role of protecting civil liberties in the

Gillman puts
rise of a

it:

New

“The eventual collapse of this

new American Republic

Stephen Griffin explicitly

1

17

Deal constitutional regime. As

constitutional tradition signaled the

Drawing on

rejects Wechsler's

this constitutional

return of substantive due process in Griswold and

was used

change,

dilemma.

Although the approach of the majority in Lochner was
abandoned after the New Deal, this does not mean that
the return of Lochner.

part of the Court’s

organized around a different understanding of

the proper use of legislative power."

doctrine

Lochner

the

Roe was

The new substantive due process

for different purposes

fundamentally different

political, legal,

To ask how Roe can be justified

and operated

in

and social contexts.

if Lochner

was

unjustified

Laura Kalman, The Strange Career uj Legal Liberalism (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1996 ) 5
117

.

Gillman, The Constitution Besieged.

15.
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thus

makes

the anachronistic assumption that the
normative
standards and relevant background did not change
between

1905 and 1973. 118

Ackerman

too focuses on constitutional change to unravel
the traditionalist's legal

dilemma. For Ackerman, Lochner was rejected
of 1937 whereby the people ultimately

in the Constitutional

ratified a

new

Constitution. This

Deal) Constitution, according to Ackerman's synthesis,

encompass Griswold and Roe. So simply
Constitution, Lochner

looting in the

is

not.

put:

Roe

is

Revolution

broad enough

is

grounded

(New
to

in the

This gives Roe and the like solid constitutional

Constitutional Revolution ol 1937." T his

is

made

evident in

Ackerman's curious discussion of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, where

the Court

upheld Roe. In upholding Roe, Ackerman says, the Court staved off President

Reagan’s attempt

at constitutional

Constitution. Yet,

Ackerman

transformation and maintained our

says very

little

about

how

(New

Deal)

the Constitutional

Revolution ol 1937 justifies Roe. Rather, Ackerman argues that Griswold (and
thus presumably Roe)

New

liberty in a "post

seamlessly

in Justice

118

at this

was a synthesis of the Founding's concern with personal
Deal world of economic and social regulation.”

conclusion,

Ackerman

19

To

arrive

ignores the very reasoning put forward

Douglas' Griswold opinion, which was preoccupied by the very

Stephen Griffin, American Constitutionalism 168. Though
,

as legitimately altering constitutional interpretation, there
“liberty

1

of contract.” Indeed, the changes wrought

in

is

if

we

recognize historical change

no reason

to preclude the return

the last years of the twentieth century

of

may

make the return of “dual federalism” viable. See, for example, Keith Whittington, Dismantling the
Modern State? The Changing Structural Foundations of Federalism” 25 Hastings Constitutional

Law
1

lv

Quarterly 483

(

1998).

Ackerman, We the People: Foundations

,

141.
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dilemma Ackerman seeks
detense ot

amount

civil liberties,

to dissolve.

120

These attempts

and particularly “privacy,”

to root the judicial

in constitutional

“to a sophisticated refinement” of the “progressive

constitutional development.”

about rights

in a

way

model of

121

Moreover, rather than

that easily tlows

these scholars suggest, the

change

New

settling

such questions

trom Carotene Products footnote

Deal revolution

4, as

itself offered contrasting

modes

ot constitutional thought that sought, in dramatically
different ways, to ground
judicial power. Here,

we might even

say that the equation of

Roe with Lochner

not so easily resolved by pointing to constitutional revolution. After

all,

is

a

powerful part of this constitutional revolution was just such a critique of judicial

power, which could be leveled
difficult to

fit

at the likes

this privacy decision into

thought that emerged from the

New

of Roe', indeed, as

any of the central

we

lines

will see,

it

is

of jurisprudential

Deal revolution.

Searching for Solid Ground

wake of the

In the

New

1

uncertainty."

In

economic

issues, the

Deal justices quickly divided amongst themselves over the proper scope of

judicial power. C.

120

constitutional shift, retreating from

Herman

" While

Ackerman’s account

the

the

Pritchett

New

New

very seriously.

We

New

far as to call

it

a “quest for

Deal justices agreed on judicial retreat from one

Deal Constitution protects just those rights he wants

protect, plucking the privacy decisions

a fashion that doesn’t take the

went so

from the past

Deal change

the People, Foundations

,

—

that he likes,

in its rejection

131-162 and

We

it

and ignoring the others

to
in

such

of “substantive due process”

the People: Transformations 390,

403. For a far more persuasive account of privacy rights amidst the project of state building, see

Kersch, “The Reconstruction of Constitutional Privacy Rights and the
121

86
122

New

Kersch, "The Reconstruction of Constitutional Privacy Rights and the
.

C.

Herman

Pritchett,

The Roosevelt Court, 46.
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American

State.”

New American

State,”

sphere, the reconstruction and
regrounding of the legitimate scope
of judicial

power was

a far

more

divisive question.

1

suggest that in the formative
years after

1937-1941, there were essentially three
clear alternatives to grounding
judicial

power, which would dominate constitutional
thought

These three central attempts

to recast judicial

for the next several decades.

power might be described

as

democracy-reinforcing," identified most closely
with Justice Stone; “jural
reasoning,’ identified with Justice
Frankfurter; and “rights based textualism.”
identified with Justice Black.

draw out how each

set

123
1

offer but a sketch of each solution,
but want to

about to resolve the problem of judicial
will against the

backdrop of constitutional change. Each attempt

to

ground judicial power must be

understood against the historical development of
our Constitution, even as each

answer played an important
point

is

part in subsequent constitutional development.

that these very different

answers

had

all

The

their feet in the Constitutional

Revolution of 1937, while their fundamental disagreements
with one another
suggests the essentially contested and fluctuating nature
of constitutional

development over these years. The

which our post 1937

New

Deal did not provide a foundation from

civil liberties naturally

perpetual and discontinuous development.

evolved; rather

it

called forth

124

123

Frankfurter’s jurisprudence as often been identified as “ordered-liberty.” While accept this
suggest that ordered-liberty is something to be identified by a discreet judicial
I

characterization,

mind

— so

it

is

I

the proper state of

mind

that

is

key

to limiting judicial discretion.

1-4

Kersch, Discontinuous Development in American Constitutional Law.
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Stone: Reinforcing Representation

The most famous statement
auguring a recasting ot judicial
power came
in

United Stales

away
to be

is

in the

now famous

now

deemed by Congress

statute that prohibited the

aimed

it

usually taken

4.

Yet the case

movement of filled milk

fat) in interstate

to be an unhealthy product

traditional guardian review,

to discover

is

heralded only because of footnote

milk product enriched with vegetable

may

rather obliquely tucked

profoundly reveals the Court's retreat
from economic issues. At

it

was a congressional

the Court

was

it

footnote 4 by Stone. Carotene
Products

an insignificant case,

interesting as

stake

Carotene Products, although

v.

commerce,

(compared

which dominated the Court

to

as

it

(a

was

whole milk). Under

until the

previous year.

well have questioned the reasonableness
of this enactment, probing

this

in lact a valid health regulation

some groups over

to protect

legislation was).

was

1

'5

species of regulation

others (which, arguably,

Under the new regime, though,

the legislation to such a critical eye.

There

ora

As Stone

put

it

the Court

in the

exactly what the

is

would not subject

body of the opinion

no need to consider [the law] here as more than
a declaration ot legislative findings deemed to support
is

and justify the action taken as a constitutional exertion
of the legislative power, aiding informed judicial
review, as to the reports of legislative committees, by
revealing the rationale of the legislation. Even in the

absence ot such aids the existence ot facts supporting
the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for
regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional
unless in light ot the tacts

assumed

it

is

made known

or generally

of such a character as to preclude the

See Geoffrey P. Miller, “The True Story ofCarolene Products" The Supreme Court Review
I9H7 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
~
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assumption
the

that it rests upon some
rational basis within
knowledge and experience of the
126
legislators.

Here Stone inserted footnote 4
attitude

and

legislation.

its

to potentially qualify
the Court's deferential

presumption of constitutionality
when reviewing economic

Stone offered three essential
qualifications where there would
be a

"narrower scope for the operation
of the presumption of
constitutionality":

When

(1)

legislation appears to violate
a specific prohibition of the
Constitution,

especially the Bill of Rights.
(2)

When

legislation “restricts those
political

processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable
legislation.”

And

(3)

when

legislation impinges

upon a “discrete and insular

minorities" that cannot be expected to
appeal effectively to the democratic
process. At root. Stone's logic developed
a two-tier theory to guide and
ground
the use ot judicial power. In ordinary
circumstances,

the Court touched on

and apply the
legislation

economic

rationality test.

was wise

issues, the

The question

when

the legislation before

Court would defer to the legislature
for the Court

was not whether

this

policy, the criticism Stone and others
had leveled at Justice

Sutherland and his colleagues, but whether the
legislature could, conceivably,

have a rational reason
passed

this relaxed standard ot

Court. In a

a

much

more exacting judicial

United States

v.

such legislation. Once the legislation had

review that was the end of the question for the

smaller group ot cases, the Court would subject the
legislation to

marked out these areas

1-6

tor pursuing

scrutiny,” what

in footnote

became known

as strict scrutiny. Stone

4 where the Court would demand that the

Carotene Products 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
,
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legislation

meet a compelling governmental

that interest.

1938

that

interest

and be narrowly tailored

The Court would be generally deferential—
an important claim

will note below.

was

that

recast judicial

it

democratic process: the Court's role was not
to police the

system

Stone had insisted

in

in

to

of Rights (although, as
this area).

power

The

numerous
is

dissents,

we

critical

as supplementing the

second guess the legislature, but

such a way that kept the democratic
process open.

unwise, the proper recourse

It,

Bill

Stone seemed to have reservations
about

basis of Carotene Products

Court.

in

should not simply be taken for
granted-unless the legislation interfered

with the democratic process or
directly implicated the
1

to

as

If,

think the legislation before us

to appeal to the

democratic process, not to the

however, the democratic process was closed, or

if a “discrete

and

insular minority" could not trust the
protection of their rights to the democratic

process (as they were always outnumbered), then
the judiciary was compelled to
act to ensure that the democratic process

remained open and

fair.

Moreover, as

John Hart Ely has argued, the Court's taking on the
maintenance of process
neatly with

its

retreat

from weighing

in

on substantive values. 127

If the

fit

Court had

rendered substantive judgments about the proper scope of
legislation, and had
addressed, as well, the substance of such legislation as part of
guardian review,
reinforcing the democratic process would not implicate the Court in
such areas

(now deemed

fraught with value judgments). Instead, the Court

with process alone, making

it

tar less likely that the justices

was concerned

might substitute

their

John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust A Theory oj Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1980).
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substantive judgments for the legislature's
(as they were not concerned with
the
legislature s substantive judgments).
Part

would also

entail the preservation

process, what

of rights intimately connected to the
democratic

would become known

freedoms. These freedoms

—

of preserving the democratic process

in the years

1938-1941 as the preferred

tree speech in particular

—occupied

a preferred

position because, unlike other rights, especially
liberty of contract, they were
intimately connected to the “core of free government.”
In an ordering of
constitutional values, they required special judicial
solicitude. But they did so in a

way

that limited judicial

power

to reinforcing

democracy; the emphasis on

process rather than substance was key to limiting judicial
will for Stone.
Frankfurter: The Jural

Mind

Frankfurter rejected both Stone's footnote 4 and Black's
textualism
(especially as

it

applied to incorporation). Yet Frankfurter's

ground judicial discretion

12

is

elusive.

*

In the

wake of the

Revolution of 1937," Frankfurter pleaded for judicial
times he seemed to

call for a

complete judicial

is

attempt to

“Constitutional

restraint, so

retreat in the face

democratically enacted legislation. For Frankfurter, restraint
peculiar judicial temperament that

own

is

much

so, that at

of

grounded

in a

necessary to protect those values that are

central to our conception of “ordered liberty,” even while giving due process of

law the

1-8

1

flexibility

it

needs.

'9

Confronted with the problem of judicial discretion

See especially, H. N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter (New York: Basic Books,

1981).
i2y

See Gary Jacobsohn, Pragmatism, Statesmanship and the Supreme Court (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 1976)

1

14-160, on Frankfurter’s statesmanship.
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as forcefully articulated in
Stone's Butler dissent. Frankfurter
did not attempt to
take retuge in grounding the
Court's judgment in process over
substance (as Stone

does) or
justices

in

textualism (as Black does). Rather.
Frankfurter

must exercise discretion as

limiting such discretion

part

must be found

ever aware that

of their judicial duty. The answer
to

in just this

conscious recognition: a

recognition cultivated by the proper
judicial temperament
this led Frankfurter to

is

be exceedingly deferential

to the

130
.

On

the

one hand.

democratic process.

suggesting that so long as that process was
open, the Court should stay

its

hand.

But to the legislature no less than to courts
is committed the
guardianship of deeply-cherished liberties.
Where all the
effective means of inducing political
changes are left free

from interference, education
legislation

is itself

in the

abandonment of foolish

a training in liberty.

To

fight out the

wise use of legislative authority in the forum of
public
opinion and before legislative assemblies rather
than to
transfer such a contest to the judicial arena,
serves to
vindicate the self-confidence of a free people 131
.

When

the Court reversed Frankfurter's opinion a few
years later, he went even

further, insisting that a sense of judicial self-restraint

was

the only thing that could

prevent a return to the judicial hubris of the past:
Judicial self-restraint

is equally necessary whenever an
exercise of political or legislative power is challenged.

There is no warrant in the constitutional basis of this
Court's authority for attributing different roles to it

depending upon the nature of the challenge to the
legislation. Our power does not vary according to the
particular provision of the Bill of Rights which is invoked.
The right not to have property taken without just
compensation has, so far as the scope of judicial power is

Mark

Silverstein, Constitutional Faiths: Felix Frankfurter,

Judicial Decision

Making

Hugo

Black,

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984) 128.

1,1

Minnersvil/e School District

v.

Gohitis 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940).
,
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and the Process of

concerned, the same constitutional
dignity as the right to be
protected against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and
the latter has no less claim than
freedom of the press or
freedom of speech or religious freedom.
In no instance is
this Court the primary protector
of the

particular liberty that

invoked.

is

Here Frankfurter
entitled to

rejects both Stone's

more judicial

and Black's insistence

protection than other rights.

that certain rights are

The lesson of 1937,

Frankfurter, prohibited any application
of a double standard and
judicial deference to legislatures

no matter what

liberties

were

for

demanded

at stake.

frankfurter pushed this line of thinking in two
free speeches cases, taking further

aim

at

footnote 4.

Above

all

we must remember

judicial review
legislature.’

majority

is

that this Court's power of
not “an exercise of the powers of a super-

Some members of the Court— and

at

— have done more. They have suggested

times a
that

our

function in reviewing statutes restricting freedom
of
expression differs sharply from our normal duty in

sitting

in

judgment on

legislation.

has been suggested, with
the casualness of a footnote, that such legislation
is not
presumptively valid and it has been weightily reiterated that
.

.

It

freedom of speech has a 'preferred position among
constitutional safeguards.

Whether

legislation

33

impinged upon

rights that

were fundamental

to the

democratic process or rights that were textually enumerated made no difference.
Yet, just as Frankfurter himself

“Those

liberties

was

rejecting this notion, he

n~

to pull back:

of the individual which history has attested as the indispensable

conditions of an open as against a closed society

momentum and

seemed

respect lacking

when appeal

West Virginia Stale Board of Education

v.

is

come

made

to this

to liberties

Barnette, 3 19 U.S. 624, 648
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Court with a

(

which derive

1942).

from shifting economic arrangements." 134
Frankfurter went on
so, "these are matters for the
legislative

opinion

"

l

35

The deeper

freedoms" as a

sort

point

is

to say that,

judgment controlled by public

that Frankfurter rejects the notion

of mechanical jurisprudence,

of "preferred

illustrating his insistence that a

discerning and attuned jural mind, weighing
context and history,
to get at these rights.

even

is

the only

way

136

Frankfurter turned to notions of "ordered
liberty" to draw

these rights out.

As H.N. Hirsch has
both self-restraint and

we can

in

noted, “Frankfurter thus believed simultaneously
in

fundamental values." 137 Yet. as Gary Jacobsohn notes,

perceive once again the tension between Frankfurter's
adherence to

fundamental principles and his policy of self-restraint.” 138 This
frankfurter

s

solution to the problem of judicial will

proper judicial temperament.

would overcome

the

was

It

is

so because

was based primarily upon

the justice's proper furnishing of

dilemma of 1937.

This required self-restraint in

mind

that

most

instances, but also the flexible articulation of f undamental values,
the very

drawing out of which was

part

of Frankfurter's notion of the jural mind, when

necessary. Thus, as Flirsch argues. Frankfurter would often claim to be
disinterested,

that as a justice

“he was capable of divorcing his personal

opinions from a necessary action." This was simply part of the judicial

n4

Dennis

v.

Kovaes

v.

United States, 341 U.S. 494, 526-527

Cooper 336 U.S.
,

77, 95

(

(

1949).

135

Ibid at 97.
n<>

Silverstein, Constitutional Faiths
117

Hirsch, The

,

143.

Enigma of Felix Frankfurter

,

137.
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195

1

).

the

temperament. Franklurter drew
the

Due Process Clause do

this out in his opinions:

not leave judges at large.

We may

merely personal and private notions and disregard the
their judicial function."

139

“The vague contours of
not draw on our

limits that bind judges in

But rather than grounding judicial will

in textual

interpretation, or the democratic process. Frankfurter
mitigated the central

problem by

insisting that justices

must be conscious of the problem:

To

believe that this judicial exercise of judgment could be
avoided by freezing ‘due process of law' at some fixed
stage ol time or thought

suggest that the most
important aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function
for inanimate machines and not forjudges ... To practice
is to

the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient

objectivity no doubt

demands of judges

the habit of self-

discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that one's

own

views are incontestable and alert to tolerance toward views
not shared. But these are precisely ... the qualities society
has a right to expect from those entrusted with ultimate
judicial power.

0

For Frankfurter the flexible discovery of and articulation of fundamental values,
balanced against the needs of society, was the very
far

removed,

Frankfurter,

in this,

art

of judging.

from a Justice Sutherland. The key

would be

that Sutherland

was too

He was

distinction, for

inflexible and, thereby, wasn't

detached enough. Sutherland was a mechanical jurisprude. This points us
fact that Frankfurter, unlike

not so

to the

Stone and Black, sought to overcome the lessons of

1937 not so much by recasting the role of the Court, but by recasting the jural
mind. Jacobsohn

1

8

hits at this just so:

whereas the Old Court “referred

Jacobsohn, Pragmatism, Statesmanship, and the Supreme Court 140.
,

139

140

Rochin

v.

California 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952).
,

Ibid at 171.
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to natural

right; [Frankfurter]

spoke of ‘notions of justice,’ of ‘civilized canon of
decency,'

and of the ‘concept of ordered

standards were not too dissimilar.” 141
restraint

if,

defer,

And

of

fact, their

perspective

so Frankfurter would

At other times, however. Frankfurter would
relief

overcome

his

insist that the justices

must come through an aroused popular conscience

the conscience of the people

part

in point

given standards of due process, the state's action “shocks
the

conscience.

must

But

liberty.’

s

representatives.

14

Knowing when

of the proper furnishings of mind of a justice. For Frankfurter,

that sears

do what was

to

it

was

this

understanding that separated him from a Sutherland.

Black

Textualism

's

Carotene Products was handed down Black's

first

year on the Court and

while Black joined the opinion, he wrote a brief concurrence for the sole purpose
of rejecting Stone's footnote 4.

144

This

move

helps illuminate Black's subsequent

attempt to ground the judicial protection of rights. While Black

is

often associated

with the short-lived era of preferred freedoms as articulated by Stone,

this doesn't

quite capture his thinking and threatens to obscure his fundamental disagreement

with Stone. For Black, the search for preferred freedoms that should be robustly
protected by the Court

was not so

protect those rights that had been

clearly

141

enumerated

in the Bill

elusive:

The Court was obligated

marked off for protection when they were

of Rights. These were preferred freedoms, not

Jacobsohn, Pragmatism, Statesmanship, and the Supreme Court 141. See also Silverstein,
,

Constitutional Faiths
142

141

to robustly

,

142-155.

Rochinat 172.

Baker

v.

Carr, 369 U.S. 186. 270 (1962).
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because they were central to the
democratic process, not because they
were

fundamental to a conception of ordered
for protection

by a democratically

liberty, but

ratified constitutional text

a later concurring opinion, taking
particular
in

Rochin

v.

California

,

“I

because they were singled out

aim

145
.

at Frankfurter's

As Black

put

it

in

majority opinion

believe that faithful adherence to
the specific

guarantees in the Bill of Rights insures a
more permanent protection of individual
liberty than that

which can be afforded by the nebulous
standards

majority [ot the Court]

empowers

this

.

What

the majority hold

Court to nullify any

conscience, offends
civilized conduct .’”

‘a

146

state

law

is

if its

that the

stated by the

Due Process Clause

application ‘shocks the

sense of justice' or runs counter to the
‘decencies of

For Black

on due process, much

this gloss

special solicitude for the democratic process,

attempts to protect liberty of contract;

Deal justices with the Constitution

it

14
.

was no

like the Court's

different than earlier

risked equating the values of the

"For

we

are told that ‘we

our merely personal and private notions’” and “we are told

may

not

found

draw on

that the discovery

must be made by an evaluation based on disinterested inquiry pursued
spirit

New

in the

of science and on a balanced order of facts .”' 148 Yet, when Frankfurter
that certain

conduct offended notions of due process because

it

“shocked

144

Silverstein, Constitutional Faiths

,

134.

Silverstein notes that Black did join Justice Cardozo s famous opinion in Palko v.
Connecticut
which exemplified Frankfurter’s notion of "ordered liberty” that so horrified Black. Yet, as
Silverstein argues. Black joined the opinion his

Cardozo and
in its
146

prior to

working out

first

year on the Court largely out of respect for

his textualist jurisprudence that rejected such subjective notions

quest to ground judicial will. Constitutional Faiths

Rochin

at

,

75.

147

Silverstein, Constitutional Faiths, 136.
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,

141.

the conscience,” Black insisted
that such pleas were
meaningless. Justice

Sutherland, too, insisted that he was
merely following constitutional

command

and not basing his decision on personal
motives. Black no more believed
frankfurter than he believed Sutherland.
Fully digesting Professor
Frankfurter's
critique of Sutherland, Black insisted
that the only

way

to

ground judicial

discretion, to get around the personal
preferences of the justices,

oneself in constitutional text

making them applicable

Amendment was

to root

144

This was key to Black's defense of the

.

Rights and his insistence that the Fourteenth
rights,

was

to the states

Amendment
150

.

Thus

of

incorporated these

liberty in the

neatly defined by the Bill of Rights

Bill

itself,

Fourteenth

which grounded

notions of due process by tethering judicial
discretion to constitutional text and
not the

vague contours
This

standard”:

why

than others?

that

I

due process"

that

allowed justices

to

roam

at large.

also led Black to get around questions of the
“double

should some rights be subject

to a

more exacting judicial

scrutiny

o turn to the democratic process or fundamental notions of
ordered

Stone and Frankfurter did, was to open oneself to the same criticism

liberty, as

that these

move

of

j

ustices

had leveled against

substantive due process."

Black himself would level against his fellow justices

in

It

was a

Griswold

criticism

v.

Connecticut the contraception case that evoked memories of “substantive due
,

process" from the Court's earlier jurisprudence,

when

the Court held that

148

Ibid.
I4J

Leslie
I5U

Friedman Goldstein. In Defense of Text (Lanham:

Adamson

v.

California 332 U.S. 46
,

(

1947).

244

Rowman

and

Littlefield, 1990).

forbidding the use of contraceptives and
the dissemination of information
about

contraception was unconstitutional (but on rather
vague grounds of privacy):

The due process argument

here is based on the premise that
vested with the power to invalidate all
state laws that
it considers to be arbitrary,
capricious, unreasonable, or oppressive,
or this Court s belie! that a particular state
law under scrutiny has
this

Court

.

.

.

is

no

‘rational or justifying' purpose, or is
offensive to ‘a sense of
tairness and justice.' If these formulas based
on 'natural justice,’ or

others which

judges

own

their

Black insisted

1937 and

it

to

mean

the

same thing

determine what

is

or

are to prevail, they require
not constitutional on the basis of

is

appraisal ot what laws are unwise of unnecessary.

that this

was just

was no

different than

as illegitimate here, as

151

what the Court had done prior

it

gave justices discretion

to

to

choose

those values they preferred, leading them to determine
whether such legislation

was reasonable or

And Black

not.

continually insisted that such a reading,

what constitutes a reasonable regulation a judicial judgment, might
slight constitutional rights.

As he

put

it

power of judicial review

exercises the

in

.

.

just as easily

an earlier case: “So long as

.1

making

cannot agree that the First

this

Court

Amendment

permits us to sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on the basis of

Congress or our own notions o! mere 'reasonableness. Such a doctrine waters

down

the First
1-'

Congress."
tairness

was

2

Amendment

so that

Allowing justices

it

amounts

to gloss notions

of textual

rights:

justices by leaving judicial will untethered.

153

Griswold

v.

Dennis

580.

at

more than an admonition

to

of due process and fundamental

of a piece with allowing justices to determine the reasonableness of

state or congressional regulation

151

to little

Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 5
,

I

I

(

1965).

245

both put us

at the

mercy of

I

he Ghost of Lochner

The attempt

to

ground judicial discretion continues

constitutional interpretation.

And

to

preoccupy

while scholars of American constitutional

development tocus on the fundamental changes wrought by
the
usual insistence that Lochner

more
the

difficult to maintain.

New Deal— in

1

"3

was

part of an earlier era that

The

central jurisprudential lines that

Stone, Frankfurter and

Black— must

backdrop of Lochner. This does not suggest a return
of the

Lochner Court. Gillman seems

development has rendered

It

no longer applies,

American

freedoms deserved

to

precisely because the

to the jurisprudential vision

of American

be characterized as truly fundamental.” 154

New

Deal critique of Lochner

it

is

ignominious place

in history, but

it

did not only leave such questions unsettled,

154

And

bound up with

a part of the

want

to

New

it

does

the

Deal's

New

Deal Court

it

And

made

this is

because the New' Deal

the very nature of judicial

the central question, thereby insuring that the search for constitutional

Gillman, “Preferred Freedoms.”
Gillman, “Preferred Freedoms,” 648.

246

this

has not been as successful in

wrestling with our constitutionalism post 1937.

151

1

what kinds of

constitutional trajectory. Revisionist scholarship has rescued the

power

political

search for grounding judicial

constitutional history, precisely

Constitutional Revolution of 1937 making

its

emerge from

be understood against the

right that the course

in the

is

haunts the “painstaking and politically-charged task of articulating,

for the first time in

from

Deal, the

that constitutional vision inadequate. Rather,

suggest that Lochner remains potent
discretion.

New

grounding would remain contested and unsettled.
Let
quote trom Professor Jacobsohn.

A

situation

activism

may demand

who

self-restraint or

the actual choice

whatever appears necessary
principle and purpose.

eloquently hits

is

to

it

me draw on

a rather lengthy

at the central

problem:

may demand

be determined by

to affirm constitutional

With

this understanding, the mental
gymnastics, tor example, ot those who were
advocates of
judicial self-restraint prior to 1937 and then
suddenly found
themselves detending judicial activism (while
concurrently
groping tor a principled way in which to explain the
abrupt
reversal ot their judicial philosophy), might have
been
avoided. Much of the embarrassment and hypocrisy
that

developed refected the inability and unwillingness of
scholars and judges to confront the essential role of
the
Court. Constitutional principles (such as, for example,
“preferred freedoms”) were usually derived from the

approach

power that required a defense. The
reverse process, however, should have occurred. Any
to judicial

particular approach to judicial

power ought

to be derived

trom a constitutional principle (which, more than the
approach, requires defense), and the approach must
therefore vary according to the circumstances surrounding
the application of such principles. 155

By

focusing on the question of judicial power and discretion as the

primary question, the

New

Deal Constitution did not,

us firm constitutional footing so

evident, as

that

Ken Kersch

we saw

much

at least

on these

issues, give

as a perpetual constitutional debate. This

is

argues, in the Black-Frankfurter debate over incorporation

above. 1 he debate between these justices over incorporation was a

debate about

how

best to cabin judicial will,

which lead both of them

to slight

and

mischaracterize the earlier jurisprudence of John Marshall Flarlan. While Flarlan

argued for incorporation, as Black draws upon and as Frankfurter dubs

247

eccentric,

the 14

th

he did not limit himself to incorporating
the

Amendment.

Anglo-American
and

let

drew

Rather, he

tradition.

as well

rights

and the

Harlan was preoccupied by constitutional
principle
156

The New Deal

reversed this order: constitutional interpretation
was
will.

of Rights by way of

on notions of natural

the judicial role flow from such
precepts.

grounding judicial

Bill

Thus

it

is difficult

to

first

speak of the

justices

and foremost about

New

as a regime that gives us constitutional
guidance. Or, perhaps

Deal Constitution

more

aptly, at the

heart ot this regime lay an unsettled question
about the proper scope of judicial

power

that

became

several decades.

the essentially contested constitutional
question for the next

The point

important insofar as

is

constitutional developments.

Roe

v.

Wade

it

suggests that subsequent

for instance,

157

are not easily rooted in

the Constitutional Revolution of 1937. Revisionist attempts
to elide the old

equation ot

it

Roe then Lochner remain troublesome
,

,

Constitutional Revolution of 1937 seriously. Ihere

Lochner
easy

fit

— whose foundations

between Roe and the

New

Griswold and Lochner which
,

are long since

is

1

Deal.

if

may

gone— but

we

take the

well be no going back to

that doesn't

make

for an

8

Justice Black's firm equation of

the precursor to just this argument, has

its feet

Jacobsohn, Pragmatism, Statesmanship, and the Supreme Court, 171-172. In a similar fashion
Whittington’s argument for originalism begins from constitutional principle and is thus quite
different than conservative arguments for originalism like Bork and Scalia’s, Constitutional
Interpretation.
|S(
’

157

Kersch, Discontinuous Development

Roe

v.

Wade, 410 U.S.

1

,

I

19-123.

13 (1973).

|S!i

It

also need not reject liberty of contract in

all its

248

forms.

New

solidly in

Deal constitutionalism. 159 This

the rise (or return) of original intent.

product ot 1937 as
Griswold,

it

if

is

On

also true,

is

want

I

this issue, originalism is

to suggest,

a

driven by the need to ground judicial will.

we

let

it

stand in for a general debate, highlights the

Griswold (and Roe), we see the reemergence of fundamental

jurisprudence that moves beyond constitutional
precisely

much

very

discontinuities at the heart of the Constitutional
Revolution of 1937.
ot

of

what brings back questions of natural

contract) and draws us back to Lochner

New

ot the constitutionalism ot the

.

And

it

text, but this

In the

rights

emergence

rights (including liberty

is

wake

is

of

precisely this, drawing

on

part

Deal, which inspires the originalism of a

160

Judge Bork.

In his opinion tor the Court, Justice

Douglas posits a

right to privacy

against governmental intrusion, but attempts to ground that right in the

“penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees”
Rights.

161

Douglas'

move

is

symbolic of the

New

in the Bill

Deal's constitutional change:

— what
prohibition of contraception between married couples? — he assumes
rather than placing the burden

on

legitimacy of regulation unless

159

Dissenting

in

it

state regulation

Roe, Justice Rehnquist drew attention to
in

this fact:

in that

the basis for the state's

the

Douglas engages

in a

“while the Court’s opinion

Lochner, the result

attuned to the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham
1,0

is

violates a specific right.

quotes from the dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes

of

case.”

it

reaches

Rue

is

more

closely

at 174.

Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Free
Keith Whittington’s more recent argument for “original intent" moves some

Press, 1990).

distance from Bork precisely

in that

it

is

not preoccupied by grounding judicial will, but

discovering constitutional principles. Thus Whittington unlinks constitutional interpretation from
questions of the judicial role. Constitutional Interpretation.
1,11

Griswold

at

484.

249

tortured construction of penumbral rights to
meet this challenge. His refusal to

draw on

the

Lochner. he

due process clause
is all

challenge that he
align with his

is

a direct result of the

too aware that any

is

own

glossing the

move

word

of the

Bill

liberty in the Fourteenth

his opinion with just this in mind:

that implicate the

we

Amendment

political preferences, leaving his judicial will
untethered.

in the

“We

to

Thus

emanations from the

are

Due Process Clause of the

Overtones of some arguments suggest
guide. But

be open to the

of Rights, insulating him from the charge of Lochnerizing.
Indeed.

Douglas opened
of questions

Deal criticism of

in that direction will

he seeks— albeit unpersuasively— to ground privacy
text

New

Lochner

that

162

decline that invitation [.]’’

Given

v.

met with a wide range

Fourteenth Amendment.

New York

this, it’s

should be our

not a coincidence that

Justice Black’s scathing dissent virtually ignores Douglas’ opinion and saves
ire for

Ninth

the concurring opinions of Goldberg, White, and Harlan,

Amendment

who draw on

its

the

notion of unenumerated rights (Goldberg) and the due process

clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment (White and

Harlan) to find the law

unconstitutional. For Black, Douglas' opinion might be a poor interpretation of
the Bill of Rights, but at least

privacy in constitutional

had the virtue of attempting

text, thus disciplining judicial will.

opinions, on the other hand,

based on ‘natural

it

let

judicial will

justice,’ or others

Ibid.

ground the

is

or

at481-482.
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is

right to

The concurring

at large: “If

these formulas

which mean the same thing are

they require judges to determine what

162

roam

to

to prevail,

not constitutional on the basis of

their

own

appraisal ot what laws are unwise or
unnecessary.”

163

Black explicitly

accuses these justices ot Lochnerizing:

The Due Process Clause with an

'arbitrary

or 'shocking the conscience' formula

was

and capricious'
liberally

used by
Court to strike down economic legislation in
the early
decades ot this century, threatening, many people
this

thought,
the tranquility and stability of the Nation.
See, e.g.

Lochner. That tormula, based on subjective
considerations
natural justice, is no less dangerous when
used to
entorce this Court's views about personal rights
than those
about economic rights. 1 had thought that we had
ot

laid that

formula, as a means for striking
rest

once and

down

for all in cases like

West Coast Hotel Co. 164

Justice Harlan levels a similar charge,

Douglas and Black as

meaning

it

more

well. Harlan notes that the

majority opinion and Black's dissent
clause's

state legislation, to

to the Bill

subtly and indirectly, at

common

link

between Douglas'

a belief that by limiting the due process

is

of Rights,

judges will thus be confined

to 'interpretation' of specific
constitutional provisions, and will thereby be restrained

from introducing
and wrong

their

own

notions of constitutional right

into the 'vague contours

of the Due Process
could not more heartily agree that judicial
'sell-restraint' is an indispensable ingredient of sound

Clause. While

I

constitutional adjudication,

achieving

it

is

I

do submit

more hollow than

that the

real. 'Specific'

formula for
provisions

of the Constitution, no less than 'due process,' lend
themselves as readily to 'personal' interpretations^] 165

One need
went on
not,

I

look no further than Douglas' opinion to confirm this point. Harlan then

to

make

a point reminiscent of Frankfurter, "Judicial self-restraint will

suggest, be brought about in the 'due process' area by the historically

Ibid, at 51 1-512.
Ibid, at

522.

Ibid, at

500-501.
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unfounded incorporation formula.

It

will be achieved in this area, as in
other

constitutional areas, only by continual insistence

upon respect

for the teachings of

history, solid recognition of the basic
values that underlie society,

and wise

appreciation of the great role that the doctrines of
federalism and separation of

powers have played

in establishing

and preserving American freedoms .” 166 For

Harlan, as tor Frankfurter, judicial will

is

more

likely to be disciplined

temperament, than by textual interpretation, which gives

his

by judicial

approach a gloss of

“substantive due process.”

All of the opinions in Griswold are preoccupied by the
need to discipline
judicial will in light of this critique

167

Yet

.

it

is

precisely this skepticism about

untethered judicial will that inhibits the development of a consensus
regarding the
protection of fundamental rights.

As Gillman

argues, “

I

he same skepticism that

called into question the ability of judges to discern true public purposes
has been

deployed against judges who struggle

to identify

fundamental rights .”

chastises critics of the Court, especially conservative critics,

Lochner as a weapon

in their struggle against the

who

168

Gillman

“use the lore of

modern Court's use of

fundamental rights as a trump on government power .” 164 This conservative

100

167

50

This

true of

left at

is

1

.

it's

Goldberg

unlikely that Frankfurter

as well, “In determining

would have joined Harlan's opinion.

which

rights are fundamental,

judges are not

large to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to

the 'traditions
to be
11,8

Although

Ibid at

and conscience of our people’

to

determine whether a principle

ranked fundamental.’”

Gillman, The Constitution Besieged 204.
,

169

Ibid.,

205.
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is

'so rooted

... as

critique,

however,

is

rooted in the Constitutional Revolution
170
ofl937.
That

revolution, with the dramatic expansion
of state power,

lundamental rights essential, but given
it

made

this very search tor

ot original intent in the

its

any kind of grounding uneasy

wake of Grisw old and Roe and

is

the search for

professed skepticism of judicial power,

,

constitutional tooting,

made

its

at best.

search for solid

intormed by the putative lessons of 1937.
While a

leading legal scholar finds

it

odd

that a conservative like

Bork would expresses

concern about the countermajoritarian nature of
judicial review,
particularly perplexing.

Lochner Court: having
a PP y h 1° the
|

The emergence

Bork was weaned on the post 1937
fully digested that critique he

modern Court

s

privacy decisions.

171

this is not

critique of the

was more than ready

17-

The primary defense of

originalism for leading exponents like Bork and Raoul
Berger, after

grounds judicial discretion.
in its

own

right, but

Originalism

because

it

is

is

to

all, is

that

it

the best theory ot interpretation, not

the only theory for these proponents that

successfully grounds judicial will by providing the judge with a neutral
basis for
interpretation.

by the

1

0

he
171

I7

‘

dilemma of judicial

While Bork
is

The construction of constitutional meaning,

fully

is

will.

skeptical of the

behind the need

here,

is

being driven

Indeed, the current Court's most powerful

abandonment of constitutional federalism

to limit judicial will.

in

the

New

Deal years,

The Tempting of America, 57.

See Friedman, “The Birth of an Academic Obsession,” 253-254.
Particularly,

we might

add, as he did not share the legal liberal’s

dilemma of liking the
Academic

result,

but disliking the reasoning. For this dilemma, see Friedman, “The Birth of an

Obsession,” and Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism.
1

“Yet

must begin with a body of rules or principles or major premises that are
we have seen, is impossible under any philosophy
of judging other than the view that the original understanding of the Constitution is the exclusive
legal reasoning

independent of the judge's preferences. That, as

source for those exterior principles.” Bork, The Tempting of America, 265. See also, Berger,

Government by

Judiciary.

253

articulator of original intent. Justice
Scalia, defends originalism in precisely
these

terms.

"Now the main

danger injudicial interpretation of the
Constitution-^or.

tor that matter, injudicial interpretation

mistake their

own

of any

law— is

that the

predilections tor the law. Avoiding this error

judges will

is

the hardest part

ot being a conscientious judge; perhaps no
conscientious judge ever succeeds
entirely.”

because

174

Originalism. while not perfect,

it

is

the best

method of interpretation

"does not aggravate the principal weakness of the system

discretion], tor

it

establishes a historical criterion that

is

[judicial

conceptually quite

separate from the preferences of the judge himself.” 175
Scalia even goes so far as
to call originalism the

lesser evil.

It

too suiters, as

all

theories must, from the

dilemma

ot judicial will, but, all things considered,

this very

dilemma.

Roe,

because they have digested a central tenet of the “Constitutional

it

is

It

these originalists

draw on

it

is

more

the ghost ot

likely to

Loehner

overcome

to criticize

Revolution of 1937.”

In

doing

so, their originalism

may

well

owe more

to the legal positivism

of

Oliver Wendell Holmes than to the jurisprudence of John Marshall, but this only
reaffirms the notion that they are firmly planted within New' Deal
constitutionalism.

intent, as

174

it

Those who argue

that the conservative insistence

upon

original

pleads for judicial restraint and deference to democratic majorities.

Scalia, “Originalism:

The Lesser

Evil."

175

Ibid.,

254

has

little

grounding

Founding may be on

in the

solid ground.

176

These concerns

stem not trom the notion of limited governmental
powers and unenumerated
rights ol the Founding, but

Gillman

is

from the

New

Deal critique of the Old Court. Thus

especially persuasive in arguing that the
attempt by contemporary

conservatives to enlist Marshall as a proponent of
judicial restraint and

democratic deference
originalism

And

is

this is so

1937.

won

wash with

better exemplified

the historical record.

177

In this Marshall's

by a Justice Sutherland than a Judge Bork. 178

because Bork has digested the central jurisprudential problem
post

The deep skepticism

beyond the Constitution
the Constitution,

is

in stride

almost closet nihilism

to articulate its values, is to

Amendment by

with these justices

critique of judicial power.

judicial activism

is

—

that

any attempt

to

go

impose judicial values upon

precisely the argument leveled at Sutherland's gloss on
liberty

under the Fourteenth

moves

t

I7y

—

Frankfurter, Stone, and Black. In this, Bork
his jurisprudence

Gillman

insists that this

is

reared on their central

conservative critique of

unfounded, as the judicial articulation and defense of rights

has a deep foundation in American constitutionalism, rather than being the
creation of the

1

7(>

modern Court

(as

Bork would have

it).

Again, as a matter of

Gillman, “The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism,” Macedo, The

Constitution Sotirios Barber, The Constitution oj Judicial
,

New

Right

v.

the

Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1993).
177

Gillman, "The Struggle Over Marshall and the Politics of Constitutional History,” Political

Research Quarterly 878.
,

178

And, not surprisingly, Bork

is

ambivalent about Marshall on

this score, calling

“divided” John Marshall for just these reasons. The Tempting of America, 20-26.
I7y

Bork, The Tempting of America, 8

1
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him

the

Gillman

history,

new torm

1937, this

It

persuasive. Yet, given the constitutional
changes wrought by

is

s ironic,

ot originalism

no doubt,

originalists, but, in a

more powerful, not

way,

may

that the

new

may make

this

less so. If

be even more resonant.
originalists

might not be good

their criticism

of Griswold and Roe

1937 was truly the collapse of constitutional

originalism, rejecting the judicial limitation of
governmental power, then the

jurisprudence of a Bork

one plausible outcome of that change. Bork's

is

insistence, for example, that the judiciary should defer
to governmental

power

unless an individual has a textually enumerated right that
trumps governmental

power

is

a product ol the

New

Deal constitution, which recognizes unlimited

governmental power and limited individual
constitutional revolution that

Ackerman

argues, this

and Roe by insisting
he doesn't

The

tie

difficulty

them
is

is

to the

New

much

such thinking. Gillman

constitutional change

rights necessary

power. But the

—

if,

New

made
that

seen as a

regimes, as

rescue Griswold

Deal constitutional “synthesis,”

is

on

was

settled in this constitutional shift justifies

at the heart

far

more

of that revolution that squarely

solid

ground

in

suggesting that this

the quest for the judicial articulation of fundamental

is,

we

are to rescue the individual from overarching state

Deal did not

variety of possibilities that

New

tries to

is

Deal's constitutional change in a persuasive way.

that very little that

is

of the

Deal

in constitutional

While Ackerman

so.

that they are part

either opinion, while there

rejects

embraced a change

even more

New

rights. If the

settle this question.

we have

It

left us, rather,

with a

continued to argue over and contest

absence of a constitutional consensus.

If this requires

256

in the

conservatives to give a more

thorough

political justification for their

of progressives.
critique

is

my

If

view of judicial power,

this is just as true

conservatives cannot simply call “original intent”

of Roe, neither can progressives

call

“Carolene Products”

contention that the deep skepticism of judicial
discretion

Constitutional Revolution of 1937 exacerbated this
problem.

at

in their

in its defense.

the heart of the

By making judicial

will the central question ot constitutional
interpretation, the constitutional

ot this period

made

it

It

unlikely that such a consensus could develop.

The

change

unsettled

nature of fundamental rights in the post 1937 era. and the
continued acrimonious

debate with charges ot judicial “law making,” are as
inheritance as

is

much

a part of the

New

Deal

the dramatic expansion of governmental power.

Conclusion

Viewed through

the lens ot constitutional settlement,

we might

see the

Constitutional Revolution ot 1937" as part of an ongoing struggle. Facing

backward, the

New

Deal

may

well be seen as the culmination of decades of

constitutional struggle over governmental

traditional accounts

power

might blend with revisionist accounts

essentially contested nature of constitutional

Court

to regulate the

economy. Here

to recapture the

meaning during

this period,

itself offering conflicting opinions. Revisionists reveal the

thought during this era (even

if

with the

power of legal

the foundations of that thought were crumbling),

while traditionalists remind us of fluctuating Court opinions that were very often

at

odds with one another. This conflict came

line

to

an end as the Court

moved

into

with the political branches and cleared the way for the expansion of state

power. Although here, too,

this struggle

would resume with
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the return of

constitutional federalism in the

was

Reagan

years. Still, this constitutional
question

settled tor decades. Yet, facing
forward,

it

is this

very settlement that leaves

the nature of the Court's role in
relation to constitutional rights
in an essentially

contested and unsettled

that—does not
I

settle

o come

rights, the ghost

forging our

past.

own

state.

New

The

Deal regime-if it can even be called

such questions, even

if

it

forces us to take

to a constitutional settlement or

of Lochner

may need

to

be overcome.

revisionists,

we

As Gillman

New

’s

ghost resonance.

As

argues, in

cannot simply draw on the

echo a progressive view of

rights that, albeit tacitly, reinforces the
traditionalist critique of the

continues to give Lochner

up.

consensus on constitutional

definition of constitutional rights

Yet Gillman himself, and other

them

Old Court

that

these tensions at the heart of the

Deal come to a head with the return of “substantive
due process,”

onginalists are deeply connected to this historically
trajectory.
struggle

is

many ways

in

The ensuing

a replay of the constitutional debates of 1937. Not
only

did Justice Scalia's dissent in the most recent “substantive
due process” case

accuse the Court of abdicating

its

neutral role in constitutional interpretation,

accused the Court of usurping the democratic process by creating new

Turning

of fundamental

to the question

repeatedly

.

.

.

that only

scrutiny protection

—

fundamental rights qualify for

that

history and tradition.'”

rights, Scalia argued,

180

is,

‘rights

We

80

Lawrence

v.

Texas.

258

heightened

in this nation's

hear not just the faint echoes of

1

rights.

have held

this so-called

which are deeply rooted

jurisprudence in Scalia's reasoning, but as

1

“We

it

argue more fully

New

in the

Deal
next chapter, a

hearty-synthesis oi Justices Black and
Frankfurter which

preoccupied by tethering judicial will

to text

is

fundamentally

and tradition as originalism draws

deeply on the putative lesson of the
“Constitutional Revolution of 1937 ”
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CHAPTER 5
UNSETTLING THE NEW DEALREAGAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
Ronald Reagan consciously drew

Delano Roosevelt. So much

between himself and Franklin

so, in fact, that after his

1980 Republican Convention, the
title:

parallels

Franklin Delano Reagan.”

New

acceptance speech

at

the

York Times lead editorial ran under the

1

But as William Leuchtenburg writes, “Reagan

presented himself as Rooseveltian ... not

order to perpetuate

in

FDR's

political

tradition but for exactly the opposite purpose: to
dismantle the Roosevelt
coalition.'"

to

break the

Indeed,

New

we might push

stress.

Reagan himself put
first

that he

FDR

is

like

which the

sorely distorted

striking.

had the authority

constitutional vision

in

New

Deal party

FDR

before him had, he sought a return to

New

Deal had fallen away from and the

beyond recognition. Here the

Reagan was

the

first

president since

to interpret the Constitution in his

bound by Supreme Court opinions. Much

Quoted

Reagan did not simply seek

937” 3 and reconstruct our constitutionalism.

1

much

it,

principles,

Supreme Court had
Reagan and

further:

Far more ambitiously, Reagan sought to unsettle

the "Constitutional Revolution of

constitutional

even

Deal coalition to create one of his own, as the

system was already under

Or, as

this

Reagan was prepared

like

FDR,

own

parallel

FDR

right

to insist

and was not

in articulating his

to wrestle with the

between

own

Supreme Court

for

Sidney Milkis, The President and the Parlies: The Transformation of the American
New Deal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 263.

Party System Since the
'

William Leuchtenburg, In the Shadow of FDR: From Harry Truman to

Bill

Clinton (Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 1993) 225.

William Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn The Constitutional Revolution
Roosevelt

(New

York: Oxford University Press, 1995) 213.
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in the

Aye of

constitutional authority as he flatly rejected
the notion that he

Supreme Court's reading of the Constitution

as

handed down

was bound by

the

in its opinions.

This chapter takes up Reagan's attempted
constitutional reconstruction.

While Reagan has been treated as a “reconstructive"
4
president, a president who
attempted to “engage the nation
called

Reagan Revolution

revolution because

it

5
in a struggle for its constitutional
soul," the so-

by and large seen as a

is

stalled constitutional

did not bring about the kind of constitutional
reconstruction

or transformation that

FDR's New Deal wrought. Even

if true, this

overlooks an

important point. The recognition that presidents play a
profound role
constructing constitutional meaning

locus on the Court.

Too

olten this

Constitution in extraordinary

is

is

in

an important one that supplements our

seen as great presidents transforming the

moments of constitutional

politics;

6

yet

Reagan

unsettled the existing order without bringing on a lull-scale
constitutional

transformation.

As we have seen

and discontinuities come

in

more

in the last several chapters, constitutional

change

subtle forms. Constitutional politics plays out

through the ordinary political process without leading

to

grand constitutional

transformation.

On
Reagan

federalism and the enumerated powers of the national government,

articulated a constitutional vision that

was

at

odds with the

“Constitutional Revolution of 1937," and one that, after a lag, the Rehnquist

4

Stephen Skowronek, The Polities Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams
Bush (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993)416.
5

Marc Landy and Sidney

to

George

Milkis, Presidential Greatness (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,

2000) 198.
''

See especially Bruce Ackerman,

We

the People: Transformations (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1998).
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C ourt began to articulate. Here,

appointments

this

chapter seeks to connect judicial

to questions ot constitutional interpretation

and development, what

Bruce Ackerman has called “transformative judicial
7
appointments .’'
appointments

may

not only serve as a

constitutional vision, but may,

whereby he

lor the President to put forth his

successfully pursued,

it

alters or overturns past

judicial appointments

way

Judicial

become

the

Supreme Court opinions. The

mechanism

literature

on

rarely integrated into larger questions of
constitutional

is

theory and development

8
.

But the evidence

is at

least suggestive that

Reagan's

determination to overturn longstanding Supreme Court interpretations
of the

Constitution— and thereby
partly

accomplished by

How judicial
interpretation

It

we

is

look only

his

articulate a “constitutional

Rehnquist Court appointees.

appointments are connected

to questions

at

Supreme Court opinions, we

are likely to see the judiciary

we have

constitutional vision.

So even

the political branches

may be behind

Justices have been the

il

most vocal

it.

silent).

Ackerman, We the People

,

But

this

misses

the President's

the appearance of judicial supremacy,

It is

not without irony that the

articulators

years, despite the fact that the President

In pursuit

remain

The Court's opinions may be based on

the larger background.

*

of constitutional

a neglected area ol study in the debate about judicial supremacy.

settling constitutional issues (if the other branches

7

reconstruction”— has been

who

of judicial supremacy

Reagan

in recent

appointed them rejected this very

26.

of what Sheldon Goldman

agenda.” Goldman, Picking
Reagan (New Haven: Yale University

calls a president’s “policy

Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection From Roosevelt

to

Press, 1997) 3. See also Terri Perreti, In Defense of a Political Court (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1999)

who makes

this

connection explicit.
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notion.

Even

justices

who have

Reagan's constitutional vision has found
acceptance by the

so,

revived a judicial defense of constitutional
federalism. This

suggests that the executive

meaning even

may

play a central role in determining
constitutional

absence of a great "constitutional moment."

in the

While the Rehnquist Court has begun

articulating

Reagan's view of

federalism, and thereby reopened constitutional
questions that have been settled

since the

New

limitations

Court

s

on

Deal,

its

it

is

not clear that Congress has accepted the
Court's

power under

the guise of federalism, or, for that
matter, the

claims to judicial supremacy. Reagan unsettled
these meanings. They

remain, though, in state ot constitutional flux revealing

how

constitutional politics

play out on a smaller scale, with constitutional
meaning in an unsettled

state.

Presidential Reconstruction and Constitutional Politics

The President

s

connection with constitutional maintenance has long been

recognized by presidential scholars, even

much
insists

ot public law scholarship.

it it

has not been fully integrated into

y

In I he Federalist

on the necessity of executive independence

Constitution against the transient

aggrandizement.

10

whims of the

This comes from the

Papers Alexander Hamilton
,

as a

way

to preserve the

public as well as legislative

man who

insisted in Federalist 7H that

"the complete independence of the courts of justice

is

peculiarly essential in a

Keith Whittington, “The Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy" in Sotirios Barber and
P. George, eds., C onstitutional Politics: Essays on Constitutional Making Maintenance,

Robert

and Change

(Princeton: Princeton University Press 2001) is one such attempt. Earlier studies, like
Robert Scigliano’s The President and the Supreme Court (New York: Free Press, 1971) drew on

the special connection, but largely deferred to judicial supremacy.

Alexander Flamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor,
and 73, 400 and 410. See also, Jeffrey Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton:

1999) No. 7

I

Princeton University Press, 1986) 39-40.
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limited Constitution.” 11 Public law scholars-and
especially legal scholars-

remain fixated on Federalist

78, insisting that the judiciary

constitutional meaning. Indeed,

announced

was

if

when Reagan's Attorney General Edwin Meese

bound by judicial opinions

as a matter of constitutional principle, 12

Meese was

Yet Meese

the final arbiter of

that the President could interpret the Constitution
in his

not, therefore,

them

is

out to subvert

—

claim on Reagan

s

rather than maintain

in the legal

—

academy acted

when

it

FDR

all

came

all

of the agreed

13

It

shouldn't

upon "great presidents were departmentalists
'

to constitutional interpretation.

Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and

claimed the power to interpret the Constitution independently of Supreme

Court opinions. Jackson, Lincoln, and
directly, arguing that they

It's

as

the claims of past

presidents and part of a robust lineage in constitutional interpretation.

escape notice that

to

constitutional government.

was consistent with

behalf

s

and

right

broad sense of adhering

in the

many

own

f

DR confronted the

Supreme Court

were not bound by specific Supreme Court opinions.

not just that they ventured

—

as a matter of constitutional theory

were capable of independent constitutional

—

that they

interpretation; rather, they struggled

with the Court for constitutional authority. And, not coincidentally, such struggles
14

“reconstructed" our constitutionalism.

Stephen Skowronek's reconstructive

presidents “reset the very terms and conditions of constitutional government”;

11

Federalist 78 434.
,

12

Edwin Meese

III,

“Perspective on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decision: The

of the Constitution" Tulane Law Review 6
11

Ronald Dworkin, Freedom

originally appeared in the

's

1

:

979

Skowronek, The

1

Politics Presidents

Law

987).

Law (Cambridge: Harvard

New York Review

University Press, 1996) (essays that

of Books); Laurence Tribe, Constitutional Choices

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
14

(

Make, 39.
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Mark Landy and Sidney
need

tor great

Milkis's great presidents “taught the citizenry
about the

change but also about how

constitutional traditions and purposes.”

1

'

to reconcile

such change with American

Bruce Ackerman has connected such

presidential struggles with dramatic constitutional
change leading to the creation

of new constitutional regimes
suggested that
judicial

16
.

reconstructive

In a similar vein, Keith Whittington has

presidents have a unique capacity to challenge

supremacy and "play the

role of constitutional prophet .” 17

Skowronek and Landy and Milkis only touch on

the Court incidentally,

and Whittington see the inherited Court, committed
principal challenger to a president's ability to

constitutional

While

to the old

Ackerman

regime, as the

remake our fundamental

commitments. Such moments ol presidential reconstruction are

extraordinary moments, after which the Supreme Court once again takes the

primary responsibility for maintaining the Constitution. The cyclical unfolding of
founding, decay, and regeneration places great presidents
“perpetuator” of our "republican institutions.” The
narrative

constitutional politics, after

a

good deal

10

to a

moment of

more ordinary

politics.

it

There

is

moments of

misses the way significant constitutional change can

incrementally, absent extraordinary transformation or clear-cut political

realignment, as

15

which we return

of

of the

ot truth to this, especially the recognition of punctuated

constitutional change, but

come

common theme

presidential interpretation as an extraordinary

is

in the role

Landy and

we have

seen in the

last several chapters.

Milkis, Presidential Greatness 4.
,

Although Ackerman focuses only on Lincoln and FDR, neglecting Jefferson and Jackson, and
Reagan’s attempted transformation failed. We the People 390-403.

explicitly arguing that

,
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Reagan
as a

is

frequently placed along Jefferson, Jackson,
Lincoln, and

departmental^ president who sought

most view
that the

proved

New

Beginning changed the terms and conditions of
national

tar less successful than the

New

As Milkis and Landy

Deal

put

it,

in reconstructing

even reinforcing

dismantling.”

19

politics,

it

American

his administration to the task

the state apparatus

Ackerman speaks

all

“Reagan’s emphasis on presidential

and executive administration relegated

managing

our constitutionalism, but

his attempt as tailing short of past
presidential re-orderings: “For

government.
politics

to refound

FDR

it

was committed

of

to

specifically of Reagan's “failed” constitutional

transformation.'" Concurrent with pronouncements of Reagan's
failed
constitutional reconstruction, legal scholars began speaking of
the “Rehnquist

Court

s

federalism revolution

as auguring a

post-New Deal jurisprudence. Some

directly accused the Court of “unconstitutionally" rejecting the

New

Deal's

constitutional settlement, of reopening settled constitutional questions. 21

Others

praised the Court for returning to the constitutional scheme of federalism. 22 In the

1995 case of United States

v.

Lopez, the Court did reject a congressional act as

beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause

for the first time since the

New

Deal

17

Whittington, “The Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy,’' 274.
18

19

Skowronek, The

Landy and

Polities Presidents

Make

,

428.

Milkis, Presidential Greatness 225.
,

Ackerman, We the People 39
,

1

Stephen Gottlieb, Morality Imposed (New York:
the

message of Ackerman’s We the People

New York

Steven Calabresi, “Federalism and the Rehnquist Court:
the

University Press). Arguably, this

is

as well.

A Normative

American Academy of Political and Social Science 574: 24 (200
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1

Defense” The Annals of

revolution ot 1937.

Court

s revival ot

23

Are we

living in a constitutional

down

this path.

Nearly

period, even while disagreeing on whether

all

is

it

agree that

New

how

far the

we

are in a transitory

Deal essentially

intact.

25

importantly, there seems to be a consensus that the emerging
constitutional

debate must be measured against the backdrop of the

moment

constitutional

New

Deal

As an isolated
League oj Cities

state. If rather

which

New

Deal, the

last great

our history. Debates about the legitimacy of the Court’s

in

federalism serve as a proxy, in

of the

Just

a major constitutional shift or a

mild departure, a mere corrective that leaves the

new

24

federalism will reach remains to be seen, but since Lopez
the

Court has continued

More

moment?

some ways,

obviously, there

for debates about the legitimacy

is

a connection

between Reagan's

take up below, Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in National
1976) held out limitations on Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause, but did so indirectly by way ot state sovereignty. Moreover, it was overturned nine years
later by Garcia. Although, as
argue below, this was surely an initial probing that laid out
case,
v.

Usery

I

(

I

Rehnquist’s view of federalism, which the Court would

start to fully

and consistently articulate

after Lopez.
24

Mark Tushnet, “Living

Western Reserve

in a

Law Review

Constitutional

Moment? Lopez and

New

46: 845 (1996) and The

Constitutional Theory”

Case

Constitutional Order (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 2003).
:s

To name

Dean Alfange, Jr., “The Supreme Court and Federalism: Yesterday and
ed.. Politics and Constitutionalism: The Louis Fisher Connection (Albany:
SUNY Press, 2000); Tinsley E. Yarbrough, The Rehnquist Court and the Constitution (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000); John Dinan, “The Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions in
Perspective” Journal of Law and Politics Spring 1999; Timothy Conlan and Francois Vergniolle
de Chantal, "The Rehnquist Court and Contemporary American Federalism” Political Science
Quarterly Volume 16 Number 2 (2001); Richard Fallon, “The ‘Conservative’ Paths of the
Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions” University of Chicago Law Review 69: 429 (2002); J.
I

but a few.

oday" Robert Spitzer,

,

1

Mitchell Pickerill and Cornell Clayton, “Politics and the Safeguards of Federalism During the

Rehnquist Court” paper delivered

at the

American

Political

Science Association, Boston,

MA,

2002; Thomas Keck, The Supreme Court and Modern Constitutional Conservatism. I <137-2002
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming); Christopher Schroeder, “Causes of the
Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpretation” Duke Law Journal 51: 307 (2001); Neal Devins,

“Congress as Culprit:

Law Journal

5

1

:

How Law

435 (200

1

);

Makers Spurred on

the Court's Anti-Congress

Keith Whittington, “Taking

Court's Federalism Offensive” Duke

Law Journal

5

1

:

What They Give

477 (200

1

),

all

Crusade” Duke

Us: Explaining the

see the see the shift as

even while disagreeing profoundly over particulars. For an interesting demurer, see
Robert Nagel, The Implosion of American Federalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001
who argues that nationalism reigns supreme and that the recent move to federalism is minor at
significant,

best.
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attempted constitutional reconstruction and the revival
of federalism on the

Rehnquist Court: tour ot the five justices behind the revival
were appointed by

Reagan and

the fifth

was appointed by George Bush

senior, “faithful son"

of the

Reagan Revolution. 26
Reagan's Reconstruction

Reagan was
rejected the

New

the

Deal

first

president living in the

Flipping

state.

FDR

on

address Reagan insisted that “In the present
to

our problem; government

is

his head, in his first inaugural

crisis,

the problem.”

shadow of FDR who squarely

The

government

is

not the solution

election of 1980 brought

federalism and the notion of a limited government of enumerated powers back to
the political agenda in a

Deal administrative

The

first full

way

state;

it

that challenged the continuing validity

year of the Reagan administration seemed to

seemed

at rolling

and the 100 Days Congress were
to stall in the election

fulfill this

tax cuts and a reduction in

expenditures, aiming specifically

FDR

New

looked like the long-awaited political realignment.

Reagan pushed through sizeable

to

of the

back the

inevitable.

of 1984. Reagan

won

New

promise as

government

Deal

state.

Comparisons

Yet the Reagan Revolution
a landslide victory, but the

Republicans failed to gain control of the House of Representatives. Reagan's
personal victory was not translated into a constitutional transformation that

dramatically rejected

26

Skowronek, The

New

Deal constitutionalism. In 1986, Democrats

Politics Presidents

Moke, 429.
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won

back

control ol the Senate and the

Contra.

was already showing

to challenge the

New

Deal Constitution

signs of strain. Indeed, as

1

argued

in part

will take

up more

fully

in the constitutional

below. The

New

because

it

in the last chapter, the

Deal Constitutional order was perplexed by deep incongruities

which was made evident
I

fizzled out in the scandal of Iran-

27

Reagan was able

New

Reagan Revolution

at its heart,

debates over Grisw old and Roe that

Deal order appeared to be

degenerating, as the administrative state seemed unwieldy and the political
coalition that sustained

efforts timely.

Some

FDR

began

to disintegrate,

which made reconstructive

scholars of political realignment pronounced the

coalition dead in 1968, if not earlier. Nevertheless, even Nixon,

who

New

Deal

insisted

upon

a “strict construction” of the Constitution and spoke more actively of federalism

than any president until Reagan, never questioned the fundamentals of the

Deal constitutional order

in

terms of governmental power.

suggested that Nixon was the

remained coherent

from the outset
In this

in

in the

way

order; rather, the

realm of “civil

New

Deal

28

Thus the

New

Deal order

to

liberties.”

merge

the

Warren Court brought out

constitutionalism and revealed

path of the

Deal president.

has even been

terms of governmental power, but was beset with tension

is difficult

it

New

last

It

New

in

how Lyndon

Warren Court with

the tensions in

New

the

Deal

Deal

Johnson's Great Society followed the

one area (national regulation) and inherited

II

New

its

Reagan’s election may look more like 1896 than 1932 if it ushers in a period of constitutional
uncertainty much like 1895-1925, rather than the sharp change of 1935-1941.
Milkis, The President

and the

Parties 228.
,

269

discontinuities in another (the role of the Court in relation to civil
liberties). Thus,

the so-called

New

Deal Constitution was already revealing unsettled

some

constitutional issues in

areas with consensus in others.

backdrop of discontent with the
constitutional vision,

New

which required

20

Against this

Deal order Reagan offered a limited
less

from government; indeed, as

1

have

already noted, he wanted to “get the government off the people's backs.” In

he was more like Jefferson and Jackson than FDR. Accomplishing

this,

this

constitutional change required an alteration in public expectations: the people

must demand

less

of the national government; they must be weaned away from

some ways, such

national administrative programs. In

a project

seemed well

suited to Reagan's rhetorical leadership, itself an outgrowth of the

presidency, rather than the earlier style of Calvin Coolidge

trumpeted as an ideal president.

Democratic President

government
president

is

was

health care. If

And

to a

Bill Clinton, after all.

New

Reagan

who pronounced

we know

it,

30
It

was

the

the “the era of big

while his greatest failure as

Deal-style attempt at government-mandated universal

didn't bring about a Republican realignment, he

have changed the ideological dimension of both

29

whom Reagan often

degree Reagan succeeded.

over” and ended welfare as

the

modern

parties in a

seems

to

more conservative

merge the Great Society and New Deal as a single constitutional order,
which neglects the way in which ordinary political change even simple judicial appointments—
helped bring in constitutional change that revealed the tensions at the heart of the New Deal. See
his The New Constitutional Order. On judicial appointments and the Great Society, see Goldman,
Tushnet attempts

to

Picking Federal Judges

—

,

1

54- 97.
1

Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency 181, goes so far as to say that "Democrats now talk like
Republicans.” While this was certainly true of New Democrat presidential contenders, it is
arguably less so of Congressional Democrats, or those seeking to run as president after Bill

30

,

Clinton.
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direction

31
.

At the same time, using the

tools of the

New Deal— a reliance on

administration and the courts to bring about constitutional change

seemed trapped by

the old order and unable to reconstitute the government’s

fundamental commitments

32
.

Here Reagan

constitutional vision in an immediate way.

in

— Reagan

failed to bring about his

Still,

the

whole

Reagan Revolution succeeded

reopening a debate about the terms of our constitutionalism and placed the

legitimacy ot the

debate that

is

New

very

In this,

Deal Constitution squarely

much

at the

center of this debate

—

alive.

Reagan did

instigate a constitutional revolution of sorts. Or,

perhaps more aptly, he succeeded

in unsettling

fundamental constitutional

New

questions that had been settled by the politics of the
“reconstructive” president

may remain

Deal. Whether he

is

a

be seen, but he surely disrupted the old

to

order, leaving the contours of our constitutionalism the subject of intense debate

(which

is

true of

moreover,

is

in

FDR

as well

on many constitutional

an area that cut to the heart of the

more, he did

it

in a peculiarly

New

Deal

New

style:

issues).

Reagan did

this,

Deal: federalism. And, what

by way of transformative judicial

appointments. Ackerman himself argues that one of the fundamental changes

wrought by the

New

Deal was the “self-conscious use of transformative judicial

appointments as a central tool for constitutional change .”

Reagan's attempted constitutional transformation as a

31

At

least at the presidential level,

to be seen if
32

it

will hold, as Al

Skowronek, The

though

Gore ran

Politics Presidents

this

is

33

failure.

'

Unlike Roosevelt,

not true at the congressional level and

to the left

of Clinton

in

it

remains

2000.

Make, 416-429 and Landy and Milkis, Presidential

Greatness, 2 19-226.
'

Yet Ackerman paints

Ackerman, We the People: Transformations, 26
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(italics in original).

Reagan did not win a
and

election,

in the defeat

Bork

s

in

solid Republican majority in the

1986 the Republicans

lost the Senate,

in the

which very

of Reagan's nomination of Judge Robert Bork

1984

likely resulted

Supreme Court.

to the

confirmation, tor Ackerman, combined with Reagan's earlier
elevation of

William Rehnquist
to the Court,

opinions

may

to the

Chief Justiceship and the appointment of Antonin Scalia

well have culminated in a series of transformative constitutional

— namely

the overruling of

Roe

controversial 1973 opinion recognizing a

abortion.

Instead, tailing to

Reagan was forced

who

Congress

v.

Wade,

34

the

woman's

constitutional right to have an

win wide-spread support

to appoint the

Supreme Court's

for his constitutional vision,

more moderate Anthony Kennedy

to the Court,

brought constitutional politics to a crashing halt when he joined Justice

O'Connor, another Reagan appointee, and
plurality opinion upholding

Ackerman

suggests.

What

is

Roe

in

Justice Souter, a

Planned Parenthood

v.

Bush appointee,

Casey

—

odd about Ackerman's argument

is

that he sees the failure to

New

Constitution stands because the Reagan Revolution failed. But Roe

to reconcile with the

New

Deal constitutional regime.

the discontinuities in

New

Deal constitutionalism making

chapter suggested, to speak meaningfully of a

in the

New

or so

3^

overturn Roe as a rejection of Reagan's constitutional vision. The

Nothing

in a

New

If

Deal

itself is

hard

anything. Roe highlights

it

difficult, as the last

Deal constitutional regime.

Deal constitutional revolution justified the Court's opinion

Roe, which embraced the very substantive due process arguments that the Court

Roe

v.

Wade. A 10 U.S. 113 (1973)

272

in

had rejected
the

to

New

1

937, clearing the

this tact:

we

New

for the

Deal.

3

"

Indeed,

see in Roe. Dissenting in Roe,
Justice Rehnquist

at

the center of

drew

attention to

"while the Court's opinion quotes from
the dissent of Mr. Justice
Lochner. the result

in

it

opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham
Justice

way

Deal was a need to tether judicial
power against the kind of reasoning
(so

speak)

Holmes

in

Hugo

reaches

is

more

in that case.”

Black's Griswold dissent that

I

37

closely attuned to the major,
ty

Rehnquisfs dissent echoed

discussed

in the last chapter.

Let

me

quote Black again:

The Due Process Clause with an

"arbitrary and capricious'
or "shocking the conscience’ formula was
liberally used by

Court to strike down economic legislation in
the early
decades ol this century, threatening, many people
this

thought,
the tranquility and stability of the Nation.
See, e.g.
Lochner. That formula, based on subjective
considerations
ol ‘natural justice,'

no

less dangerous when used to
enforce this Court's views about personal rights than
those
about economic rights. I had thought that we had laid
is

that

formula, as a means for striking

state of

once and

The

return of substantive due process in

New

39

'

37

West Coast Hotel Co. 38

Roe highlighted

the fractured

New

For

Dealer's critique of the old

New

Dealers, Lochner

— with

court—on
its

who had been

the ghost of Lochner—

embrace of substantive due

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
West Coast Hotel Company

Roe

v.

Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).

at 174.

Griswold
19

for all in cases like

Deal jurisprudence and provoked many legal scholars

the

to cry foul.

M

state legislation, to

rest

weaned on

35

down

v.

C onneclicut 38

Most notably John Hart

1

Ely,

U.S. 479, 522

who spun

(

1965)

(J.

Black dissenting).

out Harlan Fiske Stone’s famous Carotene Products

footnote four into a full-fledged theory of judicial review

in

Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of

Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), objected to Roe. Ely argued that
Roe was not just bad constitutional law, but not constitutional law at all. “The Wages of Crying
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process-was synonymous with judicial
lawmaking and
the tensions within

New

Deal jurisprudence, for

all that

a political Court. For

left unsettled,

it

from substantive due process was a
unifying theme. 40 Reagan's
to a jurisprudence

all

the retreat

call for a return

of "original intent” highlighted the
tension between rejecting

Luchner and embracing Roe, drawing
heavily upon the condemnation
of Lochner
as

handed down by the

New

Dealers themselves.

As expounded upon by Bork

and Scalia, originalism rejected the very
notion of substantive due process
whether of the Lochner or Roe variety, and

New

in this

way

digested a central tenet of

Deal constitutionalism. For originalists,
these decisions were of a piece,

which placed these jurists squarely with the
Constitutional Revolution of 1937 on
this issue; that is,

on the need

to tether judicial will.

41

The preoccupation with

reconciling judicial review with democratic
government and the suggestion that

any attempt to define substantive rights beyond
constitutional text was

were inheritances from the

New

all politics,

Deal critique of the Old Court. 42 Having

criticized the Court s use of judicial review as
illegitimate.

New

Dealers became

A Comment on Roe v. Wade" 82 Yale Law Journal 920 ( 1973). See also. Laura Kalman.
The Strange C areer oj Legal Liberalism (New Haven: Yale
University Press,
Wolf:

1996) 1-10.

40

Although

Mark

this argument repeatedly flared up between Felix
Frankfurter and Hugo Black. See
Silverstein, Constitutional Faiths: Felix Frankfurter, Hugo
Black, and the Process

of

Judicial Decision-Making (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1984) and C. Herman Pritchet. The
Roosevelt Court: A Stud'y in Judicial Politics and Values. IV37-IV47
(Chicago: The Universitv
Press, 1948).
41

Robert Bork, The Tempting of America (New York: Free Press, 1990) 57. “In
my history-book,
was covered with dishonor and deprived of legitimacy by Dred Scott v. Sandford
857), an erroneous (and widely opposed) opinion that it did not abandon, rather than by

the Court
(

1

West

Coast Hotel

(

1937), which produced the

famous ‘switch

widely opposed) constitutional opposition
originalism

is

unenumerated
Michael
4

’

H

v.

a bit different than Bork

s

to

from the Court's erroneous (and
the social measures of the New Deal.” Scalia’s

insofar as he has

rights that are clearly part of our history

Gerald D. 491 U.S.

See Holmes’ dissenting opinion

I

in

in

time

shown

and

a willingness to

draw on

tradition. See, e.g., Scalia’s

opinion

10(1989).

Adkins

v.

274

Children

's

Hospital 26

1

U.S. 525 (1923).

in

preoccupied with grounding judicial review

in a

way

that clearly limited judicial

power. Let us recall Professor Herbert Wechsler's
dilemma from the

The problem

tor

where we thought
in the areas

it

became:

ot us

all

helpful in

How

American

where we considered

it

its

New

Deal inheritance. Whether or not

illuminated

tension

its

tensions with the

at the heart

New

at the

same time condemn

was coming

constitutional change that

fell

it

43

Originalism's preoccupation
in

it

countermajoritarian terms

draws squarely on

this

this is accurate constitutional history

it

was

Deal regime

a forceful critique of Roe that

—

illuminated, in fact, the

of the “Constitutional Revolution of 1937.” 44 The

constitutional order

chapter.

a judicial veto in areas

in “original intent”

concerned,

is

and

life ...

— viewing

attempt to ground judicial will

insotar as original intent itself

we defend

unhelpful'?”

with the legitimacy ot judicial review

and

can

last

apart, as the

away from

its

New

Deal

Court had already instituted
foundations (in part because those

foundations were essentially contested from the beginning). Reagan's originalism

was

in part

an attempt to recover constitutional foundations

—

albeit

an attempt of

a very different sort.

Reagan's originalism traveled easily with the
Lochner, but

it

posed a challenge

federalism. While the

New

to the

New

’

44

Quoted

in

Deal's critique of

Deal Constitution when

it

came

Deal court abandoned substantive due process,

embraced a far-reaching view of Congress' power

4

New

it

to

also

to regulate interstate

Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn 234.
,

For an interesting take on constitutional Originalism and the

rise

of the

New

Deal see Howard

Gillman, “The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the ‘Living
in the Course of American State-Building” Studies
Development 11:1 49- 89 ( 997).

Constitution’

1

1
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in

American

Political

commerce,
limitations

rejecting arguments that
federalism or the Tenth

on national power/'

squarely challenged the

As Bork described

New

On

these issues, Reagan's
constitutional vision

Deal Constitution and

"The [New Deal] Court's

it,

Amendment were

its

institutional arrangements.

refusal to enforce limits

of any

kind simply abandoned this
aspect of the Constitution.
That worked a revolution
in the relationship

of the federal government to
the

state

governments and

people, and the revolution did
not have to await a
constitutional

By

Ackerman

to legitimate constitutional

Roe and

New

the

s

able to claim that the

is

change and, from

Deal Constitution. This

New

Deal

is

specious. But

federahsm represents a challenge

Reagan

to the

challenge to that order was

Ackerman

s

is

we

are

failed

living

still

troublesome because the link between

more importantly,

New

at least

the resurgence of

Deal order and shows signs that
partly successful. In fact.

scholarship in and of itself seems to reflect
the potency of Reagan's

protters a sort of

"New

call for original intent,

New

Deal.

Ackerman

Deal Onginalism” as a preemptive strike
against Reagan's

which rejected

federalism and limited government

'

Reagan Revolution

there, claim that

challenge: by rooting our current Constitution
in the

4

amendment ." 46

focusing on Roe and Casey, while
neglecting the Reagan Court's

federalism decisions,

under the

to the

See especially. United States

v.

Darby

3

New

Deal foundations when

it

came

to

47

Reagan's

.

1

2 U.S.

1

00

(

1

failure to overturn

94

1

Roe amounts.

).

46

Bork, The Tempting of America, 57. See also, Raoul
Berger. Federalism: The Founder's Desien
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987).
4

George Thomas, “New Deal ’Originalism”’ Polity Vol. XXXIII,
No.
Ldward White, The Constitution and the New Deal (Cambridge:

I, Fall 2000. See also G.
Harvard University Press, 2000)
27. Indeed, Reagan’s turn to original intent could be
seen as widely successful in that it has"
reshaped the debate about constitutional interpretation. When
the Reagan Administration

brought

original intent

back

to the table, the

debate was often described as a debate between
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then, to a failure to ratify his
constitutional vision,

Rehnquist Court's departure from

Ackerman

surely right that

is

ot the failure.

New

Reagan

this count.

the Court s judicial

Even

But he makes too much

48

interpret the

that he

law rather than

would put

legislate

a sure and easy

way

to affirm

Reagan's

and religious groups. And while numerous scholars

focus on this aspect of Reagan

.

and again,

criticized

such moves were largely rhetorical. Castigating

so,

lawmaking was

to pro-liters

insisted, again

who would

the bench

a clear criticism of Roe.

it

on

Reagan spoke often about overturning Roe and
frequently

men and women on

overplaying

Deal foundations “unconstitutional."

failed

what he called judicial lawmaking. He

commitment

which then makes the

As Landy and

s

constitutional vision, there

is

a danger of

Milkis argue, “Reagan the divorce', the

huckster, the casual churchgoer, the signer of the California
abortion

coexisted uneasily with Reagan the Savonarola.

As long

as the

TV

bill

Democrats kept

control of at least one house of Congress, he did not need to resolve his

ambivalence.

He

could continue

to rhetorically support a

whole host of

conservative initiatives without having to actually put them into practice ." 49

and “noninterpretivists.” But in the wake of Reagan, we are all interpretivists
now. Once powerful critics of Originalism like Ronald Dworkin now speak its very language. In a
way the argument is over who has the better form of “Originalism." See Dworkin's Freedom 's

“interpretivists”

Law (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1996). See also. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights:
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Ackerman’s scholarship

Creation and Reconstruction
itself

should be placed

in

the context of

only be understood against
48

its

American

constitutional development, as his

argument can

trajectory.

Donald Grier Stephenson, Campaigns and the Court (New York: Columbia University

Press,

1999) focuses almost exclusively on the Court and abortion. James Simon's The Center Holds

(New

York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) speaks about the failure of the conservative revolution,

but doesn’t even have a chapter on federalism!
44

Landy and Milkis, Presidential Greatness 224. Which is not to say that Reagan wasn’t
committed to these socially conservative issues, but he seemed unwilling to spend political
,

to

achieve them.
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capital

Reagan
were

commitment

s

to limited

very core of his political vision. Reagan and
Meese's vision of

at the

originalism brings this out.

was not

government and federalism, on the other hand,

that they

What was most egregious about

allowed abortion;

it

from where they properly belonged:

was

the fact that they

in the

hands of the

decisions like Roe

removed

states.

The

the decisions

states

themselves might choose to allow abortion, but constitutional
principles of
federalism

Court

commanded

that the issue be decided there

50
.

In the

wake of Casey, Ackerman

But

politics.

this isn

true. Or, to

t

New

Deal regime, so

it’s

says,

we

are

returned to normal

see in the realm of civil liberties under

not clear that

Reagan and the Rehnquist Court

“we have

vary the formula, ordinary politics itself

contains constitutional politics, which
the

and not by the Supreme

more

we

ever

left

such politics behind.

likely just a particularly vivid

and

potent form of constitutional politics in an area that had been settled. The very

same year

that

Casey was handed down,

meaning of the Tenth Amendment
Three years

later the Court, in

scope of Congress'

that

the Court reopened a debate

had been

settled since the

on the

New

Deal

52
.

Lopez clearly struck down a law as beyond the
,

Commerce Clause power

for the first time since the

New

s

"

David

E.

Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution,

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 19%), argues

amendments
This

1 776-1995
Reagan supported many conservative

same kind of rhetorical purposes, 447-455.

even true for abortion. In the 2000 partial birth abortion case, Carhart v. Stenberg
Kennedy and O’Connor argued with one another over the very meaning of Casey. And

isn't

Justices
the

for the

that

,

Congress passed the “Born Alive Infants Act"

in

July of 2002, which

may

well have dramatic

ramifications for abortion.

New

York

v.

United States 505 U.S. 144 (1992). O'Connor’s majority opinion on the Tenth

Amendment does
placed

in

context

not easily square with Darby. Again, Usery foreshadows these opinions, but
it

seems an

isolated case.
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Deal. Since that time the
Court has

shown

that

is

i,

willing t0 pollce the

boundaries between the states
and the national government:
limiting Congress-

power under

the

commerce

clause .

53

breathing

and recognizing the sovereign
immunity of the
Justices of the Rehnquis,
Court will go

of federalism decisions

Reagan

will

is

life into

states

the Tenth

55
.

Just

how

an open question, as

Amendment «
far the

Reagan

whether

is

this line

be solidified over time.

s Transformative
Appointments

Much

like

Roosevelt before him. Sheldon
Goldman argues that Reagan

“self-consciously attempted to use
the
the bench judges

who

power of judicial appointments

shared [hisj general philosophy ." 56
In

to place

on

Reagan saw a

fact.

transformation of the judiciary as key
to his political agenda and.

in

Goldman's

terms, policy considerations drove
his judicial appointments.
Unlike Roosevelt,
the Court did not play spoiler to

Reagan

To

directly.

return to a

more

limited

vision ot government, the administration
could cut government spending and

taxes and

As long

let

the states and local governments
take up their

as the government acted in such a
fashion,

it

significant

change

in

New

York

v.

on

it

articulated a

directly.

Yet absent a

our constitutional vision or a fundamental
change on the

Lope: and United States
4

to act

traditional roles.

could bring about significant

change without confronting the Court. So while
Reagan
departmental ist vision, he was not forced

more

v.

Morrison 529 U.S. 598 (2000).

United States and Print:

” Seminole Tnhe of Florida

v.

United States 52

I

U.S. 898 (1997),

Florida 5 7 U. S. 44 (1996); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank 527 U.S.
627 (1999); College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board
527 U.S. 666 (1999); A l den v. Maine
527 U.S. 706 (1999); Kimel v. Florida Board
of Regents 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett 53 U.S. 356 (2001
);
v.

1

1

279

Court. Reagan's return to
limited government would
be transitory rather than
foundational.

To

solidify a return to
"dual sovereignty." he
turned to judicial

appointments. His quarrel with
the Court was largely
rhetorical, insisting tha,
states

and

local

governments return

Court opintons he was most

critical

to their traditional
functions.

i,

l

e,

The Supreme

of-those forcing school busing,
forbidding

prayer ,n public schools, and
nationalizing abortion and
criminal rights—

prevented the states from making
choices he thought they were
constitutionally
vested with the power to make.
This required a change

in judtcial

getting justices to police the
boundaries of federalism in a

done since the pre-New Deal

was an

years.

The

insistence on judicial restraint:

rhetoric,

let state

not federal courts. Judicial
restraint, though,

much

like

legislatures

was only

way

part

philosophy:

that hadn't

been

Roosevelt's before,

make

these decisions,

of the

picture.

At the

national level a constitutionally
mandated return to federalism might
require a

much more

active judiciary. If the national
government had a broader vision of

constitutional

come

power than

the

Reagan administration

did.

it

would very

into conflict with a Court
dedicated to federalism. Perhaps

likely

more than any

administration since FDR's, Reagan was
committed to this jurisprudential
indeed, the administration started vetting
candidates for the
there

56

'

were even any vacancies

shift;

Supreme Court before

77
.

Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, 285.

7

David Yaiof, Pursuit of Justices: Presidential
Politics and the Selection
of Supreme Court
Nominees (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1999) 143. David O'Brien suggest that the
Reagan judges may well be his most enduring legacy,
“The Reagan Judges: His Most Enduring
Legacy. Charles O. Jones, ed„ The Reagan Legacy:
Promise and Performance (Chatham:
Chatham House Publishers, 1988). See also Goldman, Picking
Federal Judges, 285-345
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its

Reagan's reliance on judicial
appointments

change was
But

in par,

due

to the fact that he

also reveals the degree to which

i,

institutional order

the

in direct conflict

with the Court.

Reagan was working within an

even while attempting

existing constitutional order.

was no.

to bring about constitutional

to

change

that very order.

Reagan worked primarily through

modern executive: through administration
and

inherited

To

alter the

the instruments of

presidential rhetoric, no. large-

scale legislative change. These
instruments are part of the most
profound

constitutional change of the twentieth
century and Reagan's use of them
to foment
constitutional

was.

change reflected

just

how

Through judicial appointments,

Policy, and by

way of executive

Reagan attempted

rooted

FDR's

administrative executive

the Department of J ustice.
Office of Legal

orders and presidential signing statements.

59
to shift constitutional thinking in
legal terms
.

Reagan

criticized a "political" Court,

arena— the

And

most of the action was contained

while

in the legal

stuff of lawyers and courts, not high-level
60
constitutional politics
.

Reagan

s

rhetorical eltorts

seemed

to

promise more.

Here again, Reagan embraced the modern presidency:
he was the
rhetorical president.

But there was a

twist.

Reagan's

rhetoric, unlike

many

modern

presidents, raised “important constitutional concerns .” 62

Reagan

also used rhetoric to mobilize and flatter his political
supporters.

Of course.
(One

58

Milkis, President

and the

Parties.

See Kenneth Mayer, With the Stroke oj a Pen; Executive Orders
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
60

and Presidential Power

What Cowell Clayton calls the “judicialization of politics.” The Politics Justice:
The Attorney
of
General and the Making of Legal Policy (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992) 146-155.

(>l

Tulis,

The Rhetorical President 189-202
,

62

Ibid. 192.
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wonders, even,

if

much of his

constitutional rhetoric on abortion
and the like

was

of this nature.) Reagan's rhetoric
provoked a constitutional debate that
freed his

administration from the Court

Reagan's rhetoric
could offer

its

monopoly of constitutional norms.
Much of

in this regard

own

seemed

to be precisely so that the
administration

constitutional views independently
of what the Court had said

or done. Most famously, Reagan
insisted that he was not bound by
Court opinions

on

constitutional questions and

could-in

fact,

-

must

interpret the Constitution

independently of Supreme Court opinions.
Like Lincoln before him, Reagan did not
reject Court opinions as binding

on the

parties to the case, but he rejected the
broader rule that the Court had

articulated

most forcefully

a constitutional issue,

government.

who

Meese,

I

it

his line of reasoning

set off a

a duty of the Court.

is,

at

war with

government, and

v.

was

,

that

once the Court has spoken on
all

explicitly rejected

the branches of

by Attorney General

maelstrom by rather innocuously arguing
is

a duty of

Meese went on

all

war with

the branches of

the very

that the duty to

government and not just

to say that, given this.

the Constitution, at

at

Aaron

definitively settled that issue for

interpret the Constitution

and

Cooper

in

Cooper

v.

Aaron “was,

war with the basic principles of democratic

meaning of the

rule of

rhetoric of originalism suggested that the Court had fallen

law .”

64

The very

away from

the

Constitution and that the president was thereby better positioned to speak for the
Constitution than the Court, to return to constitutional

brought this to light

63

Cooper

v.

Aaron 358

in

first

principles.

Reagan

speeches on federalism, insisting that the states had created

U.S. 1,18 (1958).
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the national government, not the
other

de Tocqueville

around. Reagan even invoked
Alexis

1981 television address, suggesting
that federalism was key to

in a

American democracy. 6 " Meese, once
taking on the

way

again, echoed this thinking by
directly

Supreme Court's opinion

in

Garcia

San Antonio Metropolitan

v.

Transit Authority where the Court, reversing
the only significant federalism
,

opinion ot the
ol

its

was

power

last years,

held that Congress could reach state
employees by

to regulate interstate

rejected as a limitation

Blackmun, went so

tar as to

commerce. Moreover,

Meese

Amendment

on national power and the Court, per Justice
say that the judiciary was ill-equipped to
police the

boundaries ot state and national power.
Constitution.

the Tenth

way

insisted that in

It

was an affirmation of the New Deal

Garcia “the Court displayed— in the view of

the administration— an inaccurate reading of the text
of the Constitution and a

disregard for the Framers intention that state and local
governments be a buffer
against the centralizing tendencies of the national leviathan.”
Pushing this
further,

Meese noted

that

the administration

s

view

is

that

the most basic principles of our Constitution,” and added

when

Federalism

“we hope

is

for a

one of
day

the Court returns to the basic principles of the Constitution as expressed
in

Usery
In

National League of Cities

v.

Usery a case out of line with the

Deal view of federalism, Rehnquist argued

,

that the

New

Tenth Amendment limited

congressional power. The very year that Garcia overturned Usery Reagan
,

elevated Rehnquist to the Chief Justiceship.

64

Edwin Meese, “The Law of the

Constitution,” 987.
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And

dissenting in Garcia Rehnquist
.

turgidly noted that “I do not
think

it

incumbent on those of us

out further the fine points of a
principle that will,

command

1

am

confident, in time again

66
the support of a majority of this
Court.” Rehnquist has led just
such a

resurgence that has

its

roots in Reagan's constitutional
vision.

Reagan's rhetorical efforts are important,
they seem

to

Reagan brought about

his

most

And

while

supplement his more

concerted effort through administrative
and legal channels.
that

in dissent to spell

fruitful constitutional

It

is in this

manner

change.

Whither the Current Regime?

We

might see the Rehnquist Court as part of
Reagan's national governing

coalition. Federalism

emerged

as a political and constitutional issue

on the

national agenda, addressed by both the
political parties, long before the
Rehnquist

Court's revival of it.
revolution,”' so

much

It is

not clear “that the Court has led a ‘federalism

as “followed national political trends.” 67

Submerged

in the

Reagan

years, however,

Court

policing state-federal boundaries would almost surely
require judicial

s

activism

if the national

was

the possibility of an active Court.

government did not

arena lor state autonomy. 68 In the
striking

last

restrain itself

A return of the

and recognize a wide

decade the Court has taken on

down an unprecedented number of congressional

this role,

acts in the arena of

65

Congressional Quarterly, 3 October 1981, 1922.
<>0

(Junta

v.

Sun Antonio Metropolitan

Transit Authority

469 U.S. 528, 580 (1986),

(J.

Rehnquist

dissenting).
67
J- Mitchell Pickerill and Cornell Clayton, “Politics and the
Safeguards of Federalism During the
Rehnquist Court." Pickerill and Clayton examine the party platforms of both parties noting
federalism issues. This is especially true of the Republican Party platforms, which speak “a

decentralization of the federal government and efforts to return decision making
local elected officials.”
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power

to state

and

federalism. Critics have been
quick to point to the Court's
judicial activism, of

whtch Reagan was so
1 his question should

power

So

critical-’

draw our eye

a central point: the foundations
of judicial

to

are political. While the Court
has taken up the role of enforcer
of

federalism in the constitutional

order— with

supremacy-this was brought about,
political support

the

the Court thwarting congressional
will?

is

New

(even

if

we do

have grown comfortable with
started invoking notions

it

who

in the

of judicial

guessing the political branches.

after a lag.

not think of

Dealers before them, those

it

by Reagan and has strong

as a coherent regime).

criticized judicial

power

Much

in the

like

1980s

1990s. while past supporters have
suddenly

restraint

It is.

rather dramatic claims to judicial

and accusing the Court of second

no doubt, ironic

that the President

who

brought forth the current Court was an advocate
of departmentalism, while the

Court

itself

has rejected anything short of judicial supremacy.

current foundation

The

to be seen.

is.

Still,

how

solid the

including the Court's claims to judicial supremacy,
remains

fact that

so

many

ol these decisions are 5-4 symbolizes the

tensions within our constitutionalism and the difficulty,
once more, of speaking of
constitutional regimes.

Constitutional change rarely emerges
constitutional

On

moments; nor does

this aspect ot conservative

it

all at

once as

in

Ackerman's

great

untold in a neat evolutionary manner with

jurisprudence see

Thomas Keck, "Activism and

Rehnquist Court: Timing, Sequence, and Conjuncture
XXXV, No. (2002).

in

Restraint on the

Constitutional Development" Polity Vol

1

64

in The New Republic
Our Discriminating Court: Federal Offensive” April 9, 2001),
Rosen insisted that the Court’s federalism opinions put the “New Deal legacy of a

Writing

Jeffrey

powerful federal government”

at stake.

tradition of liberal judicial restraint

.

.

.

Rosen has gone on to suggest that “the resurrection of a
seems more relevant today than at any time since the New

A Modest Proposal” The New Republic January 14, 2002. Linda
The High Court s Target: Congress" The New York Times February 25, 2001.

Deal.” “Breyer Restraint:

Greenhouse

,
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subtle changes injudicial
doctrine.
great presidents— may

Court,

is

remake

The recognition

that

presidents-^specially

the constitutional order, and
often against the

an important one. Even

so, this recognition mirrors

some of the problems

with conventional notions of
judicial supremacy. Indeed, to
some degree
presidential reconstructions supplement
judicial supremacy. In remaking
the

constitutional order, great presidents
engage in departmentalist constitutional
rhetoric, displace the current
constitutional understandings as
articulated

Supreme Court, and

restructure our constitutional views
and institutions.

Court, by and large, then returns to
constitutional order

by the

70
.

its

role as the articulator

So judicial supremacy

is

The

of the new

the norm, with

constitutional politics as extraordinary events.
While surely a

moments of

more accurate

rendering ot our constitutional history than simple
judicial supremacy, this
narrative also misses

moments of constitutional

dialogue, conflict, discontinuity

,

unsettlement, and innovation that bring about significant
constitutional change.

Indeed, the ebb and

How

ot constitutional

meaning may capture

the ordinary

functioning of our system far more aptly than grand presidential
reconstructions
or simple judicial enforcement

71
.

Constitutional disjunctions

may

break with the

past order without bringing about full-scale constiutitonal
change. While

did not overturn Roe,

it

is difficult

constitutional order in the

70

first

to say that

Roe was

Reagan

part ot the existing

place, or that the question of a constitutional right

Ackerman, Whittington, Skowronek, and Landy and Milkis

all

go with

this narrative to

varying

degrees.
71

Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1988). See also Politics

Connection (collected essay

in tribute to Fisher).
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and Constitutionalism: The Louis Fisher

to abortion has truly

been

72

settled.

We see this with

Reagan's revival of

federalism: the Rehnquist Court
has broken with the

New

Deal, but in doing so

has continued, rather than settled,
a constitutional debate.

Undoing

the

New Deal

The 5-4 federalism decisions
debate about the
Lopez,

when

New

in recent years

have often amounted

to a

Deal between the majority and
dissenting justices. In

the Court struck

down

the

Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990,

Justice Souter, writing in dissent,
raised the specter that the Court

returning to a pre-1937 reading of the

Commerce

Clause.

may

be

He even accused

majority of “ignoring the painful lesson
learned in 1937.” 73

And

the

Justice Breyer’s

dissenting opinion, which was joined by
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter, insisted
that

Rehnquist

s

opinion for the majority “runs contrary
to modern Supreme

Court cases" with particular emphasis on
Wickard

New

Deal understanding ot the commerce power.

was written by
articulated the

Justice Robert Jackson,

New

who

v.

Filhurn, which solidified the

It's

appropriate that Wickard

as Roosevelt's Solicitor General had

Deal constitutional vision to a usually hostile Court.

the bench, Jackson solidified this constitutional
vision, symbolized

by the

fact that there

was not

a single dissenting opinion. In

upheld a congressional regulation

grow

for

that limited the

home consumption even though

it

move

the

more

Wickard the Court

amount of wheat

did not

all

Now on

.

a farmer could

in interstate

commerce.

77

“ Not only

is

there continued and

vehement constitutional debate on

the issues, with large sections

community refusing to view Rue as legitimate, the Court itself continues to dispute
the meaning ot Rue. The is evident Casey itself and, most recently,
with Justices Kennedy and
O Connor disputing the meaning of Casey in relation to Rue in Stenberv v Carharl 530 U S 914
( 2000 ).
ot the pol itical

71

Lupe:

at

609

(J.

Souter dissenting).
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In

doing

so, the

Court held that

must look

it

at the totality

of effects, so even

purely local matters might, taken
cumulatively, have an effect on
interstate

commerce. Therefore, such

Commerce Power.
that at least

it

local activities

Rehnquist’s opinion slyly evades the
logic of Wickard, noting

purported to regulate commercial activity
while Lopez was not

regulating commercial activity at

Wickard Court expressly held
though

may

it

whatever

its

were within the reach of the

that

not be regarded as

nature’

But as Justice Breyer pointed out:
“the

all.

so long as

Wickard's consumption of home grown
wheat.

commerce: could
‘it

nevertheless be regulated—

exerts a substantial effect

on

interstate

commerce .’” 74
Lopez does not
surely

why

sit

easily with

Wickard and looks

like a departure.

That

is

Rehnquist, although speaking of Wickard rested
Lopez on the logic of
,

an earlier

New

Deal case: Jones

&

National Labor Relations Act (the

Laughlin

Steel.

Wagner Act)

challenge, thus allowing a key piece of

New

This watershed case upheld the

against a

Commerce Clause

Deal legislation to go forward, even

while reminding the Congress that
the scope of this

power [the interstate commerce power]
must be considered in the light of our dual system of
government and may not be extended so as to embrace
effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote
that to embrace them, in view of our complex society,
would effectually obliterate the distinction between what
national and what

is

local

centralized government.

4

7

'

Lope:

at

628

(J.

Breyer dissenting,

Jones and Laughlin

and create a completely

7^

italics in original).

at 37.
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is

This

is

what Wickard did four years

just

und Laughlin

Steel, the

Rehnquist Court

later. In

may

returning to the login of Jones

not have been returning fully
to pre

1937 understandings of the Commerce
Power, but
the lull truit ot the

New

Deal as put forward

in

it

was just

Wickard.^

The Court had opened up another such
departure
United States, where

it

held that the Congress

by forcing them to take action

to

New

its

York

is

significant in that

notion of "dual sovereignty”
1937.

O'Connor explained

may

not

in

New

York

v.

-commandeer"

The

the states

implement a federal program. For our
purposes.
reading of the Tenth

Amendment

revived the

but buried in the Constitutional
Revolution of

all

that

The Tenth Amendment
Congress, but

as surely rejecting

.

.

.

restrains the

power of

this limit is not

Tenth Amendment

itself,

derived from the text of the
which, as we have discussed, is

essentially a tautology.

Instead, the Tenth Amendment
confirms that the power ol the Federal Government
is
subject to limits that may, in any given instance,
reserve

power

to the States.

The

1 enth

Amendment

thus directs us

to determine, as in this case,

sovereignty

is

whether an incident of state
protected by a limitation on an Article I

power.

Much

like the

Chief Justice would

consistent with

New

not been surrendered.

’

Justice

the
(J.
77

New

in

Lopez O'Connor held
,

Amendment

O

in

that this

United States

'states but a truism that all is retained

Connor uses

this truism,

as a substantive limit

was
v.

which has

though, to breathe

life into

on congressional power by restoring

Thomas concurring opinion helps draw this out, as he urges a complete repudiation of
Deal cases and a return to pre 1937 understanding of the Commerce Power. Lope at 585

Thomas

New

do

Deal precedent, quoting Stone's opinion

Darby: “The Tenth Amendment

the Tenth

later

concurring).

York

at

156-157.
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the notion of dual sovereignty.
This

was meant

is

exactly what Stone

to bury the notion that dual
sovereignty placed

was

rejecting:

Darby

any substantive limits

on congressional power and place such
a reading of the Tenth Amendment

in the

dustbin of history. Again, while not
necessarily returning to a pre-New
Deal
jurisprudence, the five Reagan/Bush
appointees were signaling a significant

New

departure from the

Deal Constitution— and on the very
issues

it

had

in fact

79

settled

.

The Court
struck

down

s

break became evident in United States

the Violence Against

Women

v.

Morrison when

Act even though Congress had offered

substantial findings “that gender-motivated
violence affects interstate

This was something Congress had not done
the

meaning of Lopez when Rehnquist

atlect interstate

Congress
question.

commerce

to regulate

In

its

always insisted

them

is

was

regulate under the guise of

Lopez. The Court

made apparent

"whether particular operations

come under

the constitutional

power of

its

—

opinions since Wickard. the Court had

theoretically

—a

commerce power,

limit

on what Congress could

but the reasoning of the Court's

opinions had suggested that Congress' power was plenary.

Darby

commerce.”

ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative

Commerce Clause

that there

in

insisted that

sufficiently to

it

By

itself

Lopez might

at 124.

v

In New York v. United States, Justice Souter supplied the firth vote and
Clarence Thomas was
not yet on the Court. In subsequent opinions, Souter would change his vote and
become a leading
critic of the Court’s federalism decisions, while Thomas supplied the fifth
vote. The sovereign

immunity cases are perhaps the Court’s most novel departure,
less central to the

New

but

I

don’t take them up as they are

Deal Constitution and Reagan’s attempted reconstruction.

80

Morrison at 614. Ronald Rotunda, “The Commerce Clause, the
and Morrison’’ Constitutional Commentary 18:303 (2001), argues

Political

Questions Doctrine,

that, in fact, the

dissenting
these cases represent the significant departure from past cases insofar as they argue for
a complete judicial abdication in this area.

opinions

in
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have been a simple recognition of this
outer
the Court

would police

truly local.” This

opinions,

the “distinction

gave federalism a

was simply not

limit.

But Morrison made clear

between what

is

truly national

that

and what

is

bite that while possible in the
Court's earlier

there in practice, a point Rehnquist

made

explicit:

Although JUSTICE BREYER argues that
acceptance of the
government s rationales would not authorize a
general

federal police power, he
that the States

JUST ICE

may

unable to identify any activity

is

regulate but Congress

BREYER

may

posits that there might be

not.

some

limitations on Congress' commerce power
[but] these
suggested limitations, when viewed in light of the
dissent's
expansive analysis, are devoid of substance. 81
.

1 he so-called lederalist five

made

limitations on congressional

power and, even

Deal.

addition to the

would give substance

to these

sub silentio broke from the

solidified the Court's federalism

Commerce C lause

Congress may federalize

women, under
limit

if

.

,

New

82

Morrison

that

clear that they

.

on another

front as well. In

analysis, Rehnquist s opinion rejected the idea

traditional state matters, such as violence against

Section 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Federalism was held

to

Congress' power to enforce the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Flere

federalism bled into the Court's stunning insistence upon judicial supremacy in
City of Boerne

v.

Flores which Morrison rested squarely upon. In Boerne Justice

Kennedy, appointed by

81

Lope:

at

,

,

a president

who

insisted that he could interpret the

564-565.

8_

Dean Alfange, Jr., “The Supreme Court and Federalism: Yesterday and Today” and Tinsley E.
Yarbrough, The Rehnquist Court and the Constitution see the New Deal as restoring John
Marshall’s view of the Constitution, much like Edward Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd.

and Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar
of the Law (New York: Viking Press, 1956). While originalists like Bork and Raoul Berger see the
New Deal as a departure from Marshall’s Constitution on federalism issues.

(Claremont: Claremont Colleges, 1941

)
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Constitution independently of what the
Court had said, insisted that
constitutional
interpretation

was

a job for the Court alone.
“Congress,” Justice

lectured, “has been given the

power

'to enforce,’ not the

constitutes a constitutional violation.

Were

it

power

Kennedy

to

determine what

not so. what Congress would be

enforcing would no longer be, in any
meaningful sense, the 'provisions of [the

Fourteenth

Kennedy

Amendment .]” 83 As

the Constitution

is

I've noted in several chapters, for
Justice

what the Court says

the Court's reading of the Constitution,
but not

Meese, who had a heavy hand

in

it is.

its

Congress, then, can enforce

own. This

is

surely at odds with

appointing Kennedy, insisting that “once

we

understand the distinction between constitutional
law and the Constitution, once

we

see that constitutional decisions need not be
seen as the

constitutional construction ...

interpretation

is

we can

last

words

grasp a correlative point: constitutional

not the business of the Court alone, but also properly
the business

of all branches of government.” The majority, though, has been
quite

upon the Court

in

insistent

as the definitive interpreter of constitutional meaning.

Does

this

a return to judicial supremacy, solidifying a departmental ist
president's
constitutional vision?

Congress and Court

Many

scholars suggest

we seem

regime, but one whose foundation

is

to

have entered a new constitutional

remarkably tenuous

84
.

We

might better

understand these developments as consistent with ordinary political change

Hi

s4

City of Buerne

v.

Tushnet suggests

Flores 52
this

new

1

—

U.S. 507, 535-536 (1997).

constitutional regime

constitutional aspiration remains chastened. The

292

is

New

not a radical departure, but one

Constitutional Order.

where

the

political Constitution
a,

work-which

itself is par, or

our constitutional

development. The perststence
of the 5-4 decisions on
federalism issues highlights
this fact.

The four dissenting justices
make as coherent

appointees and are convinced
that the Court
squarely in dissent

a. the

is

a bloc as the

Reagan/Bush

wrong. As justice Breyer
put

end of the Court's 2002
term,

in yet

it

another 5-4

federalism decision: "[the
majority opmion] reaffirms
the need for continued
dissent."

8

’

Both sides have solid

the path of federalism will

Supreme Court played

political support within
the political

depend on

far

more than

system and

the Court. Indeed, while
the

a limited role in the last
presidential election,

when

discussed federalism was not the
key issue. 86 Rather, the Court
factored
again, as a

way

highlighting

for both sides to Hatter
supporters

Roe

v.

Wade. The

and gain

their votes

rhetorical presidency persists.
But this

say something about the Court's
conflict with Congress over
the
I

last

in.

it

was

yet

by

may

also

decade.

he C ongress appears reluctant to
simply accept the Court's recent

decisions, but

Court struck

is

appears just as reluctant to boldly
challenge the Court. After the

down

the

Gun-Free School Zones Act

Boerne. Congress refused

to

Federal Maritime Commission
invoked he

New

“An

Deal:

structural constraints (unlike

onstitution

s

own

simply

v.

let

in

Lopez and

RFRA

in

the Court settle the issue. In passing
the

South Carolina State Ports Authority
(2002)
(Justjce Breyer dissenting

)

Breyer again

overly restrictive judicial interpretation
of the Constitution's
its protections of certain
basic liberties) will

undermine the
basic structural aim, the creation of
a
capable of translating the people's will into
effective

efforts to achieve

representative form of government

its

far

more

public

action. This understanding, underlying
constitutional interpretation since the New
Deal reflects
the Constitution's demands for structural
flexibility sufficient to adapt substantive
laws’and
institutions to rapidly changing social,
”
economic, and

technological conditions

Other than deeding
a termath.

While

commitment
rooted

in the

it

critics

Bushy. Core (2000)! mean during the election and
not
have insisted that Bush v. Core is not consistent with
in

1

in

the

the Court’s

to federalism, this need not be so. Even these
justices argue that national questions
Constitution will trump state actions. But most importantly,
however one

down on Bush

comes

v.

Core

,

the federalism revolution of the Court has continued.
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Violence Against
cases.

The Act

Women

rested

Act

in

1999. the Congress touched
on both of these

upon both Congress' Commerce
Power and

Section 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

power under

its

Lopez, the Court had rejected the

In

federal regulation of guns in a
school zone as far too tenuously
linked to the

regulation ot interstate commerce.

a "mountain of data" to

show

So

in passing the

"the effects of violence against

commerce." Here. Congress was engaging

attempt to do this and signaled

how

serious

Commerce Power. Whether Congress

By

act,

women on

the Court and attempting to

within the contours of its opinion. The
Court, as

same

VAWA. Congress compiled

it

we have

was about

will accept this

VAWA on

its

work

seen, rejected Congress-

the limits

of Congress'

remains to be seen. In the

though. Congress did challenge the Court's
recent opinion

also resting the

interstate

in

Boerne.

Section 5 power. Congress was attempting
to

define substantive rights under the amendment,
which the Court, in Boerne.
insisted C ongress could not do.

Court,

it

tried to

show

But even here Congress attempted

that these rights

were not being preserved

which therefore justified congressional action (something
in the

engage the

in the states.

show

did not clearly

RFRA).
Congress

tacitly

it

to

indulged

itselt

it.

has been ambivalent about the Court

In passing legislation that

Congress often defers

to the Court's ultimate

is

s

power, and has even

constitutionally controversial.

judgment by enacting “fast-track"

provisions that allow tor direct appeal to the Supreme Court so that
the constitutional question.

Its

reluctance to

work out

may

settle

controversial constitutional

questions by deferring to the Court for political cover neglects
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it

its

role as an

independent interpreter of the
Constitution. Perhaps most
importantly, much of
the legislation the Rehnquist
Court has struck
politics ."

87

This

is

particularly evident in the

Congress was responding
something.
state

interest

of

is

credit.

many

When

down

benefit; recognition

from

for addressing the issue. Nor,
though, are

necessarily troubled by the Court's
decisions, as such

decisions don't truly keep congressional
In fact,

“doing

cases simply mirrors

the Court strikes

Congress have already received the biggest

members of Congress

to get credit for

not held accountable for the failure;
indeed,

groups and their constituents

demands.

“symbolic" or “message

problem

In passing such legislation—
which in

such legislation. Congress

is

Gun-Free School Zones Act. Here

to a perceived national

legislation—Congress gets political

members

down

members from responding

many members of Congress may

to constituent

well support the Court's

general turn to federalism even while supporting
legislation they think the Court

very likely to strike down, so as to reap the
benefits for responding to interest

groups and constituents. This

from

interest

this says

is

perhaps

why

the Court has

drawn

far

more

groups and Court watchers than from members of
Congress.

fire

And

something important about the actions of the Rehnquist Court.

The Rehnquist Court,

in contrast to the

New

prevented political actors from achieving significant

Deal Court, has not yet
political goals.

The Court

is

not consistently thwarting a powerful national agenda
supported by Congress (or
the public and the President). Particular political groups

Court, and thus Congress

87

may

be reluctant

to

may

be miffed

simply accept the Court's path, but

Devins, “Congress as Culprit” and Whittington, “"Taking What They Give Us.”
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at the

neither has

members

it

mounted

a serious challenge to the
Court's authority.

are quite content with the
Court.) Congress,

with signing statements, engages
interpretation

on the cheap.

It

in a sort

asserts this

simply follow Court opinions (often
reject the Court's claims to
judicial

judicial

power on occasion, and refuses
ignoring them), but

supremacy. But

We may

it

does not

to

flatly

this also indicates a sort

the Court has insisted

in settling constitutional questions,
the foundations

necessarily solid.

like the President

of independent constitutional

flatly

supremacy on the cheap. While

much

(And many

upon

its

of

unique role

of such a role are not

indulge the Court, so long as

is

it

generally in line with

a political consensus, or not directly
thwarting the President and Congress’
political will.

but

it

will

How

long this will hold

may depend on how

almost certainly depend upon external

political

far the

Court pushes,

developments. As the

four dissenting justices have continually
warned, the “consequences of the court’s

approach [may] prove anodyne.'' 88 But, depending
upon events, the Court's

approach

may

also prove destructive. Justice Souter, the lone
outlier of the

Reagan/Bush appointees on federalism

issues, reiterated this

warning

dissenting opinion in Morrison:
All of this convinces

me

power

and

rests

on

error,

doubt that the majority

s

that today's

view

ebb of the commerce

same time

at the

will

leads

me

to

prove to be enduring

law. There is yet one more reason for doubt. Although we
sense the presence of [pre-New Deal decisions] once again,
the majority embraces

them only at arm's-length
Cases
standing for the sufficiency of substantial effects are not
overruled; cases overruled since 1937 are not quite revived.
.

The Court's thinking betokens

88

Federal Maritime Commission

v.

.

.

less clearly a return to

South Carolina State Ports Authority (2002).

http://supct.law.cornell.edU/supct/litml/01 -46./DI.html.
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(J.

Breyer dissenting.)

in his

conceptual straightjackets
than to something
unsteady, a period in which the failure
to provide a
workable definition left this Court to review
each case ad
hoc. As our predecessors learned then,
the practice of such
ad hoc review cannot preserve the
distinction between
.

.

.

the

judicial

and the

legislative,

and

this Court, in

lacks the institutional capacity to

any event,
maintain such a regime

for very long.

The dissenting justices
not tenable and that

it

persist in insisting the Court's
federalism jurisprudence

may, once again, have

depending on the trajectory of current

may prove
the

tew

New

a constitutional

politics, the

of 1937. Yet.

Rehnquist Court's federalism

that leaves the lessons

of 1937 as a remnant of

Deal. 1 he outcome will depend on the
constitutional politics of the next

We are,

years.

state is far

suppose;

moment

to relearn the lessons

is

more

it

is

in the

meantime,

familiar in

in a state

American

of constitutional

drift,

constitutional history then

not a stretch to suggest this

is

we

but such a

often

politics as usual.

Conclusion
Reagan's counterrevolution against the
reverse

that

New Deal—playing FDR

in

did not bring on the kind of sweeping constitutional and political
change

Roosevelt himself did. Partly

disintegration of the

New

Deal coalition

sharp political crisis of the early
enthusiastic

New

this is a result

1

in the

930' s. In

Dealer to outspoken

1970

fact,

critic

of circumstance. The gradual
s

was very

different

from the

Reagan's movement from

of the New- Deal

state

over the course

of four decades mirrored many Americans' growing frustrations with national
centralization.

Reagan sought

to dismantle

from Washington D.C. and returning

8y

Morrison

at

654-655

(J.

New

Deal institutions by turning away

political responsibility

Souter dissenting).
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back

to local

and

state

governments. Most importantly,
he saw

constitutionally mandated.

modest

task:

it

this as no, just

smart politics, but as

The Reagan Revolution has
succeeded

in this far

more

has brought federalism back
to the table as a
constitutionally

robust principle. Bu, this

is

a

work

in

progress-with the

distinct possibility

of

failure.

In this

way. Reagan's constitut.onal
reconstruction

reflects the

ebb and

flow of constitutional change,
rather than the dramatic
politics of constitutional
translormation. Here

we

indirect affirmation of

broken with the

New

government and

the

see Reagan's break with the

its

legacy.

New

Deal as well as his

The Rehnquist Court's federalism
opinions have

Deal Constitution on the enumerated
powers of the national

meaning of the Tenth Amendment. Yet.

the fact that the

most

significant aspects of Reagan's
constitutional reconstruction

worked through

the

legalistic

and administrative realm

institutions-and reveals, in
ditterent "orders."*

Court when

it

comes

system and.

in

doing

attests to the continuing

fact, the institutional

The Reagan Court,

as

so,

has unsettled the

and constitutional overlap of

we might

to federalism, has taken

up the

New

presence of New Deal

properly call the Rehnquist
role

of policer of the federal

Deal Constitution, Leuchtenburg

concluded "The Constitutional Revolution of 1937"
by noting

that

extreme negativist position ot 1935-36 was forsaken,
as

to be, the

it

had

"'When

the

Court

could find no stopping place short of abdication.’ In 1937
the Supreme Court

began a revolution

in jurisprudence that ended,

it

appeared forever, the reign of

Karren Orren and Stephen Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of
Order: Notes for a ’New
Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson, eds„ The Dynamics of American

Institutionalism’" in
Politics:

Approaches and Interpretations (Boulder: Westview
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Press, 1994).

laissez-taire

and legitimated the

arrival

of the Leviathan State.""

constitutional development things
rarely last forever." 3

seems unlikely

(particularly as

it

A

1

In

American

return to laissez-faire

never existed), but the Rehnquist
Court

is

once

again attempting to draw a line
between national and state authority
and. thereby,
rejecting the Leviathan state.

highlighted by the fact that
justice.

this

Although the Court

it

is

The

fragility

seems

to turn

of this constitutional

shift is

on the vote of a single Supreme
Court

in the forefront

of this constitutional development,

should not blind us to the politics that
underlie the Court. For

single

Supreme Court justice,

far

more than

a

the fate of the current federalism
revival will

depend on the course of American

politics

more

generally.

91

Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn 236.
,

And Leuchtenburg

himself

is

too sanguine about the Court’s view of

constitutional transformation, suggesting the

Revolution

in

its

role in the

wake of this

Warren Court comes easily out of the New Deal
"The Birth of America's Second Bill of Rights" in The Supreme Court Reborn 237-

258.
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CONCLUSION:

THE tout, cal coh»t,t

=

a

» the mvth of

Alex,s de Tocqueville's
Democracy in Africa remains
the preeminent

work on

its

subject and scholars of all
stripes

workings of American democracy.
So much

draw on

i,

to ilium, nate the

so. in fact, that
public

law scholars

have nearly reduced one of
Tocqueville's great observations-'-,
ha, nearly
polittcal questions in the

questions”

to

United States ultimately
find expression as legal

a staid recitation. Thts

quoted expression

is

is all

treated as a truism: yet

the

i,

more remarkable because

is

this of,

has only tenuous historical
support

Though Tocqueville's own understandmg
of the judiciary's
American democracy

all

peculiar role in

illuminating, history has not
always borne out his

judgments. In speaking of maintaining
our Constitution,

example, he

for

insists

that:

n the hands of seven federal
judges rests ceaselessly the
peace, the prosperity, the very
existence of the Union.
Without them, the Constitution is a
dead
letter; to

them the

executive power appeals to resist the
encroachments of the
legislative body; the legislature,
to defend

itself against the

undertakings of the executive power;
Union, to have

obeyed by the

states; the states, to repel the

itself

exaggerated

pretensions ot the Union; the public
interest against private
interest; the spirit of conservation
against democratic
instability. Their power is immense;
but it is a

power of

opinion.
to

obey

As

I

They

are omnipotent as long as the
people consent
the law; they can do nothing when

they scorn

have labored

to

show

in this dissertation, this

understanding of the

Court as the lone protector of constitutional
government has

S

d

0cqueville

ur
tu'
!J
Winthrop
(Chicago:
*

’

Democracy

in

America

,

translated by

l

University of Chicago Press, 2000) 142.
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1

it.

little

historical

Harvey Mansfield and Delba

grounding. Tocqueville's

when

own

analysis

compounds

this

problem,

ins, sling that

the Court refuses to
enforce an -unconstitutional”
law. -one of two
thtngs

happen: the people change
their constitution or the
legislature rescinds the
law ." 2
This. too. has precious

Changes wrought

little

historical support.

Many of the

great constitut.onal

the twentieth century
have taken place outside
the courts and

without formal constitut.onal
amendment. In more ordinary
terms, as

we have

seen again and again, the
Congress often passes laws that
challenge the Court's
constitutional opinions, rather
than "rescinding the law."
and the Court adapts to

the political branches reading
of the Constitution. Tocqueville
does pu, his finger

on the deeper issue
Court's power

is

a, the

the

end of the lengthy quote above,
when he says

"power of opinion.” This power

people obey, but impotent otherwise.
judicial power: the Court

is

On

this

powerful when

is

dynamic

we go

that the

omnipotent when the

rests the political basis

along with

it.

of

Yet. the political

branches (and the public) are unlikely
to be controlled by Court
opinions they
disagree with: they are fully capable
of contesting constitutional meaning
and
forcing adjustment by the Court.
This

Court

is

how maintaining

Court

is

not. in itself, reason to despair,
for the

not the sole protector of the Constitution.
Contests over constitutional

meaning demonstrate

Putting

is

it

the functioning of the Madisonian
Constitution, revealing

the Constitution

is

a task for

all

of the branches of government.

in this light should not only lead
us to reevaluate the notion that the

the great protector of constitutional
government,

2

Ibid. 96.
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it

should lead us to

aluate the so-called
countermajoritarian

much

dilemma

that is at the heart

of so

constitutional theory.

In his

most recent book.

How

Democratic

Robert Dahl picks up a variant
of this theme.

I,

is

is

the

American Constitution ’,

no surprise, given Dahl's

vartous works on democratic
theory, that he finds our
Constitution, as measured
aga.nst democratic ideals,
wanting. While Dahl insists
that his purpose "is
not

much
the

to suggest

way we

changes

think about

Constitution, very

in the existing constitution
as to

it .”

much

encourage us

to

s<

change

5

his analysis

in line

is

a stunning and harsh critique
of the

with Progressive critiques
of American

constitutionalism throughout the
twentieth century. Dahl has long
preferred, as
political scientists since

government which
popular

will,

Woodrow Wilson

is less

have, a

more parliamentary system of

concerned with structural formality,
more amenable to

and so more democratic

4

Indeed. Dahl's work, like Wilson's
before

.

htm. reads as an extended argument
with Madison and his Constitution,
arguing
that

our system "compared with the

democratic countries,

.

difficult to understand."

.

.is

among

It is.

lets institutional structures

political

the

in short,

stand in the

system of the other advanced

most opaque, complex, confusing, and

undemocratic

—witness

way of "national

the Senate

majorities."

Constitution on outdated and unworkable
structure of government

“'-

H ""

Democratic

p
Although

is

the

as

making

it

the

5
.

Alas. Dahl, an

American Constitution? (New Haven: Yale University

later progressives, unlike their
predecessors,

imitations and have

little

complaint as to

how

5

want to keep the Bill of Rights' formal
such limitations thwart democratic will.

Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution
? See also, Gordon Wood, “Rambunctious
American Democracy” New York Review of Books, May
9, 2002.
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extraordinarily accomplished
empirical political seen,
is, does no,
,ake seriously
,

the

t'ac,

that the

Madisonian system seems

to

have worked reasonably
well,

providing a structure in whteh
political and constitutional
questions are worked
ou, as par, of the political
process. Looking
disputes as

I

have done here, suggests

a, the history

of constitutional

that the Constitution
has in fact

proven

"adaptable- and accommodating
in meeting the needs
of the current generation.
True, the constitutional
structure does no, allow
any one side-or branch
of

government-to single-handedly

insist

upon

its will,

or reading of the

Cons, itut ion-in an immedtate
way. On the contrary, the very
constitut.onal

framework

calls forth serious

and contentious debate about
fundamental

constitutional (and political, issues
IS,

when

there

is

such tssues are contested." One
the one hand,

serious disagreement; when,
tha,
this reveals the limitations

of

Tocqueville's heavily digested notion
of the Court's acting against the
political
branches.

On

the other,

it

shows how the

political

branches (the democratic

branches) are central to working out
constitutional questions, revealing
the
constitutional

It is

framework

to be

more democratic than Dahl's

interesting, in this light, that

two extraordinarily

analysis suggests.

influential political

scientists,

whose

manage

view the Constitution—and theorize
about it— in ways

to

political theorizing is

deeply informed by empirical evidence,
that

have

little

regard for the historical functioning of our
constitutionalism. Tocqueville and

Dahl represent the twin polls of constitutional
theory
seeing the Constitution in more political terms.

Which

is

arguably to foster a more serious form of democracy.
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that

I

wish

to dissolve

by

Constitu

Dahl's

government

is

own

ment

pioneering study of the
Court has suggested tha,
no branch of

iong abie to

resist a nationa,
majority, as

each branch usualiy fa„
s

into line with the
"governing coalition's" politics
(constitutional or otherwise 7
).

Dahl's real complaint, then,

is

tha,

our constitutional structure
makes the

construction of such national
majorities difficult and
complicated, as
institutional structures are
not

always easy

Ihe limitations of Dahl's
earlier

to negotiate. Here,

work which views

I

its

suggest,

multiple

we

see

the Court as part of the

national governing coalition
and serves as the basis for
a regimes understanding
ot constitutional development.

I

he Madisonian Constitution,
as I've argued, provides
for continued

constitutional dispute.

The

fact that

it

has multiple institutional
actors, which are

not always aligned with one
another, no, only allows for
different institutional
orders, but creates a space in

which

political actors

can dispute,

raise,

or revisit

questions of constitutional meaning,
precluding an easy constitutional
settlement
In this

8
.

way. the Madisonian Constitution
may well leave different constitutional

questions at different levels of settlement,
depending upon the political

circumstances of the

time.''

Constitutional theory and constitutional
law. which

are often preoccupied by bringing
order to the constitutional universe,
neglect the
fact that the

Madisonian Constitution-rather than the

legal Constitution-is

See generally Robert Dahl, "Decision-Making
in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court
Policy-Maker” Journal of Public Law
(
959) 279-295

as a National

1

Which, again, might suggest a more democratic
form of government.
‘'What Stephen Skowronek dubs
Harvard University Press, 1993).

political time.
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open

The Politics Presidents Make (CambridgeB

to discontinuity, overlapping
views, unsettled constitutional

settled constitutional

meaning, partially

meaning, multiple orders and
levels of meaning,

disjunctions, dialogues, and
continued dispute. In

some ways,

the persistence

quest to treat constitutional
questions as amenable to
-'legal" resolution

is

puzzling, given our persistent
conflicts over "creedal
passions." which could only
result in a sort

law and our

of disharmony.

political

it it

"

Given

that the Constitution
is

both fundamental

framework, as Charles Grove
Haines noted long ago.

should not surprise us that
be odd

1

it

were otherwise.

is

the source of continued
dispute. Indeed,

i,

it

would

1

Political actors, not surprisingly,
refer to

and attempt

to

reframe the

Constitution in light of their politics,
making choices about conflicting
constitutional values and trying to
order constitutional priorities
based
particular politics rather than
abstract constitutional theorizing.

constitutional

1

have argued throughout the

Constitution

so, the

framework and constitutional ideas shape
such actors thinking and

structure the arguments they are able
to

As

Even

upon a

we must

make (which

is

last several chapters, to

true

of the Court as

well).

understand the

understand American constitutional
development, locating

particular constitutional disputes within
particular historical circumstances, rather

than theorizing generally about judicial
supremacy and judicial review, judicial

activism and judicial restraint, or the role of
the Congress and the president.

Samuel Huntington, American

Politics:

The Promise of Disharmony ( Cambridge- Harvard

University Press, 1981).

Charles Grove Haines, The Supreme Court
York: Russell and Russell, 1960) 9-49.

in

New
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The Polmeal Constitution
unci Constitutional
Development
Constitutional theory has
a tendency to get a,
these quest, ons in the
abstract. Front this
perspective, the Court

protector of the Constitution:

its

is

seen as the primary
(if„„, s 0 ,e)

independence and ‘learning

concern with constitutional
prmciple and

in the

law” foster a

fidelity to constitutional
text,

defends with the giving of
principled and reasoned
arguments
things considered, as
Alexander and Schauer argue,

predisposed to maintain the
Constitution and

settle

i,

is

in its

which

i,

opinions. All

institutionally

disputed constitutional

questions. Against this, the
political branches.
Congress in particular, are
said to

be driven by politics
(rather than reason or
principle), which leads
them
blithely

unconcerned with any son of
fidelity

no, eager to trample upon

it.

Thus they are

to constitutional tex,
or

likely to

be-even

Court

is

far

more

Whims of the

if

12
.

for reasoned opinions,
the

public) to provide for stable
constitutional meaning by adhering
to

down

rule-based decisions that will

means and thereby prevent

anarchy and incoherence

As my

independence and penchant

meaning,

likely than the political
branches (yearning to satisfy the
current

precedent and laying
Constitution

its

be

institutionally

predisposed to be-unconcerned
with constitutional limits
and rights

Furthermore, given the

to

tell

us just what the

us from succumbing to
constitutional

13
.

This litany has become a veritable,

historical studies suggest, the
evidence

if untested, truth.

does not bear out such claims.

Ronald Dworkin, Freedom ’s Law The Moral
Reading of the Americ
lean Constitution
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996)
344. “[Individual citizens can in fact
exercise the
moral responsibilities of citizenship better

when

removed from ordinary

politics

and assigned

final

decisions involving constitutional values
are
whose decisions are meant to turn on

to courts,

prmciple, not the weight of numbers or the
balance of political influence."

Alexander and Schauer, "On Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation.”
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These questions depend on particular

historical circumstances

and cannot be

answered detached from concrete
circumstances as so much of constitutional
theory attempts to do.

The Court,

14

the Congress, and the president,
have

all

acted differently

at

different periods in our history.
Indeed, these institutions have acted
differently

within the same time frame or constitutional
order on different constitutional
issues.

We cannot,

then, easily assign a particular
institutional role to these

branches of government insofar as constitutional
maintenance
Scholars viewing the Court as driven by law
or

is

concerned.

politics, as active or restrained, or

as the great protector of constitutional limits
and rights, neglect the myriad
in

which the Court may be each of these things

at different times,

these things within a given time period on different
issues.

example, as a general proposition,
constitutional rights.

As

I

argued

that the

in

Court

Chapter

2,

is

We cannot

Court

meaning

War Amendments

of the Civil

may have been more

in

all

of

say, for

the great protector of

Congress was a

protector of the newly freed slaves constitutional rights
and far
the true

or even

ways

far

more robust

more wedded

to

than was the Court. Yet. the

tune with public sentiment in refusing to offer a

robust protection for such constitutional rights. Similarly, the current
Congress, as
I

touch on

in

Chapters 2 and

constitutional rights in

women

many

5,

has arguably displayed a more robust reading of

instances than the Court has: in attempting to protect

from various forms of sexual harassment and insure

that religious

believers will be granted exceptions to general laws in order to practice their

14

Alexander Hamilton's Federalist 78

is

the classic

example where he

guardian of the Constitution.” The Federalist Papers
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calls the

(New York: Mentor,

Court the “faithful

1999) 433, 438.

15

rel,g,ous beliefs.

But

it

will not

Perhaps the Rehnquist Court,
is

in

do

just to speak of rights

strikmg

down

even in

this

manner.

this -rights protecting"
leg, slat, on.

genuinely concerned with constitutional
limitations and views these
various

acts as congressional attempts
to overstep

saw

in

Chapters

3

and

4. the

its

Lochner Court and the early

"rights protecting" in their
defense

with constitutional limitations

the

to recast the

New

we

Deal Court were

of liberty of contract and deeply
concerned

in actively policing the

Commerce Power. While New Deal justices
attempted

constitutional bounds. Surely,
as

boundaries of Congress’

like Stone. Frankfurter,

meaning of constitutional

rights

and Black

and limitations— rejecting

Old Court’s understanding-the Rehnquist
Court has

revisited part

question and. once more, attempted to
police the limits of Congress’

of this

Commerce

Power.

I

he deeper point

is

that these constitutional disputes
are about the proper

ordering of constitutional rights and limitations.

more

rights protecting,

limits.

The question

which

in part is rooted in historical

have argued

is

or that Congress

how

is

We cannot just

say: the Court

unconcerned with constitutional

conflicting constitutional values should be
ordered,

circumstances and political debate. Thus

that constitutional politics

1

between the branches of government

fosters a sort ol "living constitutionalism” as
constitutional values are argued

about and realized through such constitutional conflicts, connecting
the
Constitution to our politics in a more democratic form than our preoccupation

See Louis

fisher, Religious Liberty' in America: Political Safeguards (Lawrence:
University
Press of Kansas, 2002) tor a general argument that Congress has been far more
protective of
religious liberty than has the Court.
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is

With the Court would lead
us to believe, bu, no,
necessarily resulting
settled,

coherent constitutional vision.

The Court,

it

turns out,

As Ken Kersch

in , single .

argues.

doctrinal and political, an
obstacle and a
hope, active and restrained,
and formalistic and pragmatic
Its
jurisprudence is in some areas
transformed by critical elections

and

is

in others left relatively

unchanged.

It

embraces new

ideological visions, at times as
wholes, but at others only in
part
resists change, negotiates
16
change, and initiates

It

change.

The Madison, an

how American

Constitution, attuned to this
interplay, helps us better
understand

constitutionalism actually functions.

The Political Constitution and the
Limits of Constitutional Regimes

While a regime's understanding of
American constitutional development
focuses on historical context,
a disorderly

it

neglects the

ways

in

which '•development” may be

and uneven process. By connecting
the creation and maintenance
of

particular constitutional regimes to
"critical elections." great
constitutional

moments, or reconstructive

presidents, a regimes analysis misses

constitutional discontinuity, drift, and
unsettlement. In Chapter 3
critical election ot

1

896

moments of

we saw how

the

failed to bring order to the constitutional
universe.

Constitutional meaning on the most important
issues of the day was best

characterized by an incomplete dialogue between
the Court and the political

branches, leading to a period of constitutional

saw how the

critical election

recast constitutional

the government's

lb

of FDR

meaning and

power

in

While

in

Chapter Four

we

1932 and his reconstructive presidency

settled the

to regulate

drift.

most contentious issues of the day

economic

life

—

this

very settlement invited

Ken Kersch, Discontinuous Development in American Constitutional Law:
Civil Liberties and
(New York. Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming) 37.

Civil Rights in the Twentieth Century
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continued debate on “civil
liben.es and rights”
large unsettled. Here,
even if the
constitutional regime, a, the

way

reflect the

some

in

hean of this reg.me were ser.ous
discontinuities

which constitutional coherence
and settlement may

brought

home

in

Court's rejection of part of the

amount

moment'' misses the way

in

on other

on

exist

issues.

A

that

point

Chapter Five with Reagan's and
the Rehnquis.

New

Deal regime.

to a full-scale recreation,
to dismiss

in significant

remams by and

Deal could be characterized
as a new

issues side by side with
conflict and unsettlement

that is vividly

not

New

that, to this day.

which

it

it

If

Reagan's reconstruction did

as a failed "constitutional

has altered our constitutional
understanding

ways. The Madisonian Constitution

is at

home

with these

incongruities.

Seeing the Constitution

in

Madisonian terms suggests

particular imperative for “authoritative
settlement” as such,
judicial settlement

when

that there is

let

no

alone authoritative

the political branches contest the
Court's interpretation

of constitutional meaning.

The dynamic of the

persistent conflict about constitutional

political Constitution is

meaning and attempts

open

to foreclose

to

such

debates by the Court are unlikely to succeed,
as the political branches,
institutionally positioned as they are,

insistently question the logic

have the capacity

of the Court's decision.

contest judicial interpretations of the Constitution,
as
antitrust

to persistently

When

and

the political branches

Teddy Roosevelt did

in

and railroad rate-regulation, or as Franklin Roosevelt did
on the reach of

the national

government

s

Commerce Power,

they often succeed in overturning

past judicial decisions without resorting to constitutional
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amendment. Indeed,

let

me

reiterate here that the

century have certainly

most significant const.tutional
changes

come

front political

changes

in the twentieth

in constitutional

meaning, no,
by way of formal
constitutional amendment
(whether agatns, pas,
Supreme Court
opinions or not).

Other instances are

work against

less clear-cut.

such as the Congress's
efforts

the logic of the Rehnquis,
Court's

Commerce and

opmtons on both

its

effort is

aimed

at

constitutional questions in a state

We have seen,

in

Chapter

doing

so),

of doubt

it

or.

Supreme Court opinions (and

has certainly

of that earlier

era.

New

when

Deal precedents-forged

the Court

the political branches
understanding of their constitutional

and

interstate

commerce. Reagan has been

noted, in overturning the Court's
opinion in
the persistent conflict over
abortion rights,
authoritatively settled." Indeed, if there

ought

to

have a constitutional

the evidence suggests

it

derived from the Court

'

is

these

similar efforts from Reagan.
His Rehnquist Court

5,

in the const, tutional
politics

left

its

perhaps more favorably,
openness.

appointees have certainly overturned
long standing

ot federalism

Interstate

Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. While the Congress
has

no, clearly succeeded in
overcoming these recent

not clear that

to a, leas,

is

Roe

it

v.

came

power-in

pregnancy

I

here, given

difficult to call

a consensus of sorts that

right to terminate a

the sphere

far less successful, as

Wade. But even

would be

into line with

Roe

women

in the early

months,

based on a social and political understandings,
and not

s constitutional

reasoning.

17

7

See Jeffrey Rosen, "Worst Choice:
February 24, 2003.

Why We'd
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be Better off Without Roe" The

New

Republic

Even when Court opinions have
Congress,

we need

to focus

stood, striking

down

our view more carefully. As

I

significant acts

argued

in

Chapter

example, by the time the Court struck
down the Civil Rights Act of 875.
1

it

by and large, articulating popular
understandings: Congress was content
to
with the Court's opinton and not
contest
questions

is

likely to

constitutional

on some

meaning may be

or,

on

settled

others,

may

2. for

was.

live

Settlement of crucial constitutional

come based on an emerging

issues but not

understanding

it.

of

social consensus.

Thus

and then unsettled, may reach a
consensus
be contested

in

ways

that transform

our

over time, dissipate, depending upon the
tluid pull of politics.

Thus, the language ot authoritative judicial
settlement
constitutional discourse, as

it

fails to

is ill

suited to our

capture the ordinary functioning of our

constitutionalism.

I

he Myth ot Judicial Supremacy

The Court,
in

ways

constituted as

it

is

and situated

in this larger context, rarely acts

that are consistent with authoritative judicial
settlement. For the Court to

settle constitutional

clearly articulate a

questions

it

should otter deeply theorized opinions that

wide constitutional

principle;

it

should, that

is,

be concerned

with articulating general constitutional meaning, acting as the political
branches
constitutional schoolmarm, rather than simply settling the case before

it.

Yet

Court opinions are not always clearly reasoned statements of constitutional
principle that otter the political branches guidance on disputed constitutional

questions. Partly this stems from the nature of the Court: asked to decide concrete

“cases and controversies," the Court rarely spins out the single correct answer that
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gu.des both

itself

and the

political

constitutional nteantng. Justice

branches

in

Cardozo noted

discerning vexing questions
of
this in his

famous lectures

Nature of the Judicial Process.
“Our survey of judicial methods
teaches
think, the lesson that the

more malleable,
less

the

whole subject matter of jurisprudence

moulds

less definitively cast, the

is

more

us.

the

I

plastic,

bounds of right and wrong

preordained and constant, than most
of us. without the aid of some
such

analysis,

have been accustomed

to believe .”

18

At times the Court might duck the
crucial constitutional issues
opinion, as

it

did in the

first

Enforcement Acts cases. At other times,

did

m£ C

A Justice

Knight.

constitutional rule

questions, laying

Scalia might argue that

making body,

down

branches (as well as

to reason

It is

hand, as

the Court’s job, as the

basis, seeking to deliberately

need not touch

to

answer the

thus very difficult to assign the Court a
particular role.

fact that there

constitutional question

at

O’Connor, on the other hand, may

level unsettled constitutional issues that
the Court

Moreover, the

might

"bright-line” constitutional rules to guide
the political

itself in the future). Justice

it.

is

an

deeply and widely about constitutional

approach constitutional questions on a case-by-case

narrow case before

it

in

it

reason very clearly and very broadly
about the constitutional question
it

On

might be more than one plausible answer

makes

it

unlikely that the

Supreme Court

to a

will be able to

fashion an authoritative reading of constitutional meaning
that applies beyond the
specific cases

//

the other branches contest

it.

In the

name of stability and

coherence, proponents of judicial supremacy plead for such settlement.
(Though

lt!

The Judicial Process

(

New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1921) 161.
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we might wonder how
turn

“settled” things are

on the reading of a single justice:

O'Connor says

it

is?)

As

I

is

when

discernable constitutional lines

the Constitution really

what Justice

have argued, the Court has not
been able

to settle

such

contested questions. Rather, Court
opinions themselves seem to invite
continued
constitutional debate

on just what the Court's opinions
was, how

applies to the

it

particular matter at hand, and whether
the Court, in fact, got the
Constitution
right

19
.

Seeing

this traced out in the historical
studies allows us to

make an

empirical distinction between judicial
review and judicial supremacy. The
political Constitution

makes

a conceptual distinction

judicial supremacy, but the lingering
question

distinction has any empirical bite.

It

does.

between judicial review and

was whether

this

The Court's exercise of judicial review

does not close constitutional questions when
contested by the

No

doubt, the Court does strike

down

conceptual

political branches.

particular acts of Congress or the executive

as unconstitutional. Yet, the deeper question

is

whether the

political

branches then

view themselves as obligated be the Court's reading of the
Constitution and not
just the particular case at hand.

others implicitly

—do

in overturning or

The

political

branches

explicitly, at

not just lollow Court opinions and have proven successful

modifying Supreme Court opinions

This has lead Robert Nagel to suggest that social consensus
constitutional

— sometimes

meaning and

that judicial interpretation

may

is

that they think

necessary for durable

actually be at odds with stable

meaning. See

his Constitutional Cultures (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1989) 22.
Louis Michael Seidman also makes an interesting argument for “unsettlement.
When the
Supreme Court uses constitutional rhetoric to shut down an argument by imposing one potential

settlement rather than another,
political struggle.

It is

it

is

doing something more than announcing the outcome of a

attempting to constitute the community

in a fashion that excludes the losers
for reasons that cannot be explained in a fashion comprehensible to them.” Our Unsettled
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constitutionally unsound.

FDR

proceeded with

New

Deal legislation tha, clearly

went against the Court's view
of, he Constitution and
ultimately prevailed. Teddy
Roosevelt adopted a broader reading
of the government's commerce
power
antitrust cases tha,

issue.

was

a,

His reading of the

Court followed

suit.

odds with the Court's

Commerce Clause

wave of opinions on

firs,

(a, leas,

on

in the

this

antitrust) prevailed as the

Ronald Reagan rejected decades
of Court opinions on

federalism and the Rehnquist Court
has taken up his constitutional
vision,

abandoning these

earlier opinions.

subtlety, the constitutional

Perhaps more importantly, as
well as more

framework seems

to belie

any easy notion of

settlement.

The proponents of judicial supremacy
envision an independent Court

working against the

political branches.

As

I

have argued throughout

dissertation, this beginning point
fails to capture the fashion
in

and the

institutional

which the Court-

framework generally— functions. The Court
and the

branches are not necessarily

at

political

odds with one another. The Congress may,
as was

particularly evident in Chapter 3, invite
the Court to

meaning. The

result in these cases

Court and the

political

is

work out

constitutional

best characterized as a dialogue

where the

branches negotiate the contours of constitutional
meaning.

In these instances judicial

review

beginning or the middle

but

it

is

is

part

of the process

A New Defense

— whether located

very rarely the end. In

and forth over constitutional meaning— and one

( (institution:

this

oj Constitutionalism

University Press, 2001) 159.
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fact, this

at the

continual back

that is distinctly non-evolutionary

and Judicial Review (New Haven: Yale

and non-linear

may

bes, characterizejudrcial
review and the institutional

framework.
Capturing

this constitutional

dynamic

such freighted terms as judicial
activism and
not very illuminating.

some of the most
In par, this

also has important
consequences for
restraint,

which, standing alone, are

The very language of activism and

crucial

dynamics between

stems from the

the Court

restrain, fa, Is to capture

and the

fact that both positions begin

political branches.

from the premise of the

legal constitution: judicial
activism is seen as necessary because
the Court

primary enforcer of the (legal)
Constitution, while

the

this very recognition leads

those like Protessor Bickel to plead
for judicial restraint.

when

is

What

to do. though,

the political branches themselves
invite the Court to settle highly
charged or

complicated constitutional questions? 2 " Or
when the Court actively
congressional enactment

Congress

itself

has

rare, are not aptly

little

—

as

it

did in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883

interest in

down

a

that

defending? Such instances, which are hardly

captured by the idiom of activism and

better sense ol such terms,

strikes

we need

to see the

Court

restraint.

21

To make

in relation to the other

branches ol government. Focusing on the Court
divorced from an institutional and
historical setting leads to debates about the
imperatives of restraint or activism
that tail to illuminate the

Attempting

framework

way

in

which the Court actually functions.

to treat the Constitution

ol governance

— which

is

essentially a political

as ordinary law, proponents of judicial

supremacy

Ran Hirschl, “The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through
Constitutionalization:
Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions” Law and Social Inquiry
25: 91-137 (2000).
''

See Mark Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty” Studies

7 (1993).
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in

American

Political

Development

treat the

Court

in a non-historical,
theoretical fashion,

government against
specific

and

their legalist (and theoretical)
vision, rather than letting
the

historical functioning

of our institutions inform them
about the nature

of our constitutionalism. This leads

and

judging constitutional

stability that distorts

to

an insistence on constitutional
settlement

our constitutional history. Moreover,
such thinking

neglects the tact that unsettlement, or
open ended constitutional dispute,

ordinary feature of our constitutional
framework, which has not, in
the chaos and instability that proponents
of judicial

A

supremacy so

an

is

fact, lead to

fear.

developmental framework, which situates our
institutions

in historical

terms, better captures this constitutional
dynamic, with the caveat that

"development” does not suggest a forward looking,
evolutionary, or linear view of
the Constitution: there

is

no constitutional

telos.

22

On

the contrary, incongruities,

tensions, and conflicts are a central feature of
the political Constitution.

reminded

of this rather vividly in the

2000

presidential election,

We

were

where our

twentieth century view of the electoral process and a
"plebiscitary president"

clashed with the remnants of out nineteenth century institutions
in the form of the
Electoral College.

Such constitutional clashes are rooted

political disputes of the day,

Constitution.

in the politics

even as they shape and reshape

Thus we should not expect

and

how we view

the

that those constitutional issues important

today will always remain important. Rather, they will vary with political
circumstances, as different parties alter and

shift their constitutional

different circumstances. Yet, beneath the surface of these clashes

''
See Kersch, Discontinuous Development in American Constitutional Law,
on such facile views of constitutional development.
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is

for a

views under
a remarkable

wonderful take

stability, as the public

seems

have bestowed upon the
Constitution

to

that

"veneration which time bestows
on every, htng. and without
which perhaps the
wises, and frees, governments
would no, posses the requisite
stability," as

Mad, son pu,

i,

in the

49*

Federalist Paper

constitutional faith, bu, the
faith
that

is in

“ We do

have, in this manner, a
sort of

the constitutional

framework and principles

allows for a deep clash over
the parttculars of
constitutional meaning in

different circumstances,
continually revisiting

should be ordered. Here

we

how our constitutional

values

see continual flux and
perpetual contests over

constitutional meaning.

Seemg

the Constitution in a

reduce constitutionalism to politics
contests over constitutional

To

all

political light

in a crass sense.

meaning

should restore to politics— in
deserves.

more

are. at root,

should not denigrate

about deep political choices

of its complexity and tension-,
he dignity

constitutes our political

of constitution;

life.

it is

to see

The Federalist Papers 282
,

how

Recovering such a view

sense ot ourselves as a polity, illuminating
the ways

shapes our politics and.

in turn, is

is

to recover a

may even
in
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i,

more

our Constitution
give us a deeper

which the Constitution

shaped and reshaped by them.

.

or

Rather, recognizing that

see the Constitution in a more
political light

traditional understanding

it

APPENDIX

THE MEANING OF AUTHORITATIVE
SETTLEMENT
I

want

to offer a conceptual definition

of “authoritative settlement,"
as

a lack of definitional clarity on
"authoritative settlement” has lead
to
theoretical debates with

little

empirical grounding. Reading
Larry Alexander

and Fredrick Schauer, perhaps the leading
proponents of authoritative judicial
settlement, one

settlement in a

struck by the fact that they argue
for authoritative judicial

is

way

that altogether skirts empirical
questions: they insist that

extrajudicial constitutional interpretation
undermines the Constitution. But

they conflate their concepts in such
a manner that doesn't allow us to
actually
get at the

meaning

of authoritative settlement.

1

Alexander and Schauer leave

authoritative settlement undefined, while
speaking of "deference" and

"nondeference” by the

some

referents of

deference occurs

political

branches to judicial decisions, which gives
us

what authoritative settlement might look

when

a nonjudicial official

who

like.

“Non-

disagrees with a judicial

decision on a constitutional question does not conform
her actions to that
decision and perhaps even actively contradicts

it.”

authoritative settlement of constitutional questions

defer to

Supreme Court

might know

it

when we

And
when

opinions. While the concept

see

it.

is

so

we might

see

the political branches

not neatly defined,

Concerned with normative questions

we

first,

Alexander and Schauer are not preoccupied by empirically analyzing
authoritative settlement, so the actual cases

it

applies to are not always clear

1

Larry Alexander and Fredrick Schauer.

Harvard Law Review

I

“On

10, 7( 1997).
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Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation”

because the definition

itself is

taken for granted

’

Ye, the empirical component

of their claim cannot be
avoided. The attributes of
authoritative settlement
should be specified more clearly,
allowing us to actually ge,

a, this

concept.

Moreover, Alexander and Schauer
merge several concepts-blurring
logical relationship

that for analytical reasons

their

would be best separated. They

conceptualize the Constitution as
necessarily demanding
authoritative judicial
settlement, which itself requires
stability and coherence
in constitutional

meaning. Yet

this is all pul

forward by definition. Authoritative
settlement

is

collapsed into their notion of an
•authoritative constitution.” which
allows

them

to posit (not demonstrate)
that non-deference to Court
opinions by the

political branches

undermines the Constitution. Bui because
they do not give

us a clear definition of what
constitutes authoritative settlement
of
constitutional meaning,

even

if

it

is

difficult to evaluate their

claims empirically.

And

they are engaged in a normative
argument, they cannot simply avoid

the empirical

dimension of their theorizing, as

often rest on empirical presuppositions
their theory

we might

and not

in

3
.

As

their

it is.

normative arguments

their

claims remain rooted in

questions of actual constitutional governance.
While

see particular instances

of “deference” and “nondeference”

judicial decisions under their terms,

we

cannot get

at the

to

bigger theoretical

Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin offer a more
robust definition of authoritative
settlement, yet they too are primarily concerned with
the normative aspects of settlement
insofar as is necessary to "law” as such— and not
whether the Supreme Court actually acts
this capacity. The Rule of Rules: Morality,
Rules, and the Dilemmas
Law

of

University Press, 2001) 12-13.

A P omt Alexander and Schauer concede in a recent piece, but do little to change.
Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply" Constitutional Commentary
17 (2000). See also
Alexander and Sherwin, The Rule of Rules, 45-46.
1
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in

(Durham- Duke

questions they raise; that

does nondeference

is.

Supreme Court opmions

to

undermine the Constitution?
Bruce Peabody suggests

that the debate is lacking
definitional clarity.

giv[mg] insufficient attention
to what
consequently, what

is

being analyzed and proposed
(and

excluded from consideration).”
The result

is

theoretical, normative,

and empirical issues are not
separated and scholars

speak past one another. True. But
Peabody himself never

means by

is that

authoritative settlement

tells

us what he

4

This

.

is

also true

of Scott Gant's defense

and Keith Whittington's critique of
authoritative judicial settlement
authoritative settlement

transparent, that

though.

A

we

is

so patently obvious,

its

5
.

Perhaps

general definition so

don't need to spend time defining

it.

This

is

troublesome,

definition ot authoritative settlement
needs to be posited for a

number of reasons.

A

lack ot conceptual clarity at this narrower
level leads to problems at

a higher level ot conceptual abstraction.

When

authoritative settlement

is

simply collapsed into the notion of the Constitution,
one (conceptual) view of
the Constitution

definition (as

we

is

posited and authoritative settlement

see with Alexander and Schauer).

distinct concepts of

we

"What

don't sort out what

we

is

By

the Constitution?" from

is

deemed necessary by

not separating the

"Who may

are analyzing and never give

it

interpret it?”

solid grounding.

So

4

"Nonjudicial Constitutional Interpretation, Authoritative
Settlement, and

Research” Constitutional Commentary
5

Scott Gant “Judicial

16,

New Agenda

for

63 (1999),

Supremacy and Nonjudicial

Interpretation of the Constitution"
Quarterly 24 (1997) and Keith Whittington, "Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and a Response” North
Carolina Law Review
-

Hastings Constitutional

2002

Law

.
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we

don't dearly get

at the

important questions

we

are speaking to:

is

authoritative settlement of constitutional
questions central to our constitution?

Does

the

Supreme Court

actually settle such questions for
the branches of the

national government? At a

more

specific level, the lack

of clarity surrounding

authoritative settlement doesn't allow
us to address important smaller

questions.

Does

instability?

unsettled constitutional

What

is

meaning

behind authoritative settlement?

thing? Smaller-order concepts— anarchy,

example

rest

stability,

on the meaning of authoritative

promote constitutional

really

Is

there even such a

and coherence, for

settlement. Yet, as Whittington

suggests, these concepts too should be distinct
from authoritative settlement. 6

While closely

related to settlement,

constitutional

questions— with hotly contested meaning-^io not
necessarily

it

is

possible to imagine that unresolved

lead to political instability or chaos. Indeed,
need unsettlement even lead to
constitutional incoherence? Just because constitutional

authoritatively settled does not

I

mean

it

is

meaning

is

not

incoherent.

suggest that authoritative settlement by the judiciary occurs

when

a

contested constitutional question between the Congress, the president,
and the

Court

is

resolved by following the Court’s opinion. This means that

constitutional question

political branches. This

decision

shown

6

when

that the

must have been contested by one
is

The

(or both) of the

important. If the political branches abide by a Court

they didn't contest constitutional meaning,

Court

( 1 .)

we have

only

settles constitutional questions “to the extent that

Whittington, “Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation.”
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Congress, the President, and the
general public find the decisions
convincing,
reasonable, and acceptable." 7

We have not shown that the Court

authoritatively resolves constitutional
questions with which the
political

branches disagree.

(2.)

The branches now accept

the constitutional question
in

dispute as clearly settled.
(3.) They abide by the settlement
even if they

disagree with

it.

And

(4.)

They view

(even tor the judiciary). This

allow us to see

how

is,

the constitutional question as
closed

admittedly, a sort of "ideal type.”
but

close the Court

comes

it

will

(if at all) to actually settling

constitutional questions.

7

Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) 244,
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